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When it comes to lawyer “war stories,” I agree with Philip Thomas: “The only stories about a lawyer that other lawyers want to hear are funny stories.” That said, cautionary tales have an important place in the law school curriculum: learning to “think like a lawyer” includes understanding how and why lawyers screw up. How else are law students supposed to learn just how dire the consequences can be?
Via the ABA Journal and the WSJ Law Blog, I saw a new law review article called, “This is Your Brain on Law School: The Impact of Fear-Based Narratives on Law Students.” Beginning and ending with Aristotle quotes,* lawprof Abigail Patthoff tackles the question of how law professors should use cautionary tales to ensure students take home the right messages. By way of social science research into the “extended parallel process model,” Patthoff concludes, “the listeners who are most fearful following a fear appeal are also the listeners who are least likely to benefit from the fear appeal.” Thus, given law students’ pre-existing high anxiety levels, law professors should use fear-inducing cautionary tales “sparingly, carefully, and never without an accompanying efficacy message.”
Patthoff argues law professors should give fewer cautionary tales because “the combined weight of a semester’s worth of threats may, after a while, cause students’ perceptions of the threats to outweigh their perceptions of their ability to avoid those threats,” and that “law professors should attempt to soften both the perceived severity and perceived susceptibility aspect of cautionary tales” by using neutral, impersonal language. The point, she says, is to ensure law students won’t be so anxious and overwhelmed that they either develop an emotional coping mechanism (e.g., “this won’t happen to me”) or ignore the message completely.
Part of her argument is indisputable. Patthoff says that, when professors give a cautionary tale from the law, they shouldn’t just scare law students, but should “articulate the recommended response — even if that response seems obvious.” Indeed, a “cautionary tale” is of little use if it is given without any clear guidance to the student to help them avoid making the same mistake.
But there’s a problem: given the dearth of practical experience among law professors (a problem that is getting worse over time), what advice do they have? Patthoff gives several exemplar “cautionary tales,” but they all involve rudimentary issues that are easily addressed, like, as she notes, “consult the local rules and the Bluebook before filing a brief.” These are not the sort of serious problems that can cause true mischief in lawyer’s careers. A real cautionary tale would look more like this precedential Third Circuit opinion from last week, in which the court reinstated a fraud case against BASF and Cahill Gordon & Reindel alleging they “conspired to prevent thousands of asbestos-injury victims from obtaining fair tort recoveries for their injuries” by destroying and concealing evidence. Continue reading
I represent clients in the consolidated Actos litigation, and so I’m well-versed with the science linking the drug’s use to bladder cancer. As the federal court overseeing the litigation held in a Daubert order, there’s ample scientific evidence demonstrating that even just one year of Actos use can increase the risk of bladder cancer. So, the headline at MedPage on August 29, 2014 was quite a surprise: “No Actos Cancer Link in Long Term Data.” I assumed that the headline reflected some new scientific study showing the absence of a link to bladder cancer.
Then I read the actual article:
A 10-year analysis of patients with type 2 diabetes treated with pioglitazone (Actos) found no statistically significant increased risk of bladder cancer, either with any exposure or for long duration of use, the drug’s manufacturer said.
Emphasis mine. As the article continues:
No association with bladder cancer was seen in the 10-year data with higher cumulative doses of the drug or with longer time since initiation of therapy, Takeda [the company that makes Actos] said.
Other details were not released. Takeda promised that the full results would be submitted for publication and shared with regulatory authorities in the U.S., Europe, and Japan.
The refusal to release “other details” kind of says it all, doesn’t it? You can say smoking doesn’t cause lung cancer if you don’t bother to release the “other details” explaining why you think so. The timing is just a bit suspicious as well: they released that statement on the same day the court upheld a multi-billion-dollar punitive damages judgment against them, a judgment based on part on Takeda hiding a link between Actos and bladder cancer.
The essence of science, as Richard Feynman explained decades ago, is whether our guesses about how the world works agree with our observations about how the world actually works. To tell whether a particular hypothesis lines up with the real world, you need to see the details of both the guess and the observation — which, I suppose, explains why the manufacturer of Actos doesn’t want to show us those details.
The old saying, “There are three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies, and statistics,” applies nowhere so forcefully as when a for-profit company is describing the safety of its own product. Unfortunately, the rich, complex world of epidemiology gives companies more than enough mathematical and scientific tools to pretend that their products are safe. The math behind “pharmacovigilance” (i.e., the epidemiological monitoring of drugs to look for problems) is insanely complicated, so that seemingly small changes — a “misreported” case here or there, or perhaps a slight tweak to the Bayesian filter used — can completely change the outcome.
And that’s why I’m so disappointed with MedPage Today. A statement by a for-profit company about its product without any supporting analysis or data to back it up isn’t “science” or “medical news,” it’s just marketing.
This week marks the 20th anniversary of the verdict in the Stella Liebeck v. McDonald’s hot coffee case. Abnormal Use has for years been one of the few places where people could find genuine information about the case itself, rather than just commentary about the case, the great majority of which is based upon misunderstood or mischaracterized facts. They’ve put up with a series of posts reflecting on the case’s enduring legacy.
They kindly let me step up on their soapbox for a day to give a plaintiff’s perspective. Here’s how my post begins:
Medical malpractice has killed more Americans in the past week than Ebola has killed worldwide since the first recorded outbreak in 1976. Two months ago, a Wal-Mart truck driver who had been awake for 25 hours, as permitted by company policy, plowed into a van full of comedians. But when it comes to tort law, those issues stand in the long shadow of a 49-cent cup of coffee served a week afterWayne’s World hit theaters.
It shouldn’t be that way, but it is, and so there is use in continued legal anthropology of the Liebeck v. McDonald’s case. That said, I’m not going to make another argument for the damage that misunderstandings about the Stella Liebeck case have done to the civil justice system. Go watch “Hot Coffee“ or read Priceonomics. Instead, I’m going to review the case as if it was just another personal injury case.
Read the rest at: “What If Liebeck v. McDonald’s Was Just Another Case?“
Earlier this week, I wrote about lawyers obstructing discovery by responding to discovery interrogatories themselves, either by letter or by an unverified response, rather than by having their client answer. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33(b) makes clear that’s just plain wrong.
When it comes to requests for production of documents (or electronically-stored information), the Rules are a bit more intricate — but, when used properly, more powerful.
Unlike Rule 33, Rule 34 (relating to requests for production of documents and electronically stored information) has no similar requirement that the party sign the responses. Thus, a lawyer may indeed sign responses to document requests. But a lawyer signs the response subject to Rule 26(g):
(1) Signature Required; Effect of Signature. Every disclosure under Rule 26(a)(1) or (a)(3) and every discovery request, response, or objection must be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney’s own name—or by the party personally, if unrepresented—and must state the signer’s address, e-mail address, and telephone number. By signing, an attorney or party certifies that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief formed after a reasonable inquiry:
(A) with respect to a disclosure, it is complete and correct as of the time it is made; and
(B) with respect to a discovery request, response, or objection, it is:
(i) consistent with these rules and warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law, or for establishing new law;
(ii) not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; and
(iii) neither unreasonable nor unduly burdensome or expensive, considering the needs of the case, prior discovery in the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the action.
(2) Failure to Sign. Other parties have no duty to act on an unsigned disclosure, request, response, or objection until it is signed, and the court must strike it unless a signature is promptly supplied after the omission is called to the attorney’s or party’s attention.
Again, the rule leaves little doubt: every response must be signed — which means a vague letter generally discussing discovery is insufficient, as are a variety of boilerplate objections without a real answer — and the signing is a certification by the lawyer that the production is consistent and adequate.
As I’ve written before, even well-intentioned lawyers can sometimes deceive themselves into lying in service of their clients. The financial and practical incentives can be quite large for some lawyers to become a “truth shield” for their clients by exaggerating “facts” about discovery, and by feigning ignorance (or by intentionally remaining ignorant) about the evidence in the clients’ possession.
But the Rules account for those possibilities, and keep lawyers in their rightful place. As Rule 26(g) continues in subsection (3):
(3) Sanction for Improper Certification. If a certification violates this rule without substantial justification, the court, on motion or on its own, must impose an appropriate sanction on the signer, the party on whose behalf the signer was acting, or both. The sanction may include an order to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused by the violation.
When lawyers think of sanctions in federal court, they tend to think of Rule 11 (for false statements in filings) or 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (which allows sanctions against a lawyer who “multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously”), but Rule 26(g)(3) is more potent than either. Unlike Rule 11, Rule 26(g)(3) includes no “safe harbor” allowing a lawyer to correct an offending document. Unlike § 1927, which says a court may sanction a lawyer for obstructing the proceedings, Rule 26(g)(3) says the court must sanction a lawyer for filing an improper certification.
There’s also no “bad faith” requirement, either. A lawyer can run into mandatory sanctions, without any safe harbor, for an inadequate investigation of their client’s documents. As recently explained by Magistrate Judge Terence P. Kemp in Brown v. Tellermate Holdings Ltd., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90123 (S.D. Ohio July 1, 2014), copy available at ediscoverylaw.com:
Those sanctions can be imposed if an attorney fails in his or her “duty to make a reasonable investigation to assure that their clients have provided all available responsive information and documents.” Bernal v. All American Investment Realty, Inc., 479 F.Supp.2d 1291, 1333 (S.D. Fla. 2007). This rule, like the parallel provisions of Fed.R.Civ.P. 11, contains “an objective standard” governing the reasonableness of counsel’s actions, see National Ass’n of Radiation Survivors v. Turnage, 115 F.R.D. 543, 555 (N.D. Cal. 1987), so that counsel may not simply plead lack of subjective good faith as a way to avoid sanctions. “An attorney has made a ‘reasonable inquiry’ if the ‘investigation undertaken by the attorney and the conclusions drawn therefrom are reasonable under the circumstances…. Ultimately, what is reasonable is a matter for the court to decide on the totality of the circumstances.’” Quinby v. WestLB AG, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35583, 2005 WL 3453908, *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2005), quoting the 1983 Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 26.
On the basis of those principles, the Court in Tellermate Holdings awarded sanctions against the attorneys for the responding party, which had tried every trick in the book, from “failure either to learn or communicate the truth about matters related to discovery,” to “counsel’s failure to make the reasonable inquiries required by Rule 26(g),” to a “document dump … largely consisting of irrelevant and unresponsive documents,” to the excessive designation of documents as “Attorney’s Eyes Only.”
In short, Rule 34 allows a lawyer to stand in for their client in responding to discovery, but, when a lawyer does so, they are representing to the opposing party and to the court that they have done a reasonable investigation to assure that their clients have provided all available responsive information and documents.
A couple weeks ago, I wrote about how lawyers abuse “meet and confer” requirements to obstruct civil discovery. This time, let’s talk about lawyers obstructing discovery by responding to discovery interrogatories themselves, rather than by having their client answer.
It’s a common progression of events:
1. Lawyer A serves a bunch of interrogatories on Lawyer B.
2. Lawyer B responds with a bunch of boilerplate objections. (See my prior post for more.)
3. Lawyer A threatens to file a motion to compel.
4. Lawyer B “answers” some of the requests either:
a. by sending a letter that generally discusses discovery (rather than a formal discovery answer actually answering the specific interrogatories) or
b. by serving a formal discovery answers signed by the lawyer (rather than signed by the party).
Tellingly, small and mid-sized casualty insurance firms that litigate and try cases all day long rarely insult plaintiff’s counsel intelligence or the court’s time with such nonsense. I wish I could say the same of the big corporate law firms I’ve dealt with, but they seem to do this as a matter of routine, repeatedly sending vague letters about discovery that never answer the discovery requests. Often, they act insulted when I gently point out that their vague letters and emails mean far less to me than their client’s sworn answers.
It may seem pedantic to just quote the Rules at length, but I have come to believe that a significant percent of lawyers — including highly-paid litigators — either haven’t read the rule or don’t care about their contents. Continue reading
I read a lot of book-related publications and blogs, and thus I have endured weeks of Hachette-versus-Amazon posts, as the publishing giant has wrangled with the online retail giant over the terms of their contract. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the writers and publications with ties to the “Big Five” in the publishing industry have sided with Hachette, whereas the commenters to the articles and the blogs (most of which are presumably customers of books) tend to wonder why a garden-variety dispute between two big companies over money is being billed as the downfall of civilization.
I ignored most of these articles until I read Steve Wasserman’s* op-ed in The Nation — which argues “the time has come for closer scrutiny and regulation of a company that, like Standard Oil a century ago, provides an indispensable service for a modern economy and a healthy culture” — and I just couldn’t take it anymore. For the sake of our “modern economy” and “healthy culture,” we must stop calling Amazon a “monopoly.”
Please don’t misunderstand: I believe in the vigorous enforcement of antitrust laws in all industries. I’ve written before about how the Supreme Court wrongly decided Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, which made it harder to begin antitrust cases of any sort, and wrongly decided Comcast v. Behrend, which made it harder to win antitrust claims on behalf of consumers. I wrote before that the Bush Administration’s policy was “that anti-monopoly law was so dead there was no point in the Justice Department even bothering to enforce it,” and I applauded when the Obama Administration rescinded that policy and took seriously the threat of monopolies.
But we can’t be cavalier about accusations of “monopoly” or “predatory pricing,” or we risk diluting the terms and losing sight of real antitrust violations. Amazon is neither a “monopoly” nor a “monopsony.”
A “monopoly” is when one supplier of a particular product or service is able to control the market. That does not remotely describe Amazon: the vast majority of books sold by Amazon are supplied by someone else, i.e., the publisher, and those same books are available elsewhere. As Hachette’s own statement on the Amazon dispute says:
HBG’s titles are widely and immediately available on barnesandnoble.com, powells.com, booksamillion.com, walmart.com, target.com, overstock.com, and in thousands of great chain and independent bookstores across the country.
It is rather hard to have a “monopoly” over sales of something when the exactly same product is also sold online, through the largest retailers in the country, and through “thousands” of independent stores.
A “monopsony” is when one buyer of a particular productive or service is able to control the market. (Consider, for example, if there were several commercial airplane manufacturers, but only one commercial airline.) “Monopsony” is potentially a better fit for Amazon than “monopoly,” because Amazon’s real pricing power is that it can push a hard bargain with publishers when it buys the ebooks, whereas with consumers Amazon sells the books at or below the prevailing market prices. And, indeed, publishers feel obligated to deal with Amazon given its position as the largest retailer of ebooks.
But the claim just doesn’t hold up. In a monopsony, the monopsonist refrains from buying to force the suppliers to start discounting against one another (because there are no other buyers), until they are no longer making a profit. That simply isn’t the case here. First, the publishers have total control over where they sell their ebooks, and they exercise that power: the “Big Five” chose to not participate in Amazon Unlimited. Second, the ebooks are available all over the place, like Walmart and Target. Apple, for example, has used the feud as an opportunity to discount Hachette’s books. There’s nothing wrong with Apple doing that: this is competitive capitalism working for the benefit of consumers, as it should.
Even if a company is not a monopolist or monopsonist, it can engage in predatory pricing — but Amazon didn’t. Wasserman claims, “the Obama Justice Department, seemingly mesmerized by visions of a digital utopia, is oddly blind to the threat to publishing posed by Amazon’s growing monopoly,” and concludes, “A serious Justice Department investigation is past due.” But the Justice Department already investigated Amazon as part of the Apple case, and they published the results two years ago.
Back in 2012, as part of the settlement with the Big Five publishers for their admitted collusion with Apple to raise prices, the Justice Department solicited public comment, receiving hundreds of comments, including from Barnes & Noble, the Authors Guild, and the American Booksellers Association. As the Justice Department summarized in its response to the comments, the most common complaint against Amazon is that it sometimes charges too little for ebooks, and that “that lower pricing will mean reduced profits for bookstores, authors, literary agents, and publishers, and an eventual reduction in quality, service, variety, and other benefits to consumers.”
In response, the Justice Department explained — I know this is a long blockquote, but it’s the root of the issue — on page 21-22:
The United States recognizes that many of the comments reflect a concern that a firm with the heft of Amazon may harm competition through sustained low or predatory pricing. In the course of its investigation, the United States examined complaints about Amazon’s alleged predatory practices and found persuasive evidence lacking. As is alleged in the Complaint, the United States concluded, based on its investigation and review of data from Amazon and others, that “[f]rom the time of its launch, Amazon’s e-book distribution business has been consistently profitable, even when substantially discounting some newly released and bestselling titles.” Compl. ¶ 30.
Some of the criticism directed at Amazon may be attributed to a misunderstanding of the legal standard for predatory pricing. Low prices, of course, are one of the principal goals of the antitrust laws. Cf. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 340 (1990). This is because of the unmistakable benefit to consumers when firms cut prices. Id. “Loss leaders,” two-for-one specials, deep discounting, and other aggressive price strategies are common in many industries, including among booksellers. This is to be celebrated, not outlawed. Unlawful “predatory pricing,” therefore, is something more than prices that are “too low.” Antitrust law prohibits low prices only if the price is “below an appropriate measure of . . . cost,” and there exists “a dangerous probability” that the discounter will be able to drive out competition, raise prices, and thereby “recoup its investment in below-cost pricing.” Brooke Group v. Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222-24 (1993). No objector to the proposed Final Judgment has supplied evidence that, in the dynamic and evolving e-book industry, Amazon threatens to drive out competition and obtain the monopoly pricing power which is the ultimate concern of predatory pricing law. The presence and continued investment by technology giants, multinational book publishers, and national retailers in e-books businesses renders such a prospect highly speculative. Of course, should Amazon or any other firm commit future antitrust violations, the United States (as well as private parties) will remain free to challenge that conduct.
This is basic antitrust law. Professor John Kirkwood recently agreed in his article, “Collusion to Control a Powerful Customer: Amazon, E-Books, and Antitrust Policy.” As he wrote, “considerable evidence suggests that Amazon was engaged in loss leading, not predatory pricing. … Amazon was almost certainly using loss leading not as a predatory device but as an efficient promotional tool, drawing consumers to its website to buy products they might not otherwise purchase.”
But sometimes an ounce of common sense is worth a pound of legal analysis. Consider this part of Onnesha Roychoudhuri’s article calling for increased regulation:
What’s a book lover to do? Hachette authors have taken the fight online, calling their readers to boycott Amazon. In spirit, I’m all for a boycott, but given Amazon’s size and ubiquity, we’re not going to buy our way out of this, and we shouldn’t. The idea that we can spend our way to a more just world reduces us in value to the money we’ve got in our wallets. Nor should the responsibility lie solely with us as consumers. And that’s where regulation comes in.
What sense does that make? If you don’t like how Amazon deals with ebook publishers, then stop buying ebooks from them! A boycott is exactly the right idea — vote with your wallets! Amazon is not Bell Telephone. Amazon is not Standard Oil. Amazon is not the Hollywood studio system.** If you don’t want to deal with them, you don’t have to; the fact that everyone, from publishers to consumers, continues to want to deal with Amazon is proof enough that they’re not abusing a monopoly position, they’re just doing a better job.
* Wasserman, says his bio, “served as editorial director of Times Books and publisher of Hill & Wang, an imprint of Farrar, Straus & Giroux. He is a past partner of the Kneerim & Williams Literary Agency and is currently editor at large for Yale University Press.”
** Wasserman gives one example of “precedent,” United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., which broke up Hollywood’s studio system. There, the Hollywood studios (i.e., the suppliers), conspired to preclude independent theaters from showing their films, thereby controlling the theater market. It is indeed precedent: it’s similar to what the ebook publishers did to Amazon by refusing to sell their books to it except on very specific terms.
Back in 2012, I wrote: “Scientific evidence is one of those rare areas of law upon which every lawyer agrees: we are all certain that everyone else is wrong.”
There have been some missteps in the law’s use of scientific proof as evidence in civil litigation — like when the Supreme Court affirmed a trial court holding in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), that an engineer with a Masters in Mechanical Engineering who had worked in tire design and failure testing at Michelin was nonetheless incompetent to testify about tire failures — but, by and large the standard articulated in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993) makes sense. Courts review an expert’s methods, rather than their conclusions, to ensure that the expert’s testimony has an appropriate scientific basis.
To go with the baseball metaphors so often (and wrongly) used in the law, when it comes to Daubert, the judge isn’t an umpire calling balls and strikes, they’re more like a league official checking to make sure the players are using regulation equipment. Mere disagreements about the science itself, and about the expert’s conclusions, are to be made by the jury in the courtroom.
In practice, though, the Daubert standard runs into problems when courts erroneously decide factual disputes about methodology and conclusions, issues which are better left to cross examination of the experts at trial. Consider the June 27, 2014 opinion in the Zoloft birth defects multidistrict litigation, which struck the testimony of plaintiffs’ “perinatal pharmacoepidemiologist,” Dr. Anick Bérard. Dr. Bérard holds a Ph.D. in Epidemiology and Biostatistics from McGill University, teaches at the Université de Montréal, and has conducted research on the effects of antidepressants on human fetal development. The expert was going to opine that “Zoloft, when used at therapeutic dose levels during human pregnancy, is capable of causing a range of birth defects (i.e., is a teratogen),” an opinion based upon her review of a variety of studies showing a correlation between SSRI use and birth defects. The court had multiple grounds for striking the opinion, but a key issue relating to statistics jumped out at me. Continue reading
This month the Smithsonian has long profile on Anthony Bourdain that ends with, “What would you like your last meal to be?” In typical Bourdain fashion, the meal he has in mind is virtually impossible to get without reservations weeks in advance: a sushi course at Sukiyabashi Jiro, the three Michelin star restaurant profiled in the excellent documentary Jiro Dreams of Sushi. As Bourdain explains:
Watch the film and you will understand. It is an 88-year-old man doing the same basic 30 or 40 basic cuts of Edo-style sushi, meaning nothing innovative. Every night he’s been going to sleep for his entire life; how do I make that standard shrimp over rice better, better, better, better? …
Rice is magical. Rice is an explanation of everything.
Jiro’s rice has been described as “like a cloud.” The documentary interviews Jiro’s rice dealer, who scoffs at the frequent requests he gets from other restaurants and hotels to sell them the same rice — none of them realize the the enormous amount of effort and skill it takes to cook the rice properly.
If you haven’t seen it, you can read more about the documentary in various reviews online, like this one from The New Yorker. Here’s a clip where Jiro explains what it means to be a shokunin, improving his craft bit by bit every day.
I thought that idea could make a nice setup for a post, and then I realized I couldn’t possibly write about something like that without reviewing Keith Lee’s The Marble and the Sculptor, which came out back in November. He sent me a copy with a handwritten inscription over the title page promising that, if I didn’t like it, the author would be sacked. I have no doubt that Keith consciously decided to write a handwritten note because he felt it would make more of an impact (which it did), and that he inferred I would recognize the Monty Python joke (which I did). Keith is one of those folks who recognizes and attends to details like that, which is why his book is worth reading.
“Employ your time in improving yourself by other men’s writings, so that you shall gain easily what others have labored hard for,” is an insightful quote often attributed to Socrates, although the closest Socrates quote I can find with a historical source is “while gold and silver cannot make men better, the thoughts of the wise enrich their possessors with virtue.” The point is the same either way, and Keith has plainly employed his time thusly. The book touches upon many of the best writings in self-improvement, ranging from James Altucher on career development (page 17) to George Orwell on writing (page 35) to Winston Churchill on public speaking (page 37) to Peter Drucker on work performance (page 93) to Henry Rollins on discipline (page 108). (The links I’ve put here are to informative writings by each.) Continue reading
Two weeks ago, I attended the Pennsylvania Bar Institute’s Federal Bench-Bar Conference, which featured a panel discussion on “Ethical Issues During Depositions: Hypothetical Scenarios.” The panel included two federal judges and two Fellows of the American College of Trial Lawyers.
The panel raised a number of interesting issues. It also tried to tackle the vexing questions of how, exactly, you stop an opponent from obstructing your deposition and how you identify and prevent manipulation of a witness’s testimony. Deposition misconduct and discovery obstructionism are subjects I’m keenly interested in (and subjects I’ve spoken on as part of an ABA panel), so I had to go.
Before we get into the substance, let’s discuss a bit of background. Most of my writings on the subject are gathered in this post on deposition preparation, along with links to others’ reactions. An ABA article (“Ethical Preparation of Witnesses for Deposition and Trial”) a few years ago summarized the general ethical considerations at play:
A lawyer has a duty to prepare a witness to testify. This preparation may include discussion concerning the application of law to the events in issue. But “[a]n attorney must respect the important ethical distinction between discussing testimony and seeking improperly to influence it.” Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 90 n.3(1976); Hall v. Clifton Precision, 150 F.R.D. 525, 528 (E.D. Pa. 1993). Thus, the prohibition of counseling or assisting a witness to testify falsely also applies to the influence that an attorney may have on the substance of a witness’s testimony in the preparation process.” An attorney enjoys extensive leeway in preparing a witness to testify truthfully, but the attorney crosses a line when she influences the witness to alter testimony in a false or misleading way.” Ibarrav. Baker, 338 F. App’x 457, 465 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing John S. Applegate, Witness Preparation, 68 Tex. L. Rev. 277(1989)).
Now, let’s get back to the substance of the panel. The most interesting part to me was the discussion over when a lawyer can stop a deposition, despite a pending question, to speak with their client. We’ll call this a “witness conference.” Continue reading
An article last month in The Harvard Crimson (“The Changing Face of the Law Professor”) explained that, fifty years ago, the typical Harvard Law School professor was someone who knew a little about the law but nothing about how it works:
“Somebody who got into a top law school, did very well and then completed a prestigious clerkship was well situated to be hired on the basis of those credentials,” said Law School professor Richard H. Fallon, who attended Yale Law School and clerked for U.S. Supreme Court Justice Lewis F. Powell.
These days, however, the typical Harvard Law professor is someone who knows a little about the law, a little about something else, and nothing about how either works in real life:
Now, however, the Law School looks for a greater breadth of academic qualifications in its prospective faculty, including “demonstrated scholarly accomplishment, a promising research agenda offering both relevance to legal analysis or law practice, and an ability to present and effectively defend a thesis or argument before faculty members,” according to Law School Dean Martha L. Minow.
Notice the elephant not in the room: a prospective faculty member does not need to show any ability whatsoever to practice law, nor any ability to effectively teach the law to students. They can get by with “scholarly achievement,” “a promising a research agenda … [relevant to] legal analysis,” and an ability to charm other faculty members.
Only legal education tolerates this sort of circular, self-referential pedagogy in a practical field. Doctors are trained by practicing physicians. Even “academic medicine” is closely tied to the actual practice of medicine by way of teaching hospitals and clinical research. Would you learn how to design and build cars from people who had never designed one before?
This isn’t a new issue (the impractical nature of legal education has naturally been the focus of intense legal scholarship, none of which produced any useful change), and Harvard Law’s approach is by no means unique to them. Law schools across the country have increasingly considered experience to be unnecessary. That’s not new.
What’s new is to see the law school that produces the most politicians, the most federal judges, the most law professors, and, with one of the largest graduating classes of any law school, a helluva lot of practicing lawyers, look out on the dismal field of legal instruction and then tout inexperience and non-legal scholarship as virtues. It’s a smack in the face to everyone who has tried to fix the problems with law school, and it creates two big problems, one for the quality of legal practice, the other for the health of our democracy. Continue reading