Litigation and Trial - Max Kennerly : Philadelphia Trial Lawyer Max Kennerly : Business and Commercial Litigation : Civil Attorney : The Beasley Firm : Philadelphia Pennsylvania

One of the big issues that's been floating around the personal injury / wrongful death world over the past few years is the extent to which states can recoup the money they spent on an injured person's care if that person later sues the person who caused the injury and obtains a settlement.

The Supreme Court gave us a partial answer in Arkansas Dept. of Health and Human Servs. v. Ahlborn:

There is no question that the State can require an assignment of the right, or chose in action, to receive payments for medical care. So much is expressly provided for by §§ 1396a(a)(25) and 1396k(a). And we assume, as do the parties, that the State can also demand as a condition of Medicaid eligibility that the recipient "assign" in advance any payments that may constitute reimbursement for medical costs. To the extent that the forced assignment is expressly authorized by the terms of §§ 1396a(a)(25) and 1396k(a), it is an exception to the anti-lien provision. See Washington State Dept. of Social and Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537 U. S. 371, 383-385, and n. 7 (2003). But that does not mean that the State can force an assignment of, or place a lien on, any other portion of Ahlborn's property.

The issue became all the more pressing when the Medicare, Medicaid and SCHIP Extension Act of 2007 (“MMSEA”), effective July 1, 2009, named tort defendants as “responsible reporting entities” that also have to assess the plaintiff's Medicare / Medicaid status and ensure that those government liens have been paid. Defendants have, understandably, been annoyed by that.

Plaintiffs, of course, have already been responsible for clearing these liens.

Let's pause and consider the background of these cases: a plaintiff is injured, has some care paid for by the government, and hires an attorney. The attorney then spends his or her own time, and own money, pursuing the case, until the plaintiff — who, despite their injury and resulting hardship, has tried to hold out for an appropriate settlement figure — and the defendant reach an agreement on how much the case is worth. The attorney then takes a cut of the settlement, covering their costs and paying themselves a fee for all that time and risk they put into the case.

Then the government wants a piece. It didn't do anything to get the money, but it thinks it deserves to be reimbursed in full.

The vast majority of these claims are resolved amicably between then plaintiff's attorney and the government, with the government waiving a chunk of the claim in order to get payment now, rather than later, and to not have to litigate the issue and risk having a judge rule against them.

But sometimes the plaintiff's attorney and the government can't reach an agreement, and so have to get the court to figure it out.

The big question has been: how does a court figure it out?

We just got one answer:

In a decision that is sure to grab the attention of the personal injury bar, a federal judge has ruled that a settling plaintiff cannot be automatically required to reimburse the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare for 100 percent of her Medicaid expenses because a settlement always reflects a compromise.

The ruling by U.S. District Judge Berle M. Schiller comes just a few months after lawyers at Kline & Specter secured a settlement worth nearly $12 million in a "state-created danger" suit against the Philadelphia Housing Authority over persistent mold in a home that allegedly triggered an acute asthma attack and left a teenage girl brain damaged.

The settlement in McKinney v. PHA sparked a new court battle when lawyers for DPW moved to vacate the settlement and to intervene in the suit to assert a $1.2 million lien.

...

Schiller decided instead that the proper approach was for the trial judge to "assess the factors that would have influenced the parties' settlement positions and to make an ultimate determination of what portion of the settlement represents compensation for past medical expenses."

As the judge who presided over the McKinney case through summary judgment and Daubert hearings, as well as settlement talks, Schiller concluded that the plaintiffs had settled for two-thirds of the value of the case.

That's not a perfect answer, but it's not a bad one. There's no basis for the government to claim full reimbursement for a settlement in which a claim is, by definition, compromised. There's also no easy way to figure out just how much of an overall settlement "should" be allocated to medical expenses, and it doesn't make sense to engage in full-blown litigation over that question when the case itself has been settled.

Hence the shoot-from-the-hip approach. It's not what I'd prefer — I think the plaintiff was right about the parties, who know the most about the case and the reasons for settlement, establishing the portion attributable to medical expenses — but I'll take it.

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Last week, after more than a year of drafting following oral argument, and nearly two years after the original District Court order, a Third Circuit panel (Chief Judge Scirica and Judges Fisher and Greenberg) issued their magnum opus on pleading Section 1 antitrust violations after Twombly and RICO Act "enterprises" after Boyle in the consolidated Multi-District Litigation In re: Insurance Brokerage Antitrust Litigation.

The plaintiffs alleged a massive, "global" conspiracy among the major insurance companies and insurance brokers to artificially allocate customers and rig prices for commercial insurance:

(Here's the First Amended Complaint; the Second Amended Complaint was, I believe, sealed).

§ 1 of the Sherman Act and § 1962 of the RICO Act are almost constitutional in their breadth and power. Here's the relevant part of § 1 of the Sherman Act:

And here's § 1962(c) of the RICO Act:

Such breadth is a blessing and a curse for plaintiffs; like with the Bill of Rights, § 1 of the Sherman Act and § 1962 of the RICO Act are so broad, and so empowering, that Courts have spent decades literally ignoring the statutes' text to narrow the relief available to plaintiffs. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Chrysler Corp., 116 F. 3d 225 (7th Cir. 1997)(admitting that a judicially-created exclusion to the meaning of "enterprise" under the RICO Act "doesn't emerge from the statutory language," but applying it anyway).

The Third Circuit panel does an exceptional job summarizing this unwieldy body of extra-textual precedent on pages 32-42 of the opinion (for § 1 antitrust claims) and 153-172 (for RICO enterprises); any associates or clerks trying to figure out these complex fields could do worse than to review them.

These artificial restrictions force plaintiffs bringing antitrust and RICO claims — who typically only have circumstantial evidence at the beginning of their case given the efforts undertaken by the defendants to conceal their wrongdoing — to make suppositions about how the defendants carried out their scheme.

That's where Twombly and Iqbal come in. 

In the Insurance Brokerage Antitrust cases, there were, shall we say, a lot of defendants*, defendants who, for purposes of antitrust and RICO allegations, could have been configured in a wide variety of ways. The plaintiffs thus, understandably, had to make some tactical decisions about their allegations, like with the type of antitrust violation alleged:

Although plaintiffs’ 16 First Amended Complaints (FAC) expressly pled a rule-of-reason claim in the alternative, see, e.g., Comm. FAC ¶ 530; EB FAC ¶ 454, their Second Amended Complaints omit any reference to the rule of reason, and their moving papers and appellate arguments make clear they are alleging exclusively per se violations. In their initial motions to dismiss, defendants contended that the First Amended Complaints had not adequately defined a market or pled anticompetitive effects and had thus failed to state a claim under the rule of reason. In response, plaintiffs did not assert that they had, in fact, met these requirements; they argued only that “where plaintiffs allege per se claims,” these requirements do not apply.

And with the type of RICO enterprise they alleged:

While plaintiffs strenuously insist they have adequately pled the existence of “broker-centered enterprises,” they have conspicuously refrained, throughout the district-court proceedings and on appeal, from asserting alternative bilateral or single-entity enterprises.

Presumably, the plaintiffs deliberately chose to avoid rule-of-reason claims (in which the plaintiff is required to demonstrate, e.g., the defendant's market power in a defined market) and the allegation of "bilateral or single-entity enterprises" to preserve their class action status against all defendants. If, for example, the plaintiffs had split their claims up into multiple allegations of single-entity enterprises, each of those respective defendants tied to a particular scheme would move to decertify themselves from the bigger case. 

In the end, that's what did the plaintiffs in; their "parallel conduct" allegations ran smack into Twombly**:

Contrary to plaintiffs’ arguments, one cannot plausibly infer a horizontal agreement among a broker’s insurer-partners from the mere fact that each insurer entered into a similar contingent commission agreement with the broker. As the District Court concluded, the first stage of the alleged brokercentered conspiracies—the consolidation of the groups of insurers to which each broker referred business—evinces nothing more than a series of vertical relationships between the broker and each of its “strategic partners.” 2007 WL 2533989, at *15.
…
Moreover, plaintiffs’ argument proves too much. If the parallel decisions by several insurers to pay contingent commissions imply a horizontal agreement, then it is difficult to see why parallel decisions to pay standard commissions (that is, a fixed percentage of each policyholder’s premium payment) would not also imply an agreement. For that matter, plaintiffs’ logic would divine a horizontal agreement from virtually any parallel expenditures for marketing services, on the mistaken ground that a firm would not pay for advertising, for example, in the absence of an agreement with its competitors to enter into similar contracts with the advertising company. Cf. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 566 (noting that “resisting competition is routine market conduct,” and that “if alleging parallel decisions to resist competition were enough to imply an antitrust conspiracy, pleading a § 1 violation against almost any group of competing businesses would be a sure thing”)

And the same problem hit the RICO claims:

In seeking to establish a “rim” enclosing the insurer-partners in the alleged RICO enterprises, plaintiffs rely on the same factual allegations we found deficient in the antitrust context: that each insurer entered into a similar contingent-commission agreement in order to become a “strategic partner”; that each insurer knew the identity of the broker’s other insurer-partners and the details of their contingent-commission agreements; that each insurer entered into an agreement with the broker not to disclose the details of its contingent-commission agreements; that the brokers utilized certain devices, such as affording “first” and “last looks,” to steer business to the designated insurer; and that, in the Employee Benefits Case, insurers adopted similar reporting strategies with regard to Form 5500. As noted, these allegations do not plausibly imply concerted action—as opposed to merely parallel conduct—by the insurers, and therefore cannot provide a “rim” enclosing the “spokes” of these alleged “hub-andspoke” enterprises. Even under the relatively undemanding standard of Boyle, these allegations do not adequately plead an associationin- fact enterprise. They fail the basic requirement that the components function as a unit, that they be “put together to form a whole.” Boyle, 129 S. Ct. at 2244 (internal quotation marks omitted). Because plaintiffs’ factual allegations do not plausibly imply anything more than parallel conduct by the insurers, they cannot support the inference that the insurers “associated together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct.” Id. (quoting Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583); see id. at 2245 n.4 (stating that “several individuals” who “engaged in a pattern of crimes listed as RICO predicates” “independently and without coordination” “would not establish the existence of an enterprise”) ...

In short, plaintiffs' allegations didn't "plausibly" suggest any actual agreement among all the insurers; instead, they merely suggested parallel conduct that, in the Third Circuit's eyes, could just as equally be explained by way of the insurers acting independently.

Thus, the bulk of the claims were dismissed, although the plaintiffs can continue on some of their bid-rigging claims against the Marsh-connected defendants.

But there's plenty for plaintiffs to be relieved about with the opinion.

First, there's the massive size of the case. Although the Third Circuit couldn't outright say it — just like the Supreme Court didn't say it in deciding Twombly — the sheer size of the Insurance Brokerage Antitrust cases was undoubtedly a factor. The cases were an indictment of the entire commercial insurance industry, with a demand for treble damages (and attorney's fees) for years of industry-wide conduct, damages that reached into the billions. If you bring a case of that magnitude, you invite heightened scruinty.

Moreover, and more importantly, the sheer number of defendants, and the extraordinary breadth of the allegations against them, is what stretched the plaintiffs claim from "probable" into "implausible." It is understandably difficult for a court to swallow allegations of a vast conspiracy across an entire industry when the plaintiffs only have concrete evidence against a single group of defendants (the Marsh defendants whose misdeeds launched the whole investigation). The real lesson is, if you're going to file a nationwide suit of that scope, you need either to find yourself a whistleblower or to follow on the coattails of a government investigation (as the claims against the Marsh defendants did). Fair or not, nothing else will work these days.

Second, there's the actual law in In Re: Insurance Brokerage Antitrust:

 “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Because Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) “requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief,” courts evaluating the viability of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) must look beyond conclusory statements and determine whether the complaint’s well-pled factual allegations, taken as true, are “enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 & n.3. The test, as authoritatively formulated by Twombly, is whether the complaint alleges “enough fact[] to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” id. at 570, which is to say, “‘enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal[ity],’” Arista Records, LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556) (alteration in Arista Records).Fn 17

(Bolding mine). I previously covered the Second Circuit's approach to antitrust post-Twombly; it's good news for plaintiffs to see the same approach approved in the Third Circuit, particularly over a prior Third Circuit case (Fowler). Under Twombly and Iqbal, the issue isn't whether or not the plaintiff has uncovered enough evidence to make a prima facie case on the face of their complaint — as some defense lawyers have claimed — but rather whether the plaintiff has alleged "enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegality."

The dismissal in In Re: Insurance Brokerage Antitrust might thus prove to have made the law better for plaintiffs in the Third Circuit. That the plaintiffs in the case itself lost many of their claims is of no moment; the case quite literally alleged an industry-wide agreement to commit antitrust and racketeering violations. Plaintiffs with cases of lower orders of magnitude — like those against anything less than dozens of companies at the top of two major industries, insurance and insurance brokering — will have little trouble distinguishing those facts.

Continue Reading...

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In a patent infringement suit, the defendant's first line of defense is almost always a counterclaim that the plaintiff's patent is either invalid or unenforceable. There's little to lose in raising the counterclaim and potentially a lot to gain, including the possibility of a judgment rendering the patent invalid forever.

Patently-O refers us to Golden Hour Data Systems, Inc. v. emsCharts, Inc. and Softtech (Fed. Cir. August 9, 2010), which partly affirmed and partly vacated a District Court's Judgment as a Matter of Law overturning a $3,500,000 jury verdict in favor of Golden Hour, owner of United States Patent No. 6,117,073, and entering judgment in favor of the defendants on their "inequitable conduct" counterclaim, thereby rendering the patent unenforceable.

As the Federal Circuit recited:

A patent may be rendered unenforceable due to inequitable conduct if an applicant, with intent to mislead or deceive the examiner, fails to disclose material information or submits materially false information to the PTO during prosecution.” Digital Control, Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2006). The party seeking to render a patent unenforceable due to inequitable conduct must prove both materiality and intent by clear and convincing evidence. Id. The court must then weigh the levels of materiality and intent to determine whether the conduct at issue amounts to inequitable conduct. Id. We review the district court’s factual findings as to materiality and deceptive intent for clear error and the ultimate decision on inequitable conduct for abuse of discretion. Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (en banc in relevant part).

Inequitable conduct is, in essence, a judicial escape-hatch that empowers courts to enforce the duties of good faith and candor that applicants for patents have; if a patentee wasn't upfront with the patent office, the court can throw out the patent, even if a patent might still have been granted if the patentee had disclosed the information.

Given the severity of the penalty, the bar for proving inequitable conduct is quite high ("clear and convincing" proof of materiality and intent to deceive), which is why many plaintiff's lawyers don't spend much time guarding against it and why many defense lawyers focus on lower-hanging fruit like the prior art and obviousness defenses.

The defendants in Golden Hour, however, had an ace up their sleeve: a brochure for a competing product that the patentee had only partially disclosed during the patenting process.

Affirming the District Court's finding of inequitable conduct, the Federal Circuit held:

The [defendants'] contention is that [the inventors] intended to deceive the PTO by failing to fully disclose the capabilities of the AeroMed system described in the brochure. The district court appears to have inferred intent to deceive from the high materiality of the AeroMed brochure, from the selective disclosure in the IDS, and from the lack of a credible explanation on the part of Hutton and prosecution counsel for the selective disclosure.

We agree that the district court could find the explanation for not submitting the brochure or its undisclosed contents not to be credible (if its contents were known). The explanation was that it was Fuller’s practice not to submit undated materials. But Fuller testified that he knew that other practitioners at Knobbe Martins submitted undated brochures to the PTO and that the PTO considers those brochures. But most importantly, even if Fuller believed that the PTO’s rules would not have permitted the examiner to consider the undated brochure, there is no suggestion that Fuller thought that the information in the brochure was off-limits—indeed Fuller submitted information from the brochure in the IDS. See Semiconductor Energy, 204 F.3d at 1375, 1376 (holding that “[i]t was incumbent upon [the inventor] to provide the PTO with sufficient information for a reasonable examiner to consider the [submission] in context, not with a selective and misleading disclosure” and because “[t]he inventor[] failed to do that” he “cannot post facto hide behind the MPEP guidelines”). In sum, prosecution counsel failed to provide any explanation for withholding the missing information from the brochure, assuming he was aware of the brochure’s contents.

(Emphasis added.)

That's a classic example of inequitable conduct: the absence of any explanation for not disclosing to the patent office everything you know.

Of course, this being patent infringement law, issues are only settled for a few months at a time, and it's quite possible that by this time next year Golden Hour will be overruled, at least in terms of the procedure by which it was decided (i.e., a jury verdict for the plaintiffs followed by JMOL for the defendants). As Judge Newman's dissent notes: 

At the trial, the full brochure was in evidence, and stressed by the defendants, and the jury found that it was not invalidating. In view of the majority’s ruling that deceptive intent was not established in the district court, and the jury’s verdict of validity despite the brochure, the charge of inequitable conduct should be laid to rest. At most, this charge was deemed viable only because of inconsistencies in the law, inconsistencies that this court has presented for resolution in the pending en banc case of Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595.

Oral arguments on Therasense are scheduled for November 9, 2010.

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Yesterday the Third Circuit released a unanimous precedential opinion in Reedy v. Evanson:

While working as a cashier at a convenience store, nineteen-year-old Sara R. Reedy was sexually assaulted and robbed at gunpoint by a serial sex offender. She reported the crime to the police within minutes, subjected herself to a rape kit examination, and gave detailed and consistent statements to law enforcement officers and hospital staff.

Reedy needed Sam Spade. Instead, she got Der Prozess:

However, Detective Frank Evanson of the Cranberry Township, Pennsylvania Police Department, the lead investigator assigned to Reedy’s case, believed that Reedy had fabricated the incident to cover up her own theft of cash from the convenience store. Approximately three months later, Evanson also became the lead investigator on another sexual attack that was substantially similar to the assault on Reedy and that Evanson knew was suspected to be the work of a serial rapist. Six months after the assault on Reedy, Evanson filed a criminal complaint against her, charging her with falsely reporting a crime, theft, and receipt of stolen property. Reedy spent five days in jail. The charges against her were dropped only when the serial rapist was captured and confessed to assaulting her, to committing the theft, and to committing the other sexual assault investigated by Evanson.

As Reedy alleged, after the assault, she immediately called the police, who took her straight to the hospital, where Evanson — who had never met her before — called her a liar, asked her how much "dope" she did each day, accused her of stealing the money, watched her break down crying, and then told her to save it "because tears aren't going to save you now."

Three months later, another woman reported an almost identical sexual assault; the perpetrator looked the same, acted the same, and initiated the attack at the same time of night only a mile and a half from Reedy's attack.

"Sherlock" Evanson didn't — or chose not to — connect the dots, and three months later sought charges against Reedy, in support of which he filed an affidavit riddled with material omissions and misstatements.

Thus, six months after being sexually assaulted, Reedy was in jail for the crime of truthfully reporting sexual assault. She stayed in jail for five days awaiting a bail reduction hearing, after which she was released, with her trial scheduled for nine months later. Less than a month before her criminal trial was to begin, the serial rapist was caught in the midst of raping a third victim, after which he confessed to all three assaults.

The District Attorney was kind enough to drop the charges against Reedy.

Reedy, unsurprisingly, sued.

Unlawful seizure was her primary claim:

The Fourth Amendment provides that people are “to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, ... and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause ... .” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. It is well-established that the Fourth Amendment “prohibits a police officer from arresting a citizen except upon probable cause.” Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 482 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 169 (1972)).

Probable cause “requires more than mere suspicion[.]” Orsatti, 71 F.3d at 482. However, it does not “require the same type of specific evidence of each element of the offense as would be needed to support a conviction.” Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 149 (1972). Rather, “probable cause to arrest exists when the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer’s knowledge are sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable person to believe that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested.” Orsatti, 71 F.3d at 483; see also Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 789 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Probable cause exists if there is a ‘fair probability’ that the person committed the crime at issue.” (citation omitted).). “Probable cause need only exist as to [one of the] offense[s] that could be charged under the circumstances.” Barna v. City of Perth Amboy, 42 F.3d 809, 819 (3d Cir. 1994). In analyzing whether probable cause existed for an arrest, we must take a “totality-of-the-circumstances approach.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983).

The District Court granted summary judgment in Evanson's favor, inexplicably holding that, even though the affidavit was loaded with material omissions and misstatements, and even though Detective Evanson was plainly reckless in his disregard of exculpatory facts (like the presence of an almost identical crime three months later), there still was probable cause to arrest Reedy.

The Third Circuit's reversal of the summary judgment — along with their remand ordering the case to go to trial, and not just another round of summary judgment — packs a wallop for future unlawful seizure cases, particularly those involving rape victims:

In general, the District Court committed four types of error. First, it erred in its reconstruction of the Affidavit because it failed to consistently interpret the record in the light most favorable to Reedy and instead, contrary to the summary judgment standard, occasionally adopted interpretations that were the least favorable to Reedy. Second, the Court cited several inculpatory “facts” to support probable cause that were not actually supported by the record. Similarly, not all of Evanson’s arguably reckless omissions were actually included in the Court’s reconstructed Affidavit and analysis. Third, the Court erred in deciding that certain facts were inculpatory when they were either irrelevant or even exculpatory. Finally, the Court erred when it gave little weight to the highly significant exculpatory facts that the Landmark attack, with all of its similarities to the attack on Reedy, occurred before Evanson sought to arrest Reedy and that Evanson was responsible for investigating both attacks.

The Court goes on to describe each in detail.

The first is a powerful reaffirmation of what was already the law, law that has been inconsistently applied: when, at summary judgment in a civil rights lawsuit, a court goes back to look at the affidavit submitted by a police officer in support of an arrest, it must do so in the light most favorable for the plaintiff. It is for the jury, not the Court, to decide which parts of that affidavit were false and what the police officer's mindset was in submitting them.

The third, however, is perhaps the most interesting. As the Third Circuit noted, "The District Court thought it inculpatory that Reedy had failed to push the panic alarm while a gun was being pointed at her, and that she had declined professional counseling when it was offered to her."  Neither of those two judgments are legal judgments — they're moral judgments about how a woman "should" act while, and after, she is being raped.

As the Women's Law Project argued in its amicus brief in the case,

The district court also viewed Ms. Reedy’s “failure” to push the panic alarm while a gun was being held to her head as inconsistent with the behavior of a “genuine” rape victim. See App. 34a n.7, 37a, 38a (drawing negative inferences from Ms. Reedy’s “failure” to press the panic alarm). This inference is based on the assumption that victims should engage in active forms of resistance during their sexual assault. See, e.g., State in the Interest of M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1277 (N.J. 1992) (discussing assumptions historically made by courts). This is not true. Nor is it legally permissible, Pennsylvania having eliminated the resistance requirement three decades ago. See Act of May 18, 1976, Pub. L. 120, No. 53, §§ 1-2 (codified at 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3107) ...

A review of ten years of research on the subject clearly reveals that active forms of physical resistance are used by only a minority of women (20-25%) who are sexually assaulted. Sarah E. Ullman, A 10-Year Update of Review and Critique of Empirical Studies of Rape Avoidance, 34 Crim. Just. & Behav. 411, 413-14 (2007). Physical resistance during a rape is particularly unlikely among women who have been sexually assaulted in the past. Id. This response to sexual assault is both understandable and more than reasonable. ...

The district court further buttressed its decision by accepting as inculpatory evidence the fact that Reedy did not access counseling services. See App. 32a, 34a n.7 (drawing negative inferences from Ms. Reedy’s choice to forgo rape crisis counseling). Yet again, the research documents that this behavior is consistent with the behavior of many sexual assault victims. Empirical evidence suggests that a sizeable portion of victims do not access mental health services. See Dean G. Kilpatrick et al., Drug-Facilitated, Incapacitated, and Forcible Rape: A National Study 56 (2007).

The Third Circuit adopted that argument almost entirely:

[T]he District Court’s implication that there is a duty to attend counseling is incorrect. There is no such duty. Moreover, implicit in the Court’s conclusion that an inculpatory inference can be drawn from Reedy’s decision not to attend counseling is a value judgment about how victims ought to respond to trauma. That is a highly debatable judgment, lacking any foundation in the record. Even if there were some basis for saying that refusing counseling is inculpatory, Reedy explained why she did not want counseling, saying that her earlier experience with sexual abuse would allow her to handle the trauma. When confronted, as the District Court evidently believed it was, with two explanations for Reedy’s decision to refuse counseling – either she was lying about the assault or she believed counseling was not necessary – the Court chose to operate on the least favorable interpretation of the evidence. That was error. Likewise, Reedy’s failure to reach for a panic alarm when a gun was pointed at her and she was being sexually assaulted, which are the facts we must accept at this stage, is not in the least inculpatory.

Fact is, none of that is controversial — the International Association Chiefs of Police, for example, has argued for years that there is no "model" or "example" rape victim, no one way in which women deal with the trauma of rape, and so police officers have to evaluate accusations on a case-by-case basis.

Apparently, some police officers and departments still haven't heard the message.

As they say, money talks. I hope it also teaches. 

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As The Legal Intelligencer reported,

When a top-level executive suddenly quits to take a job at a competing firm, the courts have the power to block the start of the new employment if the evidence shows that such an injunction is needed to prevent a likely misappropriation of trade secrets, the 3rd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled.

The ruling came in Bimbo Bakeries USA Inc. v. Botticella, in which the appellate court considered whether the manufacturer of Thomas' brand English muffins was entitled to an injunction that barred one of its top-level executives from taking a new job with Hostess Inc.

Bimbo Bakeries won the first round in February when U.S. District Judge R. Barclay Surrick enjoined Chris Botticella, a former senior vice president at Bimbo, from starting the new job on the ground that Botticella's extensive knowledge of Bimbo's trade secrets -- including manufacturing secrets used to make the famous "nooks and crannies" in Thomas' English muffins -- made it substantially likely, if not inevitable, that he would disclose Bimbo's secrets to Hostess.

The Third Circuit affirmed.

The case turned on Pennsylvania law, specifically the Pennsylvania Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“PUTSA”) and the "inevitable disclosure" doctrine established by Air Products and Chemicals v. Johnson, 442 A.2d 1114 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982):

Essentially, Johnson and Liquid Air remonstrate that the trial court improperly reasoned from Allis-Chalmers, supra,  Emery, supra, and Goodrich, supra, in holding that it was inevitable that Johnson would disclose information to Liquid Air. They contend that inevitability of disclosure is not the proper standard by which the trial court can determine that it was clear that an immediate and irreparable injury would result unless an injunction issued. While we do not adopt the reasoning of the trial court or its use of the term inevitable, we are unable to find that the trial court committed reversible error.

The lower court held that: "It would be impossible [for Johnson] to perform his managerial functions in on-site work without drawing on knowledge he possesses of Air Products' confidential information." (Trial Court Opinion at page 18.) We are satisfied that this expression of its determination of the likelihood of disclosure was proper. The court reasoned that the duties which Johnson was to perform at Liquid Air would make it impossible for Johnson not to disclose trade secrets. This was precisely the reasoning of the court in Emery, supra, which we find persuasive. Both courts held it would be impossible for the employee to perform his duties at the new employer without disclosing trade secrets. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court acted reasonably when it issued a preliminary injunction. Valley Forge Historical Society v. Washington Memorial Chapel, supra; Boyd v. Cooper, supra; Jostan Aluminum Products Co., Inc. v. Mount Carmel Dist. Indus. Fund, supra.

The above from Air Products isn't exactly a model of clarity, prompting the Third Circuit to engage in a bit of extrapolation:

With respect to the probability of disclosure required to warrant an injunction, the Superior Court stated at the outset of its analysis that Pennsylvania law permits the issuance of an injunction where a defendant’s new employment “is likely to result in the disclosure” of a former employer’s trade secrets. Id. at 1120 (emphasis added). The Court then determined that it was reasonable for the trial court to issue an injunction based on the inevitability that Johnson would disclose trade secrets, but the Superior Court explicitly chose “not [to] adopt the reasoning of the trial court or its use of the term inevitable.” Id. at 1124. Based on these statements it seems clear that the Superior Court believed that the trial court permissibly could have granted the injunction even if the disclosure of trade secrets was not inevitable.

...

The Superior Court subsequently stated that the “proper inquiry” in determining whether to grant an injunction to prevent the threatened disclosure of trade secrets is not whether a defendant inevitably will disclose a trade secret in the absence of injunctive relief, but instead whether “there is sufficient likelihood, or substantial threat, of defendant doing so in the future.” Den-Tal-Ez, 566 A.2d at 1232 (citing Air Prods., 442 A.2d at 1122-25; SI Handling Sys.,753 F.2d at 1263-64).

I'll pass over the interesting, but highly technical, question about the precedential effect of Victaulic Co. v. Tieman, 499 F.3d 227, 234 (3d Cir. 2007), which Botticella argued held required the former employer show, as a prerequisite to an injunction, that it "would be 'virtually impossible' for an employee to fulfill his responsibilities for a new employer without disclosing a former employer’s trade secrets." In short, the Third Circuit held that the "virtually impossible" language from Victaluic Co. was dicta, and so did not bind them.

There's an underlying theme to the Third Circuit's ruling, which, like Air Products before it, didn't really lay down a rule but instead rejected the hard-and-fast rule suggested by the losing party. That underlying theme is: respect for District Courts' ability to assess the need for entering injunctions, even injunctions that impose a significant hardship, like the injunction here.

Put another way, rather than set a high bar for District Courts — as a ruling which incorporated terms like "inevitable" or "virtually impossible" would have — the Third Circuit set no bar at all, and instead deferred to the judgment and determinations of the District Court.

It's hard to argue with the logic of that; as much as we would like to set hard-and-fast rules to govern all situations, the simple truth is that every case is unique, and we have to leave some discretion in the system, have to have some trust in the trial judges, to make it work right.

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Today's The Legal Intelligencer includes an article titled, "Limited Liability Law May Apply in Duck Boat Accident" about the effect of the Limitation of Liability Act of 1851 on claims arising from last's weeks collision between a tugboat and a duck boat on the Delaware River.

The Limitation Act — which nominally limits the liability of a ship owner to the value of the ship itself — is a fascinating relic from a turbulent time in the United States, when whispers of war were beginning and the young agrarian nation was painfully converting to a steam-powered industrial society. The world's first commercial oil well would not be built, in Poland, and the world's first union railway station would not be built, in Indianapolis, for another two years.

With a lot of output, a big country, and not much transportation infrastructure, we needed investment in shipping, and lots of it.

Hence the Act.

Few would disagree that the Act has outlived its purpose, but it's still on the books.

It's just as well that the Legal article is subscription only, since it doesn't tell us much other than that defense lawyers think the tugboat and duck boat are free and clear while plaintiff's lawyers believe there are ways around it.

The press did a similar dance a few weeks ago, after Transocean invoked the same act to limit its liability following the catastrophic oil leak caused by the sinking of the Deepwater Horizon oil rig. Transocean's use of the Act so bothered Congress that they're trying to get the entire Act repealed; if that happens, this entire discussion will be rendered moot in the near future, as it should be: in our modern world of insurance, re-insurance, global finance, and limited liability companies, there's no need to give vessel owners special treatment. Ships will still be built and used, regardless of the Act.

But the Act is still on the books. I'm with the plaintiff's lawyers; there's plenty of ways to get around the Act and get these types of maritime accidents back in the state courts where they belong.

First, the Act doesn't apply if the liability of the vessel owner isn't actually at issue:

In construing the Limitation Act, this Court long ago determined that vessel owners may contest liability in the process of seeking limited liability, and we promulgated rules to that effect pursuant to our "power to regulate . . . proceedings." The "Benefactor," 103 U. S., at 244; Supplementary Rule of Practice in Admiralty 56, 13 Wall., at xiii; Supplemental Admiralty and Maritime Claims Rule F(2). Thus, we agree with respondent that a vessel owner need not confess liability in order to seek limitation under the Act. The Act and the rules of practice, however, do not create a freestanding right to exoneration from liability in circumstances where limitation of liability is not at issue. In this case, petitioner stipulated that his claim for damages would not exceed the value of the vessel and waived any claim of res judicata from the state court action concerning issues bearing on the limitation of liability. The District Court concluded that these stipulations would protect the vessel owner's right to seek limited liability in federal court. Then, out of an "abundance of caution," the court stayed the limitation proceedings so that it could act if the state court proceedings jeopardized the vessel owner's rights under the Limitation Act. 31 F. Supp. 2d, at 1170-1171. We believe nothing more was required to protect respondent's right to seek a limitation of liability.

Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438 (2001). Here, it's already been reported that K-Sea had an insurance policy* in excess of $100 million; if the plaintiffs stipulate their damages don't exceed that (which they reasonably could), then the Act's purpose has been met.

Second, even where the Act applies, there are plenty of exceptions:

The Limited Liability Act allows a vessel owner to limit its liability for any loss or injury caused by the vessel to the value of the vessel and its freight.[6] "Under the Act, a party is entitled to limitation only if it is `without privity or knowledge' of the cause of the loss."[7] If the shipowner is a corporation, "knowledge is judged by what the corporation's managing agents knew or should have known with respect to the conditions or actions likely to cause the loss."[8] Once the claimant establishes negligence or unseaworthiness, the burden shifts to the owner of the vessel to prove that negligence was not within the owner's privity or knowledge.[9]

In re Hellenic Inc., 252 F.3d 391 (5th Cir. 2001)(footnotes omitted, but they're worth reading if you're looking for more cases).

For anyone interested in the subject, the Admiralty and Maritime Law Guide has a couple cases on the Act. For anyone really interested, yesterday I went to a CLE on Boating Law and Liability — hosted, coincidentally, by Ride The Duck's maritime lawyer — that included a thick book of materials on maritime law that can be purchased, even after the CLE.

As noted by those materials, "the knowledge of a corporation necessarily is measured by the knowledge of the corporation's employees and agents." A clever plaintiff's lawyer would point out that the knowledge and negligence of the mate — the one who took the Fifth and refused to testify — is imputed back to the owners of the vessel.

All of which is to say: as nice as the Act sounds on its face to defense lawyers, that tugboat company and its insurer aren't going to just walk away from this tragedy.

Continue Reading...

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Via Howard Bashman, whose client won, comes the Third Circuit's Sullivan et al. v. De Beers et al. ruling reversing the District of New Jersey's approval of a massive, nationwide settlement of antitrust claims brought by diamond purchasers against the De Beers cartel. As The Legal Intelligencer put it:

In its 75-page opinion in Sullivan v. DB Investments Inc., the 3rd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the settlement must be vacated because the lower court had improperly certified a nationwide class of indirect purchasers despite recognizing that some of those plaintiffs would be barred from pursuing such indirect claims under the laws of their own states.

As a result, the 3rd Circuit found that a single objector from Texas had identified a fatal flaw in the lower court's class certification analysis by showing that the common issues did not "predominate."

"The objection regarding the lack of predominance of class issues in this case raises an insurmountable hurdle to certification of the indirect purchaser class," U.S. Circuit Judge Kent A. Jordan wrote.

"Two plaintiffs cannot be joined in a single class to adjudicate the same set of facts when those facts give only one of them a legally cognizable claim," Jordan wrote in an opinion joined by visiting U.S. District Judge Donetta Ambrose of the Western District of Pennsylvania.

U.S. Circuit Judge Marjorie O. Rendell concurred in the judgment, but wrote a separate opinion that said she disagreed with Jordan's decision to undertake his own analyses of predominance and the plaintiffs' entitlement to injunctive relief, rather than allowing the lower court on remand to evaluate these issues in the first instance.

Frankly, I'm surprised by the ruling, but it takes some background to explain why.

As described by the Court:

The plaintiffs in the seven cases can be divided into two categories, based on the claims that they assert. The first category consists of direct purchasers that acquired rough gem diamonds directly from De Beers or one of its competitors. The direct purchasers advanced claims of price-fixing and monopolization, citing §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2, for which they sought damages and injunctive relief under §§ 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26.

The second category of plaintiffs consists of indirect purchasers, which are entities or individuals that acquired either rough or cut-and-polished gem diamonds but did not do so directly from De Beers or its competitors. Consumers and jewelry retailers fall into this category, as do middlemen who acquired diamonds from sightholders or from another indirect purchaser. The indirect purchasers sought recovery for the same
antitrust injury as did the direct purchasers but brought their claims under state antitrust, consumer protection, and unjust enrichment law. These plaintiffs could only rely on state law as a route to monetary relief because they lack standing to bring a federal antitrust claim for damages under § 4 of the Clayton Act. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 735-36 (1977). They did, however, seek injunctive relief for those antitrust violations under § 16 of the Clayton Act. See Mid-W. Paper Prods. Co. v. Cont’l Group, 596 F.2d 573, 594 (3d Cir. 1979) (“Illinois Brick does not preclude indirect purchasers from suing for injunctive relief[,] and ... they have standing to sue under § 16 ... .”).

That is to say, direct purchasers can all claim together under the same federal antitrust law, but, since federal antitrust law doesn't permit indirect purchasers to claim, each of those indirect purchasers has to rely on the law of their own states to obtain relief. Those states, however, vary widely in their treatment of indirect purchaser claims: some states reject them (like federal law does), some states expressly permit them, and some states permit them, but with limitations.

The District Court simply lumped all of those indirect purchasers together, hence the reversal. Their claims don't share enough "commonality."

One possible solution to the problem would have been to set up subclasses for each of the fifty states, but that's not what happened here, apparently because De Beers wanted the class action settlement to resolve all possible claims in all 50 states. (I suppose we'll have to put aside, for the moment, why De Beers felt it necessary to resolve indirect purchaser claims in the states which don't recognize indirect purchaser claims.)

It would not have surprised me if, in the first instance, the Third Circuit had ruled that a national class action can't be certified — not even for settlement purposes, where the defendants essentially concede a class would be appropriate — if some of the subclasses rely on varied state laws. As noted above, it's possible to cure that defect, albeit difficult and time-consuming: set up subclasses for indirect purchasers in each state, and compensate them based on the strength of their state's laws.

But as the majority opinion admitted, the Third Circuit already ruled that it was okay to cobble together disparate state law claims for purposes of a nationwide class action settlement:

We have recognized that “there may be situations where variations in state laws are
so significant so as to defeat commonality and predominance even in a settlement class certification.” In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig. (Warfarin Sodium II), 391 F.3d 516, 524, 529-30 (3d Cir. 2004) (certifying a class of consumer deception claims under the law of all fifty states while recognizing that the entire class also shared a single, common deception claim under the law of Delaware, where the allegedly deceptive communications had originated). However, neither we nor our sister courts of appeals have considered whether variations among state antitrust statutes are so far-reaching that those differences overshadow commonalities when a class of indirect purchasers seeks certification on a nationwide basis. We must therefore consider for the first time whether a national class of indirect purchaser claimants under state law is “sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.” Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623.

You can read the In re Warfarin opinion here. The most pertinent part was:

[S]everal Appellants argue that the District Court erred when it certified a single nationwide class of plaintiffs because variations in and inconsistencies between the state consumer fraud and antitrust laws of the fifty states defeat the commonality and predominance requirements of Rule 23. Appellants rely principally on the Seventh Circuit's decision in In re Bridgestone/Firestone Inc., 288 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir.2002) ("Bridgestone"), a case involving the certification of a nationwide class alleging tort claims arising under the laws of all fifty states. However, Bridgestone is distinguishable from the instant matter because that case concerned certification of a class for purposes of litigation, not a class solely for purposes of settlement, which is at issue in this case. 288 F.3d at 1018.

The difference is key. In certification of litigation classes for claims arising under the laws of the fifty states, we have previously noted that the district court must determine whether variations in state laws present the types of insuperable obstacles which render class action litigation unmanageable. See Prudential, 148 F.3d at 315; see also In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1010 (3d Cir.1986). Thus, for instance, we have stated that a district court should examine whether varying state laws can be grouped by shared elements and applied as a unit in such a way that the litigation class is manageable. Prudential, 148 F.3d at 315; In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d at 1010. However, when dealing with variations in state laws, the same concerns with regards to case manageability that arise with litigation classes are not present with settlement classes, and thus those variations are irrelevant to certification of a settlement class. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620, 117 S.Ct. 2231 (in a settlement-only class certification, "a district court need not inquire whether the case, if tried, would present intractable management problems ... for the proposal is that there be no trial").

Nonetheless, we recognize that problems beyond those of just manageability may exist when a district court is asked to certify a single nationwide class action suit, even for settlement purposes, when claims arise under the substantive laws of the fifty states. Although there may be situations where variations in state laws are so significant so as to defeat commonality and predominance even in a settlement class 530*530 certification, this is not such a case.

Was the In re Warfarin situation really so different from De Beers just because there was that single Delaware claim? The Third Circuit back then didn't think so; instead, it found it "key" that the certification was solely for settlement purposes.

As I described above, De Beers demanded these non-existent state law indirect purchaser claims be released. Whatever the Third Circuit thinks of the merits of that, De Beers sure thought the indirect purchasers in all fifty states had something, and so sought to release those claims. In the absence of some clear, verifiable prejudice to other members of indirect purchaser classes, I just don't see the need to unwind the settlement, much less do so in a manner that ties the District Court's hands.

And that's the key difference between the majority and Judge Rendell's opinion. Judge Rendell would have vacated the settlement with instructions to the District Court to better develop its reasoning, which would then have had its reasoning reviewed under an "abuse of discretion" standard. The majority, however, has all but precluded the District Court from doing anything but adopting the majority's analysis of the various state laws, and then going about the laborious — and unwanted by anyone but a single objector — process of determining the availability of relief under each state's laws.

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Tomorrow, July 15, 2010, I'm giving the plaintiff's perspective in a webinar CLE titled: Pleadings Standards Post-Iqbal: Meeting Tougher Plausibility Standards in Commercial Litigation.

If you've not yet had the pleasure of litigating the heck out of Iqbal v. Ashcroft, this CLE is a good opportunity to get some case cites and perspective.

If you have litigated the heck out of it, you might still find some use in it (e.g., my part of the presentation cites 16 plaintiff-friendly cases interpreting Iqbal, including opinions from the Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits) and you'll get 1.5 hours CLE credit from the comfort of your home or office.

The reviews for last year's presentation were quite positive (there's some quotes on the linked website), and one of the highly-informative slides from my part is embedded in this post.

Alternatively, if you're not up for a 1.5 hour CLE, you can spend a few hours perusing some poor, poor federal clerk's nearly 300-page summary of all the recent decisions on Iqbal for the Federal Rules Committee, or perhaps the Administrative Office's statistical analysis of motions to dismiss since Iqbal.

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The Supreme Court released its opinion in Bilski v. Kappos this morning, which tested the sufficiency of a "business method" patent relating to the hedging of risk in investments.

Four Justices wanted to scrap "business methods" patents altogether. Five wanted to scrap just the patent at issue here.

Given the complexity of the issues involved, I'm pleasantly surprised to report that the actual holding of the case can be summarized with just a few quotes:

Section 101 defines the subject matter that may be patented under the Patent Act:

“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”

Section 101 thus specifies four independent categories of inventions or discoveries that are eligible for protection: processes, machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter. “In choosing such expansive terms . . . modified by the comprehensive ‘any,’ Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be given wide scope.” Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U. S. 303, 308 (1980).

Slip op., 4.

The Court’s precedents provide three specific exceptions to §101’s broad patent-eligibility principles: “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.” Chakrabarty, supra, at 309.

Slip op., 5.

In light of these precedents, it is clear that petitioners’ application is not a patentable “process.” Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk: “Hedging is a fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our system of commerce and taught in any introductory finance class.” 545 F. 3d, at 1013 (Rader, J., dissenting); see, e.g., D. Chorafas, Introduction to Derivative Financial Instruments 75–94 (2008); C. Stickney, R. Weil, K. Schipper, & J. Francis, Financial Accounting: An Introduction to Concepts, Methods, and Uses 581–582 (13th ed. 2010); S.Ross, R. Westerfield, & B. Jordan, Fundamentals of Corporate Finance 743–744 (8th ed. 2008). The concept of hedging, described in claim 1 and reduced to a mathematical formula in claim 4, is an unpatentable abstract idea, just like the algorithms at issue in Benson and Flook. Allowing petitioners to patent risk hedging would preempt use of this approach in all fields, and would effectively grant a monopoly over an abstract idea.

Slip op., 15.

And that's it: hedging is an "abstract idea," and thus not subject to patenting.

That is undoubtably the correct result; this same morning, Fred Wilson over at AVC gave some basic advice for startups on the concept of hedging. I doubt Fred ever read the patent at issue here, or ever read any paper or article based on the patent. Hedging is an abstract concept that can be applied to a particular situation, no different from the Ruy Lopez in chess or moonwalking.

But not everybody's happy, since the Supreme Court took the nice, clean rule established by the Federal Circuit in its opinion denying the patent, threw that rule out, and restored the old mess. Patent professors like Dennis Crouch at Patently-O are frustrated:

In general, the opinion offers no clarity or aid for those tasked with determining whether a particular innovation falls within Section 101. The opinion provides no new lines to be avoided. Rather, the outcome from the decision might be best stated as "business as usual."

Today, the Court once again declines to impose limitations on the Patent Act that are inconsistent with the Act’s text. The patent application here can be rejected under our precedents on the unpatentability of abstract ideas. The Court, therefore, need not define further what constitutes a patentable “process,” beyond pointing to the definition of that term provided in §100(b) and looking to the guideposts in Benson, Flook, and Diehr.

By refusing to state any particular rule or categorical exclusion, the Court has almost certainly pushed Section 101 patent eligibility to the background in most patent prosecution and litigation.

Techies (and techie lawyers) are also similarly annoyed:

The Software Freedom Law Center, which supports open source licenses, lamented the ruling.

"The landscape of patent law has been a cluttered, dangerous mess for almost two decades," said Eben Moglen, Chairman of the Software Freedom Law Center. "The confusion and uncertainty behind today’s ruling guarantees that the issues involved in Bilski v. Kappos will have to return to the Supreme Court after much money has been wasted and much innovation obstructed."

These aren't merely theoretical considerations. Patents don't control what people are allowed to think, but they certainly control what people are allowed to do with what they think. Billions, potentially trillions, of dollars of revenue are dependent on the patent laws of the United States. Whole businesses live, die, and pursue or forgo opportunities based on those laws.

And, of course, every day, patent infringement lawsuits are filed, and millions of dollars are spent pursuing or defending those lawsuits. The issue is not one to be taken lightly.

Given the circumstances here — i.e., the abrupt and sporadic acceptance, and then rejection, of the patentability of some business methods by the Federal Circuit in the 1990s — it would have been better for the majority to have clearly reaffirmed the longstanding pre-1990s rule that business methods were not patentable, as the concurrence recommended.

The majority opinion and the concurrence are both worth reading; further, as the majority noted, "Students of patent law would be well advised to study [the] scholarly opinions" of the Federal Circuit in the case. Since patent law has just been made a bit messier again, it's a good idea to keep your mind limber.

Though I agree with the concurrence, the majority's reasoning isn't wrong per se. The problem, to me, is the philosophical underpinning of their interpretation.

Four of the majority's members' hesitation in going further was understandable:

It is important to emphasize that the Court today is not commenting on the patentability of any particular invention, let alone holding that any of the above-mentioned technologies from the Information Age should or should not receive patent protection. This Age puts the possibility of innovation in the hands of more people and raises new difficulties for the patent law. With ever more people trying to innovate and thus seeking patent protections for their inventions, the patent law faces a great challenge in striking the balance between protecting inventors and not granting monopolies over procedures that others would discover by independent, creative application of general principles. Nothing in this opinion should be read to take a position on where that balance ought to be struck.

Slip op., 9-10 (Justice Scalia chose not to join that part, so that language is only a plurality opinion). But I don't think the majority's overall reasoning stands up: 

The Court’s precedents provide three specific exceptions to §101’s broad patent-eligibility principles: “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.” Chakrabarty, supra, at 309. While these exceptions are not required by the statutory text, they are consistent with the notion that a patentable process must be “new and useful.” And, in any case, these exceptions have defined the reach of the statute as a matter of statutory stare decisis going back 150 years. See Le Roy v. Tatham, 14 How. 156, 174– 175 (1853). The concepts covered by these exceptions are “part of the storehouse of knowledge of all men . . . free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.” Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U. S. 127, 130 (1948).

Slip op., 5.

The problem with this analysis is that the second sentence contradicts the first. There are plenty of "abstract ideas" that are "new and useful:" consider the Ruy Lopez and moonwalking. Neither of these ideas teaches a person how to make anything, as is the focus of the Patent Act; rather, they teach people how to do something in a "new and useful" way, much like business methods do. 

Are they patentable? There's no way to know beforehand with certainty, and so there's a chilling effect on businesses or individuals. As Justice Stevens opened his concurrence, "In the area of patents, it is especially important that the law remain stable and clear." For someone like me, who represents plaintiffs enforcing patents, stability and clarity help me evaluate whether or not to accept a potential client's case.

Unfortunately, although the law is a bit more stable than it could have been — the majority did, after all, affirm the denial of the patent — it's less clear than the Federal Circuit had made it.

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As widely reported last week, the local Boy Scouts won a partial victory against the City of Philadelphia from a federal jury in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania:

A federal jury on Wednesday declared that the city of Philadelphia had violated the First Amendment rights of the local chapter of the Boy Scouts of America by moving to evict it from its city-owned headquarters if it refused to repudiate the anti-gay policies of the Scouts' national parent group.

In its verdict, the jury of six women and two men found that the city had imposed an "unconstitutional condition" on the Scouts and declared that it was not "reasonable" to do so.

But the jury found in favor of the city on two other claims. It rejected the Scouts' claim that the city had engaged in "viewpoint" discrimination, and it also rejected an Equal Protection claim by finding that the city had a rational basis for its actions.

Nevertheless, lawyers said the verdict must be described as a win for the local scout chapter -- known as the Cradle of Liberty Council -- because a win on any one of its three constitutional claims would prevent the city from going ahead with its planned eviction.

In essence, the Boy Scouts raised four constitutional claims, two under the First Amendment and two under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The jury rejected both of the equal protection claims, one of which alleged the Boy Scouts were treated differently from other entities with similar membership policies, the other of which claimed the city had no rational basis (apart from animus towards the group) for evicting Boy Scouts.

The jury similarly rejected the Boy Scouts' First Amendment claim that the city had created a "nonpublic forum" for various other entities to use to promote their beliefs, from which it improperly excluded the Boy Scouts.

That left a single claim, which the jury accepted, that the City had unconstitutionally conditioned the subsidized use of city property upon the Boy Scouts limiting their own freedom of speech. As Judge Ronald Buckwalter explained in denying the city's motion to dismiss — which, unusually, and perhaps tellingly, was far more detailed than his order denying summary judgment for the city — an unconstitutional conditions claim works as follows:

The general idea behind the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is that the government “may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests—especially his interest in freedom of speech.” Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972). “Put another way, the Government may not propose a penalty ‘to produce a result which [it] could not command directly.’ ” Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights (FAIR) v. Rumsfeld (FAIR I), 390 F.3d 219, 229 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)), rev’d, Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights (FAIR II), 547 U.S. 47 (2006). Unconstitutional conditions claims have proven troublesome, and courts have wrestled with how to best apply a series of Supreme Court cases that appear to be in some conflict. Additionally, there is a great deal of overlap between the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions and claims of viewpoint discrimination like the one addressed above. See Wyman, 335 F.3d at 92 (observing that “[t]he case before us,” which also involved the Boy Scouts, “lies at the intersection of these two lines of
authority”).

The Third Circuit recently examined the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in
FAIR I. There, a group of law schools challenged the Solomon Amendment, which withheld a broad array of federal funding from universities that did not provide access to military recruiters. Id. at 224. As the Third Circuit succinctly put it, “if the law schools’ compliance with the Solomon Amendment compromises their First Amendment rights, the statute is an unconstitutional condition.” Id. at 229. The court went on to find that forcing the law schools to accommodate military recruiters both violated the law schools’ right of expressive association and impermissibly compelled speech. Id. at 230-42. Having established this, the court applied strict scrutiny and determined that the government could not demonstrate that its actions survived this test. Id. at 243.

The Supreme Court reversed in FAIR II, stating that “[b]ecause the First Amendment would not prevent Congress from directly imposing the Solomon Amendment’s access requirement, the statute does not place an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of federal funds.” 547 U.S. 47, 60 (2006). In other words, the Supreme Court disagreed that the Solomon Amendment compromised FAIR’s First Amendment rights, whether framed as FAIR’s right to be free of compelled speech or its right of expressive association. See id. at 61-68.

The most prestigious law schools in the country banded together to litigate the FAIR cases — which revolved around, ironically, the government forcing private entities to accept military recruiters, who necessarily brought with them the military's policies prohibiting gays from service — and lost. As the Supreme Court held, there's no right to government subsidies: if the government could have taken them away for the heck of it, then it rarely matters if the government took it away because it didn't like the views of the targeted group.

That would seem to be a serious problem here for the Boy Scouts, because:

Under the ordinance that leased the property to the scouts, the city has the right to evict them without giving any reason at all, both sides have agreed.

Asked if the city would take that step, Smith said, "The verdict was just issued today, and we'll be considering all of our options."

I'd thus be surprised to see the verdict survive appeal. The City clearly misfired at summary judgment — a common occurrence in complicated cases — and, more importantly, the Boy Scouts only succeeded on what was arguably their weakest claim. Judge Buckwalter dealt with the Third Circuit's conflicting precedent on these claims in a compelling and persuasive manner, he did so only by assuming a number of facts favorable to the Boy Scouts, including the facts underlying the Boy Scout's unsuccessful viewpoint discrimination claim.

Under the Supreme Court's opinion in FAIR, if the City of Philadelphia didn't engage in viewpoint discrimination and could have kicked them out for no reason at all, then it rarely matters what the City's reason actually was. Where the government can discriminate in its subsides in opposition to gay rights, it can discriminate in favor of them, too.

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The University of Chicago Law School Faculty Blog is hosting a debate over a new paper, Ambiguity About Ambiguity: An Empirical Inquiry Into Legal Interpretation written by Ward Farnsworth, Dustin F. Guzior, and Anup Malani.

As the paper's abstract says:

Most scholarship on statutory interpretation discusses what courts should do with ambiguous statutes. This paper investigates the crucial and analytically prior question of what ambiguity in law is. Does a claim that a text is ambiguous mean the reader is uncertain about its meaning? Or is it a claim that readers, as a group, would disagree about what the text means (however certain each of them may be individually)? This distinction is of considerable theoretical interest. It also turns out to be highly consequential as a practical matter.

To demonstrate, we developed a survey instrument for exploring determinations of ambiguity and administered it to nearly 1,000 law students. We find that different ways of asking whether a statute is ambiguous produce very different answers. Simply asking respondents whether a statute is “ambiguous” as applied to a set of facts produces answers that are strongly biased by the policy preferences of those giving the answers. But asking respondents whether they would expect others to agree about the meaning of the statute does not produce answers biased in this way. This discrepancy leads to important questions about which of those two ways of thinking about ambiguity is more legally relevant. It also has potential implications for how cases are decided and for how law is taught.

It's not a minor issue. If the plain meaning rule fails, then:

[C]ourts often treat ambiguity as a kind of gateway consideration when they interpret a statute. If the statute is ambiguous, the judge might then become interested in sources of guidance, such as legislative history, that wouldn’t otherwise be considered. Or ambiguity might cause a judge to defer to an agency’s view of the statute, as under the Chevron doctrine. Or ambiguity might cause a judge to resort to a canon of construction such as the rule of lenity, or the doctrine that courts should prefer interpretations of ambiguous statutes that avoid difficult constitutional issues, or the rule that ambiguous statutes will be interpreted to avoid conflict with foreign law, or many others. Ambiguity also serves as an occasion for judges to consult their own views of policy, whether openly, quietly, or unconsciously

Here's a selection from the paper:

If we assume that a respondent’s policy preference is in some way a reflection
of personal views, then asking people whether a statute is ambiguous, or whether two different readings of it are plausible, evidently causes them to consult their own views of how they would like the statute to be read. We hypothesize that those two questions amount, in the experience of people who are asked them, to inquiries into how strongly they themselves feel sure that one reading is better than another, and those judgments are easily contaminated by the respondents’ preferences—as a matter of policy—for a particular outcome. Asking respondents whether ordinary readers of English would agree about the best reading, however, forces them to change their frame of reference. They no longer are asking themselves which reading they prefer, or how sure they feel that one of them is right. They are forced to look outside themselves, so to speak, and to consider what others would likely say. The outward investigation is merely hypothetical—a thought experiment; but it’s a consequential thought experiment, because it reduces the bias otherwise exerted by the respondent’s policy preferences.

In other words: a reader's mindset changes the way they interpret law. If a reader is simply asked to read a statute and interpret it, they will interpret it according to their policy preferences. If, instead, the reader is asked to read the statute the way they think a hypothetical unbiased person would read it, the reader is more likely to discern ambiguity and thus presumably more likely to reach an unbiased interpretation.

You can play the ambiguity game yourself using one of the examples from their study:

A federal statute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b), provides for a mandatory minimum sentence of five years for anyone who distributes more than one gram of a “mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD).” The defendant was caught distributing LSD that had been dissolved and sprayed onto blotter paper. The weight of the LSD alone was 50 milligrams, well below the statutory threshold. But if the weight of the blotter paper was included, the total weight was five grams, well above the statutory threshold.

The question is whether, under § 841(b), the blotter paper should be included in deciding, for purposes of sentencing, the weight of the LSD the defendant distributed. Under the defendant's reading of the statute, the blotter paper should not be included in deciding the weight. Under the government's reading, it should be included in deciding the weight.

Do you think the statute is ambiguous? If not, which way should it be interpreted? Is that the way you want it to be interpreted? How do you think others would interpret it?

My initial reaction to the study was the same as William Eskridge's:

The methodology for the questions seems to me to invite normativity from respondents: The authors repeatedly ask which reading of the statute is "better". I have no idea how a first-year law student would understand this kind of inquiry; I'd understand it as asking me to see "ambiguity" (or whatever) as a normative rather than a purely descriptive endeavor. It is hard for me to tell how serious a concern this is.

Indeed, that seems to be the biggest problem with the questions they asked. It is no answer for a court — or a law student — to deem a statue ambiguous and then give up. They have been asked to decide what a statute means, and so they must come up with an answer. Lacking anything else to go on, they will defer to their own policy interpretations.

As Judge Frank Easterbrook commented,

Judges read statutes in context, not as isolated clauses. So for Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453 (1991), the LSD case, the judges asked not whether the LSD's carrier medium (blotter paper) is part of the same "mixture or substance" as LSD in the abstract (or as a matter of chemistry), but whether LSD-in-blotter-paper is the same sort of mixture as cocaine-in-mannitol or other common dilutants. And the judges knew (as the students answering the survey did not) that the statute provided alternative punishment levels for pure PCP and diluted PCP but treated the weight of all other drugs as including the entire "mixture or substance". This implied that the weight of LSD's carrier counts.

Even so, every judge of the seventh circuit (which sat en banc, see 908 F.2d 1312 (1991)) and every Justice of the Supreme Court deemed the statute ambiguous. It's a surprise to me that so many of the first-year students found clarity where, despite the aid of context, the members of the interpretive community found ambiguity. What divided the judges was not disagreement about the existence of ambiguity but disagreement about how to respond to that ambiguity. Some thought it appropriate to use linguistic context to make a best estimate of meaning; others wanted to put the linguistic context aside and consider practical effects—which when coupled with the rule of lenity or a desire to avoid constitutional questions led to a vote for the defendant.

I agree with his analysis, but it doesn't surprise me that the first-year students didn't recognize the ambiguity. One of the core components of "thinking like a lawyer" — which is what law school is supposed to teach — is the ability to review statutes, regulations, opinions, agreements, testimony, and other writings critically to discern the meaning of those writings.

It's thus no surprise to me that a first-year law student, with only minimal training in the law, would not perceive multiple possible interpretations of a complicated statute, particularly if they didn't have the benefit of any additional information. After all, even Congress and the President apparently didn't recognize the ambiguity or, at least, didn't find it important enough to rewrite the statute to avoid the ambiguity prior to enacting it.

Let's get back to the main finding: a reader's mindset changes the way they interpret law. Contrary to Steve Williams' response, this finding has practical implications for judges, since judges are asked to resolve ambiguities by adopting different mindsets, such as by attempting to divine the legislature's intent.

Judge Richard Posner's remarks exemplify the problem:

When judges say that the "literal" meaning of a statute should be followed unless the result is "absurd," they mean (or should I think be understood to mean) that the statute isn't clear once the context is understood.

And another way to put all this is that a statute is a communication and that in decoding a communication we draw on everything we know about the communicator and the subject matter of the communication in deciding what it means.

Problem is, that's putting the cart before the horse — what better evidence is there of a legislature's intent than the statute itself? Once we deem the statute ambiguous and start "decoding" even more ambiguous sources, like legislative history (e.g., "everything we know about the communicator and the subject matter..."), we've done little more than move into material even more ambiguous than the material with which we started.

Consider Judge Posner's opinion for the Seventh Circuit in Fitzgerald v. Chrysler Corp., 116 F. 3d 225 (7th Cir. 1997):

Read literally, [the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act] would encompass every fraud case against a corporation, provided only that a pattern of fraud and some use of the mails or of telecommunications to further the fraud were shown; the corporation would be the RICO person and the corporation plus its employees the "enterprise." The courts have excluded this far-fetched possibility by holding that an employer and its employees cannot constitute a RICO enterprise. ... We do not understand the plaintiffs to be quarreling with this exclusion, even though it doesn't emerge from the statutory language; it emerges from a desire to make the statute make sense and have some limits.

That's simply "decoding" one ambiguity (i.e., the definition of "enterprise" in the RICO Act) by way of "decoding" even greater ambiguities (i.e., divining the legislature's intent and "sensible" judicial policy by way of a variety of sources).

That's where the paper's conclusion has practical application for judges: how did Judge Posner analyze which sources to review? How did he decide the persuasive weight he gave each source? How did he interpret them: according to the meaning he found in the sources, or according to the meaning he thought an "ordinary English speaker" would find?

The canons of statutory interpretation don't provide a clear answer to any of the foregoing questions.

That brings us back to the paper's conclusions about the effect of a reader's mindset on their interpretation: since courts don't have clear guidance on what "mindset" they should use in interpreting secondary sources to decode ambiguous statutes, the study suggests they're likely to use their "internal" mindset and thereby likely to end up with biased interpretations.

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Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism all agree: it's easy to miss the details when you're focusing on something important.

That's why they all have their own form of prayer beads so the faithful don't lose count of their mantras.

Science and medicine agree: you can save lives with checklists. You can even land airplanes on water. As Captain Sully says,

If you think you’re infallible, you’re kidding yourself.

Hence checklists.

Here's the first item on the litigator's checklist:

1. Did you check the rules?

That includes the federal or state rules of civil procedure, the local rules for the venue, and the judge's own procedures.

I do that before filing every motion and upon receiving every motion. It's repetitive, in a good way: the rules are the mantra.

Count the prayer beads.

Check the checklist.

Every time.

Yesterday I received a call from defense counsel in one of my cases:

Since the judge requires a phone conference prior to the filing of a motion to compel, will you agree to withdraw your motion and set up the phone conference instead?

Really? I checked the judge's procedures before filing.

So I checked them again: no requirement for a phone conference. I emailed a copy to the defense lawyer asking him to show me where it said the judge needed a phone conference.

A few hours later, another call:

You have a copy of the judge's old procedures. He updated them in November. Take a look on the court's website.

So I did.

Sure enough, between the time I filed the case — when I downloaded a copy of the judge's procedures and saved them in the case file — and the time I filed the motion, the judge changed them.

Just goes to show that you can make a mistake even without taking a shortcut, even if you have "a little local knowledge."

Check the checklist, and check to make sure you're using the right checklist.

Every time.

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Yesterday, the Supreme Court released its opinion in Shady Grove v. Allstate.

On the whole, the issue was quite simple:

New York law prohibits class actions in suits seeking penalties or statutory minimum damages. We consider whether this precludes a federal district court sitting in diversity from entertaining a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.

The answer was no: 

The question in dispute is whether Shady Grove’s suit may proceed as a class action. Rule 23 provides an answer. It states that “[a] class action may be maintained” if two conditions are met: The suit must satisfy the criteria set forth in subdivision (a) (i.e., numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation), and it alsomust fit into one of the three categories described in subdivision (b). Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(b). By its terms this creates a categorical rule entitling a plaintiff whose suit meets the specified criteria to pursue his claim as a class action. (The Federal Rules regularly use “may” to confer categorical permission, see, e.g., Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 8(d)(2)–(3), 14(a)(1), 18(a)–(b), 20(a)(1)–(2), 27(a)(1),30(a)(1), as do federal statutes that establish procedural entitlements, see, e.g., 29 U. S. C. §626(c)(1); 42 U. S. C. §2000e–5(f)(1).) Thus, Rule 23 provides a one-size-fits-all formula for deciding the class-action question. Because §901(b) attempts to answer the same question—i.e., it states that Shady Grove’s suit “may not be maintained as a class action” (emphasis added) because of the relief it seeks—it cannot apply in diversity suits [...] .

In short, States cannot preclude state-law class actions from being filed in federal court because the federal rules specifically permit class actions.

The way in which the Supreme Court got there, however, was anything but simple:

SCALIA, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and II–A, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and STEVENS, THOMAS, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined, an opinion with respect to Parts II–B and II–D, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Part II–C, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and, THOMAS, J., joined. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. GINSBURG, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which KENNEDY, BREYER, and ALITO, JJ., joined.

Yikes.

Let's break that down.

Scalia wrote an opinion that was broken up into Parts I, II-A, II-B, II-C, and II-D.

Five justices agreed with Parts I and II-A: Scalia, Roberts, Stevens, Thomas and Sotomayor. Those two parts are thus the law of the land.

Four justices agreed with Parts II-B and II-D: Scalia, Roberts, Thomas and Sotomayor.

Three justices agreed with Part II-C: Scalia, Roberts and Thomas.

Stevens, in addition to joining Parts I and II-A, wrote a separate concurrence.

Ginsburg disagreed with all of it, so wrote a dissent, with which Kennedy, Breyer and Alito agreed.

Here's the interesting part. Stevens agreed with the result and with Parts I and II-A of Scalia's opinion, but didn't agree with the rest, so he wrote a concurrence explaining why he didn't also join Parts II-B, II-C, and II-D.

Sotomayor, in contrast, agreed with Parts I, II-A, II-B, and II-D, but not with II-C. Let's take a look at the beginning of Part II-C to figure out why not:

A few words in response to the concurrence. We understand it to accept the framework we apply—which requires first, determining whether the federal and state rules can be reconciled (because they answer different questions), and second, if they cannot, determining whether the Federal Rule runs afoul of §2072(b). Post, at 5–7 (STEVENS, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). The concurrence agrees with us that Rule 23and §901(b) conflict, post, at 15–16, and departs from usonly with respect to the second part of the test, i.e., whether application of the Federal Rule violates §2072(b), post, at 7–13. Like us, it answers no, but for a reason different from ours. Post, at 17–22.

The concurrence would decide this case on the basis, not that Rule 23 is procedural, but that the state law it displaces is procedural, in the sense that it does not “function as a part of the State’s definition of substantive rights and remedies.” Post, at 1. A state procedural rule is not preempted, according to the concurrence, so long as it is “so bound up with,” or “sufficiently intertwined with,” a substantive state-law right or remedy “that it defines the scope of that substantive right or remedy,” post, at 4, 13.

This analysis squarely conflicts with Sibbach, which established the rule we apply. [...]

Presumably, since Sotomayor did not join Part II-C, she disagreed with its criticisms of Stevens' concurrence.

Yet, she also didn't join Stevens' concurrence. She didn't give any indication as to what she thought about the debate between Part II-C (i.e., Scalia, Roberts and Thomas) and Stevens' concurrence.

Why not? We may never know.

You, however, are reading a blog, so let's speculate.

As I wrote before about Sotomayor's first opinion, in Mohawk Industries v. Carpenter, "As hoped, Justice Sotomayor has brought her trial experience to bear, and has contributed a practical understanding of how the law works at the trial level previously unseen in Supreme Court opinions."

My speculation is: Sotomayor understood that the debate between Scalia, Roberts, Thomas and Stevens was irrelevant to deciding the case at hand. The debate was, in legal terms, little more than dictum proprium that would serve only to confuse lower courts.

Every time a Supreme Court nomination comes up, politicians throw around the terms "judicial temperament" and "judicial restraint."

If you want to know what these terms mean, look no further than Justice Sotomayor.

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Via Blawgletter (and a couple other sources), the whole eleven-judge Federal Circuit issued a rare en banc opinion that held, 9-2, that Harvard, MIT, the Whitehead Institute for Biomedical Research, and Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. couldn't, well, I'll let Barry Barnett explain:

Ariad, MIT, the Whitehead Institute, and Harvard claimed that Eli Lilly infringed their patent on ways to reduce the symptoms of some diseases by causing a protein -- Nuclear Factor kappaB* -- to behave.  The problem (as Blawgletter gleans from the judges' five opinions) arises from the fact that the inventors seem not to have figured out how to suppress symptom-causing NF-kB activity.  They appear simply to have discovered that NF-kB existed and guessed that somehow bringing it to heel would help sick people feel better.

Ariad, MIT, Whitehead, and Harvard urged that the first paragraph of section 12 requires a patent to say only enough to "enable" an in-the-know person to build something that makes NF-kB curtail its hurtful conduct inside human cells.

I knew some of the folks at those places were smart, but I never realized they were so smart they didn't have to actually invent anything to get a patent. Instead, they can just describe a problem and then claim a patent over someone else's solution.

To call the case "significant" is an understatement. Among those submitting amicus briefs to the Federal Circuit were:

• The University of California
• Federal Circuit Bar Association
• Monsanto Company
• GlaxoSmithKline
• Microsoft Corporation
• Google Inc.
• Verizon Communications, Inc.

...and a dozen other schools and technology, pharmaceutical, and research companies who make—or pay—billions of dollars related to broad patents that claim to cover discoveries, but not necessarily inventions, in scientific fields.

The Federal Circuit, however, is even smarter still:

[A] separate requirement to describe one’s invention is basic to patent law. Every patent must describe an invention. It is part of the quid pro quo of a patent; one describes an invention, and, if the law’s other requirements are met, one obtains a patent. The specification must then, of course, describe how to make and use the invention (i.e., enable it), but that is a different task. A description of the claimed invention allows the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) to examine applications effectively; courts to understand the invention, determine compliance with the statute, and to construe the claims; and the public to understand and improve upon the invention and to avoid the claimed boundaries of the patentee’s exclusive rights.

[...]

Perhaps there is little difference in some fields between describing an invention and enabling one to make and use it, but that is not always true of certain inventions, including chemical and chemical-like inventions. Thus, although written description and enablement often rise and fall together, requiring a written description of the invention plays a vital role in curtailing claims that do not require undue experimentation to make and use, and thus satisfy enablement, but that have not been invented, and thus cannot be described. For example, a propyl or butyl compound may be made by a process analogous to a disclosed methyl compound, but, in the absence of a statement that the inventor invented propyl and butyl compounds, such compounds have not been described and are not entitled to a patent.

Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., pp. 12, 26.

Specific to the patent at issue,

The ’516 patent discloses no working or even prophetic examples of methods that reduce NF-κB activity, and no completed syntheses of any of the molecules prophesized to be capable of reducing NF-κB activity. The state of the art at the time of filing was primitive and uncertain, leaving Ariad with an insufficient supply of prior art knowledge with which to fill the gaping holes in its disclosure. See Capon, 418 F.3d at 1358 (“It is well-recognized that in the unpredictable fields of science, it is appropriate to recognize the variability in the science in determining the scope of the coverage to which the inventor is entitled.”).

Whatever thin thread of support a jury might find in the decoy-molecule hypothetical simply cannot bear the weight of the vast scope of these generic claims. ... Here, the specification at best describes decoy molecule structures and hypothesizes with no accompanying description that they could be used to reduce NF-κB activity. Yet the asserted claims are far broader.

Thus, the patent was invalid.

The Federal Circuit's opinion, though, goes much farther than the facts of the case, with a broad rule for future "discovery" patents:

Ariad complains that the doctrine disadvantages universities to the extent that basic research cannot be patented. But the patent law has always been directed to the “useful Arts,” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, meaning inventions with a practical use, see Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 532-36 (1966). Much university research relates to basic research, including research into scientific principles and mechanisms of action, see, e.g., Rochester, 358 F.3d 916, and universities may not have the resources or inclination to work out the practical implications of all such research, i.e., finding and identifying compounds able to affect the mechanism discovered. That is no failure of the law’s interpretation, but its intention. Patents are not awarded for academic theories, no matter how groundbreaking or necessary to the later patentable inventions of others. “[A] patent is not a hunting license. It is not a reward for the search, but compensation for its successful conclusion.” Id. at 930 n.10 (quoting Brenner, 383 U.S. at 536). Requiring a written description of the invention limits patent protection to those who actually perform the difficult work of “invention”—that is, conceive of the complete and final invention with all its claimed limitations—and disclose the fruits of that effort to the public.

That research hypotheses do not qualify for patent protection possibly results in some loss of incentive, although Ariad presents no evidence of any discernable impact on the pace of innovation or the number of patents obtained by universities. But claims to research plans also impose costs on downstream research, discouraging later invention. The goal is to get the right balance, and the written description doctrine does so by giving the incentive to actual invention and not “attempt[s] to preempt the future before it has arrived.” Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1171. As this court has repeatedly stated, the purpose of the written description requirement is to “ensure that the scope of the right to exclude, as set forth in the claims, does not overreach the scope of the inventor’s contribution to the field of art as described in the patent specification.” Rochester, 358 F.3d at 920 (quoting Reiffin v. Microsoft Corp., 214 F.3d 1342, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). It is part of the quid pro quo of the patent grant and ensures that the public receives a meaningful disclosure in exchange for being excluded from practicing an invention for a period of time. Enzo, 323 F.3d at 970.

Id., pp. 28-29 (emphases added).

I think the Federal Circuit made the right decision both on the statute and on the policy—there's a substantial consensus today that our patent system is unjustly overprotective in many areas, including biochemical research—but the decision is not without some costs. As the Circuit recognized with the "loss of incentive" part above, it was already hard for scientists to justify to non-scientist corporate managers or school trustees the value of basic research without referencing the financial upside of patentable discoveries. Now that will be even harder, since the financial upside is less lucrative and less secure.

That said, basic research progressed well enough for hundreds of years without the over-patenting we have today, and even a small increase in government funding could likely make up for any new losses due to reduced patentability. Thus, on the whole, the case is a victory for law and for science.

Continue Reading...

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Last week, Prof. Edward A. Hartnett (of Seton Hall University School of Law) posted Responding to Twombly and Iqbal: Where Do We Go from Here?

Hartnett's idea was eminently reasonable:

I also offer my own proposal, which focuses on the core issue at stake in debates about Twombly and Iqbal: should a plaintiff be able to obtain discovery in an effort to uncover evidence without which he or she cannot prevail?

Hartnett proposes amending Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to include:

Rule 12(j): Allegations Likely To Have Evidentiary Support After a Reasonable Opportunity for Discovery

If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c) that has not been deferred until trial, the claim sought to be dismissed includes an allegation specifically identified as provided in Rule 11(b)(3) as likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for discovery, the court must either (1) assume the truth of the allegation, or (2) decide whether the allegation is likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for discovery. In deciding whether an allegation is likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for discovery, the court must consider the parties‘ access to evidence in the absence of discovery and state on the record the reason for its decision.

If the court decides that the allegation is likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for discovery, it must allow for that discovery, under the standards of Rule 26, and deny the motion to dismiss. If the court decides that the allegation is not likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for discovery, the court must treat the motion as one for summary judgment under Rule 56, and provide all parties a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.

Again, eminently reasonable. Such an addition would immediately focus litigation on the real issues, thereby (1) enabling plaintiffs to conduct discovery into the most important areas while also (2) empowering defendants to have cases dismissed—prior to full discovery—if the plaintiff won't be able to prove an essential element of their case.

How could anyone think that was unfair?

The defense bar champions at Drug and Device Law tried to manufacturer an objection, but the argument degenerated into blather and insults. They barely even mention the details of Hartnett's proposal. Instead, they summarily dismissed him with:

Most of these proposals (except Professor Burbank's) actually go far beyond Twombly/Iqbal and would overrule all or most of the prior precedent we cited above. That strikes us as facially overkill and indicative of unexpressed (and in some cases, ulterior) motives at work.

...

We understand that a lot of academics feel that they have to help their students get jobs, or else eventually they won’t have jobs either.  Thus, they tend to support anything and everything that results in more, rather than less, litigation.

Oh, snap.

Then again, an accusation of "ulterior motives" probably would have meant more if it didn't come from someone paid by the hour to ensure corporations pay as little as possible to the people and families they hurt.

Frankly, reading through the post, I can't help but wonder if Beck et al. indeed have some "ulterior motive" in misrepresenting how defense lawyers use Ashcroft v. Iqbal in their practice:

So when we get a complaint, we look to see whether, there’s at least one actual fact pleaded that supports each essential element of a cause of action.  A plaintiff can plead more if s/he so pleases, but there has to be at least one – otherwise we’ll probably file a Twombly/Iqbal motion.

The implied concession there—that they won't file a motion to dismiss if "there's at least one actual fact pleaded that supports each essential element of a cause of action"—is rubbish. They don't run a charity over there at Dechert: if you file a case against one of their clients, they will come up with any argument they can to get it dismissed.

And that's where the problem with Twombly / Iqbal—really, just Iqbal—comes in. Every time a case is filed today, the defendant inevitably files a motion to dismiss claiming that the "actual facts" plead aren't "facts" at all, they're "conclusions," and so are not, under Iqbal, entitled to an assumption of truth.

What's the difference between a "fact" and a "conclusion?" Merriam-Webster says:

fact: an actual occurrence

conclusion: a reasoned judgment

Let me ask you, Dear Reader: who really won more votes in Florida in 2000, Bush or Gore?

Is your answer a "fact" or a "conclusion?" Do you know it as an actual occurrence, or did you make a reasoned judgment?

The problem with Iqbal is that it instructs courts—at the very beginning of the lawsuit, when they have nothing in front of them but a "short and plain" complaint—to perform a wildly subjective analysis about which allegations are merely "conclusions" and which of the non-conclusory allegations are "plausible." 

There's nothing new about that problem. It's the same problem that prompted Rule 8—the Rule supposedly interpreted by Iqbal—to be enacted in the first place:

You used to have the requirement that a complaint must allege the “facts” constituting the “cause of action.” I can show you thousands of cases that have gone wrong on dialectical, psychological, and technical argument as to whether a pleading contained a “cause of action”; and of whether certain allegations were allegations of “fact” or were “conclusions of law” or were merely “evidentiary” as distinguished from “ultimate” facts. In these rules there is no requirement that the pleader must plead a technically perfect “cause of action” or that he must allege “facts” or “ultimate facts.”

Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 75th Cong. 94 (1938) (statement of Edgar B. Tolman, Secretary of the Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure Appointed by the Supreme Court); quoted by p.4 of Professor Stephen Burbank's testimony before the Senate.

The whole point of Rule 8 was to ensure that the right to civil justice didn't turn on metaphysical word games.

And yet we're supposed to come full circle because, as Beck et al. continue,

Twombly/Iqbal are about reining in the cost of litigation; we might feel differently about Professor Hartnett's proposal if it required payment of all a defendant’s costs of “appropriate” (the Article's term) discovery – should designated allegations nonetheless turn out to be unfounded.  But under the proposal as offered, there’s no penalty for over-designation.  If it’s one thing that the fifty-year life span of Conley established, it’s that unrestrained pleading imposes huge discovery costs on defendants.  Even Professor Burbank (who really tried hard) was reduced to relying upon a single study of tiny cases in which even then 25% of the parties believed the process was too expensive.  The excessive cost of modern discovery is simply not a issue capable of dispute any longer.

At least Burbank actually cited something. Defense lawyers think they're entitled to assert the cost of discovery—a cost due primarily to their own practice of relentlessly frustrating discovery at every turn—is "excessive" through sheer ipse dixit.

Sounds like a "conclusion" to me, not an "actual fact."

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Via Overlawyered, Eric Goldman and others favor HR 4364, the “Citizen Participation Act of 2009,” which would establish a federal anti-SLAPP law.

Around half the States have anti-SLAPP (i.e., Anti-"Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation") statutes which make it easier to dismiss suits allegedly filed to chill freedom of speech. If the lawsuit arises from the Defendants' exercise of their rights to free speech — which in the post-Citizens United era means virtually every time a corporation advances an agenda — then the Defendant can file, at the very beginning of the lawsuit, a "special motion" that requires the Plaintiff show concrete evidence proving each element of their claims.

The laws make sense, in theory. “The hallmark of a SLAPP suit is that it lacks merit, and is brought with the goals of obtaining an economic advantage over a citizen party by increasing the cost of litigation to the point that the citizen party’s case will be weakened or abandoned, and of deterring future litigation.” United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963, 972-73 (9th Cir.1999). The purpose of anti-SLAPP laws is to ensure the prompt dismissal of “legally meritless suits filed in order to obtain a political or economic advantage over the defendant, not to vindicate a legally cognizable right of the plaintiff.” Condit v. Nat’l Enquirer, Inc., 248 F. Supp. 2d 945, 952 (E.D. Cal. 2002)(internal quotation omitted). “The paradigm SLAPP suit is an action filed by a land developer against environmental activists or objecting neighbors of the proposed development.” Id.

All well and good. Indeed, anti-SLAPP Acts are sometimes used to dismiss bogus suits in which one side really was trying "to obtain a political or economic advantage" over someone with inadequate resources to defend themselves. See Melius v. Keiffer, 980 So. 2d 167, 170 (La. Ct. App. 2008)(granting motion to strike complaint brought by owners of a bar against area resident who had opposed an expansion of the bar); Lamz v. Wells, 938 So. 2d 792, 794 (La. Ct. App. 2006)(dismissing case filed one week before election by one judicial candidate against another); Darden v. Smith, 879 So. 2d 390, 393 (La. Ct. App. 2004)(dismissing case filed by public official against individual who filed a complaint with the Louisiana Board of Ethics).

Goldman gives his own example where an anti-SLAPP motion allowed a party with limited legal resources to avoid the cost and burden of full-fledged litigation:

All too often, vendors use actual or threatened litigation to take down content that criticizes their offerings. The proposed federal anti-SLAPP law applies to those lawsuits. Thus, if enacted, the federal anti-SLAPP law will help consumers share their true feeling about marketplace offerings with less fear of meritless lawsuits from vendors who would rather fight in court than compete.

BoingBoing’s recent resolution of a lawsuit brought by MagicJack nicely illustrates the virtues of anti-SLAPP laws. BoingBoing blogged some criticisms of MagicJack’s offerings, and MagicJack unwisely responded to that post with a lawsuit. Fortunately for BoingBoing, MagicJack sued it in California, which has a robust anti-SLAPP law. As a result, BoingBoing was able to end the lawsuit early (BoingBoing won its anti-SLAPP motion less than 3 months from complaint filing) and get the court to order MagicJack to pay its attorneys’ fees of over $50k.

But it's not always David using anti-SLAPP laws against Goliath; it's often the other way around.

Consider the BoingBoing case. Let's assume that, instead of suing BoingBoing, MagicJack retaliated by secretly hiring a spam company to inundate BoingBoing and other widely-read blogs with hostile comments questioning BoingBoing's motives and favorably referring to MagicJack.

BoingBoing, having no other options, sues MagicJack.

Would those allegations show MagicJack's "acts" were "in furtherance of the right of free speech?" Sure; MagicJack has just as much a right as BoingBoing to talk about other companies. So the anti-SLAPP Act would be available.*

At the beginning of the case, then, BoingBoing would be required to prove — prior to conducting any discovery, since HR 4364 automatically stays all discovery — that MagicJack was behind the posts, that the posts were false, that the posts were capable of a defamatory meaning, and that MagicJack was at "fault" in publishing the comments (defined in many states as "acting with malice or reckless intent").

How could BoingBoing prove all that immediately after filing suit? Most of that information would be in MagicJack's possession.

Odds are, BoingBoing wouldn't be able to do it. Their case would be dismissed, and MagicJack could continue to harass BoingBoing at will.

The law of unintended consequences, as they say.

Put simply, the problem with HR 4364 is that it's an extraordinarily powerful device — one that substantially increases the costs of bringing meritorious cases and will undoubtedly result in the inadvertent dismissal of many meritorious cases — with few limitations on its use.

Often the only means that "David" has to challenge "Goliath" is through a lawsuit, like when ordinary individuals are powerless to repair the damage caused by sloppy or sensationalized journalism. Yet, if Goliath wants to use the Act to dismiss David's lawsuit, he can and will.

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It's no secret: plaintiffs like state court and defendants like federal court.

The reasons include: 

• federal juries, by virtue of their larger geographic range, include fewer urban jurors and more rural jurors, and thus (according to lawyers' lore) will award lower verdicts;
• the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure place express limits on the amount of discovery available;
• federal courts are (and were even before Ashcroft v. Iqbal) more prone to grant motions to dismiss (and motions for summary judgment) than state courts.

Even if a plaintiff files their lawsuit in state court, the defendant can "remove" the case to federal court if the case could have been filed in federal court.

There are two ways a case 'could have been filed in federal court': first, if the claim arises under federal law; second, if all plaintiffs and all defendants are citizens of different states. The latter is called "diversity" jurisdiction, and it has a long history of being "disfavored" by federal courts. As I wrote before, in discussing one of the games defendants play to remove cases, "much like how we prefer federal courts preside over cases bringing federal claims, we prefer state courts preside over cases bringing state claims."

So how do we determine of which States a corporation is a "citizen?" 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) says, "a corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of business."

Incorporation is simple enough; all corporations are incorporated in one, and only one, state, most commonly Delaware.

But where is the corporation's "principle place of business?"

The Supreme Court's answered that question yesterday in Hertz Co. v. Friend et al. Here's the facts from the opinion, with substantial edits for clarity by yours truly:

In September 2007, Melinda Friend and John Nhieu, two California citizens, sued the Hertz Corporation in California state court for violations of California’s wage and hour laws as part of a potential class action on behalf of other California citizens similarly-situated to them.

Hertz removed the case to federal court claiming that the plaintiffs and the defendant were citizens of different States, and thus the federal court had diversity jurisdiction over the claims. Friend and Nhieu, however, claimed that the Hertz Corporation was a California citizen, like themselves, and that, hence, diversity jurisdiction was lacking.

To support its position, Hertz submitted a declaration by an employee relations manager that claimed Hertz’s “principal place of business” was in New Jersey, not in California, because — though its California operations accounted for 273 of Hertz’s 1,606 car rental locations, about 2,300 of its 11,230 full-time employees, about $811 million of its $4.371 billion in annual revenue and about 3.8 million of its approximately 21 million rentals — the leadership of Hertz and its domestic subsidiaries is located at Hertz’s corporate headquarters in Park Ridge, New Jersey, where its core executive and administrative functions are carried out, except for some lesser, but still substantial, administrative operations in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.

Let's start with the big picture: this case has no business being in federal court. It's a class action brought solely by California residents alleging solely California-law claims against a company that has more business in California than anywhere else. None of the concerns underlying federal jurisdiction are present. There is no reason to believe that Hertz would be prejudiced by having the case heard by a California state court, and there are no federal issues in the case.

As the Supreme Court noted yesterday, two-hundred-and-one years ago, the Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion by Chief Justice Marshall, scoffed at the very notion that a corporation was a "citizen" entitled to diversity jurisdiction: “the term citizen ought to be understood as it is used in the constitution, and as it is used in other laws. That is, to describe the real persons who come into court, in this case, under their corporate name.” Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch 91–92 (1809); see Slip op., p.5. If that was the law today, Hertz would not be entitled to remove any state-law case from any state court, since it would be a "citizen" everywhere.

But that was then, this is now. The statute we have today says Hertz is a citizen "of any State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of business." If Hertz is sued anywhere else, it can remove the case to federal court. So where is its "principle place of business?"

Prior to the Hertz opinion yesterday, the answer depended upon the Circuit in which the case was brought. Friend's case was brought in the Ninth Circuit,

which instructs courts to identify a corporation’s “principal place of business” by first determining the amount of a corporation’s business activity State by State. If the amount of activity is “significantly larger” or “substantially predominates” in one State, then that State is the corporation’s “principal place of business.” If there is no such State, then the “principal place of business” is the corporation’s “‘nerve center,’” i.e., the place where “‘the majority of its executive and administrative functions are performed.’”

Slip op., p. 3. Other courts, like those in the Seventh Circuit, jumped straight to the "nerve center" approach.

Yesterday, the Supreme Court held that the "nerve center" test is the only test, that "the phrase 'principal place of business' refers to the place where the corporation’s high level officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation’s activities." Slip op., p. 1.

The opinion is a classic example of Justice Breyer's methodology; long on "administrative simplicity" (p. 13), short on the plain meaning rule. I will leave, as an exercise for the reader, the question of whether the Court's unanimous opinion is consistent with the originalism and formalism pressed by four, sometimes five, members of the Court.

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[UPDATE: The WSJ Law Blog has copies of the letters submitted to the Delaware Chancery Court. Professor Hazard is undoubtedly one of the pre-eminent experts in the field, and he makes a compelling argument that Cravath violated the Rules of Professional Conduct. Yet, showing a violation of the Rules is not enough — to disqualify counsel under Chancellor Chandler's standard, Airgas will have to show the violation will "materially advance" Air Product's position or undermine the fair and efficient administration of justice. So far, I haven't seen anything demonstrating that. The vague references made so far to Cravath's insider knowledge of Airgas's finances isn't enough, since a firewall within Cravath can likely cure that problem.

UPDATE II: As predicted, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania declined to enter an injunction against Cravath, and the Delaware Chancery Court did not disqualify them.]

As has been reported all over the legal media,

Industrial gas producer Airgas filed suit against Cravath, Swaine & Moore on Friday over the firm's role as legal adviser to rival Air Products on that company's $5.1 billion bid for Airgas.

... Air Products filed a complaint on Thursday in Delaware's Chancery Court against Airgas, claiming that the smaller company improperly blocked its board of directors from considering previous Air Products takeover offers. Cravath litigation partners Francis Barron, David Marriott and Gary Bornstein are representing Air Products in the Delaware litigation along with local counsel Kenneth Nachbar (he of sports gambling notoriety) and Jon Abramczyk from Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell. (Click here for the Chancery Court complaint, courtesy of The Times' Dealbook.)

Airgas responded by retaining Cozen O'Connor chairman Stephen Cozen, litigation chair Jeffrey Weil and litigation partner Thomas Wilkinson Jr., for a civil suit against Cravath in state court in Pennsylvania. In the suit, Airgas claims that Cravath has a conflict of interest and breached its fiduciary duty by representing Air Products because it previously advised Airgas on several financings. According to Airgas' complaint against Cravath, the company has had a client relationship with the firm for 10 years and has paid Cravath about $2 million, including a $320,000 payment last October.

There's an obvious question dangling over the Pennsylvania suit filed by Airgas: what basis — or power — does a state court in Pennsylvania have to preclude a New York law firm from representing a Delaware-registered company in Delaware state court litigation against another Delaware-registered company?

Unsurprisingly, that's just what Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas (Commerce Court) Judge Albert Sheppard Jr. wondered before denying Airgas' petition for a temporary restraining order:

In essence, I would be saying to a lawyer you can’t go to Delaware and represent your client. I find that difficult. I don’t want to do that.

Judge Sheppard only had it for two weeks, though, since Cravath, like virtually every out-of-state defendant, promptly removed the case to Federal court, i.e. the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, where it was assigned to Judge Eduardo Robreno (whose work in the Philadelphia Inquirer bankruptcy I've covered before).

Cravath (represented by a team at Conrad O'Brien*) has responded to the suit and has asked Judge Robreno to abstain from hearing the case at all:

First, whatever this Court may ultimately decide with respect to Airgas’s claim for money damages, Airgas’s request for a preliminary injunction is the functional equivalent of a motion to disqualify Cravath from appearing before the Delaware Chancery Court. With all due respect, Cravath submits that a motion precluding counsel from appearing in Delaware Chancery Court is more appropriately decided by Chancellor William B. Chandler III, who presides over the firstfiled Delaware litigation. Just as this Court has full authority over proceedings here, judicial comity warrants according Chancellor Chandler due authority over proceedings in his courtroom. ...

Second, the Delaware Chancery Court is aptly suited to decide the key issue presented by Airgas’s petition to this Court—whether Cravath should be disqualified. Indeed, the dispute concerning Cravath’s ability to represent Air Products is intertwined with the merits of the (firstfiled) Delaware litigation. ...

Third, whereas this Court’s ruling on Airgas’s petition for preliminary relief would be, by definition, provisional, the Delaware Chancery Court’s ruling on the question of whether Cravath should be disqualified will be a final decision on the merits.

(From Cravath's brief, available on RECAP.)

It's hard to argue with that; whatever the merits of the conflict-of-interest allegations, it seems they all relate to the Delaware litigation and so should be decided there.

Of course, there's a reason Cravath wants the case decided in Delaware's Chancery Court (and why Airgas wants it decided elsewhere). As Francis G.X. Pileggi notes:

[Airgas'] separate suit alleging a conflict was filed in Philadelphia. One might speculate that the suit was not filed in Delaware and it was not filed as a motion to disqualify, because the Delaware decisions recently have not granted many motions to disqualify. See, e.g., cases summarized on this blog here.

Indeed, one might speculate that. More on that in a moment.

Back in Delaware, it seems a war of correspondence has broken out:

Airgas (which has retained Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz) began the exchange of correspondence Monday, when it sent a letter to Chancellor William Chandler at Delaware's Court of Chancery ... In its Monday letter to Chandler, Airgas argues that a Pennsylvania courtroom is the proper place for the Cravath hearing. In response, Air Products and local counsel Kenneth Nachbar of Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell drafted their own letter to Chandler, urging him to decide on Cravath's fate in Delaware and accusing Airgas of trying to "circumvent" Chandler's authority by suing in Pennsylvania.

Airgas also has enlisted a legal ethics expert who has issued an opinion letter in which he claims Cravath was working under "a clear and serious conflict of interest" while it was helping Air Products formulate its takeover bid last fall, according to a copy of the letter obtained by The Am Law Daily. In his letter, Geoffrey Hazard Jr., a professor at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, says Cravath ... violated the so-called "hot potato" rule, which holds that a firm cannot get out of a conflict simply by dropping one client on short notice, Hazard wrote.

Like I wrote before, the hot potato rule lives. Here's a recent recitation of the rule:

Courts that have considered the issue have held that a firm will not be allowed to drop a client in order to shift resolution of the conflicts question from Rule 1.7 dealing with current clients, to the more lenient standard in Rule 1.9 dealing with former clients.

El Camino Res., LTD. v. Huntington Nat'l Bank, No. 1:07-cv-598, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67813, at *39–40 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 13, 2007).

On the surface, that's not good for Cravath — if Chancellor Chandler applies a similar analysis, then Cravath will be evaluated as if it was simultaneously representing Airgas and Air Products on both sides of the litigation, which is expressly prohibited by the Delaware, Pennsylvania and New York rules.

But the final analysis is a practical one:

The finding of an ethical violation, however, does not automatically require disqualification. The court should order disqualification only where some specifically identifiable impropriety has actually occurred and the balance of relevant factors requires vindication of the integrity of the legal profession over defendant's interest in retaining counsel of its choice.

Id.

Returning again to why Cravath wants the issue decided in Delaware by Chancellor Chandler, it bears mention here that Chancellor Chandler took a strongly disqualification-unfriendly view in a similar case a year ago, in which Dow Chemical attempted to disqualify Wachtell from representing Rohm and Haas:

I am not persuaded that Wachtell’s access to this information will materially advance Rohm and Haas’s position or undermine the fair and efficient administration of justice. Dow’s defense to specific performance is that conditions in the market and within Dow have changed significantly since December 2008 and that it is no longer feasible for the merger to close. Dow has failed to convince me that the information Wachtell had access to regarding Dow’s strategies and asset values in 2006 and 2007 will substantially advance the interest of Rohm and Haas in this litigation. Additionally, Wachtell has assured the Court that its attorneys who obtained confidential Dow information have not and will not share Dow’s client confidences with the Wachtell attorneys working on this matter. While Dow is correct that the ethical rules impute knowledge of one attorney to other attorneys in the firm, the issue before the Court is not whether there was a violation of the ethical rules. To justify disqualification, the Court must find that allowing the representation to continue would threaten the fair and efficient administration of justice, a threat that is greatly reduced by a credible representation to the Court that the firm will ensure that the attorneys working on this matter do not have access to Dow’s client confidences. Dow has failed to point to information or confidences obtained by Wachtell in its 2006-2007 work for Dow that will have a material influence on the proceedings before me today.

Rohm and Haas Co. v. Dow Chem. Co., No. 4309-CC, 2009 WL 445609, at *3 (Del. Ch. Feb. 12, 2009)(also courtesy of Pileggi).

Truth be told, there's not much distinguishing the Rohm and Haas v. Dow situation from the present case with Cravath, except for the "hot potato" rule aspect, given how Cravath's work for Airgas was much more recent than Wachtell's work was for Dow. Indeed, it seems Cravath's work for Airgas unambiguously overlapped its work for Air Products.

As noted above, though, a mere violation of the rules isn't enough; the question is what prejudice the former client will suffer and if that prejudice can be avoided. Cravath's work for Airgas was comparatively small, and if Cravath sets up an ethical firewall that keeps the former Airgas attorneys away from the Air Products lawsuit, that will likely be enough to satisfy Chancellor Chandler.

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Back in December, the Supreme Court held oral argument on Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection. Though the case raises several issues, the primary question is:

The Florida Supreme Court invoked “nonexistent rules of state substantive law” to reverse 100 years of uniform holdings that littoral rights are constitutionally protected. In doing so, did the Florida Court’s decision cause a “judicial taking” proscribed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution?

(See the summary at SCOTUSWiki for more.) "Judicial taking" is in quotes for a reason: the claim has never been recognized by any Federal court.

The founder of our firm, James E. Beasley, Sr., used to say "law is made on a lawyer's desk."

Let me explain.

Brown v. Board of Education was not a simple change of heart by the Supreme Court. It was the culmination of a century of litigation challenging the treatment of African Americans in education.

Even the reasoning of Brown v. Board of Education — striking down Plessy v. Ferguson by holding "separate but equal" was inherently unequal — was born not in the Supreme Court's chambers in 1954, but on Charles Hamilton Houston's desk in the 1930s. Whole books have been written on the strategy and the years of internal debates within the NAACP as to how to best frame the issue for a favorable Supreme Court opinion.

Courts do not, and cannot, change the law on their own. Federal courts in particular need a "case or controversy" to act at all.

To make new law, Federal and state courts need lawyers who can envision how the law should change before even filing suit, lawyers who can carefully guide the case — from the factual record to the preservation of arguments — through the trial courts and to the Supreme Court with the issue properly framed for judicial disposition. 

All of that happens on a lawyer's desk.

Back to Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. How do you get a court to recognize a claim that has never been recognized before?

First, you argue that precedent has implicitly supported the claim all along:

This Court’s prior cases provide a sound doctrinal basis for adopting a judicial takings doctrine. Specifically, this Court should adopt the judicial takings test articulated by Justice Stewart in Hughes that a state judicial decision effects a taking under the U.S. Constitution when it “constitutes a sudden change in state law, unpredictable in terms of relevant precedents.” See Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 296 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring).

This Court has expressly held that the Equal Protection and the Due Process Clauses apply to state judiciaries. The Takings Clause should apply to state courts as well. Without such a doctrine, a state is free to clothe one of its agents with the power to violate the U.S. Constitution. Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1879).

Merits Brief, pp. 17–18.

Second, you argue why recognizing the claim is a good idea anyway:

First, nothing in the text of the Fifth Amendment suggests that it applies to one branch of government and not others. ... Second, the Takings Clause is founded upon basic notions of fairness and justice. ... Third, this Court’s takings jurisprudence provides no basis for distinguishing between action of a state’s court and those of its legislative or executive branches. ... Fourth, if state courts are free to reorder property rights insulated from the Takings Clause’s requirement to pay compensation, then the legislative and executive branches will no longer change the law themselves (and pay for it); rather they will encourage the judiciary to make the change so that the state does not have to pay compensation. ... Fifth, the stability of property rights is the foundation for a healthy economy.

Id., pp. 44–47.

Finally, you address why recognizing the claim will not 'open up the floodgates' to further litigation:

Despite suggestions to the contrary, a judicial takings doctrine based on Justice Stewart’s test is workable and will not result in a flood of litigation. Lower courts have had little trouble recognizing a sudden and dramatic change in property law. ... Moreover, the proposed ad-hoc test can be applied easily just like other ad-hoc tests this Court has developed.

Id., p. 48. Whoever is opposing the claim will inevitably argue that your claim will "open the floodgates," so it is essential that you use some form of the "flood" metaphor. (Don't believe me? Here's all 101 times in the last two years the "floodgates" metaphor has been used in briefs filed with the Supreme Court.)

Will it work? It's hard to tell. Justice Stevens, a Florida property-holder, recused himself, creating the possibility of a 4-4 split, which would leave the Florida Supreme Court's opinion intact and would not create new law.

Moreover, the Supreme Court is typically hesitant to second-guess a state Supreme Court's interpretations of its own laws (unless, of course, the case is Bush v. Gore). Property law, in turn, is purely a creation of state common law, unmoored from even the canons of statutory construction, much less Federal constitutional principles.

If new law is made by this case, it will have been made not in the chambers of the Supreme Court, but rather on the desk of the many lawyers who developed the theory of "judicial taking" over the years and the lawyers filed Stop the Beach Renourishment's petition back in 2004.

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Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) is, as I wrote before, the Tale of Genji for electronic discovery. It is as widely-cited as all but the most prominent of Supreme Court opinions.

Gregory P. Joseph brings us selections from Judge Scheindlin’s new magnum opus on the subject, Pension Comm. of Univ. of Montreal, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4546 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2010):

In an era where vast amounts of electronic information is available for review, discovery in certain cases has become increasingly complex and expensive. Courts cannot and do not expect that any party can meet a standard of perfection. Nonetheless, the courts have a right to expect that litigants and counsel will take the necessary steps to ensure that relevant records are preserved when litigation is reasonably anticipated, and that such records are collected, reviewed, and produced to the opposing party. As discussed six years ago in the Zubulake opinions, when this does not happen, the integrity of the judicial process is harmed and the courts are required to fashion a remedy. Once again, I have been compelled to closely review the discovery efforts of parties in a litigation, and once again have found that those efforts were flawed. As famously noted, "[t]hose who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it." By now, it should be abundantly clear that the duty to preserve means what it says and that a failure to preserve records — paper or electronic — and to search in the right places for those records, will inevitably result in the spoliation of evidence.

The Court granted sanctions in the form of an adverse inference / spolitation instruction and monetary compensation to opposing counsel.

Going forward, courts will no longer accept excuses when corporations allow relevant evidence to be destroyed by failing to implement adequate controls:

After a discovery duty is well established, the failure to adhere to contemporary standards can be considered gross negligence. Thus, after the final relevant Zubulake opinion in July, 2004, the following failures support a finding of gross negligence, when the duty to preserve has attached:

• to issue a written litigation hold;
• to identify all of the key players and to ensure that their electronic and paper records are preserved;
• to cease the deletion of email or to preserve the records of former employees that are in a party's possession, custody, or control; and
• to preserve backup tapes when they are the sole source of relevant information or when they relate to key players, if the relevant information maintained by those players is not obtainable from readily accessible sources.

(Emphasis and formatting added).

Consider yourselves warned.

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Before Ashcroft v. Iqbal improperly re-wrote the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly foolishly imposed a new hurdle for plaintiffs who brought antitrust claims. Specifically, in Twombly the Supreme Court held,

In applying these general standards to a §1 claim [e.g., a price-fixing claim], we hold that stating such a claim requires a complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made. Asking for plausible grounds to infer an agreement does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement. ...[A]n allegation of parallel conduct and a bare assertion of conspiracy will not suffice. Without more, parallel conduct does not suggest conspiracy, and a conclusory allegation of agreement at some unidentified point does not supply facts adequate to show illegality. Hence, when allegations of parallel conduct are set out in order to make a §1 claim, they must be placed in a context that raises a suggestion of a preceding agreement, not merely parallel conduct that could just as well be independent action.

... A statement of parallel conduct, even conduct consciously undertaken, needs some setting suggesting the agreement necessary to make out a §1 claim; without that further circumstance pointing toward a meeting of the minds, an account of a defendant’s commercial efforts stays in neutral territory. An allegation of parallel conduct is thus much like a naked assertion of conspiracy in a §1 complaint: it gets the complaint close to stating a claim, but without some further factual enhancement it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of “entitle[ment] to relief.”

A number of defense lawyers — and, unfortunately, courts — have interpreted the above language to mean that an antitrust plaintiff can only "raise[ ] a suggestion of a preceding agreement" by proving, at the beginning of the lawsuit, that the defendants secretly agreed to raise prices together.

But how do you prove a secret agreement before you can use court processes to conduct an investigation?

Normally, you can't.

Catch-22.

Thankfully, the Second Circuit has just corrected those errors in reversing dismissal of a price-fixing case against several digital music companies. As the opinion (PDF) holds:

Defendants’ arguments that plaintiffs have failed to state a claim are without merit. Defendants first argue that a plaintiff seeking damages under Section 1 of the Sherman act must allege facts that “tend[] to exclude independent self-interested conduct as an explanation for defendants’ parallel behavior.” Appellee’s Br. 15-17. This is incorrect. Although the Twombly court acknowledged that for purposes of summary judgment a plaintiff must present evidence that tends to exclude the possibility of independent action, 550 U.S. at 554, and that the district court below had held that plaintiffs must allege additional facts that tended to exclude independent self-interested conduct, id. at 552, it specifically held that, to survive a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs need only “enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made,” id. at 556; see also 2 Areeda & Hovenkamp § 307d1 (3d ed. 2007) (“[T]he Supreme Court did not hold that the same standard applies to a complaint and a discovery record . . . . The ‘plausibly suggesting’ threshold for a conspiracy complaint remains considerably less than the ‘tends to rule out the possibility’ standard for summary judgment.”).

Defendants next argue that Twombly requires that a plaintiff identify the specific time, place, or person related to each conspiracy allegation. This is also incorrect. The Twombly court noted, in dicta, that had the claim of agreement in that case not rested on the parallel conduct described in the complaint, “we doubt that the . . . references to an agreement among the [Baby Bells] would have given the notice required by Rule 8 . . [because] the pleadings mentioned no specific time, place, or person involved in the alleged conspiracies.” 550 at 565 n.10. In this case, as in Twombly, the claim of agreement rests on the parallel conduct described in the complaint. Therefore, plaintiffs were not required to mention a specific time, place or person involved in each conspiracy allegation.

Starr et al v. Sony BMG et al., slip op., 08-5637 (2d Cir., January 13, 2010), pp. 15-16.

It's hard to call the opinion a "win" for antitrust plaintiffs — Twombly should have been better decided — but it definitely leaves antitrust plaintiffs better off than they were before.

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As Patently-O reports this morning, 

The Supreme Court recently rejected Medela's petition for certiorari arguing that the conclusion of obviousness should be made by a judge rather than a lay jury.

In the wake of Medela's failure, Acushnet (maker of Titleist) is now asking the Supreme Court to hold that "a court reviewing a jury's [obviousness] verdicts must always independently render its own legal conclusion regardless of whether one or all of the jury's underlying findings are accepted as adequately supported by the evidence." Taking that a step-further, Acushnet argues that a jury's verdict on the question of obviousness should be seen as "entirely advisory as to the ultimate legal conclusion." 

Medela was intriguing — and Acushnet would be even more intriguing — because many believed that the Supreme Court's unanimous opinion in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc. gave the courts even more power to dispose of patent infringement cases prior to reaching a jury trial by making the court involved even further in determining the "nonobviousness"* of new inventions.

The denial of certiorari in Medela, however, implied the opposite, thereby preserving the primary role of juries — to resolve factual disputes — in patent cases.  A denial of certiorari in Acushnet would be a big win for plaintiffs, since it would empower them to argue that the district court can only grant summary judgment if there is no way the jury could find the patented invention "nonobvious."

On the merits of the petition, Acushnet's argument is incompatible with the civil litigation and jury trial system envisioned by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. We don't demand jury service from ordinary citizens, particularly the weeks of jury service required for patent trials, just so they can render "advisory opinions." We demand jury service to evaluate the material facts over which there is a "genuine" dispute.

Continue Reading...

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Another interesting statutory construction case arising from allegations scientists at Cornell University Medical College and Thomas Jefferson University "misrepresented the findings of their DNA research when they applied for National Institute of Health research grants and did not correct the misrepresentations on subsequent progress reports and renewal applications." Problem is, the grants in question were filed back in the 1990s.

As Judge Savage recounts,

The [False Claims Act] prohibits 'any person from making false or fraudulent claims for payment to the United States.' Graham County Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 545 U.S. 409, 411, 125 S. Ct. 2444, 162 L. Ed. 2d 390 (2005); 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a). Any person found liable for violating the FCA is subject to a civil penalty of $ 5,000 to $ 10,000 per violation and treble damages. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a) (West Supp. 2008); Hutchins v. Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer, 253 F.3d 176, 181 (3d Cir. 2001).

An action under the FCA may be commenced in one of two ways. The attorney general may sue on behalf of the United States government; or, a private individual, known as a relator, can bring a qui tam action. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(a), (b)(1); Graham County, 545 U.S. at 411-12 (citing Vermont Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 769-72, 120 S. Ct. 1858, 146 L. Ed. 2d 836 (2000)). Because the relator brings the action on behalf of the government, he must give the government notice of the action. The government has sixty days from the filing of a qui tam complaint to elect to intervene in the action, and, for good cause shown, can petition the court to permit it to intervene at a later date. Graham County, 545 U.S. at 412; § 3730(b)(2) and (c)(3).

A civil action under the FCA must be brought within six years of the violation or within three years of the date when the government learned or should have learned the facts material to the violation, whichever is later. Id. §§ (b)(1), (2). In no event may an action be brought after ten years of a violation. Id. Specifically, the FCA statute of limitations provides:

(b) A civil action under [the False Claims Act] may not be brought -

(1) more than 6 years after the date on which the violation of [the False Claims Act] is committed, or

(2) more than 3 years after the date when facts material to the right of action are known or reasonably should have been known by the official of the United States charged with responsibility to act in the circumstances, but in no event more than 10 years after the date on which the violation is committed,

whichever occurs last.

31 U.S.C.A. § 3731(b) (2003).

The critical difference between § (b)(1) and (b)(2) is that under § (b)(1), the statute of limitations begins to run when the violation occurs, whereas under § (b)(2), it begins to run when the appropriate person learned or should have learned facts putting him on notice that a violation occurred. A conflict arises from the interplay between the unusual procedure allowing a private party to bring a qui tam action on behalf of the government and the language of the tolling provision, which appears to relate only to the government. It is this conflict that raises the issues confronting us in this case."

United States ex rel. Bauchwitz, No. 04-2892, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111919, at *23–25 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 2009).

There's no obvious right answer:

The circuits and district courts that have considered the issue are split as to whether § 3731(b)(2) applies to private relators in actions where the government has not intervened. The Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, Fifth and Tenth Circuits have held that the tolling provision does not apply to qui tam actions where the government has not intervened. United States ex rel. Sanders v. N. Am. Bus Indus., 546 F.3d 288 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2793, 174 L. Ed. 2d 291 (2009); United States ex rel. Erskine v. Baker, 213 F.3d 638, 2000 WL 554644 (5th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table opinion); United States ex rel. Sikkenga v. Regence Bluecross Blueshield of Utah, 472 F.3d 702, 725 (10th Cir. 2006). In contrast, the Ninth Circuit, as well as district courts in Massachusetts, Georgia and Illinois, apply § 3731(b)(2) to private actions even where the government has not intervened. United States ex rel. Hyatt v. Northrup Corp., 91 F.3d 1211, 1214, 1217 (9th Cir. 1996); United States ex rel. Ven-A-Care v. Actavis Mid Atlantic LLC, ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92945, 2009 WL 3171798 (D. Mass. 2009); United States ex rel. Lewis v. Walker, No. 3:06-CV-16, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68208, 2007 WL 2713018 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 14, 2007); United States ex rel. Bidani v. Lewis, No. 97 C 6502, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3530, 1999 WL163053 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 1999). The Third Circuit has not decided the issue.

Id. at *51–52.

Although the Third Circuit's precedent leans towards allowing relators in non-intervention cases to rely on statutory provisions arguably meant only for use by the government when it intervenes, the Supreme Court says otherwise:

The Third Circuit's view of the relator's status vis-a-vis the government is no longer viable in light of the Supreme Court's recent holding in United States ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York, 129 S. Ct. 2230, 173 L. Ed. 2d 1255 (2009). There, the Supreme Court held that the relator in a non-intervened FCA case cannot invoke the sixty-day deadline applicable to the United States as a party for filing a notice of appeal under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B). Resolving the circuit split, the Supreme Court determined that the government's retaining an interest in an FCA case in which it has not intervened does not make it a 'party.' 129 S. Ct. at 2233. It concluded that this interest does not convert the government's status as a real party in interest to that of a 'party' in the litigation in which it has declined to intervene. Id. at 2235. Consequently, the relator cannot be deemed to have the same status as the government.

Because the Third Circuit's rationale regarding the relator's status in Rodriguez has been rejected, it cannot support a holding that would permit a relator to take advantage of a tolling provision applicable only to the government. 54 It has been replaced by the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Eisenstein. Therefore, following that reasoning, we conclude that the three-year tolling period in § 3731(b)(2) does not apply in cases where the government does not intervene.

Id. at *55–56.

Summary judgment granted, case dismissed. It's not good material for appeal or certiorari, either, as the Eastern District of Pennsylvania also held "Even if the tolling provision applies, as [plaintiff] argues it does, the result would be the same. Because [relator] possessed knowledge of the facts underpinning his allegations regarding all three areas of the defendants' fraudulent statements by 1999 and their probable connection to grants, the claims that are barred by the six-year limitations period would also be barred by the three-year tolling period."

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The Mohawk Industries v. Carpenter (08-678) slip opinion, written by Justice Sotomayor, is available here. Here is the core of the reasoning:

The crucial question, however, is not whether an interest is important in the abstract; it is whether deferring review until final judgment so imperils the interest as to justify the cost of allowing immediate appeal of the entire class of relevant orders. We routinely require litigants to wait until after final judgment to vindicate valuable rights, including rights central to our adversarial system.See, e.g., Richardson-Merrell, 472 U. S., at 426 (holding an order disqualifying counsel in a civil case did not qualify for immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine); Flanagan v. United States, 465 U. S. 259, 260 (1984) (reaching the same result in a criminal case, notwithstanding the Sixth Amendment rights at stake). In Digital Equipment, we rejected an assertion that collateral order review was necessary to promote “the public policy favoring voluntary resolution of disputes.” 511 U. S., at 881. “It defies common sense,” we explained, “to maintain that parties’ readiness to settle will be significantly dampened (or the corresponding public interest impaired) by a rule that a district court’s decision to let allegedly barred litigation go forward may be challenged as a matter of favor.” Ibid.

We reach a similar conclusion here. In our estimation, postjudgment appeals generally suffice to protect the rights of litigants and assure the vitality of the attorney-client privilege. Appellate courts can remedy the improper disclosure of privileged material in the same way they remedy a host of other erroneous evidentiary rulings: by vacating an adverse judgment and remanding for a new trial in which the protected material and its fruits are excluded from evidence.

As hoped, Justice Sotomayor has brought her trial experience to bear, and has contributed a practical understanding of how the law works at the trial level previously unseen in Supreme Court opinions:

Moreover, were attorneys and clients to reflect upon their appellate options, they would find that litigants confronted with a particularly injurious or novel privilege ruling have several potential avenues of review apart from collateral order appeal. First, a party may ask the district court to certify, and the court of appeals to accept, an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §1292(b). The preconditions for §1292(b) review—“a controlling question of law,” the prompt resolution of which “may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation”—are most likely to be satisfied when a privilege ruling involves a new legal question or is of special consequence, and district courts should not hesitate to certify an interlocutory appeal in such cases. Second, in extraordinary circumstances—i.e., when a disclosure order “amount[s] to a judicial usurpation of power or a clear abuse of discretion,” or otherwise works a manifest injustice—a party may petition the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus. Cheney v. United States Dist. Court for D. C., 542 U. S. 367, 390 (2004) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Firestone, 449 U. S., at 378–379, n. 13.3 While these discretionary review mechanisms do not provide relief in every case, they serve as useful “safety valve[s]” for promptly correcting serious errors. Digital Equipment, 511 U. S., at 883.

Another long-recognized option is for a party to defy a disclosure order and incur court-imposed sanctions. District courts have a range of sanctions from which to choose, including “directing that the matters embraced in the order or other designated facts be taken as established for purposes of the action,” “prohibiting the disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses,” or “striking pleadings in whole or in part.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 37(b)(2)(i)–(iii). Such sanctions allow a party to obtain post judgment review without having to reveal its privileged information. Alternatively, when the circumstances warrant it, a district court may hold a noncomplying party in contempt. The party can then appeal directly from that ruling, at least when the con-tempt citation can be characterized as a criminal punishment. See, e.g., Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U. S. 9, 18, n. 11 (1992); Firestone, 449 U. S., at 377; Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U. S. 323, 328 (1940); see also Wright & Miller §3914.23, at 140–155.

(emphasis added).

I wrote before about Mohawk Industries v. Carpenter. Essentially, a host of corporate defense interests and, disturbingly, the ABA, urged the Supreme Court hold that large corporate defendants with the financial wherewithal to over-litigate cases were special and thus entitled to more appellate review than individuals.

The Supreme Court today held otherwise. It is a good ruling — by a unanimous court — that eliminates a one-sided rule that large corporations routinely used to frustrate and to delay cases. One of the most common tricks played by corporate defense lawyers goes something like this:

• First, the defense files a motion attaching cherry-picked internal documents supporting their defense, some of which were either reviewed by, or drafted by, the corporation's counsel;
• Second, when the plaintiff requests information related to those documents, the defendant asserts attorney-client privilege;
• Third, when the district court rules against the defendant, the defendant immediately files an appeal.

That game alone would add two or more years to litigation.

No longer.

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As I’ve written before, health care is “one of the ugliest businesses in America.” Health care litigation is often just as contentious.

Today’s example comes from Robotics v. Deviedma, No. 09-cv-3552, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112077 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2009), which denied in part and granted in part Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

The facts:

Health Robotics, S.r.L. ("HRSRL") is an Italian company that designs, develops, markets and licences robotic medical preparation products. Plaintiff, Devon Robotics, signed two agreements with HRSRL for the distribution of two robotic medication preparation products for hospitals and health care facilities, i.v.Station and CytoCare. … At the time these agreements were negotiated and signed, Mr. DeViedma, one of the Defendants, served as General Counsel for HRSRL. These contracts between Devon Robotics and HRSRL contained an identical arbitration clause which requires all disputes arising from the agreement to be arbitrated in Switzerland.

Plaintiffs claim that on March 1, 2009, Mr. DeViedma was hired as Devon Robotics' Chief Operating Officer ("COO"). In his position as COO, DeViedma was solely responsible for the management of sales, marketing, support and installation of CytoCare robots on Devon's behalf. All of Devon Robotics' employees reported directly to DeViedma. Additionally, Mr. DeViedma served as the primary contact between Devon and HRSRL.

* * *

In December 2008, Devon Robotics began negotiating a contract with McKesson Corporation, another defendant, which would give McKesson the right to distribute CytoCare within a certain territory in the United States. DeViedma played a key role in negotiating the contract as Devon Robotics' COO. On December 22, 2008, Devon Robotics and McKesson entered into a Confidential Disclosure and Non-Competition Agreement prohibiting McKesson from divulging or using any confidential information for any purpose other than analyzing its deal with Devon. After executing the agreement, McKesson engaged in extensive due diligence. According to Plaintiffs, around March 2009, McKesson and Devon reached an oral agreement regarding the material terms of the Exclusive Distribution, Licensing, Services and Support Agreement. The only thing that was needed to finalize the agreement was to allow McKesson's due diligence of HRSRL in Italy. However, DeViedma, in his capacity as an officer of HRSRL, refused to permit McKesson representatives to visit Italy and complete the due diligence.

Later, after McKesson and Devon Robotics failed to come to an agreement, HRSRL terminated the CytoCare Agreement with Devon Robotics on July 30, 2009. Then on August 10, 2009, McKesson and HRSRL entered into a five year agreement granting McKesson distribution rights with regard to CytoCare in various areas in North America which had previously been controlled by Devon Robotics.

Naturally, Devon sued everyone, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, tortious interference with current and prospective contractual relations, defamation, and conspiracy.

Defendants first moved under Rule 12(b)(1) to dismiss on the grounds that the Devon/HRSRL agreements compelled arbitration:

[A]s this Court noted in Miron, the presumption of arbitrability has never been extended to claims by or against non-signatories. Miron v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 342 F. Supp. 2d 324 (E.D. Pa. 2004); see, e.g., Medtronic Ave Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 367 F.3d 147, 100 Fed. Appx. 865 (3rd Cir. 2004) (quoting Sweet Dreams Unlimited, Inc. v. Dial-A-Mattress International, Ltd., 1 F.3d 639, 642 (7th Cir. 1993)). Because arbitration is a matter of contract, exceptional circumstances must apply before a court will impose a contractual agreement to arbitrate on a non-contracting party. AT&T Tech., 475 U.S. at 650. However, as this Court again noted in Miron, there are five established theories under which non-signatories may be bound to the arbitration agreements of others: (1) incorporation by reference; (2) assumption; (3) agency; (4) veil-piercing/alter ego; and (5) estoppel. Thomson-CFS v. American Arbitration Association, 64 F.3d 773, 776 (2d Cir. 1995). Furthermore, where the party seeking enforcement of the arbitration clause is a willing non-signatory an alternative theory of reverse estoppel may apply. Thomson-CFS, 64 F.3d at 779.

The only theory under which DeViedma may be able to enforce the arbitration clause is the alternative estoppel theory. The alternative estoppel theory binds a signatory to arbitrate at a non-signatory's insistence where there is an obvious and close nexus between the non-signatories and the contract or the contracting parties. E.I. DuPont, 269 F.3d at 199. The two-part test for alternative estoppel requires a court to determine whether there is a 'close relationship between the entities involved,' and examine the 'relationship of the alleged wrongs to the nonsignatory's obligations and duties in the contract.' E.I. DuPont, 269 F.3d at 199 (citing Thomson-CSF, 64 F.3d at 779); see also Bannett, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 360. To satisfy the second part of the test, the non-signatory seeking enforcement of an arbitration agreement must show that the claims against them are 'intimately founded in and intertwined with' the underlying obligations of the contract to which they were not a party. E.I. DuPont, 269 F.3d at 199 (citing Thomson-CSF, 64 F.3d at 779).

The essential question in situations such as these is whether plaintiffs would have an independent right to recover against the non-signatory defendants even if the contract containing the arbitration clause were void. 'The plaintiff's actual dependence on the underlying contract in making out the claim against the nonsignatory defendant is therefore always the sine qua non of an appropriate situation for applying equitable estoppel.' Price Plaintiffs v. Humana Ins. Co., 285 F.3d 971, 976 (11th Cir. 2002) (rev'd on other grounds, PacifiCare Health Sys. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401, 123 S. Ct. 1531, 155 L. Ed. 2d 578 (2002)). In In re Humana, the Eleventh Circuit held that equitable estoppel was inappropriate where plaintiffs brought a RICO suit against a non-signatory defendant, because the RICO claims were based on a statutory remedy apart from any available remedy for breach of the underlying contract. In re Humana, 285 F.3d at 976."

Robotics v. Deviedma, No. 09-cv-3552, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112077, at *11–13 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2009). Three strikes, one hit for the defendants:

It is not proper to dismiss this claim in favor of arbitration because the breach of fiduciary duty claim does not arise out of the various agreements between Devon Robotics and HRSRL. …

Plaintiffs' claim of tortious interference with current and prospective contractual relations is not subject to the arbitration clauses in the various agreements between Devon Robotics and HRSRL. Count V of Plaintiffs claim is based on DeViedma's alleged interference with various validation contracts. These contracts are not intimately intertwined with the i.v.Station and CytoCare agreements. …

Plaintiffs' claim of defamation is not subject to the arbitration clauses in the various agreements between Devon Robotics and HRSRL. …

To the extent that Plaintiffs' claim of conspiracy is based on the termination of the CytoCare agreement, their claim is dismissed. Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges that the Defendants conspired to wrongfully terminate the CytoCare agreement. The determination as to whether the agreement was wrongfully terminated will be intimately related to the terms of the agreement. Additionally, there is an extremely close nexus between the non-signatory parties and Devon Robotics.

Id. at 13–16.

Defendants next moved under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss the claims on the merits, with three strikes (on the breach of fiduciary duty, tortious interference with current contractual relations, and defamation claims) and hits on the rest. Most notably, “Devon Robotics has pled that it had several validation contracts with different hospitals, that DeViedma purposefully interfered with those contracts for his own benefit, without justification, and that as a result, Devon lost substantial amounts of business. These pleadings are sufficient to establish a claim for tortious interference with existing contractual relations.”

Though the Court “grant[ed] Plaintiffs leave to amend their tortious interference with prospective contractual relations to include any claims related to the McKesson negotiations,” it added the caveat that “Although the Court granted leave to amend the tortious interference claim and Plaintiffs may choose to attempt to amend their conspiracy claim, it should be noted that the Court likely lacks jurisdiction over any underlying torts asserted in support of the conspiracy claim based on the CytoCare or i.v.Station agreements due to the arbitration clauses in the agreements.”

A big win for Devon Robotics and a guide for future plaintiffs — in the face of an arguably applicable arbitration agreement, they kept alive the core of their suit: breach of fiduciary duty, tortious interference, and defamation.

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Oh, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, will we ever stop blogging about you?

The newest online debate pits the class action defense lawyers at Drug & Device Law against University of Pennsylvania Law School Professor Stephen Burbank at PENNumbra, the online supplement to UPenn's Law Review.

Beck and Herrmann open with a defense of Iqbal on several grounds, including:

[C]ourts have no legitimate basis for favoring plaintiffs when interpreting pleading standards. A just system does not pick sides in advance, but instead establishes neutral rules. We reject the normative view that it is somehow “better” to let unmeritorious cases proceed than to risk that meritorious cases will be dismissed. Either way represents error, and neither error is inherently better than the other. Indeed, given the enormous transaction costs that litigation entails, Type II errors (false negatives) are probably preferable to Type I errors (false positives) from a purely economic perspective.

From a "purely economic perspective" it is better if corporations stop wrongfully causing damage in the first place, which they will only do if they have an economic incentive like the threat of legal liability.

But there's a bigger problem with Beck and Herrmann's argument.

It is an "error" when a court dismisses a meritorious case. It is a particularly unjust, unfair, and avoidable "error" when a court dismisses a meritorious case prior to any discovery.

It is not, however, an "error" for a court to refuse to dismiss a case that may be unmeritorious.

Why not? Because the case may be meritorious and, if it is not, the defendant has four more opportunities to resolve the case favorably by testing the merits of plaintiff's claim: judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, trial, and post-trial relief. That is to say, even after the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff's claims will be assessed, re-assessed, re-re-assessed, then re-re-re-assessed. Then there's an appeal to re-re-re-re-assess each and every element of plaintiff's claims and each and every element of plaintiff's damages.

When a court declines to dismiss an unmeritorious case, there is ample room for error-correction down the road to ensure plaintiff's claims have merit. It's why we have a civil justice system: to provide a thorough airing and evaluation of disputes.

When a court dismisses a meritorious case, however, the only error-correction is a single appeal that will be evaluated under the same unfair anti-plaintiff standard established by Iqbal.

Beck and Herrmann have it exactly backwards: there is "no legitimate basis" for not favoring plaintiffs when interpreting pleading standards. Their "neutral" interpretation of pleading rules is not "neutral" at all, but rather a "normative view" that plaintiffs are not entitled to the same error-correcting procedures to which defendants are entitled.

A "just system" wouldn't pick defendant's side in advance.

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"Removal" is the process by which a defendant in a state court case "removes" the case to federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) makes it sound so simple:

Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties. Any other such action shall be removable only if none of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.

There are two ideas behind removal, each expressed in their own sentence above. (If you're in the mood for some light reading of 18th century constitutional debates, here's primary source material on federal court jurisdiction.)

The first idea (in the first sentence) is that defendants have the right to have claims made against them under federal law heard by a federal court. For example, if plaintiff brings a claim under the RICO Act, a claim for violation of federal constitutional rights, or a claim under the Lanham Act, then the defendant has the right to remove the case to federal court so that a federal court will preside over the federal claims.

The second idea (in the second sentence) dates to the beginning of our Republic: federal courts, where the judges were appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, were (and still are) perceived as being less likely to be biased in favor of local litigants than state courts, where the judges were either elected by the public or appointed by state officials. The "other such actions" described by 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) refer to cases brought under "diversity" jurisdiction, which allows plaintiffs in one state to sue defendants in another state in federal court, regardless of the claims brought. Thus, out-of-state defendants concerned about bias in a plaintiff's home state can remove cases if the case could have been filed in federal court in the first place under "diversity" jurisdiction.

Diversity jurisdiction, however, is disfavored by the federal courts. Personally, I think the most simple reason for the federal courts' dislike for diversity jurisdiction is because, much like how we prefer federal courts preside over cases bringing federal claims (as reflected by the first part of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)), we prefer state courts preside over cases bringing state claims. Much like how a defendant has an interest in having federal law claims against them heard in federal court, a plaintiff has an interest in having their state law claims heard in state court.

The United States Constitution provides for a limited federal government, including a limited federal judiciary. Thus, the requirements for removal have been strictly construed, since loosely construing them would violate basic principles of federalism:

Because lack of jurisdiction would make any decree in the case void and the continuation of the litigation in federal court futile, the removal statute should be strictly construed and all doubts resolved in favor of remand." Abels v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 F.2d 26, 29 (3d Cir. 1985) (citations omitted). If there is any doubt as to the propriety of removal, that case should not be removed to federal court. See Boyer v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108, 111 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1085, 111 S. Ct. 959, 112 L. Ed. 2d 1046 (1991).

Brown v. Francis, 75 F.3d 860, 864–865 (3d Cir. 1996). 

The latest "fad" among defense lawyers — more on the source of the word "fad" in a moment — is to hire companies to monitor state court dockets for suits against big corporations, particularly class actions alleging product liability. The moment a plaintiff files a lawsuit that includes any out-of-state defendants, the big corporations collude to have the out-of-state defendant file for removal, on the grounds that the in-state defendants haven't been "properly joined and served" yet.

It doesn't matter if the case involves 99 in-state defendants and 1 out-of-state defendant. It doesn't matter, if, quite obviously, the case could not have been filed in the first instance as a diversity case, since it involves in-state defendants, too. The big corporations found themselves a dubious loophole and decided to run with it.

And run with it they have: the defense gurus at Drug & Device Law have tallied a few dozen of these cases across the country. The defense argument is always the same: under the "plain meaning" of the statute, we can remove any case we want if the in-state defendants haven't been served yet.

It's a silly argument: the plain meaning rule does not permit a court to find a "plain" meaning “demonstrably at odds with the intentions of the drafters.” United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989). There is, of course, no indication that Congress intended to let defendants avoid the strict, centuries-old federal policies against diversity jurisdiction and against removal by setting up a computer program that downloads the state court dockets every 10 minutes.

The more compelling "plain meaning" of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) is that Congress wanted to ensure the in-state defendants were "proper" defendants, and thus prevent plaintiffs from adding bogus in-state defendants to a lawsuit.

The defendants' game worked for a while, but the tide is turning.

Via Gregory P. Joseph's Complex Litigation Blog, we see the Northern District of Ohio rejecting the "properly joined and served" silliness:

Comerica's interpretation of §1441(b) suggests that the language "properly joined and served" creates an exception to the forum defendant rule. This argument is not novel; in fact, it has been the topic of much jurisprudential debate with varying success across the country. I, however, have no need to survey such case law because the Northern District of Ohio recently rejected Comerica's argument in a case of first impression. In Ethington v. Gen. Elec. Co., 575 F. Supp. 2d 855, 861 (N.D. Ohio), my colleague, District Judge Dan Aaron Polster, engaged in a thorough review of available case law.

And what does Ethington say?

The Court further notes that the growing trend among district courts wrestling with this latest litigation fad is to grant a timely motion to remand. While a review of the Frick, Thomson, and Ripley cases indeed shows that the judges in those cases abided by the plain meaning interpretation of the forum defendant rule, the GE Defendants' assertion that the New Jersey federal district courts 'ha[ve] rejected Plaintiffs' argument' is disingenuous at best; it fails to acknowledge that Frick (issued February 23, 2006), Thomson (May 22, 2007), and Ripley (Aug. 16, 2007) were each issued well in advance of the more recent case law from the District of New Jersey -- starting with Judge Chesler's opinion in DeAngelo-Shuayto -- that in fact rejected the approach taken in those three earlier cases. See, e.g., DeAngelo-Shuayto, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92557, at 5, 2007 WL 4365311, at *3 (finding that '§ 1441(b) must bar removal by a forum defendant, whether it has been served or not'); Fields, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92555, at *12-13, 2007 WL 4365312, at *5 (rejecting the plain language approach because it would create an 'untenable result' that would 'eviscerate the purpose of the forum defendant rule,' and holding that 'the 'properly joined and served' language of § 1441(b) does not encompass the situation in which the removing party is a forum defendant, and that in such situations removal to federal court is improper.'). See also, Brown, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55490, at *8, 2008 WL 2833294, at *5 (adopting magistrate judge's report and recommendation with additional analysis, explicitly embracing the reasoning provided in the R&R, DeAngelo-Shuayto, and Fields, and stating 'this Court agrees with [the conclusion] that § 1441(b) must be read to preclude removal by an in-state defendant whether it has been served or not.'); Brown v. Organon USA Inc. (hereafter 'Brown R&R'), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50179, at *24-25, 2008 WL 2625355, at *8 (D.N.J. June 27, 2008) (M.J. Salas) (magistrate judge's R&R concluding that '[t]he Court agrees with DeAngelo-Shuayto' and finding 'that § 1441(b) bars a forum defendant from removing to federal court even if they have not been 'properly joined and served.''); Optec Displays, Inc. v. Am. Maint., Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47562, at *3, 2008 WL 2510633, at *2 (D.N.J. June 16, 2008) (J. Debevoise) (remanding removed case with forum defendant, and explaining that 'even if [defendant] was not properly joined and served, it is still precluded, as a forum defendant, from removing the action to federal court.') (citing DeAngelo-Shuayto, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92557, at *15, 2007 WL 4365311, at *3)).).

Notably, these more recent New Jersey federal district court cases are not alone in adopting Judge Chesler's reasoning and analysis on the proper way to interpret § 1441(b). Other federal district courts as of late have likewise followed the reasoning articulated in DeAngelo-Shuayto. See, e.g., Allen, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42491, at *13-15, 17-18, 2008 WL 2247067, at *4-6; Vivas v. Boeing Co., 486 F. Supp. 2d 726 (N.D.Ill. 2007) (J. Lefkow). (See also, ECF No. 30-2, Pls.' Rep. Mem., Ex. A to Aff. Dec. of Mitchell M. Breit, 1-6 (remand order in Evans v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, Civ. A. No. 07-5046 (Jan. 10, 2008) (J. Brody); remand order in Hance v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, Civ. A. No. 07-5047 (Jan. 10, 2008) (J. Brody); remand order in Malone v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, Civ. A. No. 07-5048, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97461 (Dec. 4, 2007) (J. Savage) (citing Oxendine v. Merck & Co., Inc., 236 F. Supp. 2d 517, 524-25 (D. Md. 2002)); remand order in Scott v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, No. 07-CV-5049, Order of March 11, 2008, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84490, n.1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2008) (J. Joyner)).) But see Flores v. Merck & Co. (In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig.), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57473, at *37-38, 2008 WL 2940560, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 2008) (a recent federal district court opinion invoking the plain language of § 1441(b) with little analysis to deny plaintiff's motion to remand).

After considering Sixth Circuit precedent on statutory interpretation and carefully reviewing case law on both sides of a federal district court split, the Court finds that applying the plain language of § 1441(b) would produce a result demonstrably at odds with Congressional intent underpinning the forum defendant rule, and specifically with the 'properly joined and served' language. Accordingly, the Court hereby joins the DeAngelo-Shuayto line of cases, and in so doing, the Court incorporates and adopts the well-reasoned, thorough analysis and holdings of Judge Chesler in DeAngelo-Shuayto as the basis for the instant ruling.

Ethington v. GE, 575 F. Supp. 2d 855, 864 (N.D. Ohio 2008). A "fad" that is "demonstrably at odds with Congressional intent." 

Told you so.

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One of the positive parts of being involved with The Philadelphia Inquirer's bankruptcy is, though I've had to slog my way through over 1,500 separate filings (most of which are irrelevant to my clients) since The Inquirer filed bankruptcy in February, I've also been privy to extraordinarily exhaustive briefings of what are, on the surface, "simple" issues.

A $300 million question in the bankruptcy is whether the banks that loaned the current owners the money to buy the company back in 2006 can use their existing debt to "bid" on its assets at the auction proposed by management. The question should be answered in the text of the Bankruptcy Code; unsurprisingly, both the banks and management have asserted that the text of the Bankruptcy Code clearly and unambiguously supports their position.

Such a dispute means it's time to pull out the old canons of statutory interpretation.

Judge Robreno's Order yesterday — in which Judge Robreno reversed Judge Raslavich's interpretation of when a debtor may deny secured creditors the ability to "credit bid" in a pre-confirmation auction — provided a remarkably thorough description of the plain meaning rule, which I post below in full so all can cherry-pick for their own cases within our great United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.

(In case you're confused why Judge Robreno of the District Court is acting as an appellate court, note that the District Court initially hears appeals from Bankruptcy Court.)

* * *

It is often said that the polestar for interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intent of Congress. See White v. Lord Abbett & Co. LLC (In re Lord Abbett Mutual Funds Fee Litig.), 553 F.3d 248, 255 (3d Cir. 2009).  “The role of the courts in interpreting a statute is to give effect to Congress's intent.” Alston v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., --- F.3d ---, 2009 WL 3448264, at *4 (3d Cir. Oct. 28, 2009) (quoting United States v. Diallo, 575 F.3d 252, 256 (3d Cir. 2009)). In seeking to ascertain the intent of a statute, a court is bound to follow principles of statutory construction. See In re J.E. Brenneman Co., Inc., 277 F. Supp. 2d 518, 521 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (Yohn, J.) (recognizing that in interpreting the intent of Congress a district court follows established precepts of statutory interpretation).

“Because it is presumed that Congress expresses its intent through the ordinary meaning of its language, every exercise of statutory interpretation begins with an examination of the plain language of the statute.” Alston, --- F.3d ---, 2009 WL 3448264, at *4 (quoting United States v. Diallo, 575 F.3d 252, 256 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also Lamie v. United States Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) (“[W]hen the statute's language is plain, the sole function of the courts . . . is to enforce it according to its terms.”). Thus, the necessary starting point in any attempt to discern congressional intent is the language of the statute itself. United States v. Abbott, 574 F.3d 203, 206 (3d Cir. 2009) (“As in all cases of statutory interpretation, our inquiry begins with the language of the statute and focuses on Congress' intent.”) (citing United States v. Whited, 311 F.3d 259, 263-64 (3d Cir. 2002)); In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 432 F.3d 507, 512 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989)); Idahoan Fresh v. Advantage Produce, Inc., 157 F.3d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 1998).

This plain meaning rule dictates that where the meaning of the relevant statutory language is clear then no further inquiry is required. In re Armstrong, 432 F.3d at 512; Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 313 (3d Cir. 2001) (en banc) (where the statutory language “admits of no more than one meaning the duty of interpretation does not arise and the rules which are to aid doubtful meanings need no discussion”) (internal quotation and citation omitted); Lancashire Coal Co. v. Sec'y of Labor, Mine Safety and Health Admin. (MSHA), 968 F.2d 388, 391 (3d Cir. 1992) (“[W]hen the statutory language is clear a court need ordinarily look no further.”).

Adherence to the plain meaning rule is not simply a matter of judicial craftsmanship. Faithfulness to the words Congress has used in enacting a statute promotes respect for Congress as the principal source of positive law in a democratic society. See Lamie, 540 U.S. at 536 (“We should prefer the plain meaning since that approach respects the words of Congress.”); Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 470-71 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (recognizing that departure from the plain meaning rule, except in limited circumstances where completely necessary, would intrude upon the lawmaking powers of Congress). Furthermore, allegiance to the plain meaning rule also disciplines courts to avoid making policy choices where the intent of Congress is expressed in the language of the statute. Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at 471 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that courts should act with self-discipline in refraining from nonchalantly applying exceptions to the plain meaning rule); Lamie, 540 U.S. at 538 (stating that the “unwillingness to soften the import of Congress' chosen words . . . results from ‘deference to the supremacy of the Legislature, as well as recognition that Congressmen typically vote on the language of a bill.’”) (quoting United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 95 (1985) (internal citation omitted)).

There is a hierarchical approach that courts must follow in construing a statute. First, the Court “determine[s] whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning.” Dobrek v. Phelan, 419 F.3d 259, 263 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002)). In order to be ambiguous, the disputed language must be “reasonably susceptible of different interpretations.” Id. at 264 (quoting Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S. 451, 473 n.27 (1985)). The plain meaning approach requires a court to “read the statute in its ordinary and natural sense.” Harvard Secured Creditors Liquidation Trust, v. I.R.S. (In re Harvard Indus., Inc.), 568 F.3d 444, 451 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). If the language is clear, “‘Congress says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.’” Singer v. Franklin Boxboard Co. (In re Am. Pad & Paper Co.), 478 F.3d 546, 554 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). If no ambiguity exists, then the plain meaning of the text is conclusive and the inquiry generally comes to an end. Lawrence v. City of Phila., Pa., 527 F.3d 299, 316-17 (3d Cir. 2008) (“The plain meaning of the text should be conclusive, except in the rare instance when the court determines that the plain meaning is ambiguous.”); AT & T, Inc. v. F.C.C., 582 F.3d 490, 498 (3d Cir. 2009)(finding that a determination that the statutory language was unambiguous negates consideration of arguments concerning statutory purpose, non-binding case law, and legislative history).

Second, if the statutory language appears to be unambiguous, a court must look beyond that plain language where a literal interpretation would lead to an absurd result, or would otherwise produce a result “demonstrably at odds with the intentions of the drafters.” United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted); In re Kaiser Aluminum Corp., 456 F.3d 328, 330 (3d Cir. 2006) ("A basic principle of statutory construction is that we should avoid a statutory interpretation that leads to absurd results.") (citing Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982)); Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 535 (3d Cir. 2003) ("We do not look past the plain meaning unless it produces a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters . . . or an outcome so bizarre that Congress could not have intended it."). It is only in “rare cases” that a literal application will produce such results. See In re Mehta, 310 F.3d 308, 311 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal citation omitted); Abdul-Akbar, 239 F.3d at 313 (internal citation omitted).

Third, if application of the plain meaning approach dictates that the language is ambiguous or that application of the statute would lead to results demonstrably at odds with congressional intent, then the Court may employ other traditional tools of statutory interpretation.

Where the plain meaning approach does not clearly define the disputed language, the Court should construe the relevant provision in the context of the statute as a whole. Kaufman v. Allstate N.J. Ins. Co., 561 F.3d 144, 156 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006)). It is inappropriate, however, to reference other statutory provisions in order to create an ambiguity where none would otherwise exist. See Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs v. Sun Ship, Inc., 150 F.3d 288, 292 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding that related statutory sections could not be used to create an ambiguity where the language was clear).

Further, courts may resort to canons of statutory construction, such as ejusdem generis, when the plain meaning approach does not yield a conclusive result. Baltimore County, MD. v. Hechinger Liquidation Trust (In re Hechinger Inv. Co. of Del., Inc.), 335 F.3d 243, 254 (3d Cir. 2003) (concluding that even if section 1146 of the Bankruptcy Code was ambiguous, the court’s interpretation was supported by two canons of construction); Folger Adam Sec., Inc. v. DeMatteis/MacGregor JV, 209 F.3d 252, 258 (3d Cir. 2000) (applying canons of construction to ambiguous term “any interest” in section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code). These canons of construction only serve as rules of thumb and “are often countered ... by some maxim pointing in a different direction.” United States v. Cooper, 396 F.3d 308, 313 (3d Cir. 2005)

One tool often used in parsing out ambiguity in the language of the statute is legislative history. It is recognized that legislative history is a “useful and appropriate tool for [an] inquiry into congressional intent” when the plain statutory text is ambiguous. Francis v. Mineta, 505 F.3d 266, 270-71 (3d Cir. 2007); In re Harvard Indus., 568 F.3d at 451. Cf. Hay Group, Inc. v. E.B.S. Acquisition Corp., 360 F.3d 404, 406 (3d Cir. 2004) (“The Supreme Court has repeatedly explained that recourse to legislative history or underlying legislative intent is unnecessary when a statute's text is clear and does not lead to an absurd result.”) (internal citation omitted). Based upon the inherent difficulty in distilling precise congressional intent from the amorphous nature of legislative history, however, the Third Circuit has instructed that “[f]or the vast majority of ambiguous statutory provisions, then, relying on legislative history to discern legislative intent should be done with caution, if at all.” Morgan v. Gay, 466 F.3d 276, 278 (3d Cir. 2006).

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The Wall Street Journal's Law Blog points us to a WSJ story on the absurd language used in copyright contracts these days:

Decked out in sequined black and gold dresses, Anne Harrison and the other women in her Bulgarian folk-singing group were lined up to try out for NBC's "America's Got Talent" TV show when they noticed peculiar wording in the release papers they were asked to sign.

Any of their actions that day last February, the contract said, could be "edited, in all media, throughout the universe, in perpetuity."

She and the other singers, many of whom are librarians in the Washington, D.C., area, briefly contemplated whether they should give away the rights to hurtling their images and voices across the galaxies forever. Then, like thousands of other contestants, they signed their names.

...

The terms of use listed on Starwars.com, where people can post to message boards among other things, tell users that they give up the rights to any content submissions "throughout the universe and/or to incorporate it in other works in any form, media or technology now known or hereafter developed."

Lucasfilm Ltd., Star Wars creator George Lucas's entertainment company that runs the site, said the language is standard in Hollywood.

"But, to be honest with you, we have had very few cases of people trying to exploit rights on other planets," says Lynne Hale, a Lucasfilm spokeswoman.

In a May 15, 2008, "expedition agreement" between JWM Productions LLC, a film-production company, and Odyssey Marine Exploration Inc., a shipwreck-exploration outfit, JWM seeks the rights to footage from an Odyssey expedition. The contract covers rights "in any media, whether now known or hereafter devised, or in any form whether now known or hereafter devised, an unlimited number of times throughout the universe and forever, including, but not limited to, interactive television, CD-ROMs, computer services and the Internet."

It reminds me of a draft settlement I received not too long ago that, notwithstanding the statute of limitations, required my client release all claims "from the beginning of the world until the present." Just for fun, I negotiated that down to "from the dawn of mankind."

Ken Adams, the blogosphere expert on contract language (and who is interviewed in the article), blogged about the same problem nearly three years ago, and updated his post today to note:

The phrase occurs most often in contracts in which a consultant or employee assigns to a company all rights to any intellectual property the consultant or employee develops in the course of providing services under the contract. An example: "Employee hereby irrevocably assigns, licenses and grants to Company, throughout the universe, in perpetuity, all rights, if any, of Employee to ...." In that context, saying "all rights" is entirely comprehensive; adding "throughout the universe" constitutes needless elaboration.

Indeed, making your contract apply to "all rights ... throughout the universe" could be worse than applying to "all rights," because it redefines an unambiguous word and makes it more likely that other ambiguous parts of the contract will be interpreted against whoever inserted the "throughout the universe" language.

"All" means "all." "All rights... throughout the universe" means "all" with a caveat. When faced with unambiguous contract terms (e.g., "all") that are specifically defined by the parties (e.g., "throughout the universe"), a court will ask itself, why did someone try to further specify the unambiguous term?

The court will then presume there must have been some reason for the additional language and try to figure that reason out. The danger of needless elaboration like "throughout the universe" is that the court will view additional language as narrowing the unambiguous terms, which is usually not what the party demanding the additional language wanted.

Moreover, the court will presume that, if one party keeps adding language to "clarify" the meaning of general words (such as "all"), then any ambiguity in the contract should be interpreted against that party, because that party was the one with the most control over the contract's language.

In the contexts above, those distinctions are probably irrelevant. But, as Adams notes, "it’s symptomatic of the broader dysfunction in contract language." It's also a bad habit: once you become comfortable with this type of ridiculous language redefining the word "all," how do you know if the ambiguity will stop there?

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I have no problem criticizing Bank of America for deceptive conduct or blaming Wachtell for the failure of a legal stategy, but there's nothing obviously wrong with this:

Eric Roth, a litigation partner at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, apparently was telling the Bank of America Corp. leadership one story about how difficult it would be to escape from the merger with Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc., while singing quite a different tune to the federal government.

E-mails from Roth and in-house lawyers at the bank were among documents released last week from the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, which is investigating the merger. Roth and Bank of America representatives did not return calls for comment on this story.

The e-mails show that early on the morning of Dec. 19 Roth advised the bank's chief executive, Ken Lewis, and its interim general counsel, Brian Moynihan, on how difficult and financially risky it would be to try to invoke a so-called MAC -- or material adverse change -- clause, which would allow the bank to get out of the merger with Merrill.

But another e-mail from associate general counsel Teresa Brenner to Moynihan, sent several hours later and on the same day as Roth's e-mail, says, "Eric made a very strong case as to why there was a MAC" during a conference call with some officials from the Federal Reserve.

The e-mails appear to confirm previous Corporate Counsel stories that the bank was telling federal regulators that it wanted to declare the MAC, even though its own lawyers and leaders knew that legally it probably could not succeed. If the bank were to make public its MAC threat, government regulators have said Merrill would have collapsed, causing severe damage to the shaky U.S. financial system at the time.

Although it's not a given that the Rules of Professional Conduct would apply to an argument before the Federal Reserve, let's assume that, by way of Rule 3.9, all the basic duties of merit, candor and fairness apply.

Under those rules, there's nothing wrong with advocating on behalf of your client an argument you believe "probably could not succeed." There are two sides to every story, and at least two interpretations of every legal issue. The United States uses an adversarial legal system precisely so that these stories and interpretations can be fully developed, critiqued, and challenged.

Indeed, it's clear the Federal Reserve's lawyers knew how weak Bank of America's case was:

Brenner's e-mail states that all questions other than one came from a "prickly" Thomas Baxter Jr., general counsel of the New York Federal Reserve Bank. The other question came from Scott Alvarez, general counsel to the Federal Reserve Board in Washington. Baxter "pointed out that there had never been a successful MAC case before," the e-mail says, but Roth countered "that this one essentially could be the first" because of the magnitude of Merrill's losses

Just as the NY Fed's lawyer had no duty to say if he thought the Bank of America / Merrill Lynch merger could become the first successful material adverse change case, Bank of America's lawyer had no duty to say if he thought Bank of America was unlikely to win. Lawyers have no duty to reveal what they believe are the strengths and weaknesses of their case, nor how likely they believe it is that their client will prevail.

There is, however, an ethical issue lurking deeper under the surface. There is a dispute (and shareholder class action) as to when, exactly, Bank of America learned of Merrill Lynch's losses. The executives at Merrill Lynch have suggested that BoA knew of the losses before it consummated the merger. If that's true, and Bank of America's lawyers knew it, then they're in a tighter spot, since the essence of a "material adverse change" is the change in circumstances after the merger consummation. One wonders how a lawyer could in good faith argue for a "material adverse change" arising from circumstances known before the merger.

But that's an issue for another day.

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Really, you should:

The New York Court of Appeals held Pepper Hamilton had a duty to disclose in advance to the insurers the firm's potential involvement in litigation concerning fraudulent loan securitization activities by its client, Student Finance Corp., according to a New York Law Journal article reprinted in New York Lawyer (reg. req.). The court applied Pennsylvania law in the case, which the parties agreed was controlling.

...

But the undisclosed, foreseeable risk of a SFC-related claim against Pepper Hamilton and partner W. Roderick Gagné, even though they had not been involved in SFC's wrongdoing, violated a "prior knowledge" coverage-exclusion clause in the indemnity policies, the Court of Appeals held. Hence, the carriers are not required to indemnify the firm and Gagné in SFC-related claims.

"Given the law firm defendants' role in the securitization of the loans and Gagné's close involvement with SFC, a reasonable attorney with the law firm defendant's knowledge should have anticipated the possibility of a lawsuit, particularly when millions of dollars may have been lost from activities of which they were aware," writes Judge Theodore Jones Jr. in the court's unanimous 6-0 decision.

In 2002, when the law firm applied for the excess coverage, Gagné told Pepper Hamilton's general counsel, in response to a question about the insurance application, that he knew of two suits related to SFC transactions, the ruling recounts. He was, he told the GC, "not certain" about whether the law firm might be joined in the litigation in the future.

I don't fault Pepper Hamilton for trying, but, really, if there is a multi-million-dollar lawsuit out there related to a fraud perpetrated by a client whose business you were deep into, you should probably tell your insurer about it.

The context, too, was important: SFC went bankrupt and the bankruptcy trustee started looking to third-parties for recovery.

Want to guess where bankruptcy trustees start first?

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At Legal Ethics Blog, Professor Andrew Perlman posts a hypothetical:

I was recently a panelist at the Association of Corporate Counsel's annual conference, and someone in the audience posed an interesting hypothetical.

Imagine that in-house counsel is conducting an internal investigation and speaks with an employee whose conduct may have been unlawful. 

Let me interrupt to point out that the above hypothetical is one of the classical examples used to teach professional responsibility to law students. Employees are frequently confused about the role of the company's lawyers in internal investigations, and frequently do not understand that the lawyer there represents solely the company and not the employees themselves. The context of these interviews — typically involving nothing more than the lawyer coming into the employee's workplace — heightens the likelihood of confusion.

As such, corporate lawyers are under a duty (under Model Rule 1.13(f)) to explain the distinction whenever they deal with directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other corporate constituents.

But Perlman's hypothetical is a bit different:

The employee does not have her own counsel, so the in-house lawyer makes clear to the employee that the lawyer represents the company and not the employee herself. So far, so good.

But now let's imagine that the employee is reluctant to speak with the lawyer. The lawyer then says to the employee, "You are subject to the company's employment policies, which require you to speak with me about this matter."

Several audience members were convinced that such a statement was both commonplace and ethically permissible. It was my position that such a statement, which appears to be giving legal advice to an unrepresented (and potentially adverse) party regarding her obligations under the employment policy, could be unethical under Rule 4.3. What do you think?

Here's the whole text of Rule 4.3:

In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested. When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer’s role in the matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding. The lawyer shall not give legal advice to an unrepresented person, other than the advice to secure counsel, if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the interests of such a person are or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the interests of the client.

It's an interesting question. As I responded in the comments [with minor edits here], I think it comes down to context. If the context has made it clear to the employee that the employee's interests are, or could be adverse, then there is not much problem in the lawyer advancing the views of the company, since the concern about "misunderstanding" expressed by the rule is inapplicable.

If, however, the impression created is one of a neutral investigator, then it seems to be legal advice given to an adverse unrepresented party.

The precise wording also creates a problem for the attorney, because they did not merely assert that the company could do if the employee did not cooperate (e.g., terminate and/or sue them), but instead outright told the employee what their legal obligations were under the employment agreement. That's the essence of legal advice.

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Howard Bashman (of How Appealing) has a new article in The Legal Intelligencer:

Recently, however, in cases where I am representing the party that won in the trial court, I have observed experienced appellate opposing counsel who will designate the contents of the appendix or reproduced record on appeal in a far more "adversarial" manner than I would have done had I been in their position. What I mean is that the designation they are serving will include only the parts of the record that benefit their client's position, while excluding (at least until I counterdesignate them in response) those parts of the record that favor my client's position and the trial court's ruling.

Because other experienced appellate advocates are now frequently engaging in a more "adversarial" method of appendix designation than I am, I cannot help but wonder whether this "adversarial" method ever succeeds. In other words, if counsel for appellee is inexperienced or inattentive, presumably the "adversarial" method of appendix designation could ultimately result in an appellate appendix that was bereft of the evidence and other material on which the party that won in the trial court would wish to rely in arguing for affirmance of the trial court's ruling.

Howard has a good argument against the practice and why it's unlikely to succeed. Assuming the court doesn't recognize what's happening and punish the offending party for it, let's consider the question from the perspective of game theory.

The more information available to a court about a case, the more informed and thus more sound the court's analysis will be. Conversely, the less a court knows about a case, the less informed and thus less sound its opinion will be.

I agree with Howard: limiting the appellate record makes it harder for the appellate court to closely and carefully review the case, which increases the risk to both parties of the appellate court unintentionally rendering an ill-informed opinion unjustified by the actual facts.

If a party believes they have a strong case and that they will prevail on appeal, that additional risk is a bad thing. Hence their desire for as complete a record as possible.

But if a party believes they have a weak case that's likely to lose at appeal, however, then they have an incentive to make the record incomplete, and thereby increase the likelihood of the appellate court issuing an erroneous or ill-informed opinion.

Though the losers at the trial level probably have this incentive more often than the winners, the winners can have it as well — if the party that won at trial thinks their victory is unlikely to survive appeal, then they, too, have an incentive to make the record incoherent and incomplete, thereby frustrating review. Indeed, the winning party might have more of an incentive to mess up the record, if they believe, as many lawyers do, that appellate courts generally defer to trial courts, even where the standard of review is de novo.

Perhaps not the most upstanding of tactics, but not necessarily a foolish one.

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Prof. Robert Reinstein, my mentor at Temple University Beasley School of Law, has just posted on SSRN a draft of The Limits of Executive Power:

Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion in The Steel Seizure Case has taken on iconic status among legal scholars and had been adopted by the Supreme Court as the governing framework for evaluating presidential power. But Jackson’s principles are conclusory, do not rest on any historical foundation, and raise as many questions as they answer. He fails to examine, much less justify, the existence or scope of implied presidential powers, nor does he meaningfully explain the extent to which those powers are subject to congressional regulation and override. I apply novel originalist methodologies to answer those unexamined questions, with important consequences to several current theories and cases concerning presidential power.

The construction of the presidency and the allocation of legislative and executive powers can be understood only by an examination of the historical experiences that influenced the Framers. Prominent among these were the preceding two centuries of constitutional developments in England which critically influenced the allocation of executive and legislative power in the Constitution. The central lesson of these historical experiences was that proscriptive legislative restraints on executive power were necessary but not sufficient to prevent autocracy. any of the English proscriptions on the exercise of executive power were included in our Constitution, but there was also a massive transfer of previously held executive power to the legislature. Most of the prerogatives that had been exercised by the King were vested completely in Congress, prohibited to the President, or omitted altogether from the Constitution. Of the small number delegated to the Executive, only one was the same as its royal counterpart; the others were more limited or structurally shared with the Legislative Branch.

I examine this history in detail and apply its underlying principles to develop a general theory of presidential power. In lieu of creative but ultimately inconclusive arguments over indefinite powers that are said to be “executive” in nature, implied powers should be tied to, and derived from, the powers expressly vested in the President in Article II. I refute the propositions that the Vesting Clause is a residual source of plenary executive power and that there is a presidential “completion” power. I apply and elaborate on these principles in the context of the President’s two most important implied powers - executing the laws and developing and implementing foreign policy. The President has broad discretion in choosing how to exercise these powers, but they are not plenary in nature. They are subject to three basic limitations: (1) the President may not, without congressional authorization, use these powers to change domestic law or create or alter existing legal obligations; (2) these powers are subject to regulation by Congress; and (3) in the event of a conflict between the exercise of these powers and congressional legislation, the latter prevails.

Finally, I argue that these limits on presidential power have continuing validity despite the enormous changes in the country since these principles were established. We are now in much the same situation as England in the 18th century - the real power of the Executive is much greater than its nominal legal power. Although the Framers viewed the President as a necessary check on an otherwise dominant Congress, the present reality is now the reverse. The Executive has become the most powerful branch of government. There is no reason to adopt legal theories that would further enhance executive power.

Highly recommended for anyone with an interest in constitutional history.

Anyone looking for relevant primary material should review The Founder's Constitution. Anyone looking for further historical support for Reinstein's argument that,

the construction of the presidency owed much less to political theory or a reflexive reaction to George III than to two centuries of historical experiences that shaped the Framers’ views on executive and legislative powers: “the great disputes of Stuart England, which resonated still in eighteenth-century America; alarms over the rise of ministerial ‘corruption’ under the Hanoverian kings; and lessons learned from the efforts of early state constitutions to cabin executive power within strict republican limits”

should consider Kevin Phillips' The Cousins' Wars, an economic, sociological, religious and political examination of the links between the English Civil War, the American Revolution, and the U.S. Civil War.

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I admire Judge Posner, one of the flag bearers for the law and economics movement. He is thoughtful, prolific, and has not succumbed to the extraordinary pressure judges feel to guard their actual thoughts and feelings. He is in every sense of the word an open book, and we should be grateful for that.

It also makes him the logical target for critics of any of the ideas he champions. Such is the case for my remarks below.

I rather enjoyed Posner's latest article, How I Became A Keynesian, which does as good a job as any at summarizing Keynes' core philosophy, until I came across this paragraph:

But the government may be able to arrest the decline--another of Keynes's central ideas, and one strongly resisted by the conservative economists of his time, as of today. It can reduce interest rates (by buying government bonds or other debt for cash, which increases the amount of money that banks are permitted to lend) in an effort to reduce the costs of active investment and thus encourage employment. Keynes urged this approach. But he also pointed out that it might not work well--as we have learned in the current downturn. The banks may lack confidence in "those who seek to borrow from them," so that "while the weakening of credit is sufficient to bring about a collapse, its strengthening, though a necessary condition of recovery, is not a sufficient condition." In fact, banks in America today are hoarding, rather than lending, most of the cash that they have received from the government's bailouts. The hoard may make the banks a little freer with lending, but the effect on economic activity, at least in the short run, may be tepid.

In sum: the government can "arrest" an economic decline by taking action to "reduce interest rates," but such has "not work[ed] well ... in the current downturn."

Perhaps he's correct. Then again, perhaps he was correct a month ago when he wrote that "the various factors that are responsible for the reduction in the rate of decline of output" last quarter are "probably impossible" to "disentangle:"

This assertion is groundless. No one has the faintest idea what effect the stimulus has had. My guess is that it has had some positive effect, because of its confidence-enhancing character that I mentiioned earlier and because some of the $100 billiion--though no one seems to know how much--has been spent rather than saved. But it is impossible to determine the net impact of the stimulus on GDP or employment because so much else has been happening to stimulate an economic recovery. Some people have had to dissave--turn savings into expenditures--because their income has fallen (maybe because they have become unemployed) below the level necessary to cover their basic expenses. Some people have had to replace durables that wore out. Foreign demand for U.S. products has risen some. (Dissaving, replacing durables, and export growth if the domestic currency loses value are standard nongovernmental spurs to recovery from a depression.) And the government has been doing a lot to stimulate recovery besides the stimulus--has in fact expended or guaranteed trillions of dollars in an effort to increase the amount of lending, which is essential to economic activity.

Disentangling the various factors that are responsible for the reduction in the rate of decline of output in the second quarter is probably impossible, but in any event has not, to my knowledge, been attempted--and certainly not in Romer's talk.

Which Posner do I believe? The one who asserts that "disentangling the various factors" affecting the economy "is probably impossible" (with whom economists vehemently disagree), or the one who asserts as a matter of fact that, of the "various factors" affecting the economy, government efforts to "reduce interest rates" "might not work well?"

Of course, Keynes himself famously responded to a critique that he had changed his mind about the causes of the Great Depression with: "When the facts change, I change my mind. What do you do, sir?"

The facts here, however, have not changed. The columns were published a month apart.

That, too, would be perfectly fine -- Richard Posner, the man, is entitled to his own thoughts and opinions and should change them as befits further thought, data, argument and experience -- but for the belief of many adherents to "law and economics"  that judges' interpretations and application of economic theory should color their judicial decisions.

There's a difference, of course, between the macroeconomics that trouble Posner and the microeconomics at play in most cases. And there's a difference, of course, between recognizing the contributions that economics can bring to legal policy decisions (which is what the original law and economics scholars, like Ronald Coase and Guido Calabresi, focused on) and enabling courts to decide cases by way of economic theories they are not even trained to understand, much less apply.

These distinctions, however, rapidly break down in actual practice. Witness the Twombly Supreme Court opinion, in which seven Justices, none of which have any formal training in economics, held the following as a matter of law:

The complaint makes its closest pass at a predicate for conspiracy with the claim that collusion was necessary because success by even one CLEC in an ILEC’s territory “would have revealed the degree to which competitive entry by CLECs would have been successful in the other territories.” Id., ¶50, App. 26–27. But, its logic aside, this general premise still fails to answer the point that there was just no need for joint encouragement to resist the 1996 Act; as the District Court said, “each ILEC has reason to want to avoid dealing with CLECs” and “each ILEC would attempt to keep CLECs out, regardless of the actions of the other ILECs.” ...

Plaintiffs’ second conspiracy theory rests on the competitive reticence among the ILECs themselves in the wake of the 1996 Act, which was supposedly passed in the “ ‘hop[e] that the large incumbent local monopoly companies … might attack their neighbors’ service areas, as they are the best situated to do so.’ ... Contrary to hope, the ILECs declined “ ‘to enter each other’s service territories in any significant way,’ ” Complaint ¶38, App. 20, and the local telephone and high speed Internet market remains highly compartmentalized geographically, with minimal competition. Based on this state of affairs, and perceiving the ILECs to be blessed with “especially attractive business opportunities” in surrounding markets dominated by other ILECs, the plaintiffs assert that the ILECs’ parallel conduct was “strongly suggestive of conspiracy.” Id., ¶40, App. 21.

But it was not suggestive of conspiracy, not if history teaches anything. In a traditionally unregulated industry with low barriers to entry, sparse competition among large firms dominating separate geographical segments of the market could very well signify illegal agreement, but here we have an obvious alternative explanation. In the decade preceding the 1996 Act and well before that, monopoly was the norm in telecommunications, not the exception. ... The ILECs were born in that world, doubtless liked the world the way it was, and surely knew the adage about him who lives by the sword. Hence, a natural explanation for the noncompetition alleged is that the former Government-sanctioned monopolists were sitting tight, expecting their neighbors to do the same thing.

 In fact, the complaint itself gives reasons to believe that the ILECs would see their best interests in keeping to their old turf. Although the complaint says generally that the ILECs passed up “especially attractive business opportunit[ies]” by declining to compete as CLECs against other ILECs, Complaint ¶40, App. 21, it does not allege that competition as CLECs was potentially any more lucrative than other opportunities being pursued by the ILECs during the same period and the complaint is replete with indications that any CLEC faced nearly insurmountable barriers to profitability owing to the ILECs’ flagrant resistance to the network sharing requirements of the 1996 Act, id., ¶47; App. 23–26. Not only that, but even without a monopolistic tradition and the peculiar difficulty of mandating shared networks, “[f]irms do not expand without limit and none of them enters every market that an outside observer might regard as profitable, or even a small portion of such markets.” Areeda & Hovenkamp ¶307d, at 155 (Supp. 2006) (commenting on the case at bar). The upshot is that Congress may have expected some ILECs to become CLECs in the legacy territories of other ILECs, but the disappointment does not make conspiracy plausible. We agree with the District Court’s assessment that antitrust conspiracy was not suggested by the facts adduced under either theory of the complaint, which thus fails to state a valid §1 claim.

Is the above economic analysis correct? We will never know -- even economists will never know -- since this economic theory was codified as law without anyone reviewing the empirical data, because the Supreme Court dismissed the case prior to any discovery.

Twombly is not some outlier case hurriedly drafted by an overworked trial judge. It is the thoughtfully considered, yet wholly uninformed, product of the highest court in the land.

That's the problem with law and economics: it creates the illusion of judicial competence to interpret and apply economic theories to individual cases. Such is particularly problematic these days because economics is in a state of intellectual collapse and is plagued by conflicts of interest, making it particularly ripe for misuse and abuse in other fields, like the law.

Now that Posner has seen the light and become a Keynesian, will he recognize the criticisms of law and economics and become a legal realist?

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Adam Liptak at the New York Times writes:

In the early 1980s, the Supreme Court decided more than 150 cases a year. These days, it decides about half that many.

A couple of weeks ago, the Supreme Court advocacy clinic at Yale Law School held a conference to explore the mystery of the court’s shrinking docket. Law professors presented data, theories and speculation. Expensive lawyers told rueful stories about can’t-miss cases that somehow did not make the cut.

Some participants blamed the newer justices, others their clerks. Some blamed Congress, saying it is not cranking out enough confusing legislation. And some blamed the Justice Department, which is filing fewer appeals.

But there emerged nothing like a definitive answer to why the court now selects perhaps 80 cases from more than 8,000 requests for review it receives every year.

I suppose this is as good a time as any to dust off a post of mine from June, Granting or Denying The Writ of Certiorari: The Most Important Decision by Supreme Court Justices:

Thus, for the vast majority of cases, the parties must first complete all of their appeals through state or federal appellate courts, after which they file a "writ of certiorari" with the Supreme Court requesting the Court hear their case. About 8,000 of these writs are filed every year. The Supreme Court grants (through a vote of at least four justices in favor) about 1 or 2% of them.

Why is this so important? Of course, a Supreme Court decision is always a big deal, affecting the livelihood and liberty of millions of people.

But there's another reason, too, one that goes to the heart of debates about "judicial temperament:" the law of unintended consequences.

Just as the best-laid plans of mice and men go oft' astray, so too do Supreme Court decisions:

Appellate judges who don't first serve as trial judges are prone to stupid decisions.  Not because the judges themselves are stupid, of course, but because they literally don't know what they're doing. Example: Scalia insisting that his 2006 Davis decision imposed a constitutional test that was "objective and quite 'workable'." 

After three years, that test has come to mean something different in every state - literally, without exaggeration, different in each of the 50 states.  It produces contradictory results on a daily basis. It's become a constitutional Rorschach test, revealing judges' biases with hi-res fidelity.

So was Scalia lying?  Of course not.  How could he have known enough to be able to lie about what he was doing?  He's never been a trial judge, never practiced criminal law, and hasn't practiced any kind of law since 1967.  He was just guessing.

(via Sentencing Law & Policy)

Since these days actual ideology is off the table in Supreme Court confirmation hearings (everyone claims they don't want to "prejudge" the issue (PDF), even to the extent of neither agreeing nor disagreeing with existing case law), we should at least examining when, how and why a potential Justice would grant the writ.

It's not necessarily wrong for the Court to take few cases -- indeed, abstention generally makes the law more stable and predictable because the intermediate appellate courts are far less likely to issue sweeping rulings that change existing law.

Indeed, for the "unintended consequences" reason above, on many issues the Supreme Court should wait for organic development of the law by way of actual cases litigated throughout the District Courts and Circuit Courts of Appeal. That way, the Supreme Court can see those consequences on a smaller level before irrevocably applying them to the whole country, rather than dealing with the aftermath of an ill-considered decision.

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Business Week points us to the major cases.

As Litigation & Trial is a legal, rather than a business, blog, I'm going to take their list of cases but replace their description of each with the actual legal issue at stake, along with links to SCOTUSWiki, which hosts all of the relevant briefs for your reading pleasure:

Bilski v. Kappos: Whether a “process” must be tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or transform a particular article into a different state or thing (”machine-or-transformation” test), to be eligible for patenting under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and whether the “machine-or-transformation” test for patent eligibility, contradicts Congressional intent that patents protect “method[s] of doing business” in 35 U.S.C. § 273.

Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, et al.: Whether the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is consistent with separation-of-powers principles - as the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board is overseen by the Securities and Exchange Commission, which is in turn overseen by the President - or contrary to the Appointments Clause of the Constitution, as the PCAOB members are appointed by the SEC.

Black et al. v. United States: Whether the “honest services” clause of 18 U.S.C. § 1346 applies in cases where the jury did not find - nor did the district court instruct them that they had to find - that the defendants “reasonably contemplated identifiable economic harm,” and if the defendants’ reversal claim is preserved for review after they objected to the government’s request for a special verdict.

American Needle Inc. v. NFL, et al.: Whether NFLP, the NFL, and the teams functioned as a “single entity” when granting the company an exclusive headwear license and therefore could not violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, which requires proof of collective action involving “separate entities.”

United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa: Where a debtor declares to discharge a student loan debt in his Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan, has the debtor satisfied the due process requirements of Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co, and does the fact that the debtor failed to initiate an adversary proceeding render the enforceability of the discharge order under 11 U.S.C. 1327(a)inapplicable?

Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Company: Can a state legislature properly prohibit the federal courts from using the class action device for state law claims?

Hemi Group, LLC, et al v. City of New York: Whether city government meets the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act standing requirement that a plaintiff be directly injured in its “business or property” by alleging non commercial injury resulting from non payment of taxes by non litigant third parties.

Graham County Soil and Water Conservation Dist v. ex rel. Wilson: Whether federal courts have jurisdiction over False Claims Act suits based on revelations in administrative reports or audits issued by state or local governments, as opposed to the federal government.

Stay tuned for more discussion of each in upcoming posts.

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In a stunning display of judicial activism, two conservative judges on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia re-wrote several recent Department of Defense regulations, a sixty-year-old Act of Congress, a basic principle of federalism upheld by dozens of Supreme Court opinions, and millenia of common law to dismiss the Saleh v. Titan Corporation and Ibrahim v. Titan Corporation lawsuits brought by more than a dozen Iraqis who "were beaten, electrocuted, raped, subjected to attacks by dogs, and otherwise abused by private contractors working as interpreters and interrogators at Abu Ghraib prison." Dissent op., p.1. The United States was not a defendant, nor were the military officers. The lawsuit was solely against the private contractors.

You already know the "allegations" -- you've probably already seen much of the evidence. There's no doubt what happened. It was "abhorrent" and "[doesn't] represent America” according to President Bush. Secretary Rumsfeld assured “[t]he people of the Middle East . . . that we will investigate fully, that we will find out the truth . . . and [that] justice will be served.” Dissent op., p. 2. Ilham Nassir Ibrahim isn't around for justice; he was beaten to death while in captivity. His widow is one of the plaintiffs.

The prohibition on unauthorized violence, even against prisoners, is universal to civilization. Under the Code of Hammurabi, if a prisoner like Ibrahim died "from blows or maltreatment," the responsible party's son was put to death. These days, torture for fun and profit without even the pretense of government authorization violates a panolopy of laws, including the Torture Victim Protection Act, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, numerous common law torts (assault and battery, wrongful death and survival, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligence), government contracting laws, and various international laws and agreements.

To cover their bases, the plaintiffs sued under all of them. Surely at least one such claim would survive under centuries-old Anglo-American legal maxim -- reaffirmed by the most important Supreme Court decision in our history -- that "where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or action at law whenever that right is invaded?"

The plaintiffs' claims were strengthened by the absence of any Executive or Congressional action to stop them, despite numerous claims by the private contractors that the federal government had a substantial interest in the outcome of the case. The Bush and Obama administrations both declined to intervene in the case. Congress for a half-century now has authorized dozens of military actions which included the use of private contractors without passing a single law granting them immunity from suit.

The only related Congressional Act -- the Federal Tort Claims Act -- expressly says it "does not include any contractor with the United States.”  In fact, the only recent relevant action by either the Executive or Legislative branches is a regulation from the Bush-era Department of Defense stating that, for performance-based service contracts, "contractors [are] accountable for the negligent or willful actions of their employees, officers, and subcontractors." Dissent op., p. 22. The DoD further explained that "“[i]nappropriate use of force could subject a contractor or its subcontractors or employees to prosecution or civil liability under the laws of the United States and the host nation.” Id at p. 21.

The Supreme Court, too, has made it quite clear that, when a government contractor breaches its agreement with the government and thereby causes a third party harm, that contractor is responsible for the harm. In Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U. S. 25 (1977), the victims of an airplane crash sued a county airport because it "breached the FAA [flight permission] contracts by owning and maintaining a garbage dump adjacent to the airport, and that the cause of the crash was the ingestion of birds swarming from the dump into the jet engines of the aircraft." After reiterating (consistent with prior law) that "the issue of whether to displace state law on an issue such as this is primarily a decision for Congress" and noting "Congress has chosen not to do so in this case," the Supreme Court affirmed the victims' right to sue. Keep that "primarily a decision for Congress" concept, a basic principle of federalism recently upheld in Wyeth v. Levine, in mind -- we'll come back to it later.

Why, then were the Abu Ghraib cases dismissed? Judicial activism, plain and simple: having no act of Congress, no Executive decision (in fact, regulations to the contrary), and no applicable Supreme Court precedent to support their preferred policy outcome, two conservative judges invented an entirely new judicial doctrine.

The judges didn't say that, of course. They claimed to be applying existing law.

A bit of background is required to see why that's not true. Though Miree is the general rule for lawsuits brought by third parties injuried by government contractors who breach their contracts, an exception for government manufacturers who perform their contracts properly was created by Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988), where a United States Marine helicopter copilot was killed when his CH-53D helicopter crashed off the coast of Virginia Beach and he drowned. His family brought a lawsuit against the manufacturer of the CH-53D, alleging that the helicopter was defective because escape hatch opened out instead of inward, and thus was impossible to open underwater.

The Supreme Court held the family could not recover against the manufacturer because that design had been specifically required by the government, and thus the federal procurement specification "preempted" any claims of negligence, rendering the contractor immune from suit for following those specifications. Make no mistake: as the Supreme Court later described Boyle, preemption and immunity for government contractors applies only in the "special circumstance" where the “government has directed a contractor to do the very thing that is the subject of the claim.”  Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 74 n.6 (2001)(applying the old Miree rule)

It's a sensible rule, even though one not enacted by Congress (as Miree and long-standing law said it should be). But it's also a very limited rule: as Justice Scalia wrote for the Supreme Court, it applies where "the asserted basis of the contractor's liability (specifically, the duty to equip helicopters with the sort of escape-hatch mechanism petitioner claims was necessary) is precisely contrary to the duty imposed by the Government contract (the duty to manufacture and deliver helicopters with the sort of escape-hatch mechanism shown by the specifications)."

Note those words: "precisely contrary." Scalia even gave an example of where it would not apply, such as where a government merely purchased air-conditioning units without any requirement contrary to a specific safety feature. As Scalia wrote, "no one suggests that state law would generally be preempted" if someone injured by the lack of that safety feature filed a lawsuit. Of course, absolutely no one suggested that a government contractor who breached their contract would be immune. As Scalia wrote, "conflict there must be" between the federal contract requirements and the lawsuit.

Compare "precisely contrary" and "conflict there must be" to Abu Ghraib, where the contractors intentionally breached their contracts through criminal conduct. Such is even less a case for preemption and immunity than Miree, where the breach was negligent, and which was reaffirmed by Boyle. Yet, Boyle is what the conservative judges claimed they were applying:

Slip op., p 13.

Did you catch all of that? The conservative judges took a twenty-year-old Supreme Court case admittedly involving the "special circumstance" where a plaintiff sued alleging a government manufacturer should have done the exact opposite of what the government told them to do, then, by way of a federal statute that expressly says it does not apply to contractors (the FTCA), the conservative judges applied that "special circumstances" to immunitize every private contractor in any "battle-field" -- which Abu Ghraib certainly wasn't -- who tortures and kills people without even the pretense of governmental authority.

In order to do that, the conservative judges also ran roughshod over the millenia-old prohibition on abusing prisoners, the centuries-old maxim that every right has a remedy, decades of precedent holding that Congress -- not the Courts -- is responsible for creating immunities, and recent crystal-clear Department of Defense regulations affirming that private contractors remain responsible for their wrongful conduct.

Judicial activism at its finest. Read the opinion yourself, if you dare. I recommend you start with the fine dissent by Judge Garland.

Continue Reading...

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For years, gender equality advocates have argued that Title VII's prohibition on sex discrimination in employment also prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, because the latter is inherently sex discrimination, since it's based on preconceived notions of how men and women should act.

The theory has generally been rejected by federal courts, which have refused to incorporate sexual orientation discrimination into Title VII. Worse, a number of courts have used the rejection of the sexual orientation claims as a de facto prohibition on all claims brought by gay plaintiffs, even where the facts clearly showed discrimination on the basis of sex and sexual orientation.

Last week the Third Circuit reversed that trend:

On Friday, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit issued a ruling in Prowel v. Wise Business Forms, 07-3997 (3d Cir. Aug. 28, 2009), which states clearly that a plaintiff can bring a claim of gender stereotyping sex discrimination under Title VII even if there is coexisting evidence of sexual orientation discrimination.  This ruling is an important victory for women’s rights advocates and will have an especially helpful impact on women in nontraditional employment, who frequently suffer not only gender stereotyping discrimination, but also discrimination on the basis of their real or perceived sexual orientation.

...

In discussing Mr. Prowel’s gender stereotyping discrimination claim, Judge Hardiman writing for the unanimous appeals court panel reasoned:

[The employer] argues persuasively that every case of sexual orientation discrimination cannot translate into a triable case of gender stereotyping discrimination, which would contradict Congress’s decision not to make sexual orientation discrimination cognizable under Title VII.  Nevertheless, [the employer] cannot persuasively argue that because Prowel is homosexual, he is precluded from bringing a gender stereotyping claim.  There is no basis in the statutory or case law to support the notion that an effeminate heterosexual man can bring a gender stereotyping claim while an effeminate homosexual man may not.  As long as the employee–regardless of his or her sexual orientation–marshals sufficient evidence such that a reasonable jury could conclude that harassment or discrimination occurred “because of sex,” the case is not appropriate for summary judgment.

Judge Hardiman quoted language from the famous gender stereotyping case of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (plurality opinion): “We are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their group, for ‘[i]n forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.’”

The Women's Law Project here in Philadelphia submitted an amicus brief in the case, available at their blog.

Thus, as a result of the ruling, employers in the Third Circuit can discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation, but not on the basis of gender stereotypes. If anyone out there knows how defendants could ever prove that in court, there's a couple hundred employment discrimination defense lawyers in Philadelphia just dying to hear from you.

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[UPDATE: The Volokh Conspiracy, Concurring Opinions and TechDirt picked up on the case and this post as well. Volokh has substantial discussion in the comments, including links to law review articles on the issues of vacated and unpublished opinions, and a comment by the author of The Legal Intelligencer article, Shannon Duffy, noting that you can find the opinions themselves on the Eastern District of Pennsylvania's own website. I have also edited a line (the one quoted by Co-Op) for clarity.]

The Legal Intelligencer reports:

Ordinarily, the decision to settle a case while an appeal is pending means giving up the opportunity to set a legal precedent as well as forgoing the chance to win a reversal of any unfavorable published decisions handed down by the lower court.

But a team of defense lawyers fighting to overturn a $24 million verdict have figured out a way to have their settlement cake and eat their jurisprudence, too.

The confidential settlement in Klein v. Amtrak -- a case in which two trespassing teenagers climbed atop a parked train car and suffered serious burns when they got too close to a 12,000-volt catenary wire -- included an unusual provision that called for the trial judge to vacate all of his published opinions and have them removed from Lexis and Westlaw.

And it worked.

A few months after holding an hourlong oral argument, the 3rd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals agreed in late July to remand the case to the trial judge, U.S. District Judge Lawrence F. Stengel, who, in turn, agreed to vacate eight of his published opinions and to "direct" Lexis and Westlaw to remove them from their databases.

...

Exactly how the lawyers went about persuading Stengel to take such an unusual step is impossible to say because all of the court papers are under seal and none of the lawyers will talk about it.

The verdict drew a lot of attention in the Philadelphia legal community, not least because of the size and the names of the defendants, most of whom often avoid premises liability on a variety of theories. It's no surprise the defendants want to re-write history to prevent future plaintiffs from finding or referring to the case.

As a citizen, I am a strong believer in open government and governmental accountability, including for the judiciary. As a lawyer, I do not believe a court can ever truly "unpublish" a decision, and I believe that law is made every time a court decides any issue.

As such, I am linking to the free and publicly-available RECAP copies of the "vacated" opinions:

(a) the District Court's March 31, 2008 Memorandum Order denying Defendants' post-trial motions [reported at 2008 WL 879968 and 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25990] (District Court Docket No. 208).

(b) the District Court's October 11, 2006 Memorandum Order denying Defendants' in limine motion regarding evidence of prior electrical contacts [reported at 2006 WL 2927280 and 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73940] (District Court Docket No. 130).

(c) the District Court's October 12, 2006. Memorandum Order denying Defendants' in limine motion regarding evidence of prior electrical contacts [reported at 2006 WL 3000955 and 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75942] (District Court Docket No. 145).

(d) the District Court's March 31, 2006 Memorandum Order denying Defendants' summary judgment motion [reported at 2006. WL 859442 and 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15331] (District Court Docket No. 58).

(e) the District Court's Memorandum Order, entered August 17, 2006, denying Amtrak's motion to certify pursuant to 28 USC 1292(b) [reported at 2006 WL 2385516 and 2006 U.s. Dist. LEXIS 57613] (District Court Docket No. 72).

(f) the District Court's October 2, 2006 Memorandum Order granting Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration of the District Court's order of July 13,2006 with respect to Norfolk Southern's liability as a non-possessor of land [reported at 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80992; not reported in Westlaw] . (District Court Docket No. 111).

(g) the District Court's October 2,2006 Order denying Defendants' in limine motion regarding Amtrak's internal memorandum dated November 17, 1983 and Amtrak's June 20, 1984 letter [This Order is not reported in LexisNexis or Westlaw] (District Court Docket No. 119).

(h) the District Court's October 10, 2006 Memorandum Order denying Defendants' in limine motion regarding evidence of prior electrical contacts for the purpose of proving ·punitive damages [This Order is not reported in LexisNexis or Westlaw] (District Court Docket No. 129).

Law, once made, cannot be unmade.

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The Recorder reports:

Michael Ross was fired and blamed for two corporate scandals at Atmel Corp. -- but now the former general counsel is fighting back.

Ross has filed a lawsuit, claiming the San Jose, Calif., semiconductor company ruined his reputation when it pointed the finger at him and others for the company's stock option backdating problems, which led to a $125 million financial restatement. Having been fired along with other Atmel executives in 2006 after an investigation into the misuse of travel funds, Ross became an easy scapegoat when the company faced a mounting backdating mess a year later, his lawyers say.

Many lawyers in Ross' position bore the brunt of the blame for the backdating scandal that swept Silicon Valley's tech companies. They were fired; they were pursued by the government for overseeing the illegal practice of fudging dates to grant stock options at low prices and not properly accounting for it. But few have fought back with lawsuits like this.

* * *

When it released the results of its internal probe to the world, it laid the blame squarely on Perlegos and Ross in an April 2007 press release.

"Mr. Ross was aware of, and participated in the backdating of, stock options," the release blared, although the company's audit committee conceded that Ross may have not understood the tricky accounting implications of backdating until 2002. It also leveled accusations that Ross backdated his own stock options.

In his lawsuit, Ross said the press release damaged his career and counts as defamation: "As a result of the reckless, false and misleading comments made by Atmel regarding Ross' culpability in Atmel's stock option troubles, Ross has had significant difficulty obtaining employment commensurate with his experience and background."

As the story continues, after the travel investigation, Atmel went through one of the most bitter corporate struggles for control in recent Silicon Valley memory, resulting in the ouster of the brothers who founded the company, with whom Ross was close.

Most interesting to me, however, is how Atmel covered its bases dealing with the travel scandal, but not the backdating scandal. Take note:

An internal investigation of Davani led to the Perlegos brothers, Ross and another executive.

Daniel Bergeson and his team found that the executives had been paying small amounts in return for lots of travel on the company's dime ...

In the end, the executives contested the travel scandal findings, claiming it was a ploy to oust the management. The company got Morrison & Foerster to double-check Bergeson's investigation -- and the MoFo lawyers concluded it was fair.

"Double-check." Reminds me of a recent derivative suit here in Pennsylvania, which the company got dismissed because it had hired outside counsel to conduct an independent investigation.

Which is exactly what Atmel did for the travel funds but not, apparently, for the backdating. Now, they might pay the price.

Hiring independent counsel for an investigation is expensive. It's inconvenient. It may end up being unnecessary, or it may end up revealing troubling facts and recommending painful remedies. But it is, bar none, the best prophylactic a company can take when it finds itself in trouble.

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AmLawDaily catches Merck passing the reins from Cravath, Swaine & Moore to Williams & Connolly for its petition to the Supreme Court regarding the consolidated Vioxx securities litigation. In a moment, we'll look at Merck's (likely very, very expensive) brief, and marvel at the Catch-22 it proposes.

But first, some background, courtesy of the Third Circuit's opinion:

Appellants, purchasers of Merck & Co., Inc. stock, filed the first of several class action securities fraud complaints on November 6, 2003, alleging that the company and certain of its officers and directors (collectively, “Merck”) misrepresented the safety profile and commercial viability of Vioxx, a pain reliever that was withdrawn from the market in September 2004 due to safety concerns. The District Court granted Merck’s motion to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, holding that Appellants were put on inquiry notice of the alleged fraud more than two years before they filed suit, and thus their claims were barred by the statute of limitations. Appellants argue that the District Court erred in finding as a matter of law that there was sufficient public information prior to November 6, 2001 to trigger Appellants’ duty to investigate the alleged fraud.

The Third Circuit agreed with Appellants and reversed the dismissal. That's what Merck has appealed to the Supreme Court.

Although Merck had internal doubts over Vioxx's safety long before it was even approved by the FDA, it never made those doubts public (they were only discovered through litigation). After the "VIGOR" study released in 2000 suggested Vioxx had an increased risk of cardiovascular incidents over another pain reliever, naproxen, Merck argued the difference was due to a protective effect of naproxen, rather than any danger due to Vioxx. In September 2001, the FDA sent Merck a warning letter, which noted:

Although the exact reason for the increased rate of [myocardial infarctions] observed in the Vioxx treatment group is unknown, your promotional campaign selectively presents the following hypothetical explanation for the observed increase in MIs. You assert that Vioxx does not increase the risk of MIs and that the VIGOR finding is consistent with naproxen’s ability to block platelet aggregation like aspirin. That is a possible explanation, but you fail to disclose that your explanation is hypothetical, has not been demonstrated by substantial evidence, and that there is another reasonable explanation, that Vioxx may have pro-thrombotic properties.

The issue remained controversial and disputed until October 2003, when a "study by the Harvard-affiliated Brigham and Women’s Hospital in Boston that found an increased risk of heart attack in patients taking Vioxx compared with patients taking Celebrex and placebo." A week after that study was made public, the investors sued Merck.

Merck's argument is that the FDA warning letter alone -- which it vigorously disputed in public, while concealing its own internal doubts -- was evidence enough that they committed securities fraud, thereby putting investors on "inquiry notice" and beginning the statute of limitations.

Thanks to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, and the Supreme Court's 2007 decision in Tellabs Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., investors alleging fraud need to show facts, in their initial complaint, which create an "inference of scienter" (i.e., the defendant’s intention “to deceive, manipulate, or defraud) that is

more than merely “reasonable” or “permissible”—it must be cogent and compelling, thus strong in light of other explanations. A complaint will survive, we hold, only if a reasonable person would deem the inference of scienter cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference one could draw from the facts alleged.

It's a high bar to meet, a "heightened pleading requirement" to be sure. In essence, investors filing a shareholder fraud suit have to prove, when they file suit, that they'll likely win.

Keep that in mind while reading Merck's brief to the Supreme Court:

With regard to those elements that are required for a violation of Section 10(b), moreover, it is not necessary that the plaintiff possess sufficient information to satisfy any heightened pleading requirements applicable to those elements before the limitations period begins running. In the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA)—enacted after this Court first set out the limitations period for Section 10(b) actions in Lampf—Congress adopted heightened pleading requirements for private securities-fraud actions, including the requirement that the complaint “state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.” 1934 Act § 21D(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. 78u-4(b)(2).

In Rotella, this Court considered and rejected the argument that the existence of heightened pleading requirements should drive application of the discovery
rule. Specifically, the Court rejected the plaintiff’s contention that it should adopt a broader version of the discovery rule for civil RICO claims on the ground that, in
many cases, those claims were subject to the heightened pleading requirement for fraud claims in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). 528 U.S. at 560-561. While acknowledging the plaintiff’s concern that a narrower rule could “allow[] blameless ignorance to defeat a claim,” the Court concluded that “we simply do not think such a concern should control the decision about the basic limitations rule.” Id. at 560 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Although the PSLRA operates differently in some respects from Rule 9(b), the basic point remains the same: under the discovery rule, the limitations period may be triggered even when a plaintiff will not possess sufficient information to satisfy any applicable heightened pleading requirements.

It is therefore true, at least as a theoretical matter, that, under Section 1658(b), a plaintiff may not be in a position to file a securities-fraud complaint that would survive a motion to dismiss before the limitations period runs. Even when the discovery rule is applicable, however, the purpose of the limitations period itself is to give the plaintiff a specified period of time in which to “prepare a case against [the] perpetrators”—not to sit on his complaint once it is ready. Lampf, 501 U.S. at 378 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Fujisawa Pharm. Co. v. Kapoor, 115 F.3d 1332, 1334 (7th Cir. 1997). As the government has previously explained in another case involving the discovery rule, “statutes of limitations are designed to induce prospective plaintiffs to investigate and act; they are not designed to offer a period of leisure between the completion of an investigation and the filing of suit.” U.S. Br. at 13, Kubrick, supra (No. 78-1014). The possibility that a heightened pleading requirement “will exact some cost,” insofar as some plaintiffs may be unable to prepare valid complaints within the limitations period, is thus an insufficient basis for adopting a broader interpretation of the discovery rule. Rotella, 528 U.S. at 560.

Like I said: Catch-22. According to Merck, you can't sue until you have enough evidence to show a "strong inference" of scienter, but you have to sue within two years of the first sign -- determined in hindsight -- of when you should have been "induce[d] ... to investigate and act," even if there was no evidence of scienter.

It's odd that Cravath and Williams & Connolly didn't put more effort into this argument. Rotella reached its conclusion by analogizing the racketeering claims at issue there -- brought by a psychiatric patient eleven years after discharge against a facility which, he alleged, fraudulently kept him there to boost profits -- to medical malpractice, where the patient is typically put on "notice" of their claims at the time of their injury.

Such bears little resemblance to the Merck case, in which the investors were arguably vaguely "injured" by the 2001 FDA letter regarding Merck's marketing, but had nothing even suggesting deliberate concealment of Vioxx's risks until 2003.

Moving on to the next two paragraphs in Merck's brief: 

Significantly, in extending the limitations period for Section 10(b) claims from one year to two years in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Congress acted out of concern that the preexisting one-year period would foreclose plaintiffs who were unable to prepare complaints sufficient to satisfy the PSLRA’s heightened pleading requirements in time. In its report, the Senate Judiciary Committee observed that “[t]he one year statute of limitations from the date the fraud is discovered is * * * particularly harsh on innocent defrauded investors,” because “the complexities of how the fraud was executed often take well over a year to unravel, even after the fraud is discovered.” S. Rep. No. 146, supra, at 9. Specifically, the committee noted that, “[w]ith the higher pleading standards that * * * govern securities fraud victims, it is unfair to expect victims to be able to negotiate such obstacles in the span of 12 months.” Ibid. That concern would have been wholly misplaced if the one-year period did not begin to run until the plaintiff possessed enough information to satisfy the PSLRA’s heightened pleading requirements in the first place.

Conversely, if the limitations period were triggered only once a plaintiff was able to bring suit, the practical effect of Congress’s adoption of heightened pleading requirements in the PSLRA would have been to postpone the start of the limitations period, sometimes significantly, in many cases. Given that the PSLRA’s primary purpose was to “check * * * abusive litigation by private parties,” Tellabs Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 313 (2007), it is implausible that, in enacting the PSLRA, Congress would have wanted effectively to extend the time for filing private securities fraud actions—and thus to enable more plaintiffs to use securities-fraud actions as a hedge against downside risk. See pp. 48-49, infra. In sum, the limitations period in Section 1658(b) is triggered by something short of the ability to file a viable complaint, and there is therefore no valid statutory basis for the court of appeals’ rule that a plaintiff must possess information specifically relating to scienter in order to be on inquiry notice.

That misses the point entirely. If Congress wanted to "check abusive litigation," then it is similarly "implausible" that Congress wants to force investors to file suit before they "possess sufficient information to satisfy any heightened pleading requirements."

Which is what Merck suggests.

The investors' brief is due in October. The Supreme Court has not yet scheduled oral argument.

But it will raise an interesting question: should investors be required to sue companies at the first hint of trouble, or can they wait until they have facts suggesting wrongdoing? Do we really want to encourage suits which even the plaintiffs don't know are meritorious?

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Not too long ago, I argued that Ashcroft v. Iqbal was not nearly as important as commentators thought, and that the sky had not fallen on plaintiffs. Instead, Iqbal merely put into words the standard that numerous courts had already applied to large-scale litigation without saying as much. I also argued that Iqbal in particular involved a very unique circumstance -- a Bivens suit against top-level official -- and so was easily distinguishable from the vast majority of civil litigation.

For a while, it seemed no one agreed with me. Every week there was another "[pharmaceutical manufacturing defect / establishment clause / whatever] case dismissed under Iqbal" story.

It's not easy being green.

But I'm no longer alone.

Drug & Device Law has more news, referencing a law review article and a post by a law professor who, like me, but in a more scholarly fashion, reject the argument that six paragraphs of Iqbal radically re-rewrote the rules of civil procedure.

"They're just professors," the defense bar nay-sayers will nay-say, "Iqbal has nonetheless overruled centuries of precedent, making it nearly impossible to file a lawsuit against anyone anymore."

I, of course, disagree. So how about I up the ante with recent opinions from two of the most respected conservatives judges in the federal appellate courts?

Like Judge Frank Easterbrook:

Lusby contends that Rolls-Royce defrauded the United States about the quality of the turbine blades in the T56 engine. The complaint alleges that five contracts between Rolls-Royce and the United States require all of the engine's parts to meet particular specifications; that the parts did not do so (and the complaint describes tests said to prove this deficiency); that Rolls-Royce knew that the parts were non-compliant (not only because Lusby told his supervisors this but also because audits by Rolls-Royce's design and quality-assurance departments confirmed Lusby's conclusions); and that Rolls-Royce nonetheless certified that the parts met the contracts' specifications. The complaint names specific parts shipped on specific dates, and it relates details of payment. Simple breach of contract is not fraud, but making a promise while planning not to keep it is fraud, see Wharf (Holdings) Ltd. v. United Int'l Holdings, Inc., 532 U.S. 588, 121 S. Ct. 1776, 149 L. Ed. 2d 845 (2001), and this complaint alleges the promise, the intent not to keep that promise, and the details of non-conformity. What else might be required to narrate, with particularity, the circumstances that violate 31 U.S.C. §3729(a)(1)?

Rolls-Royce's answer is: the specific request for payment. Lusby has not seen any of the invoices and representations that Rolls-Royce submitted to its customers. He knows about shipments and payments, but he does not have access to the paperwork. The district court held that, unless Lusby has at least one of Rolls-Royce's billing packages, he lacks the required particularity. Since a relator is unlikely to have those documents unless he works in the defendant's accounting department, the district court's ruling takes a big bite out of qui tam litigation.

We don't think it essential for a relator to produce the invoices (and accompanying representations) at the outset of the suit. True, it is essential to show a false statement. But much knowledge is inferential--people are convicted beyond a reasonable doubt of conspiracy without a written contract to commit a future crime--and the inference that Lusby proposes is a plausible one. 

United States ex rel. Lusby v. Rolls-Royce Corp., No. 08-3593, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 14119, at *10–11 (7th Cir. Jun. 30, 2009)(reversing dismissal of qui tam / false claims act complaint).

And Judge Richard Posner:

In our initial thinking about the case, however, we were reluctant to endorse the district court's citation of the Supreme Court's decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007), fast becoming the citation du jour in Rule 12(b)(6) cases, as authority for the dismissal of this suit. The Court held that in complex litigation (the case itself was an antitrust suit) the defendant is not to be put to the cost of pretrial discovery--a cost that in complex litigation can be so steep as to coerce a settlement on terms favorable to the plaintiff even when his claim is very weak--unless the complaint says enough about the case to permit an inference that it may well have real merit. The present case, however, is not complex. Were this suit to survive dismissal and proceed to the summary judgment stage, it would be unlikely to place on the defendants a heavy burden of compliance with demands for pretrial discovery. The parties did not negotiate face to face over the termination agreement, and though some of the negotiations were over the telephone rather than in letters or emails, Smith recorded those and the transcripts are attached to his complaint. So almost all the potentially relevant evidence is already in the record.

But Bell Atlantic was extended, a week after we heard oral argument in the present case, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009)--over the dissent of Justice Souter, the author of the majority opinion in Bell Atlantic--to all cases, even a case (Iqbal itself) in which the court of appeals had 'promise[d] petitioners minimally intrusive discovery.' Id. at 1954. Yet Iqbal is special in its own way, because the defendants had pleaded a defense of official immunity and the Court said that the promise of minimally intrusive discovery 'provides especially cold comfort in this pleading context, where we are impelled to give real content to the concept of qualified immunity for high-level officials who must be neither deterred nor detracted from the vigorous performance of their duties.' Id. (emphasis added).

So maybe neither Bell Atlantic nor Iqbal governs here. It doesn't matter. It is apparent from the complaint and the plaintiff's arguments, without reference to anything else, that his case has no merit. That is enough to justify, under any reasonable interpretation of Rule 12(b)(6), the dismissal of the suit.

Smith v. Duffey, No. 08-2804, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 17211, at *11–13 (7th Cir. Aug. 3, 2009).

Neither Easterbrook nor Posner are bleeding hearts, and neither has shown much sympathy for plaintiffs in the past. Yet, even they believe the Twombly and Iqbal chatter is overblown.

Chalk two victories up for plaintiffs. It seems the battle over pleading standards is far from over.

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All's fair in love, war and litigation:

An arbitrator cannot sue a lawyer for wrongful use of civil proceedings, the 3rd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled, even if the lawyer allegedly lodged false accusations in court papers to have the arbitrator disqualified, because lawyers enjoy an "absolute privilege" that immunizes them from liability over any communication made in the course of litigation.

The five-page unpublished opinion is available here. It says:

The underlying litigation in this case began in 1995 when Anthony Patterson, a
member of the Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith in Philadelphia, filed an action in state court against church leaders alleging that they had looted millions of dollars from the church’s bank accounts. In November 2006, the parties agreed to submit the case to binding arbitration. The parties selected Edward Naythons (“Naythons”), a retired United States Magistrate Judge in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, as the neutral arbitrator. . . .

Naythons issued the final adjudication in October 2006, but dated it July 25, 2006,
the date he completed it. In November 2006, Stradley filed a motion to vacate the final arbitration award. In December 2006, Stradley filed a petition for a hearing on their petition to vacate, as well as their previous petition for recusal.

About ten months later, Naythons filed a complaint against Stradley. In it, Naythons alleged abuse of process and wrongful use of civil proceedings due to the “scorched earth” litigation strategy Stradley employed and the accusations Stradley leveled against Naythons in the course of making arguments for his recusal. Stradley moved to dismiss the case because Naythons, a non-party to the underlying litigation, lacked standing.

The Third Circuit agreed in a single paragraph of analysis:

Under Pennsylvania law, the District Court correctly dismissed Naythons’s claims
of abuse of process and wrongful use of civil proceedings. Stradley did not “use legal process” against Naythons. Naythons was the arbitrator in the state proceeding, not a party to the action, and the fact that he was named as a respondent in one of the state court petitions is of no import. Permitting Naythons to sustain either of these claims against Stradley would abrogate the doctrine of judicial privilege, whereby “pertinent and material” communications made in in the context of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged from civil liability. Moses v. McWilliams, 549 A.2d 950, 956 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (citing Post v. Mendel, 507 A.2d 351, 355 (Pa. 1986)). The proper recourse for any unethical conduct on behalf of Stradley is through judicial review of the arbitration proceedings, which could result in sanctions against Stradley if their conduct was as egregious as Naythons alleged in his complaint.

The claims were obviously a long shot -- an arbitrator isn't a party to the case they hear, so nothing is "used" or "initiated" against them.

Why didn't Naythons allege defamation? 

Ask his lawyer, George Bochetto. Bochetto was the plaintiff in the most recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court opinion on "judicial privilege," Bochetto v. Gibson,  which reaffirmed Post:

 Pursuant to the judicial privilege, a person is entitled to absolute immunity for 'communications which are issued in the regular course of judicial proceedings and which are pertinent and material to the redress or relief sought.' Post v. Mendel, 510 Pa. 213, 507 A.2d 351, 355 (Pa. 1986) (emphasis in original). This privilege is based on the 'public policy which permits all suiters, however bold and wicked, however virtuous and timid, to secure access to the courts of justice to present whatever claims, true or false, real or fictitious, they seek to adjudicate.' Id. As we explained in Post, 'to assure that such claims are justly resolved, it is essential that pertinent issues be aired in a manner that is unfettered by the threat of libel or slander suits being filed.' Id. Notably, this privilege is extended not only to parties so that they are not deterred from using the courts, but also to judges so that they may 'administer the law without fear of consequences,' 'to witnesses to encourage their complete and unintimidated testimony in court, and to counsel to enable him to best represent his client's interests.' Binder v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 442 Pa. 319, 275 A.2d 53, 56 (Pa. 1971).

Bochetto v. Gibson, 580 Pa. 245, 251, 860 A.2d 67, 71 (2004).

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held the privilege did not apply to the facts alleged by Bochetto, however, as the defendant attorney had faxed a copy of the allegedly defamatory complaint to a reporter (at The Legal Intelligencer). Such faxing was not "in the regular course of judicial proceedings."

The lawyers at Stradley Ronon no doubt paid heed the lesson of Bochetto v. Gibson and kept all their allegations within the confines of the litigation. Hence Naythons' and Bochetto's creativity.

I don't know the merits of the allegations either way. Assuming, for a moment, that Naythons' allegations were true and Stradley injured him through "scorched earth " litigation tactics, the immunity granted to them from suit by Nathons is all the more reason that the district court needs its hands free to deal with lawyers and parties who misbehave, the exact issue pending before the Third Circuit in Grider v. Keystone Health.

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How Appealing points to this Shannon Duffy article in The Legal Intelligencer:

Shockwaves reverberated through the civil defense bar in September 2007 when a federal judge imposed sanctions on several lawyers and their clients for engaging in discovery tactics that the judge said were designed to delay and drive up the costs, but that many lawyers say are nothing more than business as usual. * * *

The case has become a cause among defense lawyers who argue that if the sanctions imposed by U.S. District Judge James Knoll Gardner are not lifted, they will find it difficult to represent their clients properly.

The Philadelphia Bar Association took the rare step of filing an amicus brief in the appeal, saying Gardner's ruling, if upheld, threatens to "increase substantially the cost of civil litigation and to chill the zealous advocacy that is every attorney's duty and the cornerstone of our judicial system." * * *

In his September 2007 decision, Gardner imposed sanctions on attorneys John S. Summers of Hangley Aronchick Segal & Pudlin; Daniel B. Huyett and Jeffrey D. Bukowski of Stevens & Lee; and Sandra A. Girifalco of Stradley Ronon Stevens & Young.

Gardner's blistering 77-page opinion concluded that the lawyers and their clients -- a pair of insurance companies -- had acted in bad faith.

By way of background, as The Legal notes,

The underlying suit was brought by a class of doctors and alleged RICO claims against Capital Blue Cross, Highmark Inc. and their jointly formed HMO, Keystone Health Plan Central. The doctors claimed they were being cheated out of their rightful fees because the insurers "shave" capitation payments to doctors by under-reporting the number of patients enrolled in the doctors' practice groups. ... The suit also accuses the insurers of defrauding doctors by "manipulating" the medical service codes used to calculate reimbursements.

Simple, right? Sure, it's a lot of documents, but they're the defendants' own payment processing documents, so they should be readily accessible.

You can read the District Court opinion here. Let's highlight some of Judge Gardner's findings:

The corporate defendants have repeatedly denied that they have access to the requested information, and have misrepresented the nature of their roles in the claims submission process. Moreover, defense counsel have feigned misunderstanding of words, terms and phrases clearly understood by them and their clients. * * * 

As stated in Finding of Fact 26, on March 1, 2004 Attorney Summers sent a letter to the court attaching a series of Declarations which affirmatively represented to the court that plaintiffs’ allegations of bundling and downcoding lacked any factual basis, and that those claims were “without merit”. Thereafter, defendant Keystone, through its counsel, Attorney Summers, refused to produce the underlying documents and data compilations which supported the Declarations on a number of frequently changing bases. Initially, Attorney Summers withheld the underlying documents and data compilations because they allegedly constituted lay opinion. Next, Attorney Summers withheld the information on the basis that it was expert opinion and immune from discovery. Finally, Attorney Summers asserted
that the underlying information was privileged material pursuant to either the attorney-client privilege or the attorney work product doctrine.

As noted by my colleague Senior United States District Judge J. William Ditter, Jr., “It is not good faith for a lawyer to frustrate discovery requests...with successive objections like a magician pulling another and another and then still another rabbit out of a hat.” Massachusetts School of Law at Andover, Inc. v. American Bar Association, 914 F.Supp. 1172, 1177 (E.D.Pa. 1996). * * * 

The most egregious instance of late production involves Keystone’s late production of claims data. Keystone claimed for years that it was unable to provide claims data. During the same time that Keystone and its counsel were feigning an inability to produce claims data (which it owned according to the ASA agreement with Synertech), Keystone was using claims data for its own self-serving purposes (i.e., the Declarations sent to the court on March 1, 2005). * * *

This case is about claims processing. To deny plaintiffs the data which Keystone owns is equivalent to denying plaintiffs their day in court. Without this data it will be more difficult for plaintiffs to prove their claims. I conclude that this is exactly what defendant Keystone hoped to accomplish by thwarting discovery in this case.

From reading the opinion, it seems the defendants' strategy was two-pronged:

1. Thwart plaintiffs' discovery by repeatedly inventing new excuses for not producing the claims processing data, and,
2. Distract, delay, and overwhelm the court and the plaintiffs by repeatedly interjecting collateral issues through "declarations."

The beauty of this plan is that it rapidly snowballs: once you introduce a new issue through #2, you can then apply #1 to refuse any further discovery into it, complicating and delaying the case further, which is apparently what happened here:

After appointment of Special Discovery Master Blume, the parties spent a period of time productively dealing with discovery issues. Plaintiffs have accepted all the decisions of Special Discovery Master Blume. Defendants initially accepted many of her decisions, but reverted to a systematic routine of not only appealing to me most, if not all, of her substantive decisions, but also filing objections to the Master’s monthly reports which detail the proceedings before her and her impressions of the status of this case. The docket reveals the amount of activity this case has generated by virtue of nearly 850 docket entries since this cases’s inception on November 7, 2001.

The cost and difficulty of discovery, particularly in complex business cases like Grider, is one of the most important issues in American law today. Unfortunately, the institutions that should be offering solutions have failed us, typically preferring to propose heads defendants win, tails plaintiffs lose "reforms" in which defendants have neither an obligation to produce evidence on their own nor an obligation to answer anything but the most specific and limited of requests. See, for example, the American College of Trial Lawyers' Civil Discovery Report, which proposed giving defense lawyers a blank check to file frivolous discovery objections while also eliminating most of the tools available to plaintiffs for compeling production.

The Philadelphia Bar Association stepped into this vacuum by hiring two defense firms to prepare an amicus brief (see the brief here) which seizes upon the above to argue that Judge Gardner's sanctions create a "chilling effect" by forcing attorneys into

... a Hobson's choice: either represent their clients in discovery matters to the limits of zealous advocacy at the risk of incurring potentially draconian sanctions; or fail to assert (or stand by) well-founded objections to arguably overreaching discovery requests, regardless of how onerous the burdens such requests may impose on their clients, for fear of incurring highly punitive sanctions.

The PBA's amicus brief misses the point: the defendants' discovery objections were meritless and designed to frustrate the action. All of the requested discovery was either highly relevant (and accessible) or was interjected into the litigation by defendants themselves.

Just like with claims for abuse of process and wrongful use of civil proceedings, attorneys and parties are not shielded from liability when they use a proper procedure for an improper purpose. Whether the means were justified is a question of what the ends were.

Here, defense counsel used a variety of theoretically appropriate discovery means -- like objections, privilege assertions, declarations, appeals from discovery masters, and motions for reconsideration -- for the illegitimate end of thwarting discovery, overwhelming the court, and delaying the action.

Fact is, discovery is going to continue to be needlessly expensive and time-consuming up until defendants have an affirmative duty to produce relevant information, since the lack of such duty forces plaintiffs to engage in fishing expeditions if they want any information at all.

If plaintiffs can't even get sanctions for intentionally dilatory and obfuscatory conduct, then talk of "reform" is pointless, since the only "reform" on the table would give the keys to the courthouse doors to whichever defense lawyer was most willing to slam them shut.

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The Blog of The Legal Times talks about the Sotomayor confirmation hearings:

Under questioning from Sen. Ted Kaufman (D-Del.), she spoke in greater detail than she has before about her career as a commercial litigator. She said she learned the importance of predictability in business law when partners would revise the drafts of settlement agreements she had written. The partners, she said, replaced her plain language with what she considered "gobbledygook," in order to conform the agreements to court precedent.

"In business, the predictability of law may be the most necessary," she said, "in the sense that people organize their business relationships based on how they understand the courts interpret their contracts."

When I was a summer associate at a business and transactional firm, the managing partner told me a similar story. Back when he was an associate, a partner at the firm asked him to draft a real estate bill of sale. He did so, with considerable difficulty, and a considerable investment of time, and took it to the partner, who skimmed it and threw it away.

Why?

"Because I don't know what any of that means. I do, however, know what these old agreements I've been using mean. Their meaning hasn't changed in five hundred years."

It seems Sotomayor got the same lesson. Lots of lawyers do.

Let me tell you: the lesson is wrong.

It's not always wrong. In certain circumstances -- like some real estate transactions -- there is language used so frequently that it has become the standard against which all other grammar and syntax is measured. Any deviation will likely be interpreted against the person who suggested it.

If you have one of those situations, be sure you know what the "standard" language is. Otherwise, focus on making the text of the written agreement reflect the reality of the parties' understanding, not on adding in "gobbledygook" to make it look lawyerly.

But even where you have a "standard" contract, the lesson may lead you astray. Long ago, I lost track of the number of times a lawyer told me "court precedent" dictated the use of particular language yet couldn't produce any actual "court precedent" to back that up.

Do you think every partner who told Sotomayor how the contract "should" have been written actually reviewed that "court precedent" prior to rejecting Sotomayor's draft? I doubt it. I'm betting more than a few of those "replaced" agreements included "standard" language that meant something different from what their clients intended.

Pay heed your elders, but shepardize your cases.

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At The National Law Journal, Nick Akerman, a partner at Dorsey & Whitney, has a thorough argument that the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA") should, and likely will, be applied against employees who leave with trade secrets or other proprietary / confidential information for use at their new jobs:

The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, a federal criminal statute outlawing the theft of data, permits a company that "suffers damage or loss" by reason of a violation of the CFAA, to "maintain a civil action against the violator" for damages and injunctive relief. 18 U.S.C. 1030(g). Since [Pacific Aerospace & Electronics Inc. v. Taylor, 295 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1196 (E.D. Wash. 2003)], there has developed a body of district court opinions that refuse to apply the CFAA against employees who steal their employer's data. This article will explain why these opinions are not likely to survive appellate review; it will also provide a strategy to avoid the application of these decisions.

Well worth reading if you come across trade secrets theft in your practice. Akerman may be the most experienced attorney in the country on this developing body of law, and it shows.

I agree with him, but for a more general reason. Since I practice in the Third Circuit (Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Delaware), I'll focus on the Third Circuit's most recent opinion on the CFAA:

The District Court focused on the criminal provisions and found it difficult to infer a civil application within the statutory framework and concluded that it could not do so, although the Court did acknowledge that several other courts had determined to the contrary. However, we conclude that not only the relevant case law, but also the plain language of the statute, militate in favor of the availability of a civil remedy, and specifically, the type of injunctive relief sought by the PC plaintiffs.

Numerous courts have recognized that a civil cause of action is apparent from the text of § 1030(g). Although we acknowledge the criminal thrust of the section in general, as it is found in Title 18, there is ample authority for permitting civil actions to proceed based on violations of the section pursuant to the language of § 1030(g). See, e.g., Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003) ('The civil remedy extends to 'any person who suffers damage or loss by reason of a violation of this section.'') (emphasis in original); I.M.S. Inquiry Mgmt. Sys., Ltd. v. Berkshire Info. Sys., Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 521, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (stating that § 1030(g) affords civil action for any violation of CFAA). Accordingly, we conclude that civil relief is available under § 1030(g).

P.C. Yonkers, Inc. v. Celebrations the Party & Seasonal Superstore, LLC, 428 F.3d 504, 511 (3d Cir. 2005).

In one sense, the above looks like a straightforward review of a criminal statute which permits a civil remedy. The statute says there's a remedy, so we'll enforce it.

In another sense, we're witnessing a big change in the way Circuit Courts and the Supreme Court interpret federal statutes which provide plaintiffs with civil relief for criminal conduct.

Like the CFAA, The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") creates a civil remedy for those persons injured by racketeering activities, typically mail or wire fraud. Also like the CFAA, numerous District Courts have contorted the brief text of the RICO Act to enact confusing, complicated barriers to relief without much basis in the Act itself. For example, numerous District Courts required plaintiffs show "first-party reliance" on the alleged mail or wire fraud (rather than merely injury related to the racketeering as a whole) and required that the plaintiff prove the defendants used a formal racketeering structure.

In the past year, the Supreme Court has torn down both of these barriers. See Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 128 S. Ct. 2131, 2145 (2008)(eliminating the "reliance" requirement, noting "Whatever the merits of petitioners’ arguments as a policy matter, we are not at liberty to rewrite RICO to reflect their — or our — views of good policy. We have repeatedly refused to adopt narrowing constructions of RICO in order to make it conform to a preconceived notion of what Congress intended to proscribe."); Boyle v. United States, ___ U.S. ____, No. 07-1309, 2009 U.S. LEXIS 4159, at *22–23 (Jun. 8, 2009)(eliminating the "structure" requirement, noting "The fact that RICO has been applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates breadth.”).

Like the RICO Act, the broad text of the CFAA "does not demostrate ambiguity[,] it demonstrates breadth." If the Circuit Courts and the Supreme Court interpret the CFAA the same way they've interpreted the RICO Act, we'll see a lot more of these claims in the future.

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The Conglomerate catches a political bait-and-switch afoot in the TARP regulations:

After the hullabaloo about the $440,000 AIG retreat in October 2008, and news in January of John Thain's $1.2 million office renovations, and the Citigroup plane fiasco, the luxury expenditures section of ARRA was inevitable.  The Act requires that the boards of TARP recipients adopt "a companywide policy regarding excessive or luxury expenditures ..." . . .

Buried in Treasury's June 15 interim final rule on TARP Standards for Compensation and Corporate Governance is a requirement that the boards of TARP recipients by September 19th "adopt an excessive or luxury expenditures policy, provide this policy to Treasury and its primary regulatory agency, and post the text of this policy on its Internet website, if the TARP recipient maintains a company website.  After adoption of the policy, the TARP recipient must maintain the policy during the remaining TARP period." 

As the executive summary explains, Sarbanes-Oxley provided a similar method of disclosure of codes of ethics under Section 406.  this doesn't work.  Letting companies make up their own rules and then disclose when they break them is a bad idea.  Clearly the incentive for the company is to make the policy as weak as possible.  

Note that these regulations, unlike Section 406, don't require disclosure of any waivers granted from the policy, just the policy itself and any amendments to it. 

It's just part of the modern Orwellian trend among corporations in which policies are given names describing them as the exact opposite of what they really are.

"Document retention" policies usually say little about retaining documents and a whole lot about destroying them. "Employee leave" and "sexual harassment" policies typically create Byzantine procedures for taking leave and filing complaints designed to provide a basis for terminating the employee or ignoring the harassment.

No surprise to see the government getting in on the act.

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The American Constitution Society's blog reports:

The Supreme Court ruled today that Arizona public school officials violated the constitutional rights of a teenage girl when they searched her for prescription-strength ibuprofen.

"The issue here is whether a 13-year-old student's Fourth Amendment right was violated when she was subjected to a search of her bra and underpants by school officials acting on reasonable suspicion that she had brought forbidden prescription and over-the-counter drugs to school," Justice David Souter wrote for the 8-1 majority in Safford Unified School District v. Redding. "Because there were no reasons to suspect the drugs presented a danger or were concealed in her underwear, we hold that the search did violate the Constitution ...." The justices, however, overturned a federal appeals court decision that found the school official who performed the search could be held personally liable.

Here's the background, from The Blog of the Legal Times:

The case involved Savana Redding, then 13, who attended a public school with a zero tolerance policy toward possession of all drugs. Acting on reports that the girl had prescription-strength ibuprofen pills, an assistant principal ordered the search to be conducted by the school nurse. She was told to strip to her underwear and pull out her bra and underpants to show that she was not hiding individual pills. None were found. Her mother sued the school district claiming a Fourth Amendment violation, and last year an en banc ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit found that the search was unconstitutional and the assistant principal was not immune from liability.

I wrote recently about "qualified immunity" in the California Proposition 8 lawsuit, the doctrine which establishes that government agents are not liable for constitutional violations unless the right they allegedly violated was "clearly established" at the time it was allegedly violated. The Supreme Court held today that student's right not to be strip-searched without cause was not previously clearly established, but is now clearly established.

Jonathan Turley highlights Justice Souter writing for the Court (in what is likely his last opinion), showing that he truly understood the core privacy issues:

Savana’s subjective expectation of privacy against such a search is inherent in her account of it as embarrassing, frightening, and humiliating. The reasonableness of her expectation (required by the Fourth Amendment standard) is indicated by the consistent experiences of other young people similarly searched, whose adolescent vulnerability intensifies the patent intrusiveness of the exposure. ... The common reaction of these adolescents simply registers the obviously different meaning of a search exposing the body from the experience of nakedness or near undress in other school circumstances.

Changing for gym is getting ready for play; exposing for a search is responding to an accusation reserved for suspected wrongdoers and fairly understood as so degrading that a number of communities have decided that strip searches in schools are never reasonable and have banned them no matter what the facts may be ...

SCOTUSBlog's quick update (I'm sure they'll write more later) takes issue with the vague nature of the new rule:

The ruling in Safford United School District v. Redding (08-479) made clear that, while the Court seriously frowns on strip searches of students, those have not been forbidden totally; it depends, in other words.

The other constitutional rule — searches of public school students’ backpacks, notebooks, other belongings, outer clothing, and pockets are generally allowed if they are based on “reasonable suspicion” — remains as it has for a quarter-century, but with a small amount of refinement, the exact scope of which is not quite clear.

We're guaranteed to see more such Fourth Amendment school lawsuits in the future, particularly in light of the removal of qualified immunity for future defendants. Hopefully, we'll also see better behavior by school administrators.

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An interesting opinion out of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Youtie v. Macy's Retail Holding, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47383 (June 5, 2009) by Senior Judge Thomas N. O'Neill, Jr.:

On August 1, 2000, Macy's acquired all of the publicly-held shares of David's Bridal, Inc. David's Bridal is a corporation and a clothier specializing in bridal gowns and other formal wear and accessories. Plaintiff had purchased David's Bridal in 1972, expanded the operations, partnered with Steven Erlbaum beginning in 1989 or 1990 and with Erlbaum made a public offering of David's Bridal's stock in 1999. After Macy's acquired David's Bridal, plaintiff entered into a contract of employment with a division of Macy's, Macy's Retail, on or about October 1, 2001. In accordance with the terms of the agreement, Youtie served as the Executive Vice-President, Product Development and Sourcing of the David's Bridal division of Macy's Retail. On November 17, 2006, an affiliate of Leonard Green & Partners signed an agreement with Macy's to acquire David's Bridal and consummated the sale and transfer of stock of David's Bridal to the Leonard Green affiliate on January 31, 2007. As part of the transaction, Macy's subsidiary Macy's Retail assigned its employment agreement with plaintiff to David's Bridal.

In short, Plaintiff claimed that the sale of his division to another company was a termination entitling him to severance. He lost; applying Missouri law (per the contract), the Court held:

The employment contract at issue in this case is one for personal services, which, as a general rule, cannot be assigned without the consent of the employee. Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. Koelz, 722 S.W.2d 311, 312-13 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986), citing Alldredge v. Twenty-Five Thirty-Two Broad. Corp., 509 S.W.2d 744, 749 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974). However, a mere change in the form in which a business is owned or conducted should not work to prohibit assignment. Id. at 313. Whether there is a change in partnership personnel or structure, the incorporation of a previously unincorporated business, the dissolution of a corporation or a change in corporate structure, "if there is no material change in the contract obligations and duties of the employee, there is no reason for the transfer of the rights from one entity or form to another to work an assignment putatively prohibited by the rule against assignment of personal service contracts." Id.

That's what happened here, in addition to the employment agreement itself recognizing the possibility of assignment. Hence, summary judgment for the Defendant on Plaintiff's claims.

Plaintiff probably should have left it alone:

Defendants filed an answer, affirmative defenses and counterclaims on December 17, 2007, alleging that plaintiff breached his employment agreement, misappropriated trade secrets and/or confidential and proprietary information, breached his fiduciary duty and duty of loyalty, engaged in tortious interference with business and employment relations, was unjustly enriched and engaged in unfair competition.

Uh oh. Among other allegations:

Plaintiff does not dispute that the "first cost" data at issue is the cost the manufacturer charged David's Bridal to manufacture the designs David's Bridal provided the manufacturer for its Spring 2007 catalogue. Additionally, plaintiff admitted in his affidavit that he "asked for the cost data because [] Erlbaum . . . was interested in what David's Bridal paid various manufacturers for the dresses they manufactured." Plaintiff further admits that he gave a copy of the cost sheet to Erlbaum but believes that plaintiff provided it to Erlbaum after plaintiff recovered from the surgical procedure he underwent after his January trip to Hong Kong.

Plaintiff also admits that he and his former partner Erlbaum had general discussions about Erlbaum returning to the bridal business. 

It's never a good idea to share proprietary information about your current employer with your former business partner.

Plaintiff raise a good issue; most of Defendants' claims were actually a single "trade secrets" claim:

laintiff argues that defendants' counterclaims for misappropriation of trade secrets and/or confidential and proprietary information, unjust enrichment and unfair competition are preempted by the PUTSA. The relevant section of the PUTSA provides as follows:

(a) General rule.--Except as provided in subsection (b), this chapter displaces conflicting tort, restitutionary and other law of this Commonwealth providing civil remedies for misappropriation of a trade secret.

(b) Exceptions.--This chapter does not affect:

(2) other civil remedies that are not based upon misappropriation of a trade secret; or

12 Pa. C.S.A. § 5308. The dominant view of courts in states that have also adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act of 1985 is that preemption exists to the extent that defendants' counterclaims are based on the same conduct that is said to constitute a misappropriation of trade secrets. See e.g., Motorola, Inc. v. Lemko Corp., 2009 WL 383444, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 11, 2009); Hecny Trans., Inc. v. Chu, 430 F.3d 402, 404-05 (7th Cir. 2005); Penalty Kick Mgmt. Ltd. v. Coca Cola Co., 318 F.3d 1284, 1296-98 (11th Cir. 2003); Savor, Inc. v. FMR Corp., 812 A.2d 894 (Del. 2002).

Defendants' counterclaims for misappropriation of trade secrets and/or confidential and proprietary information, breach of fiduciary duty and duty of loyalty, unjust enrichment and unfair competition involve plaintiff's conduct of requesting and disclosing "first cost" data to Erlbaum. These claims each refer to the same "first cost" data and are wholly based on the same conduct as the conduct that comprises a misappropriation of trade secrets claim. The "first cost" data is the sole information at issue in this case and it is either a trade secret or something less. Thus, these counterclaims are preempted only if the "first cost" data at issue constitutes a misappropriation of a trade secret.

And that's what would have kicked out most of these claims, except that the parties forgot to brief if the information was actually a trade secret:

A trade secret under the PUTSA is defined as:

Information, including a formula, drawing, pattern, compilation including a costumer list, program, device, method, technique or process that:

(1) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use.

(2) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.

PUTSA, 12 P.S. § 5302.

However, neither party has properly briefed whether this information qualifies as a trade secret. Plaintiff argues that the PUTSA preempts defendants' counterclaims but states, without sufficient legal analysis, that the information does not qualify as a trade secret to satisfy the PUTSA because it was readily available to anyone who asked for it. These arguments are contradictory; plaintiff cannot have it both ways. See Callaway Golf Co. v. Dunlop Slazenger Group Am., Inc., 295 F. Supp.2d 430, 437 (D. Del. 2003), stating that arguing that information does not constitute a trade secret and also that other claims are preempted by the Trade Secret Act is contradictory. Defendants did not respond with legal analysis on whether the "first cost" data constitutes a trade secret; instead they merely requested leave to file an amended counterclaim complaint if I find such information to be a trade secret. As this information may qualify as a trade secret, I will not find that the data satisfies lesser standards than those required for a trade secret merely because the issue has not been properly briefed. For this reason, I cannot find that defendants' counterclaims of misappropriation of trade secrets and/or confidential and proprietary information, breach of fiduciary duty and duty of loyalty, unjust enrichment and unfair competition are preempted at this time because defendants may still be able to recover under such theories in the event that the "first cost" data does not constitute a misappropriation of a trade secret under the PUTSA. Cenveo Corp. v. Slater, 2007 WL 527720, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2007), stating "that the cases holding that the Trade Secrets Act does not preempt common law tort claims when it has yet to be determined whether the information at issue constitutes a trade secret take the better approach." 

 

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The Ninth Circuit just decided Barnes v. Yahoo! (link to PDF opinion). Here are the facts, as summarized by Anita Ramasastry at FindLaw:

The facts begin when plaintiff Cecilia Barnes learned that her ex-boyfriend – pretending to be her – had posted nude photos of her on Yahoo, along with her email address, work address and phone number, and an invitation to men to contact her for sexual purposes. The ex-boyfriend had also gone into Yahoo's member chat rooms to direct men to her profile. Soon, as the Ninth Circuit summarized it, "men whom Barnes did not know were peppering her office with emails, phone calls, and personal visits, all in the expectation of sex."

Yahoo's policy provides for the removal of fake profiles if the person making the request provides a copy of her driver's license, which Barnes says she did. However, Barnes alleges that when she contacted Yahoo on several occasions, in an effort to have the profile removed, the site did not remove them. She says that approximately three months after the first of these contacts, a Yahoo representative contacted her and advised her that Yahoo would now put a stop to this unauthorized profile – yet three more months passed, and Yahoo did nothing. Indeed, according to Barnes, Yahoo took no action to de-post the profile until she sued the company.

Unsurprisingly,

The court dismissed Barnes's negligence claim against Yahoo, based on Section 230 of the federal Communications Decency Act (CDA).

Nothing new about that.

However, it held that Yahoo's promises to her that it would de-post could give rise to a claim under the doctrine of promissory estoppel.

Interesting! Paul Levy at Consumer Law & Policy filed an amicus and attended the hearing, and fills us in on some context:

The argument also revealed that Barnes’ contention is that Yahoo!’s promise to take down her profiles came on the eve of a television report about her situation, after reporters contacted Yahoo! in an effort to avoid negative press, Yahoo! contacted her “on its own” to promise to take the material down, and that even though she could not have sued Yahoo!, there were other steps that she could have taken to obtain redress.  For example, she claims that, at Yahoo!’s direction, she did not testify before the Oregon Legislature about what had happened to her, because Yahoo! told her it would take the material down.  If Barnes proves such facts, one can see a real case here.

Daniel Solove at Concurring Opinions agrees with the result but looks on the horizon:

One of the potential problems with the court’s holding is that it may deter ISPs and other sites from having an explicit policy for removing tortious material.  Yahoo could be penalized with potential liability and a loss of its immunity by having a removal policy.  An ISP or site that has no such removal policy and that would say “get lost” to people who request takedowns would not be subject to promissory estoppel liability.  Is it fair to penalize those who have such policies?

But, Solove notes, we're not at that point quite yet, since the Court's holding was expressly limited, in that "Yahoo is liable not because it had a general removal policy, but because it made specific promises to Barnes." Evan Brown at Internet Cases sees ISPs changing their behavior nonetheless, in advance of the law:

Smart intermediaries (e.g. website operators) are likely to communicate less now with individuals who feel aggrieved, because the intermediary may fear that anything it says could be construed as a breakable promise putting it at risk for liability.

On a more technical issue, but one with big ramifications for the course of these case, Eric Goldman at Technology & Marketing Law Blog worries (much as Levy did) that the opinion on its face holds 230 immunity can not be raised on a motion to dismiss. That implicates the ISP's First Amendment rights to go about their business and permit online speech without fearing the cost of a long, meritless suit that's eventually dismissed anyway. Yahoo! has petitioned for rehearing on that issue alone.

In my humble opinion, I agree with everyone above. There is a very good reason not to apply section 230 immunity to an ISP interjecting itself into a private dispute to avoid negative publicity. At the same time, it does indeed create a precedent that makes other ISPs shy to intervene at all.

Yet, under section 230 immunity, the ISP already can choose to completely ignore anyone it wants to, and there is no good reason to "protect" Yahoo! for yanking Ms. Barnes' chain to avoid negative publicity. If an ISP promises to remove content, it should do so. If the ISP doesn't want to remove content, it shouldn't promise it will.

Simple enough.

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Summing up their reversal of a Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas' dismissal of plaintiff's complaint on preliminary objections:

Therefore, taking the facts pled in the Thierfelders' complaint as true, we hold that when a physician is providing specific treatment for psychological problems, and has a sexual relationship with the patient, if that sexual relationship directly causes the patient's psychological/emotional symptoms to worsen, that patient has potentially stated a cognizable cause of action for malpractice. These doctors need not be specialists in psychological care, but merely must be medically licensed to treat patients for such conditions. We note that in this case it is claimed that Dr. Wolfert was actively treating the patient for those issues, and not merely cognizant of them."

David Thierfelder & Thierfelder v. Wolfert, 2009 PA Super 92 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009).

The case clarifies the rule set by Long v. Ostroff, which held "a general practitioner's duty of care does not prohibit an extramarital affair with a patient's spouse." Long, 854 A.2d 524 (Pa. Super. 2004).

Perhaps of more interest to law students, Thierfelder goes through the basic elements of tort duties and medical malpractice:

To establish a case of malpractice requires evidence that the physician acted negligently or unskillfully performed his duties which are devolved and incumbent upon him on account of his relations with his patients, or lacked the proper care and skill in the performance of a professional act. Keech v. Mead Joson and Co., 580 A.2d 1374 (Pa. Super. 1990). In order to set forth a prima facie case of malpractice, a plaintiff must establish the essential elements of a negligence cause of action, namely: (1) a duty owed by the doctor to the patient; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) the breach of duty was the proximate cause, or substantial factor in bringing about the harm suffered by the patient; and (4) damages suffered by the patient resulting directly from that harm. Gregorio v. Zeluck, 678 A.2d 810 (Pa. Super. 1996) (emphasis added). In order to meet this burden, the plaintiff is required to provide expert testimony to establish, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the acts of the physician deviated from acceptable medical standards, and that such deviation was the proximate cause of the harm suffered. Id.(a) Physician's Duty of Care to Patient and Althaus v. Cohen, 756 A.2d 1166 (Pa. 2000).

Here, the trial court concluded that a general practitioner, such as Dr. Wolfert, does not breach a duty to his patient by having a sexual affair with that patient while under the physician's care. The concept of duty has been discussed by our Supreme Court in Althaus v. Cohen, 756 A.2d 1166 (Pa. 2000). The existence of a duty is a question of law for the court to decide. R.W. v. Manzek, 888 A.2d 740 (Pa. 2005). In Althaus, supra, the Supreme Court stated that the determination of whether a duty exists in such a case involves weighing the following factors:(1) the relationship between the parties; (2) the social utility of the actor's conduct; (3) the nature of the risk imposed and foreseeability of the harm incurred; (4) the consequences of imposing a duty upon the actor; and (5) the overall public interest in the proposed solution. 756 A.2d at 553. 

Thierfelder, 2009 PA Super 92 at * 11-12 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009).

As noted by the dissent, in Physicians Ins. Co. v. Pistone, 726 A.2d 339 (Pa. 1999), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied medical malpractice liability insurance coverage to a doctor who, in the course of examining the patient for treatment for gallstones, performed a number of offensive and lewd acts. Pistone held medical malpractice liability "looks to whether the act that caused the alleged harm is a medical skill associated with specialized training," which the foregoing was not.

The case thus has good odds of eventually ending up in front of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court: given Pistone, the doctor's insurer likely believes they are under no duty to indemnify the doctor, and so is paying for the doctor's defense subject to a reservation of rights. Given the possibility of there being no coverage under Pistone, the insurer is likely loathe to contribute to sizable settlement, which means the parties will keep fighting it out until the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decides it for them.

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I'm somewhat surprised this issue comes up as often as it does:

"Scholarly commentary has recognized that Pennsylvania law has been riven with 'considerable confusion as to the nature of the covenant of good faith, when that covenant is implicated, and how claims arising from a breach of the covenant are enforced.' Seth William Goren, Looking for Law in all the Wrong Places: Problems in Applying the Implied Covenant of Good Faith Performance, 37 U.S.F. L. Rev. 257, 258 (2003). As the parties' discussion of the law illustrates, it has not always been clear 'whether the covenant is implicated in every contractual relationship or only some . . . and whether a breach of the covenant of good faith gives rise to an independent cause of action or is merely a tool of contract interpretation.' Id. at 260. According to Goren this confusion 'derived from confusing the contract-tort of bad faith with breaches of the general covenant [of good faith] present in all contracts.' Id. at 303. Whatever its source, this confusion has largely been resolved: 'The majority of Pennsylvania cases through the 1990s to today . . . have refused to permit independent claims for breach of the covenant of good faith outside of an insurer-insured relationship. Thus, in general, a 'breach of such covenant is a breach of contract action, not an independent action for a breach of a duty of good faith and fair dealing.'' Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Seiple v. Comty. Hosp. of Lancaster, No. 97-cv- 8107, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5093, 1998 WL 175593, at (E.D. Pa. April 14, 1998) ('Pennsylvania does not recognize a claim for breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing as an independent cause of action.')).

Recent case law confirms this as the prevailing rule in Pennsylvania. See, e.g., LSI Title Agency, Inc. v. Eval. Servs., Inc., 2008 PA Super 126, 951 A.2d 384, 391 (Pa. Super.2008), appeal denied, 960 A.2d 841 (Pa.2008) (citing cases holding that Pennsylvania does not recognize separate breach of contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing where that claim is subsumed by separately pled breach of contract claim.); JHE, Inc. v. SEPTA, No. 1790 NOV. TERM 2001, 2002 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 78, 2002 WL 101894,1 at (Pa. Com. Pl. May 17, 2002) (''[T]he implied covenant of good faith does not allow for a claim separate and distinct from a breach of contract claim . . . [A] claim arising from a breach of the covenant of good faith must be prosecuted as a breach of contract claim, as the covenant does nothing more than imply certain obligations into the contract itself.') (collecting cases from other jurisdictions adopting same rule) (emphasis in original); Commonwealth v. BASF Corp., No. 3127, 2001 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 95, 2001 WL 1807788, at (Pa. Com. Pl. Mar.15, 2001) ('Pennsylvania law does not allow for a separate cause of action for breach of either an express or implied duty of good faith, absent a breach of the underlying contract.').

Federal courts construing Pennsylvania law have adhered to the same rule. See e.g., Chanel, Inc. v. Jupiter Group, Inc., Civ. No. 3:04-CV-1540, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43363, 2006 WL 1793223, at (M.D .Pa., June 27, 2006) (agreeing and citing cases holding that claim for breach of good faith and fair dealing is not independent cause of action, but part of a breach of contract claim); In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 338 F. Supp.2d 517, 549 (D.N.J. 2004) ('Although Pennsylvania imposes a duty of good faith and fair dealing on each party in the performance of contracts, there is no separate cause of action for breach of these duties . . . .') (citations omitted); Blue Mt. Mushroom Co. v. Monterey Mushroom, Inc.., 246 F. Supp. 2d 394, 400-01 (E. D. Pa. 2002) ('Pennsylvania law does not recognize a separate claim for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.'); McHale v. NuEnergy Group, No. Civ. A. 01- 4111, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3307, 2002 WL 321797, at (E.D. Pa. Feb.27, 2002) (internal citations omitted) (same)."

McHolme/Waynesburg, LLC v. Wal-Mart Real Estate Bus. Trust, No. 08-961, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38934, at *5–8 (W.D. Pa. May 7, 2009).

I suppose from the plaintiff's perspective it is an issue of "why not? If the claim is recognized, it could have been malpractice for me not to include it," but I wonder about the ramifications if a plaintiff actually gets one of these "independent" good faith claims through trial.

What are the elements of proving it? What are your damages? Do they overlap your breach of contract damages? Can you recover twice? 

Is there any doubt the defendant will appeal such a verdict? Any doubt it will get your case reversed and re-tried?

I think the down side including such a claim -- particularly the distraction from the real issues in the case and the loss of some credibility with the court -- outweigh any potential benefits.

Just include it as more evidence of the breach of contract.

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Judge Timothy J. Savage of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania had a straightforward job.

All he had to do was:

• survey the laws of all fifty states with regard to unjust enrichment and breach of the implied warranty of merchantability,
  • Huber v. Taylor, 469 F.3d 67, 82-83 (3d. Cir. 2006) (consideration of the requirements for certification must be conducted in light of the correct jurisdiction's law); see also In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1010 (3d Cir. 1986).;
• determine whether there were actual or real conflicts between those laws,
  • Hammersmith v. TIG Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 220, 230-31 (3d Cir. 2007)
• where there was such a conflict, assess which state has the greater interest in the application of its law to determining the liability for defective aircraft crankshafts that were allegedly more vulnerable to stresses in their ordinary and foreseeable use,
  • Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563, 267 A.2d 854, 856 (Pa. 1970); Melville v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 584 F.2d 1306, 1311 (3d Cir. 1978)
• and consider whether applying that law to all plaintiffs and class members violates the Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses through individualized scrutiny of the claims asserted by each member of the plaintiff class.
  • Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13, 101 S. Ct. 633, 66 L. Ed. 2d 521 (1981) (plurality opinion); see generally, 1 Joseph M. McLaughlin, McLaughlin on Class Actions: Law and Practice § 5:46 (4th ed. 2007).

Simple, right? Apparently not:

Our review of the record persuades us that the choice-of-law examination here had its shortcomings. As one instance, the District Court observed in its unjust enrichment analysis that a true conflict existed between the relevant states' laws because Pennsylvania and some others preclude recovery if the parties had an express contract.  Believing unjust enrichment to be a hybrid of contract and tort law, the Court purportedly weighed the factors from sections 188 (concerning contracts) and 148 (relating to torts involving fraud and misrepresentation) of the Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws and concluded that Pennsylvania 'has the most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties.' Defendants were sued in Pennsylvania, manufactured the crankshafts there, 'issued service bulletins and instructions . . . about the crankshafts . . . in Pennsylvania, and plan[] to replace [them] [t]here.'"

Powers v. Lycoming Engines, No. 07-4710, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 6785, at *10–12 (3d Cir. Mar. 31, 2009).

Unfortunately, the above was in error because:

Pennsylvania, however, does not consider unjust enrichment to be either an action in tort or contract. Unjust enrichment, rather, an equitable remedy and synonym for quantum meruit, is 'a form of restitution.' Mitchell v. Moore, 1999 PA Super 77, 729 A.2d 1200, 1202 n.2 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999); see also Ne. Fence & Iron Works, Inc. v. Murphy Quigley Co., 2007 PA Super 287, 933 A.2d 664, 667 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007); Sack v. Feinman, 495 Pa. 100, 432 A.2d 971, 974 (Pa. 1981) (citing Restatement of Restitution § 1 (1937) as a source for the elements of an unjust enrichment claim); Meehan v. Cheltenham Twp., 410 Pa. 446, 189 A.2d 593, 595 (Pa. 1963) (same). The Restatement views restitution as an area of the law 'which is neither contract nor tort.' Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 221 introductory note (1971)."

If there is a claim under Pennsylvania law that falls within the scope of restitution under the Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws, [Fn 3] the following factors should have been addressed in the choice-of-law examination: (1) the place where the parties' relationship was centered; (2) the state where defendants received the alleged benefit or enrichment; (3) the location where the act bestowing the enrichment or benefit was done; (4) the parties' domicile, residence, place of business, and place of incorporation; and (5) the jurisdiction "where a physical thing . . . , which was substantially related to the enrichment, was situated at the time of the enrichment." Id. § 221(2) (1971).

Id. Footnote 3 notes:

Although we have found no instance in which Pennsylvania has adopted section 221, our case law, in explaining the state's choice-of-law approach, directs courts to "use the Second Restatement of Conflict of laws as a starting point." Berg Chilling Sys., Inc. v. Hull Corp., 435 F.3d 455, 463 (3d Cir. 2006). "[T]o properly apply the Second Restatement and remain true to the spirit of Pennsylvania's 'flexible approach,' [courts] must . . . characterize the particular issue . . . in order to settle on a given section of the Restatement for guidance." Id. Because Pennsylvania considers unjust enrichment to be a form of restitution, we believe applying section 221 would be proper.

In other words, Judge Savage, having no Pennsylvania precedent at all to rely on, incorrectly predicted which way Pennsylvania would go in making the archaic distinction between claims in law and claims in equity in the choice of law context. The Third Circuit predicted that, if Pennsylvania courts had to decide if unjust enrichment was a tort or contract claim, the Pennsylvania courts would say, "neither, it's a claim in equity," and so should be evaluated under different standards in determining which state's laws should be evaluated for potential application in a class action filed in Pennsylvania.

Oh.

Nonetheless, in light of Judge Savage's lengthy opinion analyzing most of the relevant issues under the similar, but erroneous, standard he used, it's hard to see how the outcome will change by this ruling.

A model of efficiency, class actions are not.

I don't have an easy answer for how class actions should be prosecuted and evaluated. Judge Savage and the Appellate Judges (Ambro, Weis and Van Antwerpen) clearly did the best they could; fact is, class actions are complicated, time-consuming, expensive and just plain hard to litigate and to decide. It's not uncommon to bounce back and forth between the trial court and the appellate court several times prior to even beginning discovery, much less trial. Then comes the "real" post-trial appeal from a final order.

Plaintiff's complaint was filed July 10, 2006, more than two-and-a-half years ago. Plaintiff and his lawyers have gone essentially nowhere since then, and still have years of litigation ahead, all at substantial time and expense to the plaintiff's counsel, who likely represents plaintiff on a contingent fee, a fee that will depend not only on winning, but on the judge's own evaluation of whether the claimed fee is fair and reasonable. All years down the road.

Something to keep in mind when you hear about all these "unfair" counsel fees in class actions.

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Trial courts in Pennsylvania (particularly the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania) continue their organic development of the "gist of the action" doctrine in the absence of explicit guidance from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.*

The latest comes from EDPA Judge Jan E. DuBois in Farmaceutisk Laboratorium Ferring A/S v. Shire United States, Inc., CA NO. 08-941 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30209 (April 8, 2009), who finds an interesting way to thread the needle between the gist of the action doctrine, the parol evidence rule, and the common sense acknowledgment that fraud can and does occur amongst the parties to a contract.

First, the gist of the action:

Pennsylvania's gist of the action doctrine "bars claims for allegedly tortious conduct where the gist of the alleged conduct sounds in contract rather than tort." Hospicomm, Inc. v. Fleet Bank, N.A., 338 F. Supp. 2d 578, 582 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (internal quotation marks & citations omitted). The purpose of the doctrine is to "preclude[] plaintiffs from re-casting ordinary breach of contract claims into tort claims." eToll v. Elias/Savion Adver., Inc., 811 A.2d 10, 14 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (citation omitted). Although a breach of contract can give rise to an actionable tort, "to be construed as in tort, . . . the wrong ascribed to defendant must be the gist of the action, the contract being collateral." Bash v. Bell Tel. Co., 601 A.2d 825, 829 (Pa. Super. 1992) (internal quotation marks & citation omitted). "In other words, a claim should be limited to a contract claim when 'the parties' obligations are defined by the terms of the contracts, and not by the larger social policies  embodied by the law of torts.'" Bohler-Uddeholm Am., Inc. v. Ellwood Group, Inc., 247 F.3d 79, 104 (3d Cir. Pa. 2001) (citing Bash, 601 A.2d at 830).

Fraud in the inducement claims are not barred by the gist of the action doctrine where the fraud involves representations of fact independent of promises of performance made in the contract. See eToll, 811 A.2d at 17; TruePosition, Inc. v. Sunon, Inc., No. 05-CV-3023, 2006 WL 1451496, at *3 (E.D. Pa. May 25, 2006) (DuBois, J.); Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Eaton Metal Prods. Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 329, 341 (E.D. Pa. 2003). "[F]raud to induce a person to enter into a contract is generally collateral to (i.e., not interwoven with) the terms of the contract itself." Air Prods., 256 F. Supp. 2d at 341 (citing eToll, 811 A.2d at 17) (internal quotation marks omitted). On the other hand, when fraud in the inducement is based on statements made with regard to performance of the contract, such claims are barred under that doctrine. In such circumstances a plaintiff's remedy lies in contract. See Williams v. Hilton Group PLC, 93 F. App'x 384, 386-87 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding that fraud in the inducement claim that defendant had no intention of honoring [*25] the contract was barred by gist of the action doctrine). "Moreover, promises made to induce a party to enter into a contract that eventually become part of the contract itself cannot be the basis for a fraud-in-the-inducement claim under the gist of the action doctrine." Freedom Props., L.P. v. Landsdale Warehouse Co., No. 06-CV-5469, 2007 WL 2254422, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 2, 2007) (citations omitted).

The Court notes that "caution should be exercised in determining the gist of an action at the motion to dismiss stage. Judicial caution is appropriate because often times, without further evidence presented during discovery, the court cannot determine whether the gist of the claim is in contract or tort." Interwave Tech., Inc. v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., No. 05-CV-398, 2005 WL 3605272, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 2005) (internal quotation marks & citations omitted).

And now the parole evidence rule:

Pennsylvania law concerning the application of the parol evidence rule to claims of fraudulent inducement is well established. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained the law as follows:

Where the alleged prior or contemporaneous oral representations or agreements concern a subject which is specifically dealt with in the written contract, and the written contract covers or purports to cover the entire agreement of the parties, the law is now clearly and well settled that in the absence of fraud, accident or mistake the alleged oral representations or agreements are merged in or superseded by the subsequent written contract, and parol evidence to vary, modify or superseded the written contract is inadmissible in evidence.

HCB Contractors v. Liberty Place Hotel Assocs., 652 A.2d 1278, 1279 (Pa. 1995) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The exception to the parol evidence rule for fraud covers fraud in the execution, i.e., the oral representations were fraudulently omitted from the contract, not fraud in the inducement. Dayhoff, Inc. v. H.J. Heinz Co., 86 F.3d 1287, 1300 (3d Cir. 1996); Freedom Props., L.P. v. Landsdale Warehouse Co., No. 06-CV-5469, 2007 WL 2254422, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 2, 2007); Interwave Tech., Inc. v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., No. 05-CV-398, 2005 WL 3605272, at *16 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 2005). Applying the parol evidence rule to bar claims of fraudulent inducement, as in Pennsylvania, is the minority rule. Regent Nat'l Bank v. Dealers Choice Auto. Planning, Inc., No. 96-CV-7930, 1997 WL 786468, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 26, 1997). Pennsylvania courts justify this position under the rationale that if the parties "relied on any understanding, promises, representations or agreements made prior to the execution of the written contract . . . , they should have protected themselves by incorporating into the written agreement the promises or representations upon which they now rely . . . ." 1726 Cherry St. P'ship v. Bell Atl. Props., Inc., 653 A.2d 663, 666 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (internal quotation marks & citation omitted). Thus, where there is an integrated agreement and the asserted misrepresentations giving rise to fraud in the inducement are addressed by the agreement, the parol evidence rule bars extrinsic evidence of such a fraud claim.

To apply the HCB Contractors rule, courts must determine whether there is an integrated agreement and whether the asserted prior representations are specifically covered by the written agreement. Interwave Tech., 2005 WL 3605272, at *17; Quorum Health Res. v. Carbon-Schuylkill Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 430, 433 (E.D. Pa. 1999). One key factor in concluding whether an agreement is integrated is the presence or absence of an integration or merger clause in the written agreement. See HCB Contractors, 652 A.2d at 1280; Interwave Tech., 2005 WL 3605272, at *18; Quorum Health, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 433; G. Daniel Glass v. Singer Optical Group, Inc., No. 95-CV-308, 1995 WL 717411, at *3-4 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 1995). To determine whether the written contract specifically addresses the subject of the oral representations, courts ask whether "they relate to the same subject matter and are so interrelated that both would be executed at the same time and in the same contract . . . ." Hershey Foods Corp. v. Ralph Chapek, Inc., 828 F.2d 989, 995 (3d Cir. 1987) [*31] (internal citation omitted).

In this case, the 2005 Settlement Agreement does not contain an integration or merger clause.  ... The only section of the 2005 Settlement Agreement that possibly covers such a representation is section 2.4 As discussed in Part III.D, supra, the language of section 2.4 is ambiguous, particularly with respect to whether it requires defendant to market all new oral 5-ASA drugs as PENTASA(R). In light of this ambiguity, the Court cannot determine at this stage whether the written agreement specifically addresses the content of the alleged oral representations such that they would be barred by the parol evidence rule. "For the Pennsylvania parol evidence rule to bar a claim for fraudulent inducement, the contract must be written, unambiguous, and fully integrated." Coram Healthcare Corp. v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 2d 589, 594-95 (E.D. Pa. 1999). As the Court concludes that the 2005 Settlement Agreement is ambiguous and not fully integrated, it will not dismiss plaintiffs' fraudulent inducement claim as barred by the parol evidence rule.

Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings was thus denied. I don't agree with the whole approach here -- I think Bell and eToll hold only that a plaintiff can't simultaneously recover under negligence and breach of contract -- but, importantly, Judge DuBois didn't throw out half of plaintiff's claims for failure to "prove" an issue that should be left to the jury. However phrased or theorized, the core ability to recover where one party may have defrauded the other in the context of a contract is preserved.

* I don't mean to imply it's necessarily wrong for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to permit this organic development. The United States Supreme Court, for example, routinely denies cert on cases up until a general consensus has development among the Circuit Courts of Appeal.

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 You may have seen this article in The American Lawyer:

Simpson Thacher & Bartlett partner Barry Ostrager isn't exactly mincing words in his assessment of the counsel that guided Chubb Insurance to the U.S. Supreme Court, where on Monday it will square off against Ostrager's insurance company client, Travelers Indemnity. "Whoever has been advising Chubb," he told the Litigation Daily on Friday, on a train en route to Washington, "gave them the worst advice any lawyer ever gave a client." ...

Way back in 1986, Manhattan federal bankruptcy court judge Burton Lifland confirmed the Chapter 11 reorganization plan of the granddaddy of all asbestos companies, Johns-Manville Corp. The plan was groundbreaking. It created a trust, to be funded by Johns-Manville and its insurers, through which all asbestos claims against the company would be processed. ...

Fast-forward to 2001, when asbestos plaintiffs lawyers began testing new theories of liability against insurance companies. They filed tortious interference suits -- which have become known as "direct action" claims -- asserting that insurers had an independent duty to warn potential victims of the dangers of asbestos. In 2002, Travelers asked Judge Lifland -- the Manville bankruptcy judge -- to enjoin the "direct action" cases. ...

At this point, Chubb became involved. Chubb hadn't been part of the Manville deal but it was worried that if Judge Lifland approved the Travelers settlement, it would be precluded from suing Travelers in cases in which they shared liability. Chubb aligned with the asbestos plaintiffs lawyers to challenge the bankruptcy court's power to enjoin suits against parties other than the debtor. (That's the decision that Ostrager has scorned.)

That bothered Stephen Cozen enough that he wrote a letter to The American Lawyer, deriding Ostranger as a "noncredible source ... launching ad hominem attacks."

The irresistible part is that this feud involves none other than the In re Johns Manville Corp. constellation of cases, including 06-2320 (2nd Cir., Jan. 17, 2007), in which Mr. Ostrager's cross-appeal was rejected because:

Travelers had 14 days to file its notice of cross-appeal. However, the firm calculated the 14 days from the date it received the notice, not from the date the notice was actually filed. The district court denied Traveler’s motion to extend the deadline by one day, explaining that this was a case of “garden variety attorney inattention” and not excusable neglect. The Second Circuit affirms.

Doh! But let's focus on the supposed worst advice ever.

The Travelers / Simpson argument is that Chubb / Cozen should have kept their mouths shut and not attempted to intervene, because the arguments they made (or the precedent created) in support of intervention could be used by plaintiffs attempting to sue Chubb in a later "direct action" case involving an asbestos trust.

There is something to be said for not putting forth your best argument in a particular case as part of a broader strategy involving other cases. That something is: you should not sandbag your own arguments in one case unless there is clear and convincing evidence that it will help you in other cases.

The law of unintended consequences applies to the practice of law just as it applies to everything else. What, exactly, did Travelers / Simpson believe would happen in the absence of the Chubb / Cozen intervention? That the billion-dollar asbestos plaintiffs lawyers industry would not realize a bankruptcy court's injunction protecting a non-debtor raised serious statutory and constitutional concerns?

We already know exactly the opposite is true, and that the asbestos plaintiffs lawyers were already challenging the power of the court to enjoin the "direct action" cases against insurance companies. These issues were already destined for the Circuit Courts and the Supreme Court. The difference was the names on the briefs.

Where then would that have left Chubb if Cozen had told them to sit on their rights and not intervene? Had the Supreme Court denied certiorari for the appeal, or if the Supreme Court agrees with the Second Circuit in prohibiting the bankruptcy court from enjoining these suits, then Chubb would have been left out in the cold, potentially precluded from raising issues relating to hundreds of millions of dollars in insurance coverage and tort liability.

Could that be in the running for the worst advice a lawyer ever gave a client?

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Fresh off the presses is Acumed LLC v. Advanced Surgical Servs., 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 5854 (3d Cir., March 20, 2009), a charming setup in the insanely hostile and competitive world of medical devices:

Acumed is a manufacturer of surgical implants and related devices, and appellant [Morris] and [Advanced Surgical Services] are in the business of distributing surgical implants and other medical devices for various manufacturers, including Acumed, to hospitals and surgeons. ... At the trial, Ryan Crognale, a sales representative for appellant, explained his view of the events that Casey described at Nazareth Hospital. Crognale testified that Morris directed him to deliver the implants to Nazareth and to attend the surgery. He then stated that after his earlier delivery of Acumed implants, he returned to the hospital and saw Casey in the operating room and observed that the physician doing the procedure was "not using my stuff anyway." Consequently, Crognale took the tray of instruments he previously had delivered and left the operating room. Thus, it appears that the physician performing the procedure used materials Acumed supplied through Surgical, its authorized representative.

As Crognale was leaving the surgery center, he encountered Casey, and an argument between the two representatives ensued. Appellant contends that during the argument Casey loudly accused Crognale of illegally selling Acumed inventory, an incident that appellant contends led Dr. Robert Frederick, a doctor at Nazareth, to stop doing business with it. Moreover, appellant contends that because of Dr. Frederick's connection with a large group of physicians in Philadelphia, the confrontation was a factor in a decision by Jefferson Hospital in Philadelphia to exclude Morris from its operating theater for one year. As a result of the incident at Nazareth Hospital, Acumed sent another notice to its customers stating that Surgical was its only authorized representative in eastern Pennsylvania and southern New Jersey.

Can you guess what happened next?

Appellees filed the complaint in this action against appellant in the District Court charging it with violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125, violation of Pennsylvania's Anti-Dilution statute, 54 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1124 (West 1996), unfair competition, breach of a non-disclosure provision in the Advanced-Acumed Agreement, conversion, unjust enrichment, and tortious interference with existing or prospective contractual relationships.

...

Appellant filed a four-count counterclaim against appellees. In counts I, II, and III appellant charged that Acumed breached its contract with appellant by not providing timely notice of termination of their relationship and by failing to pay the contractually required buy-out fee that became due to appellant when Acumed terminated their relationship. In addition, appellant charged that Acumed's failure to pay the buy-out fee violated the Pennsylvania Commissioned Sales Representatives statute, 43 P.S. §§ 1471 et seq. (West 1991). In count IV ("counterclaim IV") appellant alleged that Acumed and Surgical ". . .converted property belonging to Advanced, defamed and disparaged Advanced maliciously and falsely, intentionally interfered with Advanced's contractual and business relationships and competed unfairly against Advanced."

After a little more than a week of trial...

The jury returned a verdict on March 21, 2007, finding for appellees on their count against appellant for tortious interference with existing or prospective contractual relationships with appellees' customers. The jury, however, rejected appellees' claim that appellant had tortiously interfered with Acumed's and Surgical's contractual relationship between themselves and also rejected appellees' other claims, including appellees' Lanham Act claims. The jury also found against appellant on the portions of its counterclaims that had survived the District Court's dismissals, i.e., the claims predicated on breach of contract and violation of the Pennsylvania Commissioned Sales Representatives statute. The jury awarded $ 20,000 in compensatory damages to Surgical and $ 0 in compensatory damages to Acumed on the tortious interference claim but found that both Acumed and Surgical were entitled to punitive damages. ... The jury then returned a verdict awarding $ 1 in nominal damages to Acumed and punitive damages to both Acumed and Surgical Resources in the amount of $ 100,000 each.

Uh oh.

As we indicated above, to recover on a tortious intentional interference with existing or prospective contractual relationships claim in Pennsylvania, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant was not privileged or justified in interfering with its contracts: "While some jurisdictions consider a justification for a defendant's interference to be an affirmative defense, Pennsylvania courts require the plaintiff, as part of his prima facie case, to show that the defendant's conduct was not justified." Triffin v. Janssen, 426 Pa. Super. 57, 626 A.2d 571, 574 n.3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (citing Thompson Coal 412 A.2d at 471 n.7); Silver v. Mendel, 894 F.2d 598, 602 n.6 (3d Cir. 1990). We hasten to add, however, that our conclusion does not depend on the allocation of the burden of proof on the privilege issue, as we would reach our result even if appellant had the burden of proof to establish the privilege as a defense, because the evidence established conclusively that appellant did so.

Pennsylvania has adopted section 768 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which recognizes that competitors, in certain circumstances, are privileged in the course of competition to interfere with others' prospective contractual relationships. See Gilbert v. Otterson, 379 Pa. Super. 481, 550 A.2d 550, 554 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988). The law necessarily recognizes this privilege because if more than one party seeks to sell similar products to prospective purchasers, both necessarily are interfering with the other's attempt to do the same thing. Moreover, even if an entity has an existing contractual relationship with another entity, a stranger to the relationship must be privileged to seek to replace one of the entities lest competition be stifled. Thus, under section 768: "[o]ne who intentionally causes a third person not to enter into a prospective contractual relation with another who is his competitor or not to continue an existing contract terminable at will does not interfere improperly with the other's relation if: (a) the relation concerns [*37] a matter involved in the competition between the actor and the other; (b) the actor does not employ wrongful means; (c) his action does not create or continue an unlawful restraint of trade; and (d) his purpose is at least in part to advance his interest in competing with the other."

...

Comment e to section 768 elaborates on the type of conduct that constitutes wrongful means: "If the actor employs wrongful means, he is not justified under the rule stated in this Section. The predatory means discussed in § 767, Comment c, physical violence, fraud, civil suits and criminal prosecutions, are all wrongful in the situation covered by this Section." Courts relying on comment e have interpreted the wrongful means element to require that a plaintiff, to be successful in a tortious interference action, demonstrate that a defendant engaged in conduct that was actionable on a basis independent of the interference claim. See Brokerage Concepts, 140 F.3d at 531 (citing DP-Tek, Inc. v. A T & T Global Info. Solutions Co., 100 F.3d 828, 833-35 (10th Cir. 1996)). Moreover, we noted in 2000 that even though the Pennsylvania courts have not interpreted the "wrongful means" element of section 768, it is likely that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would adopt this meaning, that is, for conduct to be wrongful it must be actionable for a reason independent from the claim of tortious interference itself. See Nat'l Data Payment Sys., Inc. v. Meridian Bank, 212 F.3d 849, 858 (3d Cir. 2000); see also CGB Occupational Therapy, Inc. v. RHA Health Servs. Inc., 357 F.3d 375, 389 (3d Cir. 2004). Nothing in later Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions to which the parties have directed our attention or of which we are aware leads us to change our view of this issue.

I'm sure you can imagine what happened next.

We therefore will reverse the District Court's order of May 21, 2007, to the extent that it denied appellant a judgment as a matter of law on the tortious interference claim, and will remand the case to the District Court for it to enter judgment as a matter of law in favor of appellant on that claim and to set aside the prior judgment on the claim. As a result, we also will reverse the jury's award of compensatory and punitive damages against appellant and the District Court's grant of an injunction in appellees' favor.

That's why business contingent fee cases demand such a high fee and why commercial litigators have to be so selective in the cases they take. On the most basic level, appellees won in the District Court and at trial and post-trial after years of complicated, intense litigation and trial.

How complicated? The Third Circuit Court of Appeal's opinion is a whopping 18,785 words, about one-fifth the length of a typical paperback novel. The briefs from the complaint to the appeal no doubt exceeded 100,000 words.

And the plaintiffs walked away with nothing.

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Twitter, twitter, everywhere. My delicious morning coffee was interrupted this morning by Anne Reed, who tweeted the following on Twitter:

Another tweeting juror, in Philly Fumo trial; How Appealing posts copy of "motion for immediate voir dire", http://tinyurl.com/c74h6s

Apparently the blogging gods want to be kind to your gentle host, ensuring him an endless fountain of inspiration. The Philadelphia Inquirer summarizes:

Defense lawyers for former State Sen. Vincent J. Fumo moved late yesterday for an immediate halt in jury deliberations and the removal of one juror, contending that the juror posted oblique remarks on Facebook.com and Twitter.com - including one declaring, "Stay tuned for a big announcement on Monday everyone!"

The petition, filed on the eve of the scheduled sixth day of deliberations in Fumo's federal corruption trial, stated that there was "substantial evidence" that the juror, who was not identified, had violated admonitions not to disclose the status of deliberations.

The lawyers asked U.S. District Judge Ronald L. Buckwalter to question the juror and other members of the panel.

"An immediate suspension of deliberations and a delicate but probing judicial inquiry is warranted," lawyers NiaLena Caravasos and Peter Goldberger stated in the petition. "Depending on the results of that inquiry, it seems that one or more jurors ought to be removed and possibly replaced . . . or that a mistrial will be required."

The motion cites one case, United States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 257, 301 (3d Cir. 2007). Here's the relevant passage:

"We review 'a trial court's response to allegations of juror misconduct for abuse of discretion.' United States v. Boone, 458 F.3d 321, 326 (3d Cir. 2006). Here, we conclude that the District Court acted within its discretion when it individually questioned the jurors.

We have recently had occasion to set forth the applicable legal standard governing the district courts' latitude to question jurors during deliberations about allegations of misconduct. In Boone, we recognized that '[i]t is beyond question that the secrecy of deliberations is critical to the success of the jury system.' Id. at 329. At the same time, we emphasized that '[i]t is also manifest, however, that a juror who refuses to deliberate or who commits jury nullification violates the sworn jury oath and prevents the jury from fulfilling its constitutional role.' Id. Attempting to reconcile these disparate values, we held that 'where substantial evidence of jury misconduct -- including credible allegations of jury nullification or of a refusal to deliberate -- arises during deliberations, a district court may, within its sound discretion, investigate the allegations through juror questioning or other appropriate means.' Id. We stressed that a district court, 'based on its unique perspective at the scene, is in a far superior position than this Court to appropriately consider allegations of juror misconduct, both during trial and during deliberations.' Id.

...

Accordingly, the legal standard is clear: a district court may investigate allegations of juror misconduct when presented with 'substantial evidence' of that misconduct.

In other words, while the District Court has ample discretion in deciding whether or not to question a juror, the Court can't just do so on a whim -- it needs "substantial evidence" of juror misconduct.

Here, however,the situation is a little different: while particular tweets (say, "he's guilty as sin, ain't nothin' gonna change my mind") might provide "substantial evidence" of "jury nullification" or "a refusal to deliberate," twittering alone isn't necessarily "substantial evidence" itself of any particular misconduct.

Sure, the jury is instructed to keep the content of deliberations secret, but it doesn't seem the juror revealed any content, other than the cryptic reference to a "big announcement" on Monday, which itself doesn't reveal any content other than the jury being close to a resolution.

Moreover, there's the bigger question of: so what? The Third Circuit still hasn't settled on a standard for removing a juror. Suffice to say it's not easy:

"While it is undisputed that in certain circumstances, district courts may discharge a juror for cause during deliberations, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(b), we have yet to enunciate the appropriate standard. 24 Any standard must accommodate two clashing interests. First, it is clear that 'a court may not dismiss a juror during deliberations if the request for discharge stems from doubts the juror harbors about the sufficiency of the government's evidence.' United States v. Brown, 262 U.S. App. D.C. 183, 823 F.2d 591, 596 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Any other rule would eviscerate the right to a unanimous verdict of guilt. See id. On the other hand, courts agree that a district court has the authority to dismiss a juror -- even during deliberations -- if 'that juror refuses to apply the law or to follow the court's instructions.' United States v. Abbell, 271 F.3d 1286, 1302 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). That is because 'a juror who refuses to deliberate or who commits jury nullification violates the sworn jury oath and prevents the jury from fulfilling its constitutional role.' Boone, 458 F.3d at 329. While the jurisprudence discussing the discharge of jurors during deliberations has largely focused on a refusal to deliberate or jury nullification, its reasoning applies with equal force to claims of juror bias." United States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 257, 303 (3d Cir. 2007).

Id. at 303.

Twittering a couple lines about the status of the trial doesn't come close to "refusing to apply the law." At the most, the juror arguably didn't "follow the court's instruction" with regard to secrecy, but it's hard to say such was deliberate when the juror plainly made an effort not to disclose any specific information.

It all comes back to a discussion I had with Anne Reed just last week (on Twitter, about another juror twittering case, of course):

annereed: Civil defendant wants new trial after finding juror's trial tweets; they look appropriate to me. http://ping.fm/OvHlM

phillyshortcite: @annereed re http://ping.fm/OvHlM Agreed; jurors entitled to tell others they're on a jury and to describe verdict afterwards.

 

annereed: @phillyshortcite Yes.Juror networking issues are easier than people think; q is whether it would be ok if juror said it face to face.

 

phillyshortcite: @annereed I'm surprised by depth of confusion over social media & law. "Are tweets admissible?" Yep, just like everything else.

There's nothing different here. Jurors for centuries have told their friends over the weekend "I think we've finally reached a verdict!"

We just have more "friends" these days, and, as Seth Godin would put it, everything goes on your permanent record.

So, juror, if the jury's suspended while the lawyers argue and you're reading this... stop reading this! Do what the court tells you to and stick to the evidence at trial!

But if you're done with deliberations and have entered a verdict, don't sweat it. You're not the first juror to breathe a sigh of relief after months of trial.

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Legal Blog Watch catches Charles Nesson, a professor at Harvard Law School and a founder of Harvard's Berkman Center for Internet & Society, getting reprimanded in the SONY BMG Music v. Tenenbaum case. Recording Industry vs. The People has the Order (PDF), which says:

Absent plain evidence to the contrary, and the Defendant has presented none, Plaintiffs must be taken at their word -- in which case Mr. Oppenheim [an attorney for the Defendants in other matters] is not a party to this case whose deposition may simply be noticed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(1). Instead, he may only be deposed pursuant to a third-party subpoena that conforms to the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 (requiring a more formal process for deposing witnesses who are not parties in the case). For the very reasons stated by the Plaintiffs, the Defendant's subpoena fails to meet these requirements: it was not delivered through personal service; witness and mileage fees were not tendered at the time of service; and it was not served within the district of the issuing court or within 100 miles of the place specified for the deposition. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(b)(1)-(2). In addition, because Defendant has not made his initial disclosures pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1), D. Mass. Local Rule 26.2 bars him from initiating any discovery, including depositions, absent an order from the Court.

Yep. That'll get a warning like "The Court will not hesitate to impose appropriate sanctions, including potentially substantial costs, should the Defendant waste either the Plaintiffs' time and money or scarce judicial resources by filing frivolous motions in the future."

As much as I'd like to smugly deride the foolishly ivy tower law professor for daring to believe he could be a civil litigator, fact is, in the real world, lawyers sometimes make honest mistakes and, depressingly, often care little for what the rules actually say.

Here's an example from the Federal Rule of Civil Procedures. I am apparently among the very few, very proud lawyers who have ever laid eyes on it:

(d) Timing and Sequence of Discovery.

(1) Timing.

A party may not seek discovery from any source before the parties have conferred as required by Rule 26(f), except in a proceeding exempted from initial disclosure under Rule 26(a)(1)(B), or when authorized by these rules, by stipulation, or by court order.

(2) Sequence.

Unless, on motion, the court orders otherwise for the parties' and witnesses' convenience and in the interests of justice:

(A) methods of discovery may be used in any sequence; and

(B) discovery by one party does not require any other party to delay its discovery.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(d)(emphasis added). I have lost track of the number of defendants who have opposed my discovery and sought protective orders on such frivolous grounds as:

(a) I have to depose the defendant last;

(b) I have to obtain persuasive evidence for my case before I can depose the defendant;

and, my favorite,

(c) it's "unduly burdensome" unless we do depositions in the order the defendant wants to do them.

So, Professor Nesson, welcome to the club. Please take note of the mistake and move on.

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As you've probably heard at sites like Overlawyered and Drug & Device Law, the sky is falling upon us because the Supreme Court didn't override Congress and the FDA and decide to pre-empt state failure-to-warn tort suits against prescription drug manufacturers.

If you don't know the basic facts, see SCOTUSBlog. Some initial commentary at the WSJ.

Wyeth manufactures pharmaceuticals, subject to FDA regulation. The FDA sets a minimum standard for the use of these drugs and their labeling; it does not dictate the text of warning labels, though it does have to approve them, which it does after intense lobbying by the manufacturers, lobbying generally unopposed by anyone at all, where the sole "evidence" are manufacturer-sponsored studies, studies which have repeatedly come under fire for conflicts of interest.

Nonetheless, under the "changes being effected" regulation, a drug company can unilaterally change its warning labels to improve patient safety.

Does this regulatory authority preclude all state tort suits alleging drug companies promoted or failed to warn against unsafe uses of these drugs?

Vested interests have spent a lot of money trying to convince judges (and the public) that this question is so hard to answer on purely legal grounds that it requires the judges start making policy instead of law.

Because the law is very clear, as the Supreme Court ruled, 6-3:

As it enlarged the FDA’s powers to “protect the public health” and “assure the safety, effectiveness, and reliability of drugs,” id., at 780, Congress took care to preserve state law. The 1962 amendments added a saving clause, indicating that a provision of state law would only be invalidated upon a “direct and positive conflict” with the FDCA [Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act]. §202, id., at 793. Consistent with that provision, state common-law suits “continued unabated despite . . . FDA regulation.” Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U. S. ___, ___ (2008) (slip op., at 8) (GINSBURG, J., dissenting); see ibid., n. 11 (collecting state cases). And when Congress enacted an express pre-emption provision for medical devices in 1976, see §521, 90 Stat. 574 (codified at 21 U. S. C. §360k(a)), it declined to enact such a provision for prescription drugs.

Slip op. at 10.

Congress has had numerous opportunities, while amending the FDCA, to change that. It didn't.

The FDA has had numerous opportunities, while promulgating regulations with the force of law (as opposed to mere policy positions, which are not binding on courts), to change that. It didn't.

There was no "direct and positive conflict" between plaintiff's claims and the FDA approval.

There's nothing more to say here.

The Supreme Court is to be commended for refraining from telling Congress and the FDA they didn't know how to set policy, and for sticking to basic principles of judicial, statutory and regulatory interpretation.

Thanks for refraining from judicial activism.

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One of the few interesting parts of law school Professional Responsibility classes lives on in this article at The Recorder:

A San Francisco Bluetooth headset maker says Fish & Richardson played an unseemly game of hot potato by dropping it as a client and then turning around and suing for patent infringement the very next day.

Aliph Inc. moved to disqualify Fish from representing Bluetooth rival Plantronics in the patent case two weeks ago, arguing that the firm shouldn't be allowed to sue its own client or get out of the mess by suddenly disowning Aliph at 8:30 p.m. the night before.

...

Aliph's lawyers say that Fish's behavior is condemned by the so-called "hot potato doctrine," which frowns on a law firm creating a conflict so it can drop a smaller client for a more lucrative one.

As part of the engagement letter, Fish did have a prospective conflict waiver, stating, "In the past, when we have been retained for regulatory work only, we have made it an express condition of our representation that the firm not be conflicted from taking any intellectual property work that might otherwise be adverse to our clients."

Although most lawyers know (or at least have heard of) the hot potato doctrine, and law students are told the courts "frown" on it, there are not many cases actually applying it. A quick search reveals fewer than two dozen nationwide, at least of cases that actually refer to it as the "hot potato doctrine."

It's nonetheless a powerful doctrine, one that can easily get a lawyer disqualified from a lawsuit.

First, a simple question: what good does it do a lawyer or law firm to drop a client on the eve of suing them?

Lawyers have different obligations to current clients than they do former clients. Perusing the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, a version of which is in place in most states (New York is one exception), we find Rule 1.7 (relating to current clients) strictly prohibits lawyers from representing new clients "directly adverse to another client" whereas Rule 1.9 (relating to former clients) merely prohibits lawyers from working on "the same or a substantially related matter" as they did for the former client.

Fish & Richardson (allegedly) dropped Aliph, a regulatory client, because they were about to take a position "directly adverse" to Aliph, a current client, which is prohibited. They wanted the standard to be that they would be prohibited only if the Plantronics intellectual property matter was "the same or a substantially related matter" to the work they did for Aliph, which it wasn't, since it was different fields, different lawyers, different everything.

Too bad for F&R: there are good odds the court will apply the "hot potato doctrine" and apply the rules for current clients to them.

Pepper Hamilton was disqualified from a suit in Michigan a year and a half ago because...

Courts that have considered the issue have held that a firm will not be allowed to drop a client in order to shift resolution of the conflicts question from Rule 1.7 dealing with current clients, to the more lenient standard in Rule 1.9 dealing with former clients.

El Camino Res., LTD. v. Huntington Nat'l Bank, No. 1:07-cv-598, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67813, at *39–40 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 13, 2007) quoting Ethics Committee of the State Bar of Michigan Opinion RI-139 (Aug. 7, 1992).

Fish & Richardson has plenty of defenses, including that they didn't summarily drop the client but in fact gave them extended notice of the problem, albeit in a vague form, without identifying the client. And, of course, there's the big "so what?" question arising from the fact that, in reality, it's unlikely Aliph will be prejudiced by F&R representing Plantronics.

Moreover, "The finding of an ethical violation, however, does not automatically require disqualification. The court should order disqualification only where some 'specifically identifiable impropriety' has actually occurred and the balance of relevant factors requires vindication of the integrity of the legal profession over defendant's interest in retaining counsel of its choice." Id., at *54.

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Here are the facts, liberally edited by me:

Appellee purchased property for $ 20,000.00, including a building that was deemed uninhabitable by both the City and Appellee.

After Appellee purchased the Property, she contacted the Philadelphia Neighborhood Housing Service (PNHS) to assist her in securing a loan to rehabilitate the Property. A building inspector estimated the cost of renovation and repair to be $ 113,500.00. Another contractor estimated the cost of renovation and repair to be $ 122,590.00.

PNHS agreed to lend Appellee $ 65,000.00 to renovate and repair the Property. PNHS also agreed to help Appellee secure additional financing to reach the estimate provided by the inspector. Appellee successfully received a total mortgage commitment of $ 125,000.00 for the renovation and repair of the Property.

After Appellee received the mortgage commitments, but before any renovations were made, the City tore down the building on the Property.

So, what's it worth? The relevant Second Restatement of Torts provisions are below the fold.

One answer is market value. Plaintiff certainly didn't want that: they bought it for $20,000 and it was valued at $35,000 after the demolition, a gain of $15,000.

Another is "special value" (the Restatement calls it "peculiar value"). Here's what happened at trial:

The trial court read, in pertinent part, the following charge to the jury:

Plaintiff is entitled to be compensated for the harm done to her property. If you find that the property was a total loss, damages are to be measured by either its market value or its special value to the plaintiff, whichever is greater. The plaintiff is entitled to be reimbursed for losses reasonably incurred because of the damage to the property.

The City objected to that part of the trial court's charge which was based on Section 6.11 of the Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Civil Jury Instructions, 3rd Edition (Jury Instruction). The trial court overruled the City's objection. The jury found the City negligent in tearing down the building and entered a verdict for the Appellee in the amount of $ 80,000.00.

Oliver-Smith v. City of Philadelphia, 962 A.2d 728 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2008). The Commonwealth Court reversed, holding:

'The fundamental purpose of damages for an injury to or destruction of property by the tortious conduct of another is to compensate the injured party for the actual loss suffered.' Department of Transportation v. Crea, 92 Pa. Commw. 242, 483 A.2d 996, 1001 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1977). Appellee presented evidence that she purchased the Property on April 8, 2003, for $ 20,000.00. The Property was later appraised, prior to demolition, at $ 20,000.00. Appellee did not present any evidence showing that she had spent any money repairing or rehabilitating the Property or that there were any unique characteristics of the Property that warranted a special value. The charge by the trial court of anything further than market value was, therefore, an erroneous extension of the range of permissible damages.

Appellee cannot receive as damages money that she never spent. Such unspent money is not actual damages, but a windfall. Section 911 provides for special value, but only for matters which can be accounted for. In this case, the loss of approved loans/mortgages which were never executed and to which no legal obligation ever attached does not amount to 'special value.' The trial court erred in directing the jury. 

There's definitely a "special value" here: the plaintiff was going to rehabilitate the project and, presumably, re-sell it for a profit. A condemned building might be worth nothing to you and me, but it's worth a lot to a contractor with a vision. The plaintiff is entitled to recover those damages.

Maybe the plaintiff didn't present anything but the sizes of the loans, in which case the above is correct. But I bet they did, since the size of the jury's verdict reflects, in my view, the lost profit on the resale of the property contemplated by the plaintiff once they had rehabilitated and renovated it. Such a number -- a projection about future profits -- is certainly open to doubt, but it's a factual issue for the jury, and the defendant (the City of Philadelphia) easily could have presented evidence to the contrary.

Oh well.

Continue Reading...

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Continuing on from our discussion yesterday, medical malpractice, like any other negligence tort, is proven by showing:

(1) the defendant had a duty to the plaintiff to act a certain way,

(2) that the defendant breached that duty,

(3) that the defendant’s breach caused the plaintiff harm and

(4) that the harm caused is compensable under the law.

In most medical malpractice cases, the first element (the duty) is undisputed: every doctor has a duty to provide appropriate professional care and treatment to their patients. Similarly, the fourth (the harm) is usually not denied, though the defense will raise questions about the degree of harm actually suffered, particularly where significant non-economic damages (a.k.a., “pain and suffering”) are alleged.

In most medical malpractice cases, the fight is over whether the standard of care was breached and whether that breach actually caused the patient’s harm. The latter is sometimes the biggest issue in wrongful death cases, with the defense lawyer arguing that, even if the doctor had not been negligent, the patient still would have died.

The octuplets are different. There’s no question about the second element: the doctor very clearly breached the standard of care by transferring so many embryos through IVF. There’s also little question about the third element: the octuplets’ obstetrical and neonatal care appears to have been impeccable, so any birth injuries (or fetal or neonatal injuries) they suffer were likely caused by the multiple gestation and resulting placental insufficiency and premature birth.

As noted previously, the fourth element is up in the air – they’re all reportedly in good health – but a simple fact of neonatology and pediatrics is that problems can develop months or years down the line. Bronchopulmonary dysplasia, cognitive delays, and cerebral palsy are all very common among premature babies, even those with “normal” NICU courses.

Which leaves us with the first element: did the doctor who transferred those embryos have any duty to the resulting children?

Most of the cases brought arising from IVF revolve around either a failed attempt to prevent or terminate the pregnancy or a fertility clinic’s failure to screen the embryo for genetic defects. In each of those cases, courts have found that the ‘wrongfully born’ child has no claim against the clinic. But let’s take a careful look at what the “wrongful life” laws really prohibit. Here’s Pennsylvania’s statute:

WRONGFUL LIFE.-- There shall be no cause of action on behalf of any person based on a claim of that person that, but for an act or omission of the defendant, the person would not have been conceived or, once conceived, would or should have been aborted.

42 Pa.C.S. § 8305. Yet, as noted last time, that’s not what the octuplets would claim here. There was no attempt or desire to terminate any of them; the problem is that they were gestated in an unsafe manner, not that they should not have been transferred through IVF or gestated or born. They would not be claiming that they should have not been transferred through IVF or should have been aborted, but that one or more of their siblings should have been.

I have not found any cases raising that theory; the law here is anything but settled. To determine if a court would find such a duty, we can turn to that old war horse of law school classrooms, Tarasoff, cited by courts across the country for the factors to be weighed in establishing a legal duty:

[T]he foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff,

the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury,

the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered,

the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct,

the policy of preventing future harm,

the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and

the availability, cost and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.

Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 435 (1976). As Tarasoff continued, “The most important of these considerations in establishing duty is foreseeability. As a general principle, a defendant owes a duty of  care to all persons who are foreseeably endangered by his conduct, with respect to all risks which make the conduct unreasonably dangerous."

There’s no doubt of the foreseeability of the danger of transferring eight embryos, and no doubt of the moral, policy and community reasons for recognizing a legal duty. As noted by Dr. Thomas H. Murray, a bioethicist, the American Society for Reproductive Medicine acknowledged in a 2004 report that fertility programs may withhold services when they can provide "well-substantiated judgments" that the child will not receive adequate care, and to exercise such judgment particularly" when significant harm to a future child is likely." A professional duty is thus recognized, so why not a legal one?
 
Yet, in another sense, permitting the octuplets to claim that each other should not have been born raises similar philosophical problems as “wrongful life:” for example, who is to say which sibling should have not been born, and how many? Pennsylvania’s case law on “wrongful life” – a split Supreme Court, which prompted the statute above – gives us a forceful example of how courts (and lawyers) can cut such Gordian knots:

It is undoubtedly true, as a review of the cases on this subject indicates, that legal scholars are able to cite numerous theories and reasons to support the view that recovery must be defeated in all cases of this type, and therefore that courts should not even entertain such complaints. The view that we cannot calculate the value of existence as compared to nonexistence is only one such hyper-scholastic rationale used to deny a cause of action in these cases. Those holding such views are apparently able to overlook what is plain to see: that -- in cases such as this -- a diseased plaintiff exists and, taking the allegations of the complaint as true, would not exist at all but for the negligence of the defendants. Existence in itself can hardly be characterized as an injury, but when existence is foreseeably and inextricably coupled with a disease, such an existence, depending upon the nature of the disease, may be intolerably burdensome. To judicially foreclose consideration of whether life in a particular case is such a burden would be to tell the diseased, possibly deformed plaintiff that he can seek no remedy in the courts and to imply that his alternative remedy, in the extreme event that he finds his life unduly burdensome, is suicide. No court in the land would directly send such a message to these plaintiffs. We deem it unfortunate that some courts have indeed sent that message by implication.

Speck v. Finegold, 497 Pa. 77, 87 (1981, Flaherty, J., concurring).

The irony here is that, while the mother may bear some fault for these circumstances, her claim is far more simple, and more likely to prevail, than her children's claims. Indeed, the parents in the original “wrongful life” case, Becker v. Schwartz, were permitted to claim damages arising from the cost of care and treatment of their child, although not damages for noneconomic and emotional harm. Recall what I wrote above: every doctor has a duty to provide appropriate professional care and treatment to their patient, here the mother, if maybe not the children.

[Here's Part 1, see also Can a Patient Consent to Medical Malpractice? (A Followup on the Octuplets)]

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You can see the impulse to try to sue directly in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania:

"Plaintiff entered into a lease agreement with defendants dated July 16, 2003 for a term of five years for a space located at the Philadelphia Navy Yard, Building 6, Suite 320, 4900 S. Broad Street, Philadelphia, PA 19102 which was occupied by the United States Department of Agriculture. The lease ended on August 31, 2008 and plaintiff alleges that defendants [the Department of Agriculture]  have failed to vacate the premises despite plaintiff's demands that they do so. Paragraph 6(d) of the addendum to the lease requires defendants to vacate upon termination of the lease and to quit and deliver up to plaintiff the premises peacefully and quietly.

Plaintiff alleges that it requested that defendants vacate the premises and on September 8, 2008, defendants responded that they were 'looking for space' and could not vacate the premises until they found new space. Defendants also allege that they have continued to pay rent for the premises and that plaintiff has accepted it. Plaintiff alleges that he has a new tenant ready to occupy the premises when it becomes vacant and that the new tenant has stated that it needs possession of the premises as soon as possible or it will look for other space."

4900 S. Broad St. Associates-Tenant, L.P. v. USDA, No. 8-4646, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4023, at *1–2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 21, 2009, O'Neill, Jr., J.).

But you just can't do it:

"The United States is immune from suit unless it has consented or has waived immunity in an act of Congress. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586, 61 S. Ct. 767, 85 L. Ed. 1058 (1941). To survive a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, plaintiff has the burden of showing that sovereign immunity has been waived to the satisfaction of the Court. In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prod., Liab. Litig., 264 F.3d 344, 361 (3d Cir. 2001). The primary congressional acts waiving sovereign immunity for tort and contract suits against the government are the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (FTCA), and the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (CDA), 41 U.S.C. § 607(g)(1) and § 609(a)(1). Waiver of government immunity is narrowly construed. Id. at 362.

The Little Tucker Act, 1 which is simply a subsection of the FTCA, states that immunity is expressly waived for those claims not sounding in tort that are not subject to sections 8(g)(1) and 10(a)(1) of the CDA. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2). These sections state that contract claims against the United States must either originate in the United States Court of Federal Claims or claimants must first exhaust their administrative remedies. U.S. v. Slaey, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55699, 2008 WL 2845351, at (E.D. Pa. 2008)."

Everyone who tries one of these suits against the United States in their local district court has a hook (the better 'hook' being equitable claims), and here's where these guys get shot down:

"Plaintiff also alleges jurisdiction under the [Administrative Procedures Act] and the [Declaratory Judgment Act]. However, the APA does not provide an independent basis for jurisdiction. that 'provision is not an independent grant of subject-matter jurisdiction.' Fanning v. U.S., 346 F.3d 386, 402 (3d Cir. 2003), citing Your Home Visiting Nurse Services, Inc. v. Shalala, 525 U.S. 449, 457-58, 119 S. Ct. 930, 142 L. Ed. 2d 919 (1999), citing Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 97 S. Ct. 980, 51 L. Ed. 2d 192 (1977). Neither does the DJA provide an independent cause of action or confer subject matter jurisdiction where it does not already exist. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Obusek, 72 F.3d 1148, 1153 (3d Cir. 1995), citing Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671, 70 S. Ct. 876, 94 L. Ed. 1194 (1950)."

 Better luck next time! 

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Kevin LaCroix at The D&O Diary delivers news that surprises no one, a securities class action based upon Bank of America's untimely disclosure of Merrill Lynch's catastrophic losses:

As has been well-publicized, within a matter of weeks of closing its acquisition of Merrill Lynch, Bank of America announced previously undisclosed 4Q08 operating losses at Merrill of $21.5 billion that required BofA to obtain an emergency $20 billion cash injection from the U.S. Treasury, as well as an additional $118 billion asset backstop. BofA’s stock market valuation has dropped more $100 billion since the day before the merger was announced through the company’s January 16 earnings release.

As the Wall Street Journal reported (here), questions immediately arose following BofA’s announcement of the Merrill losses, such as why BofA’s CEO Kenneth Lewis "didn’t discover the problems prior to the Sept. 15 deal announcement" and "why he didn’t disclose the losses prior to the vote on the Merrill deal on Dec. 5 or before closing the deal on Jan. 1."

With these kinds of questions circulating, it comes as no surprise that plaintiffs’ attorneys have initiated litigation. There were actually two different lawsuits announced on January 21, 2009 relating to these circumstances. Both of the lawsuits purport to be filed on behalf of persons who held BofA securities on October 10, 2008, the record date for the December 5, 2009 special meeting of shareholders to approve the merger.

LaCroix, no stranger to director and officer liability, has a thorough take on it, and Ideoblog raises the possibility of a "national interest" exception to securities disclosure laws due to the circumstances: on December 17, Lewis had become so concerned that he went to DC to meet with Bernanke and Paulson for guidance, both of whom, Lewis said, "[were] firmly of the view that terminating or delaying the closing...could result in serious systemic harm."

The Fed denied they requested Lewis to keep quiet. Either way, Lewis obviously knew of the trouble by the December 17 meeting with the Fed, but didn't report the losses publicly until Bank of America's next earnings statement on January 16. That's problematic.

The WSJ Law Blog also flags another action, this one brought by Susman Godfrey, alleging the same, with a particular paragraph of interest in their complaint:

As reported in The Wall Street Journal, just three days after shareholders voted to approve the merger, on December 8, 2008, Merrill’s CEO John Thain addressed a meeting of Merrill’s Board of Directors. Thain reported that Merrill suffered significant losses in November, which Thain described as one of the worse months in Wall Street history. Despite the size of these losses, Thain told Merrill’s board the losses were in line with BOA’s estimates. Neither BOA nor Merrill, nor any of the Individual Defendants, ever disclosed any such estimates . . . to their shareholders in the Proxy Statement. Likewise, no loss estimates were disclosed in any subsequent filings.

Ruh-roh!

• September 15 -- Deal is reached. BoA and ML get to work on details.
• October 31 -- Proxy statement issued to shareholders (you can find it here) in conjunction with the special meeting.
• December 5 -- Special meeting of shareholders, who vote to approve the deal.
• December 8 -- Thain tells ML board of significant losses in November, losses "in line with BOA's estimates."
• "Mid December" -- Lewis learns of ML's losses.
• December 17 -- Lewis meets with Bernanke and Paulson
• January 16 --  BoA discloses losses to shareholders.

Lewis & Thain's stories are not consistent. Either:

1. BoA didn't provide ML estimates like Thain suggested;
2. Lewis didn't know about BoA's own estimates, even though Thain did; or,
3. Lewis knew sbout ML's losses sometime significantly before December 8.

The plaintiffs are betting on #3, though they could make hay out of #2. It's hard to see how anyone could sue for #1 -- the BoA deal was the best thing that could have happened to ML, without which ML probably would have collapsed.

Of course, there's another issue here: both Bank of America and Merrill Lynch were effectively insolvent throughout the plaintiffs' class period. Both are completely dependent upon emergency government policies to stay operating, and the government has already stepped in to convert the messy merger into a complicated loan and guarantee program.

That is to say, anyone who bought shares of Bank of America in this time frame knew they were buying an effectively insolvent company, and the damages of the Merrill transaction may be, at most, to rearrange the form of Bank of America's insolvency -- possibly to its advantage.

(If you're not familiar with Section 14(a) shareholder class actions, there's a little background below the fold.)

Continue Reading...

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EDD Update discusses the D.C. Court of Appeals affirming a contempt order against the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (“OFHEO”) in In re: Fannie Mae Securities Litigation, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 9 (D.C. App. Jan. 6, 2009):

OFHEO handled the e-discovery very poorly, to put it mildly, and was held in contempt by the district court in Washington D.C. The agency had not complied with a prior order that their lawyers had consented to. Turns out the consent order allowed the requesting parties to specify any search terms they wanted, so they did. They specified 400 keyword terms which returned over 660,000 documents. The government lawyers clearly did not understand what they had agreed to.  Still, they went ahead with the search and spent $6,000,000 in the process [9% of the agency's entire annual budget]. As is typical, the main costs were for privilege review.

...

Is it just to allow a single government lawyer's goof to drain 9% of an agency's total annual budget, a budget drawn from taxpayer funds?  Should the appellate court have considered an economic analysis of the situation in reaching its decision, and perhaps ruled differently in the face of a possible gross inefficiency? What happened to proportionality and Rule 26(b)(2)(C)? It seems that the court erred in ordering what amounts to a wanton waste of taxpayer funds.

It sounds outrageous, but it has to be viewed in context. OFHEO, though a third-party, was intimately tied to the facts here, and knew well that the defendants -- the executives of Fannie Mae and Fannie Mac -- would want extensive documentation from them. The defendants subpoened that information in the summer of 2006. OFHEO objected (not sure why, maybe just habit), lost, and was ordered to produce the information.

So, what did OFHEO do? Request several extensions and then claim electronically-stored information was not part of the original order.

The court disagreed and ordered them to produce more. Then granted another extension.

Then OFHEO claimed it had produced everything -- which it transparently had not -- so the defendants deposed a records custodian and found mountains which had not been produced.

The defendants moved for contempt, which OFHEO thwarted, at the hearing, by agreeing to the stipulated order at issue.

They then sat on the issue again, then finally hired some contract attorneys immediately prior to the deadline, then requested two more extensions, assured the Court each time they were almost done, then had the contempt order entered against them. Apparently, they still have not produced everything.

I have two thoughts.

First, approach discovery from a strategic, not tactical, perspective. What were all those contract lawyers doing? What "privilege" concerns does OFHEO have? Did they really have to spend taxpayer money to review every document, pre-production, for the possibility that taxpayer money was previously spent providing advice to a public agency? There wasn't another way to do this production? They couldn't have, say, entered into a production agreement permitting them to withdraw documents inadvertently produced? How damaging could they be?

Second, don't play around with the Court, even if you're "only" a third party. It's quite clear that this incident was not a simple error by a lawyer, but rather months of deliberate neglect, even through multiple court events, until well after the last minute. Indeed, it seems that, though some of the language arguments were raised, the "cost" argument was not even raised until appeal itself. Prior to that, OFHEO did not even review the issue thoroughly enough to see how expensive it would be.

No wonder the Court called it "too little, too late."

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I so often see the Board of Directors at a company acting badly that it’s almost is heartening to see things done the right way.

After a protracted period of familial disputes over the company, including a prior lawsuit, one side sent a Demand Letter, as is proper, alleging various Board members “breached their fiduciary duties and engaged in wrongful, self-serving and bad faith acts and omissions … which have resulted in catastrophic injury to [the Company] and corresponding and substantial loss of value to [the challenger’s] stock [in the Company].”

That prompted a Board Meeting where:

Attorney Sonnenfeld discussed the Demand Letter, corresponding ALI Principles, and the duty of care owed by the board to respond to the Demand Letter. He advised, 'evaluation of the demand should be made by independent and disinterested directors.' At that point, [the Members accused of wrongdoing] were excused from the meeting. 'The meeting continued, attended by the independent and disinterested Directors … ' At that point, Attorney Sonnenfeld discussed the proper formation of a special litigation committee to address the issues in the Demand Letter. He advised that such committee retain independent counsel 'to develop a response to the demand letter' and he provided a preliminary list of candidates and their qualifications. He further 'discussed the possible role and functions of the Committee in conjunction with the independent counsel.' "

Lemenestrel v. Warden, 2008 PA Super 295 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008)(emphasis added).

The company then hired independent counsel to perform an internal investigation of the claims, who concluded “there was no basis or evidence upon which to support a suit by the Company against the Wardens and that, therefore, pursuing those claims through litigation would not be in the best interests of the Company.”

Since the Board followed all the appropriate procedures, the Superior Court upheld the Court of Common Pleas’ holding that the Board’s decision not to pursue litigation was protected under the business judgment rule:

'Decisions regarding litigation by or on behalf of a corporation, including shareholder derivative actions, are business decisions as much as any other financial decision. As such, they are within the province of the board of directors.' The Cuker Court cautioned that, 'if a court makes a preliminary determination that a business decision was made under proper circumstances, however that concept is currently defined, then the business judgment rule prohibits the court from going further and examining the merits of the underlying business decision.' In other words: 'Without considering the merits of the action, a court should determine the validity of the board's decision to terminate the litigation; if that decision was made in accordance with the appropriate standards, then the court should dismiss the derivative action prior to litigation on the merits.'

Id., citing Cuker v. Mikalauskas, 547 Pa. 600, 692 A.2d 1042 (Pa. 1997), which adopted The American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations ("ALI Principles"), particularly sections 7.07-7.10 and 7.13.

I'm sure the internal investigation was both a substantial burden on time and attention and a considerable expense, but look what it accomplished. An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.

 

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On Christmas Eve, the Third Circuit issued its opinion in Jurinko v. The Medical Protective Company and The Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error (MCARE) Fund, a fascinating insurance bad faith claim arising from the failure to tender policy limits in a medical malpractice case, prompting an article in yesterday’s Legal Intelligencer and a flurry of twitter and blog activity. Perhaps it’s a lesson to all of us in the limitations of twitter and blogs and other rapid-response social media. Bob Ambrogi’s tweet “3rd Circuit imposes 1-1 ratio for punitive to compensatory damages” was technically correct, as was this AmLawDaily blog post summarizing the holding:

The court, citing two U.S. Supreme Court rulings (including the Exxon case), ruled that the award was excessive under a test the high court devised in a 2003 case. The judges went further, though, in concluding that the Supreme Court's general path points toward a 1-1 ratio between compensatory and punitive damages becoming a general guidepost. Good news for corporate defense lawyers.

Both, however, miss the point: the Third Circuit didn’t create or recognize a brightline 1-to-1 ratio. It’s a little more complicated than that.

Taking the “precedential” and “non-precedential” designations at face value (in spite of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 making such designations irrelevant), the non-precedential Jurinko opinion must give way to the precedential CGB Occupational Therapy v. RAJ Health Services, et al. opinion of August 23, 2007, which reduced a verdict of 18-to-1 punitive-to-compensatory damages down to 7-to-1 in another case also involving purely economic damages (and thus falling squarely under State Farm and Gore).

On the face of the two opinions, the take-home message is that, in the wake of recent Supreme Court precedent, trial and appellate courts will give very little weight to jury’s punitive damages awards and will instead look anew at the facts to determine, in the court’s own judgment, the degree to which the plaintiff established the State Farm v. Campbell elements for exceeding the 1-to-1 ratio:

(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct; (2) the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3) the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the [factfinder] and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418 (2003). (I note here how courts frequently overturn jury verdicts awarding punitives but never overturn verdicts denying punitives.)

Viewed that way, the distinction between the cases is clear: the conduct of Medical Protective was not nearly as reprehensible as the conduct of Sunrise (the company responsible for the most wrongful conduct in CGB Occupational Therapy), because Medical Protective merely acted in an outrageous manner to protect its own financial interests, rather than intentionally setting out to harm the plaintiff, as Sunrise did. The size of the respective underlying compensatory awards was also critical: in Jurinko, the jury awarded $1,658,345 in compensatory damages, as compared to the $109,000 awarded in CGB.

In essence, as a defendant’s conduct becomes worse, punitives above 1-to-1 are allowed but will be discounted by the size of the compensatory damages. (Again, note how no opinion will conclude, for example, “because the jury did not recognize how truly reprehensible the defendant’s conduct was, we hereby triple the punitive damages awarded.”)

Which brings me to what I believe is the real meaning behind both of these cases: courts have begun to take an economic, as opposed to legal, view of punitive damages. In line with the Supreme Court’s criticism in Exxon v. Baker of “the stark unpredictability of punitive awards” – an economic, not legal, concern – courts are increasingly unwilling to uphold verdicts designed to financially punish defendants (one of the explicit goals of punitive damages), even where the defendant has acted in a manner the court itself has recognized as “outrageous” and “reprehensible.”

I think that’s a shame, particularly given the mechanism by which such civil immunity from bankruptcy is being enacted: constitutional interpretation, the second most powerful weapon in the legal arsenal after constitutional amendment. If the duly-elected legislature decides that unlimited punitive damages awards are outweighed by the need for “predictability” after outrageous and reprehensible conduct, that’s one matter, but to see the courts usurp an economic policy determination under the rubric of constitutional interpretation is quite another.

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FYI:

Cozen complains that Treasury has not supplied it with documents relating to entities that were listed on its request but were not designated until after the request was made. Treasury has no obligation to produce documents that were not responsive at the time the request was made. See Bonner v. U.S. Dep't of State, 289 U.S. App. D.C. 56, 928 F.2d 1148, 1152 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

An agency does not have a continuing duty to update its previous response to a FOIA request. McGehee v. CIA, 225 U.S. App. D.C. 205, 697 F.2d 1095, 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1983). A document's status is determined at the cut-off date. Bonner, 928 F.2d at 1153. A subsequent decision that changes the status of the document does not render it improperly withheld. Id. This is consistent with the notion that an agency is not required to produce documents that were exempt at the cut-off date but subsequently became nonexempt after the agency fully responded to the FOIA request. See Ashfar v. Dep't of State, 226 U.S. App. D.C. 388, 702 F.2d 1125, 1137 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (noting that although the government declassified requested documents after the cut-off date, remanding the case to take into account that change would be contrary to FOIA's goal of speedy and final resolution of FOIA requests); McGehee, 697 F.2d at 1103. In these circumstances, the requester may submit another FOIA request. Bonner, 928 F. 2d at 1153.

An agency is expected, however, to update the FOIA request when it has improperly withheld information in its prior responses or has not responded fully to the FOIA request. See id. An inadequate search renders the initial cut-off date as suspect. Dayton Newspaper Inc. v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 510 F. Supp. 2d 441, 452 (S.D. Ohio 2007). Therefore, when a search has been found to be inadequate and another search must be conducted, the date of the supplemental search can serve as the cut-off date. Id. at 451; Wilderness Soc'y v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt, No. 01-2210, 2003 WL 255971, at *7 n. 18 (D.D.C. 2003).

Cozen O'Connor v. United States Dep't of Treasury, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97941 (December 3, 2008, Savage, J.)(emphases supplied).

 

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Slashdot led me to this erroneous article at The Industry Standard:

According to a recent legal filing (see page 7) in the Psystar vs Apple antitrust case, Apple employees are responsible for maintaining their own documents such as emails, memos, and voicemails. In other words, there is no company-wide policy for archiving, saving, or deleting these documents.

...

An e-discovery lawyer, who asked not to be named because his employer (a firm you probably have heard of) doesn't want him speaking to the press, explained the basic legal requirements surrounding email and document retention to The Standard. "If litigation is anticipated, the party has a duty to preserve potentially relevant documents," he said.

"An employee retention program with no organization or coordination is effectively incapable of compliance," he continued, "barring an act of God, or luck akin to picking every game right in an NCAA pool. Apple's retention policy is negligent."

(Emphasis added). I dissent. Apple did have a policy once the litigation was anticipated:

... Apple claims in the Psystar document that its policy is fine because once the company anticipated litigation:

[Apple] identified a group of employees who could potentially have documents relevant to the issues reasonably evident in this action. Apple then provided those individuals with a document retention notice which included a request for the retention of any relevant documents.

I think the problem here is that the lawyer and/or reporter presumed that, in the absence of a company-enforced "litigation hold" on documents, the employees would not or could not comply fully with that hold.

But that's because they presume Apple works like most companies, destroying documents and files as quickly as they can so as not to leave evidence of anything, thereby (they hope) frustrating plaintiffs' cases.

Yet, as noted by the article itself, Apple also had no deletion policy. As such, relevant documents are likely scattered all over their systems in multiple places, many easily accessible, and, "As a general rule, then, a party need not preserve all backup tapes even when it reasonably anticipates litigation." Zubulake, see below.

Apple would likely be able to preserve most of the relevant and unique information by duplicating their internal servers and instructing the key officers and employees to duplicate and produce any documents that could be relevant.

If carried out honestly, such an ad hoc policy would probably work better than most corporate litigation hold "policies," in which the company deliberately retains a pile of useless garbage to dump on the plaintiff's lawyers while also failing to instruct those unaware of the litigation to take reasonable preservation steps.

The duty to preserve is for most companies not that complicated: once a company is aware of litigation, the company should put automatic destruction policies on hold and instruct relevant employees not to destroy anything until the company can find a way to preserve everything that might be relevant to the litigation. Here's how Zubulake, the Tale of Genji for electronic discovery, described it:

anyone who anticipates being a party or is a party to a lawsuit must not destroy unique, relevant evidence that might be useful to an adversary. While a litigant is under no duty to keep or retain every document in its possession . . . it is under a duty to preserve what it knows, or reasonably should know, is relevant in the action, is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, is reasonably likely to be requested during discovery and/or is the subject of a pending discovery request.

Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).

Aside from case law, there's no explicit rule or statute on preservation; one could do worse than following this modified Federal criminal obstruction of justice statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1519:

Whoever knowingly, reckless or negligently alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the intent to, or which has the effect to, impede, obstruct, or influence [civil litigation of which they are aware] shall be subject to sanctions, fines, adverse inference, and humiliation by trial lawyers.

That's a good rule unless, of course, the company was doing something wrong and intends to hide it, in which case they will start coming up with sneaky ways to pretend to comply with the rules while destroying everything detrimental to their defense.

But beware: even without evidence of intentional destruction, if a plaintiff's lawyer catches a company fooling around with document retention and failing to keep important documents, the plaintiff's lawyer will use it as an excuse to argue the missing documents say whatever the plaintiff's lawyer wants them to say.

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Breach of fiduciary duty class actions under the Employee Retirement and Income Securities Act ("ERISA") are as common as the day is long. If an employee pension plan loses a lot of value, odds are good there will be a lawsuit.

Unsurprisingly, the federal courts have clamped down on these lawsuits over the years. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Delaware) just reaffirmed,

in the context of an ERISA plan that offers employees the option of investing in a fund consisting solely of the employer's own securities, there is a "presumption that a fiduciary acted prudently in investing in employer securities" and that, to rebut the presumption, "a 'plaintiff must show that the ERISA fiduciary could not have believed reasonably that continued adherence to the [Plan's] direction was in keeping with the settlor's expectations of how a prudent trustee would operate.'"

Ward v. Avaya Inc., (3d Cir. 2008, November 13, 2008, Jordan, J.)(on appeal from the District of New Jersey). The Third Circuit again rejected that "a company to be on the brink of bankruptcy before a fiduciary is required to divest a plan of employer securities," but held, in essence, that if the plaintiffs cannot show the stock plummeting and staying in the gutter, then they cannot win as a matter of law. In holding the plaintiffs cannot overcome the presumption as a matter of law, the Court describes:

At the outset of the class period immediately following the spin-off on September 30, 2000, Avaya's stock traded at $ 22.18 a share. As Ward takes pains to point out, it initially lost much of that value, and by August 2, 2002, after fluctuating significantly for some time, it reached a low of $ 1.15 a share. By April 25, 2003, the day after Ward's Count II class period ended, Avaya stock was trading at $ 3.24 per share. Following the end of the class period, however, Avaya's stock continued to rise and, by August 2003, was trading at around $ 10.00 a share. Between October and December 2003, the stock was trading between $ 12.00 and $ 14.00 a share. During 2004, Avaya stock usually closed at between $ 12.00 and $ 16.00 a share. Commensurate with its rising stock price, Avaya reported significant positive net income in 2003 and 2004. Further, like the plaintiff in Edgar and unlike the plaintiff in Moench, Ward's complaint fails to point to anything other than Avaya's financial struggles to support his breach of fiduciary duty claim.

The frustrating part here is that of course the plaintiff had no direct evidence, their case was dismissed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) before they could conduct discovery. The message from the Third Circuit is thus loud and clear: if the company's stock has regained a substantial portion of its value, don't bother filing suit.

I have plenty of sympathy for the defendants here, directors who almost certainly did, in fact, believe they were simultaneously acting in the best interests of the company and the retirement plan beneficiaries. No could blame them for believing in the eventual success of their own company, and the company did, in fact, regain at least two-thirds of its prior market value, more than 10 times its lowest value just two years prior to that.

But that's precisely the problem -- of course the directors will believe in the eventual success of their own company. Indeed, aside from company officers, who could possibly be less objective about their own company? They're supposed to believe in the company's success, even against the odds.

The core problem, as the Third Circuit noted, is that "as the financial state of the company deteriorates … fiduciaries who double as directors of the corporation often begin to serve two masters. And the more uncertain the loyalties of the fiduciary, the less discretion it has to act." At what point should we expect that a "prudent" director will recognize their own lack of objectivity and step aside? The answer from the Third Circuit appears to be "never," at least not if the stock has regained substantial value.

Maybe, on balance, that makes the most sense, a "no serious harm, no foul" rule. The stock market is inherently unpredictable; if, for example, the directors had moved assets out of Avaya in the spring of 2003, the retirement fund likely would have missed out on Avaya's dramatic rise in the fall and winter of 2003. You don't invest your money in a 100% company fund to go willy-nilly at the first sign of trouble.

Nonetheless, though there are many plausible legitimate explanations, it's troubling to see issues like that decided on a motion to dismiss, denying plaintiffs the chance to see what the explanation actually was. The directors here could have completely breached their fiduciary duties and, after getting 'lucky,' still have cost beneficiaries one-third of their pension's value, potentially even more when compared to the fund's hypothetical value if it had been managed properly. Yet, the case was over before it started, merely because the fund lost 'only' one-third of its value as compared to value on the plaintiff's class certification date.

Finally, just how common are ERISA breach of fiduciary suits? So common that the Third Circuit held plaintiffs claims were also barred by a prior class action settlement in Reinhart v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., 327 F. Supp. 2d 426 (D. N.J.).

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The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania punts an easy one:

Counts I and II of the complaint arise under the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601, et seq., Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994 ("HOEPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1639 and Regulation Z of the Federal Reserve Board ("Regulation Z"), 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1 et seq. Plaintiff seeks rescission of the loan transaction and actual and statutory damages. ...

Under TILA, a borrower has the right to rescind certain consumer credit transactions [either until midnight of the third business day or, if the consumer was not provided the rescission forms, within 3 years or delivery of those forms] ...

Regulation Z requires the creditor to deliver two copies of the notice of right to rescind to each consumer entitled to rescind and specifies the information that the creditor must include in the notice.

...

Defendants believe plaintiff's rescission claim is untimely because the three-day limitations period under 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (a) applies and plaintiff failed to notify them of her intention to rescind until January 9, 2007. Defendants claim to have complied with 12 C.F.R. § 226.23 (b) (1) by delivering to plaintiff two copies of the required rescission form on January 22, 2004. ...

Defendants support their motion for partial summary judgment with evidence that plaintiff received two copies  of the required rescission form. Exhibit C, attached to Defendants' memorandum of law, is a rescission form dated January 22, 2004 and titled "Notice of Right to Cancel." ... Ms. Gonzales' signature appears below the following sentence: "The undersigned each acknowledge receipt of two completed copies of this Notice of Right to Cancel." Plaintiff does not deny it is her signature.

Counsel for plaintiff contends that, contrary to the written acknowledgment, only one copy of the Notice of Right to Cancel "wound up in the hands of Plaintiff, the borrower." (Plaintiff's Memorandum at 13.) TILA addresses the effect of written acknowledgments of receipt, such as the Notice of Right to Cancel  [*7] produced by Defendants:

Notwithstanding any rule of evidence, written acknowledgment of receipt of any disclosures required under this title ... does no more than create a rebuttable presumption of delivery thereof.

15 U.S.C. § 1635 (c). Plaintiff's written acknowledgment of the Notice of Right to Cancel creates the presumption that plaintiff received two copies of the document. ...

On a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must come forward with evidence setting forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. The nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986). Plaintiff has failed present evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption of delivery. Absent from the record is any sworn statement from Ms. Gonzales or other witness that plaintiff received one copy rather than two. Plaintiff relies entirely on the assertions of counsel and the Closing Checklist. No reasonable jury could conclude, on the basis of the Closing Checklist alone, that plaintiff received one copy rather than two. The three-day limitations period under 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (a) applies and commenced on January 22, 2004, the date plaintiff received the Notice of Right to Cancel. Plaintiff is not entitled to rescission because her letter demanding rescission on January 9, 2007 was untimely.

Gonzales v. CIT Group/Consumer Fin., Inc. (E.D.PA, October 30, 2008, Shapiro, J.).

And just like that, the Truth In Lending rescission claim and all the other pendant federal claims are dismissed, with the state law claims remanded back to state court.

The plaintiff's counsel apparently made a complicated argument relying upon words in the agreement itself that arguably reflected their position that the plaintiff had only received one copy.

But there was no need to go down that road: all they needed was an affidavit from the plaintiff saying that she had only received one copy. That's all. At that point, it would've been a fact issue for the jury and would have survived summary judgment.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) provides for exactly this situation:

(e) Affidavits; Further Testimony.

(1) In General.

A supporting or opposing affidavit must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant is competent to testify on the matters stated. If a paper or part of a paper is referred to in an affidavit, a sworn or certified copy must be attached to or served with the affidavit. The court may permit an affidavit to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or additional affidavits.

(2) Opposing Party's Obligation to Respond.

When a motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported, an opposing party may not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own pleading; rather, its response must — by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule — set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. If the opposing party does not so respond, summary judgment should, if appropriate, be entered against that party.

Keep that in mind the next time you get a motion for summary judgment saying the evidence revealed in discovery failed to meet an essential element of your claim: odds are your client or another witness can fill that gap based on their own recollection.

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In theory, Pennsylvania recognizes a duty in every contract for both parties to act with the utmost good faith and to engage only in fair dealing with one another.

In practice, these claims rarely succeed, like a week ago in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania:

Pennsylvania law recognizes an independent cause of action for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing only in "very limited circumstances," such as insureds' dealings with insurers and franchisees' dealings with franchisees. Northview Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 227 F.3d 78, 91 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Creeger Brick and Building Supply, Inc. v. Mid-State Bank and Trust Co., 560 A.2d 151, 153-53 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989). In Northview Motors, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit predicted that Pennsylvania courts would limit the application of claims for breach of the covenant to situations where they were "essential" and would not recognize an independent cause of action for breach of the covenant where the parties had entered into a detailed contract setting forth their obligations and rights. Id.; see also McHale v. NuEnergy Group, 2002 WL 321797 at *8 (E.D. Pa. February 27, 2002) (finding that "Pennsylvania law would not recognize a claim for breach of [the] covenant of good faith and fair dealing as an independent cause of action" where the allegations underlying the breach of covenant claims are "essentially the same" as those underlying the plaintiff's claim for breach of contract).

The Court similarly finds that Pennsylvania would not recognize an independent claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in this case. As in Northview Motors, the parties here entered into a detailed contract setting forth their rights and obligations with respect to the purchase of the property at issue. The facts that Sentry Paint alleges give rise to its claim for breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing are the same as those that form the basis for its breach of contract claims. Under these circumstances, Sentry Paint's breach of covenant claims are subsumed in its breach of contract claims and cannot be maintained as a separate cause of action. Fn 20:

Fn 20: In support of its separate cause of action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Sentry Paint cites to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Birth Center v. St. Paul Co., 787 A.2d 376 (Pa. 2001) and the decision of the Lawrence County Court of Common Pleas in Harlan v. Erie Ins. Group, 2006 WL 1374502 (Lawrence Co. CCP February 16, 2006). Both Birth Center and Harlan involved contractual bad faith claims by an insured against an insurer, one of the "limited circumstances" in which Pennsylvania recognizes an independent cause of action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Neither case supports recognizing an independent cause of action here in an action involving an arms-length purchase of property.

Sentry Paint Techs. v. Topth (EDPa, October 31, 2008, McLaughlin, J.).

C'est la vie. Hard to know what their damages would be anyway in this case, if not damages arising out of a breach of the explicit terms of the contract. To me, outside of those quasi-fiduciary situations described above, the "good faith and fair dealing" seemed like a catch-all where it was hard to prove exactly what the breach was, except for a bad faith failure to perform.

But don't despair, business plaintiff trial lawyers — this case was at summary judgment, so you can even use it in support of alleging the claim in your complaint when they file a motion to dismiss or motion for judgment on the pleadings.

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If you've ever done business or commercial litigation, you've done tortious interference with contractual / business relations. It's alleged virtually every time a party switches suppliers or customers, and virtually every time the lawsuit involves more than two parties.

But did you know you can claim non-pecuniary damages (so long as you have some economic damages) and get an injunction  before the damage occurs?

From the Eastern District of Pennsylvania:

The damages element of a claim for intentional interference with contractual relations (the fourth element) requires a plaintiff to prove that the alleged interference has caused an actual pecuniary loss, the benefits of which flowed from the contract itself. Although an actual pecuniary loss must be established, non-pecuniary harms are also recoverable under this tort. Shiner v. Moriarty, 706 A.2d 1228, 1239 (Pa.Super. 1998); Perry v. H&R Block Eastern Enterprises, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22406, 2007 WL 954129, at *10 (E.D.Pa. March 27, 2007)(McLaughlin, J.).

Moreover, the actual pecuniary loss requirement does not defeat actions for tortious interference with contractual relations, such as this one, which seek to enjoin the interfering conduct before it is successful. In Adler, Barish, Daniels, Levin & Creskoff v. Epstein, 482 Pa. 416, 436 n.21, 393 A.2d 1175, 1185 n.21 (1978), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania specifically held that notwithstanding the actual pecuniary loss requirement, "[i]t  is well settled that equity will act to prevent unjustified interference with contractual relations." See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766, comment u.

Similarly, in affirming the issuance of a preliminary injunction in a case based upon tortious interference with contractual relations and trespass claims, the Third Circuit recognized that injunctive relief may be appropriate before an actual pecuniary loss is sustained. In this regard, the Third Circuit held that a preliminary injunction may issue where the claimant has demonstrated that there is a "presently existing actual threat of injury". Ride the Ducks of Philadelphia, LLC v. Duck Boat Tours, Inc., 138 Fed.Appx. 431, 434 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Continental Group, Inc. v. Amoco Chemicals Corporation, 614 F.2d 351, 359 (3d Cir. 1980)).

Hospitality Assocs. of Lancaster, L.P. v. Lancaster Land Development, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76772 (September 20, 3008, Gardner, J.).

Shiner v. Moriarty, cited above, quotes Pawlowski v. Smorto, 403 Pa. Super. 71, 588 A.2d 36 (Pa.Super. 1991), for the damage element of the tort involving "the loss of the benefits of the contract or prospective relation or consequential, emotional or reputational losses resulting from the defendant's conduct."

Did you plead all that last time? If not, perhaps you should consider amending...

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The "Truck Injury Lawyer Blog" points us to a new development in the world of trucking accidents:

In his recent article, Premiums Fall 10% to 50% As New Firms Enter Market, Frederick Kiel describes the effect that the drop in premiums has on the trucking companies, as these new insurance companies are offering across the board rates to trucking companies in an effort to compete for their business. ...

These new insurance companies are offering low premiums in an effort to gain new business, a trend that has been seen intermittently since the 1980s. Perhaps now is the time to look at the minimum insurance required to be carried by tractor trailer companies. Congress set the minimum rates back in 1984 at $750,000 for some companies with most being required to carry $1,000,000. Inflation and time have eroded the value of the coverage. Medical bills and the costs associated with catastrophic injuries have risen dramatically. Today, in a catastrophic case, the minimum limits are paid and quickly spent. The injured are then left for the taxpayer to pay for through medicaid or some other assistance program.

$1 million frequently will not cover the damages in a catastrophic personal injury case, particularly not where there will be extensive continuing medical treatment. $1 million also frequently does not cover wrongful death damages, and it usually will not cover an accident where multiple people have catastrophic injuries.

although the article does not address it, an important point to keep in mind here is how much safer trucking these days should be given the depth and breadth real-time monitoring available to trucking companies. Traffic, weather, and driver alertness -- down to excruciatingly minor details -- are all readily apparent in real-time to fleet managers, thereby eliminating the bulk of the systematic risks faced by truckers that cause major motor vehicle accidents.

If trucking companies used this technology appropriately -- rather than using it solely to run their drivers right up to (and frequently beyond) the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulation limits -- and purchased adequate insurance, including insurance with coverage for each plaintiff, rather than the accident as a whole, the costs and financial risk of trucking would be dramatically reduced.

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Courtesy of the complicated mess that is Sovereign Bank v. BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc., 533 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2008), in which credit card "Issuers" sued credit card "Acquirers" and "Merchants" (Acquirers are the companies that process transactions for the Merchants) after a bunch of credit card numbers were stolen from the Merchant.

The big issue is: are Issuers intended beneficiaries of the Merchant and Acquirer's agreement with the Visa network, which includes a number of anti-fraud regulations that the Merchant and Acquirer allegedly didn't follow?

Historically, under Pennsylvania law, "in order for a third party beneficiary to have standing to recover on a contract, both contracting parties must have expressed an intention that the third-party be a beneficiary, and that intention must have affirmatively appeared in the contract itself." Scarpitti v. Weborg, 530 Pa. 366, 609 A.2d 147, 149 (Pa. 1992) (citation omitted). Sovereign appropriately concedes that it is not an express third-party beneficiary of the Visa-Fifth Third Member Agreement. However, in Scarpitti, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted § 302 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. Id. That provision allows an "intended beneficiary" to recover for breach of contract even though the actual parties to the contract did not express an intent to benefit the third party. Section 302 provides as follows:

Intended and Incidental Beneficiaries

 (1) Unless otherwise agreed between promisor and promisee, a beneficiary of a promise is an intended beneficiary if recognition of a right to performance in the beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intentions of the parties and either

(a) the performance of the promise will satisfy an obligation of the promisee to pay money to the beneficiary; or

(b) the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance.

(2) An incidental beneficiary is a beneficiary who is not an intended beneficiary.

Got all that? Summary judgment reversed, based upon a memorandum and deposition testimony indicating that the regulations were for the benefit of all the members, as discussed in the next post.

Update: for some reason, movable type ate most of my post, which has been corrected.

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From the Middle District of Pennsylvania:

In Pennsylvania, an individual who sustains injury in a motor vehicle collision that is aggravated by subsequent medical negligence may recover damages for both injuries either from the driver exclusively or from the driver and the negligent medical practitioner in tandem. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 457 (s1965) [hereinafter "RESTATEMENT"]; Smialek v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 290 Pa. Super. 496, 434 A.2d 1253, 1258 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) (stating that "the original tortfeasor[ in an automobile collision] is . . . fully responsible . . . for the negligent manner in which a physician or surgeon treats the case"). The plaintiff may recover all damages solely from the negligent driver because subsequent faulty treatment is deemed to be a foreseeable consequence of the automobile accidence. See RESTATEMENT § 457 cmt. a ("[D]amages assessable against [a negligent driver] include not only the injury originally caused by the [driver's] negligence but also the harm resulting from the manner in which the medical, surgical, or hospital services are rendered"); Boggavarapu v. Ponist, 518 Pa. 162, 542 A.2d 516, 517 (Pa. 1988).

However, if the plaintiff sues both the driver and the physician, liability should be allocated according to each tortfeasor's separate negligence. 1 See Frazier v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 109 F.R.D. 293, 295-96 (W.D. Pa. 1985) (stating that negligent motorists and subsequently negligent physicians commit separately identifiable acts of negligent); Smith v. Pulcinella, 440 Pa. Super. 525, 656 A.2d 494, 497 (Pa. Super Ct. 1995); Harka v. Nabati, 337 Pa. Super. 617, 487 A.2d 432, 434 (Pa. Super Ct. 1985) (quoting Voyles v. Corwin, 295 Pa. Super. 126, 441 A.2d 381, 383 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982)) ("[T]o the extent that the acts of the original tortfeasor and those of the physician are capable of separation, the damages should be apportioned accordingly."). The court determines as a matter of law whether injuries are capable of apportionment; however, the jury determines the value of the claim against each defendant. Voyles, 441 A.2d at 383.

Trout v. Milton S. Hershey Med. Ctr., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65553 (emphasis added).

If the medical malpractice causes a catastrophic injury, there are very few situations in which you would want to proceed only against the car driver, not least because they likely have far less available insurance than the medical provider. Indeed, in this case the plaintiff's leg became necrotic and had to be amputated allegedly due to medical malpractice, an injury that, when combined with the accident itself, likely exceeds the insurance coverage of most drivers.

Then again, if neither the auto accident nor the medical malpractice was catastrophic, and the damages are within the coverage limits, the action can be substantially simplified by proceeding only against the car driver. You will still need expert medical testimony, but you might not get nearly the same fight as you would going against the medical provider directly. You might also have more settlement leverage against the car driver's insurance company because they run the risk of eating all of the damages at trial.

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We're aiming for new heights of nerdom here at Litigation & Trial, combining comic books, movies, old law school contract cases, equitable principles, permanent injunctions, and recent circuit splits in one post. The Watchmen lawsuit -- which is less copyright infringement and more commercial litigation, since the dispute is largely over contract terms -- gives us license (har har) to do so.

Graphic novels (née "comic books") are serious money these days, at least when adapted for the big screen. In addition to the normal superhero adaptations, like Iron Man and The Incredible Hulk (which have generally done quite well), particular attention has been paid to noir comics like Sin City and 300. (The Nolans' Batman adaptations are a hybrid, drawing from noir variations on Batman, like The Dark Knight Returns.)

Watchmen, published in 1986-87, is perhaps the most heralded of the noir comics, a complex and character-driven drama set in a alternative-history 1980s United States in which superheroes (the bulk of which have no obvious superpower) have been suppressed as unaccountable vigilantes, while Nixon is on his fifth term as president.

Such a complicated tale obviously presents numerous visual, thematic and temporal problems for moviemakers, in addition to normal stress of taking a work revered by a subculture and making it widely appealing without offending the subculture or alienating the masses. Multiple attempts to make the movie since the story was published have fizzled out; even Terry Gilliam, who has no trouble bringing madness to the big screen, deemed it unfilmable.

But Zack Snyder, who directed the enormously successful 300 (which made $450 million on a $60 million budget), has apparently done it and done it well.

Since he's appearing on this blog, you can guess what happened next: the production company, Warner Brothers, was sued.

The movie buzz is that the case has substantial merit and could turn the movie into a loss for WB, and the original documents are available online for your perusal. In essence, Fox bought the complete rights to Watchmen, tried to begin production, gave up, quitclaimed the rights to the producer (with the terms of that quitclaim disputed), then entered into multiple disputed subsequent agreements. Here's the Court's outline (as formatted by Deadline Hollywood):

1986-90: Fox acquires motion picture rights in The Watchmen.

1990: Fox enters into a domestic distribution agreement with Largo Entertainment, a joint venture of JVC Entertainment Inc., Golar (Larry Gordon), and BOH, Inc. The “Largo Agreement” established Fox’s domestic distribution rights, through a license from Largo, in “subject pictures” as defined in the agreement.

June 1991: Fox enters into a “Quitclaim Agreement” with Largo International, through which Fox “quitclaims to Purchaser all of Fox’s right, title and interest in and to the Motion Picture project presently entitled Watchmen, which included specifically described literary materials. Notably, the agreement provides that, “if Purchaser elects to proceed to production, the Picture shall be produced by Purchaser and shall be distributed by Fox as a Subject Picture pursuant to the terms of the Largo Agreement ...” In consideration for the rights to Watchmen, Fox was to be reimbursed for its development costs ($435,600) plus interest plus a profit participation in the worldwide net proceeds of any Watchmen picture.

Nov. 1991: The Largo Agreement was amended; Watchmen was listed as a project quitclaimed to Largo.

Nov. 1993: Larry Gordon, through Golar, withdraws from the Largo Entertainment joint venture; Largo conveys any rights it has in Watchmen to Gordon/Golar. Based on the 1991 quitclaim, the Court may infer that Gordon now stood in the shoes of Largo with respect to Watchmen and held whatever rights it acquired through the 1991 Quitclaim, which left Fox with the distribution rights it retained through that agreement.

1994: Fox negotiated a “Settlement and Release” agreement with Gordon which contemplated that the Watchmen project would be put in “perpetual turnaround” to Lawrence Gordon Productions, Inc. The “turnaround notice” gave Lawrence Gordon Productions “the perpetual right . . . to acquire all of the right, title and interest of Fox [Watchmen] pursuant to the terms and conditions herein provided.” The turnaround notice then described the formula for determining the buy-out price in the event that Gordon elected to acquire Fox’s interest. Thus, the document suggests that Gordon acquired an option to acquire Fox’s interest in Watchmen for a price. In fact, the notice obligated Gordon to pay the buy-out price on the commencement of any production of a Watchmen film. The notice also provided that the agreement was personal to Gordon and that, “prior to payment of the Buy-Out Price,” he could not assign rights or authorize any person to take any action with respect to the project.

(emphasis mine) WB now argues the full rights were quitclaimed multiple times; Fox claims they granted an option the producer failed to exercise, so the rights are still their's. A court last week denied WB's motion to dismiss. Variety summarizes:

At the heart of Fox’s suit, filed in February, is the contention that it never ceded rights to the property. And according to the federal Judge Gary Allen Feess, Fox retained distribution rights to the graphic novel penned by Alan Moore and illustrated by Dave Gibbons through a 1991 claim. Furthermore, Feess appears to agree that under a 1994 turnaround deal with producer Larry Gordon, Gordon acquired an option to acquire Fox’s remaining interest in "Watchmen," which was never exercised, thereby leaving Fox with its rights under the 1994 agreement.

Frankly, I agree with the Court's ruling (denying the motion to dismiss) but not the reasoning, which I'll get to below. For now, it's a motion to dismiss: all disputed facts and ambiguities are resolved in the plaintiff's favor and all reasonable inferences are  made in the plaintiff's favor. The meaning could be as Fox alleges, but that'll require some testimony and extrinsic evidence.

But that's not what this post is about. This post is about the remedy requested in paragraph 30 of Fox's complaint:

Fox is entitled to preliminary and permanent injunctive relief enjoining and preventing Defendants, their agents' and employees, and all persons acting in concert or participation with Defendants, from having, copying, distributing, displaying or making any other unauthorized use of The Watchmen in a manner inconsistent with Fox's rights as detailed herein.

As a practical matter, I can assure all graphic novel fans that no one wants to stop or even delay this movie. Fox doesn't want to scrap the picture, they want as big a piece as they can get, and they want the injunction for leverage. We're watching a negotiation-by-litigation.

Yet, as a legal matter, if they prevail, they can halt distribution entirely.

But, you say, recalling first year contract law, wouldn't that be a tremendous waste of money, the type of economic destruction generally discouraged by a long line of post-formalist, legal realism cases, like Jacob & Youngs v Kent, 230 NY 239; 129 NE 889 (N.Y. 1921, Cardozo, J.)(denying specific performance where home contractor used wrong brand of plumbing pipes)? Yes, but that's the choice you made through your elected representatives and the copyright laws they have enacted.

So how can the law allow Fox to sit by while WB (and their producers, directors, actors, etc) pours their sweat, tears and money into a work, just to later bring a lawsuit requesting not a cut of the profits but total destruction of the work?

It may not sit by. The doctrine of laches was created to thwart people to squat on their rights, lie in wait, and choose not to sue until it will most damage and prejudice the other party.

The doctrine of laches is a judicial escape hatch enabling courts to dismiss or limit lawsuits that, though brought within the statute of limitations, would be inequitable to permit because of the conduct of the party bringing the lawsuit. It's closely related to the doctrine of unclean hands, a similar tool courts use to deny equitable remedies to those who have behaved badly in the context of the dispute.

Since the doctrine of laches has its roots back in the English common law, the elements in all 50 states are roughly the same, so we might as well look to Pennsylvania:

Laches bars relief when the plaintiff's lack of due diligence in failing to timely institute an action results in prejudice to another. Because it is an affirmative defense, the burden of proof is on the defendant or respondent to demonstrate unreasonable delay and prejudice. See Weinberg v. State Bd. of Exam'rs. of Pub. Accountants, 509 Pa. 143, 147, 501 A.2d 239, 242 (1985). Thus, "[t]he party asserting laches as a defense must present evidence demonstrating prejudice from a lapse of time . . . [such as] that a witness has died or become unavailable, that substantiating records were lost, or that the defendant has changed [her] position in anticipation the opposing party has waived his claims." Richard, 561 Pa. at 496, 751 A.2d at 651. Furthermore, "[t]he question of laches is factual and is determined by examining the circumstances of each case." Weinberg, 509 Pa. at 148, 501 A.2d at 242 (quoting Leedom v. Thomas, 473 Pa. 193, 200-01, 373 A.2d 1329, 1332 (1977)).

Commonwealth ex rel. Corbett v. Griffin, 946 A.2d 668, 676-677 (Pa. 2008). Like most equitable doctrines, it has essentially no elements: the court finds it or it does not.

Obviously, such equitable powers apply to common law claims. Can it apply to statutory claims like copyright infringement?

In most circuits, yes. The Eleventh Circuit just grappled with that in Peter Letterese & Assocs. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enterprises et al, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 14496; Copy. L. Rep. (CCH) P29,589 (July 8, 2008). They unearthed a fantastic Learned Hand quote:

It must be obvious to every one familiar with equitable principles that it is inequitable for the owner of a copyright, with full notice of an intended infringement, to stand inactive while the proposed infringer spends large sums of money in its exploitation, and to intervene only when his speculation has proved a success. Delay under such circumstances allows the owner to speculate without risk with the other's money; he cannot possibly lose, and he may win.

That describes Fox's conduct precisely: they couldn't make it, so they waited for someone else to get it together then filed suit after WB tests Synder and crew out on 300, figures out a plausible script, puts together a cast and crew, films it, and makes its way through a good deal of post-production. But that was before there was an explicit 3-year federal statute of limitations for copyright claims. What now? The Eleventh Circuit sums up other responses:

In answering the question of whether the defense of laches may be interposed in a copyright infringement suit, therefore, we cannot agree with the conclusion of the Fourth Circuit, which is an unqualified "no." See Lyons P'ship, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 798 (4th Cir. 2001). Prather recognized the applicability of general equitable doctrines, and like tolling, laches falls into that category. Cf. Teamsters & Employers Welfare Trust of Ill. v. Gorman Bros. Ready Mix, 283 F.3d 877, 882 (7th Cir. 2002) ("What is sauce for the goose (the plaintiff seeking to extend the statute of limitations) is sauce for the gander (the defendant seeking to contract it)."). However, we remain mindful of the Fourth Circuit's invocation of separation of powers principles which counsel against the use of "the judicially created doctrine of laches to bar a federal statutory claim that has been timely filed under an express statute of limitations." Lyons P'ship, 243 F.3d at 798. We therefore answer this question with a presumptive "no"; there is a strong presumption that a plaintiff's suit is timely if it is filed before the statute of limitations has run. Only in the most extraordinary circumstances will laches be recognized as a defense. Cf. Chirco v. Crosswinds Communities, Inc., 474 F.3d 227, 234 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting the limited applicability of laches to copyright cases in "what can best be described as unusual circumstances"); Jacobsen v. Deseret Book Co., 287 F.3d 936, 951 (10th Cir. 2002) ("Although it is possible, in rare cases, that a statute of limitations can be cut short by the doctrine of laches, we see no reason to supplant the statute of limitations in this case." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

But we're not yet done:

Even where such extraordinary circumstances exist, however, laches serves as a bar only to the recovery of retrospective damages, not to prospective relief. As the former Fifth Circuit explained in a patent infringement action:

Although laches and estoppel are related concepts, there is a clear distinction between the two. The defense of laches may be invoked where the plaintiff has unreasonably and inexcusably delayed in prosecuting its rights and where that delay has resulted in material prejudice to the defendant. The effect of laches is merely to withhold damages for infringement which occurred prior to the filing of the suit.

Estoppel, on the other hand, "arises only when one has so acted as to mislead another and the one thus misled has relied upon the action of the inducing party to his prejudice." Estoppel forecloses the patentee from enforcing his patent prospectively through an injunction or through damages for continuing infringement.

Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbH v. Eastman Kodak Co., 616 F.2d 1315, 1325 (5th Cir. 1980) (internal citations omitted).

Arguably, the big damages here have yet to occur, and will occur when the film is distributed for hundreds of millions of dollars. But I still don't understand why WB didn't raise laches as an affirmative defense in their Answer to Fox's Complaint. There's a legitimate argument that the real infringement damages occured during scripting, casting, filming, and post-production, where Fox was shut out of the creative process it presumably wanted to control.

Moreover, the quitclaim agreement itself (the source of most of Fox's claimed rights) includes a clause where, if the movie is ever made, Fox is entitled to the money it initially spent (at least half a million, circa 1990) plus interest. That's serious money by now, at least enough to warrant adding one line about laches to your Answer and briefing the issue.

THE POINT (other than to learn):

There's been a lot of hoopla about this sentence in the judge's order:

It is particularly noteworthy that nothing on the face of the complaint or the documents supplied to the Court establishes that Gordon, the claimed source of Warner Brothers' interest in 'Watchmen,' ever acquired any rights in 'Watchmen.'

That's a problem, but it's not the end of the road. Let's presume Fox still legally has the rights to Watchmen. Now what? Do they get an injunction?

As the Eleventh Circuit continued,

Rather, under "well-established principles of equity, a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test before a court may grant such relief," and a court's decision to grant or deny such relief is within the exercise of its discretion.  [eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391, 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1839 (2006)]

A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.

Id.

Even if laches doesn't directly apply, and even though "irreparable injury" is presumed in copyright cases, Fox may have waived its "irreparable injury" by allowing virtually all of Watchmen to be completed (excepting some post-production) before filing suit in February 2008. Fox did exactly what Learned Hand complained about: waiting for WB to finish what Fox could not, then suing when they got wind that it was good.

They're no longer in it for protection of their creative endeavor; they're in it just for the money. That won't do. WB's goal is to show that to the judge.

But I think Fox has a bigger problem: the 1994 agreement. Under that, the last of all agreements with Fox, Gordon (the producer) has a perpetual right to exercise his option to make the film. Fox's complaint mentions the 1994 agreement but does not claim breach of it, just breach of the 1991 quitclaim, which means Gordon (now WB) can still exercise the option, buying out the rights.

And that raises yet another problem for Fox when they then try to claim their due under the 1994 option: laches, which can completely bar a contract claim, not just pre-suit damages. When did Fox first know Gordon was trying to make the movie? Recall from the Court's outline, "The notice also provided that the agreement was personal to Gordon and that, “prior to payment of the Buy-Out Price,” he could not "assign rights or authorize any person to take any action with respect to the project."

Here's a 2001 article about an attempt, long after the relevant agreements with Fox. Did Fox move to protect its rights then? Did it tell Gordon not to "authorize any person to take any action with respect to the project?" Here's a rumor:

[P]rivately, Warner Bros execs are decrying to me what they say is Fox's "opportunistic claim," noting that "Fox sat on its so-called rights for years while other studios in town developed this property. In fact, Paramount greenlit the movie for production and Fox never said a word! Fox even had an opportunity to re-acquire the project at some point and it passed on it!"

Did Fox try to "speculate without risk with the other's money?"

I'd say "we shall see," but we probably won't. Once the injunction and the option are decided, the case will likely be sufficiently narrowed to be settled easily; the spread won't be worth the risk anymore.

 

UPDATE: On December 24, 2008, District Judge Gary A. Feess issued a brief ruling holding "Fox owns a copyright interest consisting of, at the very least, the right to distribute the Watchmen motion picture," with a promise to issue a more definite ruling soon. It's hard to say what the practical effect is of such a holding (it's obviously not good news for WB); I still believe an injunction is unlikely. I'll write more when the full order comes out.

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A reminder: failure to pay general contractor / subcontractor disputes can get expensive, per 73 P.S. § 512:

§ 512.  Penalty and attorney fee

(a) PENALTY FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH ACT.-- If arbitration or litigation is commenced to recover payment due under this act and it is determined that an owner, contractor or subcontractor has failed to comply with the payment terms of this act, the arbitrator or court shall award, in addition to all other damages due, a penalty equal to 1% per month of the amount that was wrongfully withheld. An amount shall not be deemed to have been wrongfully withheld to the extent it bears a reasonable relation to the value of any claim held in good faith by the owner, contractor or subcontractor against whom the contractor or subcontractor is seeking to recover payment.
 
(b) AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEE AND EXPENSES.-- Notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, the substantially prevailing party in any proceeding to recover any payment under this act shall be awarded a reasonable attorney fee in an amount to be determined by the court or arbitrator, together with expenses.

Prevailing defendants can recover attorneys' fees, too. Zavatchen v. RHF Holdings, Inc., 2006 PA Super 240, 907 A.2d 607, 2006 Pa. Super. LEXIS 2221 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006), appeal denied by 591 Pa. 685, 917 A.2d 315, 2007 Pa. LEXIS 345 (2007).
 

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Judge Sheppard of the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas (commerce court division) had opportunity to pen this clear, concise opinion explaining when a litigant may claim legal malpractice for entering into an unfavorable settlement:

Nixon Peabody relies upon the case of Muhammad v. Strassburger, in support of its claim that the Rubins should not be able to bring suit. In Muhammad, plaintiffs in a medical malpractice action agreed to accept a monetary settlement from defendants in exchange for dismissing their lawsuit. After they agreed to the settlement, plaintiffs changed their minds and decided that the settlement amount was insufficient. Plaintiffs sued their attorneys for legal malpractice because plaintiffs were dissatisfied with the monetary settlement. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a client cannot sue his attorney for legal malpractice when the client is simply dissatisfied with the terms of the settlement, unless the client can show that he was fraudulently induced to enter into that settlement.

This holding was later narrowed in McMahon v. Shea. In McMahon, the court noted that Muhammad was based on Pennsylvania's public policy of encouraging the settlement of disputes and preventing "Monday morning quarterback suits."  In limiting Muhammad to the specific facts of that case, the McMahon court concluded that the plaintiffs allegations that his attorney failed to advise him of a contract's controlling law constituted grounds for a permissible claim for negligence. McMahon limited Muhammad to cases involving similar facts.

In Banks v. Jerome Taylor & Associates, the Superior Court reconciled the Muhammad and McMahon decision as follows:

"In cases wherein a dissatisfied litigant merely wishes to second-guess his or her decision to settle due to speculation that he or she may have been able to secure a larger amount of money, i.e. 'get a better deal' the Muhammad rule applies so as to bar that litigant from suing his counsel for negligence. If, however, a settlement agreement is legally deficient or if an attorney fails to explain the effect of a legal document, the client may seek redress from counsel by filing a malpractice action sounding in negligence." 

In the case at bar, the allegations are more similar to the facts in McMahon than in Muhammad. The Rubins alleges that Nixon Peabody, early in its representation of plaintiffs, failed to file one of the claims sought to be prosecuted by plaintiffs within the applicable statute of limitations. Plaintiffs further allege that Nixon Peabody continued to prosecute the claims in the Kentucky federal court suit and caused plaintiffs to expend one million dollars in litigation expenses. Plaintiffs allege that if Nixon Peabody had been honest and forthcoming during the Kentucky representation and Nixon Peabody would have explained to plaintiffs that the statute of limitations had expired on this claim and explained the shortcomings, plaintiffs would have made a decision as to whether they should continue with the claim. Unlike the plaintiffs in Muhammad, the Rubins did not change their minds about the settlement. Rather, they complain about Nixon Peabody's failure to advise them regarding the controlling law applicable to Rubin's claim, i.e. application of the statute of limitations and its ramifications.

Jan Rubin Assocs. v. Nixon Peabody, LLP, 2008 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 175 (July 31, 2008).

Simple and direct. I'd go a bit farther than the Court (since I'm allowed to) and rephrase the rule as: a plaintiff can claim the fact of settlement at that amount was caused by malpractice, but cannot claim the amount of settlement itself was malpractice. 

The former is where, due to the malpractice of client, an unfavorable settlement was either necessary or an appropriate mitigation of damages. The latter is where the client willingly enters into an unfavorable settlement, into which they later claim the lawyer should have advised them not to enter.

 

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Defendant here did a splendid job of waiving its rights and annoying Judge Pollak:

Second, defendant, in a footnote, suggests that this matter should be referred for arbitration in accordance with the grievance procedures outlined in the CBA. See Pl.'s Ex. 4, at § 1.05-09. Defendant's presentation of this argument is, to say the least, underwhelming. Whether a dispute is subject to mandatory arbitration is a question of too much consequence to be relegated to a one-sentence footnote in an opposition to a motion for summary judgment. Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act is instructive:

 If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the  terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration.

9 U.S.C. § 3 (emphasis added). Parties desiring an order compelling arbitration must make application to the court for such an order. The manner of this application should, in accordance with Rule 7(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, be a formal motion. Such a motion should, in accordance with Local Rule 7.1(c), be accompanied by a memorandum explaining the grounds for the party's request. Here, rather than following these basic rules for requesting action from a federal district court, defendant has styled its request for relief as an alternative argument (that is, alternative to its main argument, which appears in the text of its opposition papers, that summary judgment is inappropriate on the merits) and tucked it into a footnote.

The court will deny defendant's alternative request for arbitration for three reasons.

First, the request is not made in the form of a motion, as Rule 7(b) requires, nor it is briefed, as Local Rule 7.1(c) requires. Few rules of civil procedure are as easy to follow as Rule 7(b) and Local Rule 7.1(c). All these rules require is a formal  [*21] motion and a statement of grounds. If defendant cannot be bothered to submit a formal motion and a statement of grounds, then it cannot be serious about the relief it purports to desire. Moreover, the court could not easily rule on defendant's request, as the court has not been provided a complete copy of the arbitration portion of the CBA. The copy submitted by plaintiffs does not include anything following the third line of § 1.09, which makes sense given that this section has nothing to do with plaintiffs' argument. Defendant, however, has not submitted a complete copy to accompany its footnote request, nor has it made any argument as to how the grievance procedure works or how it applies. Without providing a complete copy of the arbitration agreement and some explanation of why defendant believes it applies here, the court cannot find that defendant has adequately demonstrated that this dispute is subject to arbitration.

Second, defendant has waived any right to arbitration by not raising the issue in motions practice before now. Although waiver by delay is not favored, the Third Circuit has held that the right to arbitration is waived when defendant's delay causes prejudice. Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 980 F.2d at 912, 926-27 (3d Cir. 1992). Here, defendant has, without a peep, submitted to full discovery in this matter. Discovery is now complete, and the case, having been pending for more than a year, is ready for disposition, either by summary judgment or by trial. Plaintiffs have doubtless spent substantial time, effort, and expense in getting this case ready for summary judgment practice and trial. The sheer number of exhibits and depositions submitted attests to plaintiffs' efforts, which, particularly considering that this is not a high-dollar-value case, are significant. Moreover, the arbitration procedure outlined in those portions of the CBA available to the court do not appear to contemplate discovery. Thus, having accepted the benefit of discovery from plaintiffs, and having put plaintiffs to the expense of discovery, defendant should not now be allowed to stay these proceedings and access an arbitral forum. See id. at 926. The court acknowledges that it appears that defendant raised the issue of arbitration in its answer, and that there has not been, before now, any other substantial formal motions practice 6 (aside from the motions practice associated with vacating defendant's default), id. at 927; nevertheless,  the court believes that, for the reasons just discussed, submitting this case to arbitration at this late stage would cause plaintiff prejudice, and should not be allowed.

Third, defendant's alternative request for an order compelling arbitration bears a striking resemblance to forum shopping. The thrust of its opposition to plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is that this court should deny plaintiff's motion on the merits. But, just in case the court disagrees, it attempts to preserve an argument for arbitration in a footnote. This form of argument is not attractive, nor is it persuasive.

Ibew Local Union No. 380 Health & Welfare Fund v. Travis Electric, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58037 (E.D. Pa. July 31, 2008)(emphasis added).

What were they thinking? The only good explanation I can think of is that the defendant didn't actually want to arbitrate, and decided such long ago, yet tucked in the remark as some form of collateral persuasion, where you toss in barely-relevant arguments in the hopes that it will, by sheer inertia, carry your other arguments further.

Otherwise, someone dropped the ball, or perhaps never even picked up the ball since they were so busy churning the billable hours on the litigation...

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So sayeth 3si Sec. Sys. v. Protek, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56283 (E.D. Pa. July 23, 2008), more routine commercial litigation:

The gist of the action doctrine "precludes plaintiffs from re-casting ordinary breach of contract claims into tort claims." eToll, Inc. v. Elias/Savion Adver., 811 A.2d 10, 14 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) citing Bash v. Bell Tel. Co., 601 A.2d 825, 829 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992). The difference between a cause of action for tort and breach of contract is that "tort actions lie for breaches of duties imposed by law as a matter of social policy, while contract actions lie only for breaches of duties imposed by mutual consensus agreements between particular individuals." Bash, 601 A.2d at 829. A breach of contract may give rise to a tort claim only when defendant's wrongful conduct is the gist of the action, and the contract is collateral. Pittsburgh Constr. Co. v. Griffith, 834 A.2d 572, 582 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) citing Bash, 601 A.2d at 829)

To successfully prove a negligence claim a plaintiff must demonstrate the following elements: (1) a duty of care was owed by defendant; (2) defendant breached this duty; and (3) the breach resulted in injury. McCandless v. Edwards, 908 A.2d 900, 904 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (citations omitted). Because Defendant's obligation to provide Plaintiff with FlexPac batteries arose from the contract and not from a general duty of care, Plaintiff's negligence claim should be barred by the gist of the action doctrine.

In Factory Market v. Schuller Intl, defendant guaranteed plaintiff it would install a watertight roof. 987 F. Supp. 387, 388 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 1997). Defendant promised to pay for any repairs needed to maintain the roof in a watertight condition. Id. at 389. From the onset "the roof was plagued with leaking problems," which defendant attempted to fix on a number of occasions. Id. Upon various unsuccessful  attempts by defendant to repair the roof, plaintiff brought suit against defendant alleging breach of contract, negligence, and fraud. Id. at 391. The court held that plaintiff's negligence claim sounded more in contract than in tort. Id. at 394. Plaintiff merely alleged that defendant's repairs were negligently performed, and as a result the roof was not watertight despite defendant's guarantee. Id. at 394-95. The court ruled that defendant did not owe plaintiff a duty of care; rather defendant's obligation to repair the faulty roof was imposed by way of the contract, and without the contract plaintiff "simply would not have [had] a claim." Id. at 395. Therefore, the court barred plaintiff's negligence claim. Id.

(emphasis added).

Without fail, defendants raise the "gist of the action" doctrine in every single breach of contract case that also includes other claims. It doesn't matter if the other claim is unjust enrichment, tortious interference, fraud, defamation, professional malpractice, or any other entirely appropriate claim that can rest alongside a breach of contract. If there's a contract, and there's another claim, the preliminary objections / 12(b)(6) are inevitable.

And it's usually wrong.

The doctrine is simple: the "gist of the action" doctrine precludes negligence claims where, under the facts alleged, the defendant has no duty to the plaintiff except for those created by contract. The "gist" is contractual -- there are no duties between the parties except for those created by the contract.

A reminder: everyone has a duty not to defraud others. Everyone has a duty not to tortious interfere in others' business. Everyone has a duty not to defame others. If someone defrauded you, that's wrong; you don't need to first have a signed and sealed Agreement Not To Defraud Me.

Ergo, there's really only one instance in which, at the complaint stage, the "gist of the action" doctrine applies: where a complaint alleges breach of contract and negligence based solely upon that contract. That a plaintiff cannot do.

Fraud and breach of contract? That's fine -- indeed, they're usually entirely appropriate forms of alternative relief which a plaintiff should allege if they have the factual basis.

But if you're alleging negligence, there must be an independent duty outside from the contract itself.

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Drug and Device Law has an exceptionally detailed post about the new voluntary PhRMA guidelines, along with dozens of cases holding that such guidelines don't create negligence per se liability standards, particularly not retroactively.

But what about ordinary, post hoc negligence? Can voluntary industry codes be relevant to the standard of care?

Absolutely! For example, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania case they cited, Knarr v. Chapman Sch. of Seamanship, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5351 (E.D.Pa. 2000)(interpreting Florida law), rejected the per se application of ANSI standards, but was happy to cite "Jackson v. H.L. Bouton Co., 630 So. 2d 1173, 1174-75 (Dist.Ct.App.Fl. 1994)(violation of ANSI standards is "merely evidence of negligence.)."

The same is true in Pennsylvania, where evidence of industry standards is clearly relevant to the reasonableness of a manufacturer's conduct, and is thus admissible, except in strict liability cases where reasonableness is irelevant. Lewis v. Coffing Hoist Div., Duff-Norton, 515 Pa. 334, 528 A.2d 590, 594 (Pa. 1987). As you'd expect, if the plaintiff brings in industry standards, so too can the defendant. Daddona v. Thind, 891 A.2d 786, 807 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006).

As for whether its plaintiffs or defendants are engaging in what D&D Law calls "foolishness," you can bet your bottom dollar that every PhRMA defendant from here on out will make their compliance with these new standards the centerpiece of future defenses, and that PhRMA took great pains to ensure these codes were easy to comply with and would play well in front of judges and juries.

Seriously, look at these codes and consider the state of the industry in 2008:

Promotional materials should:
(a) be accurate and not misleading;
(b) only make substantiated claims;
(c) reflect the balance between risks & benefits; and
(d) be consistent with all FDA requirements.

...

Decisions regarding the selection or retention of [health care providers] as consultants should be made based on defined criteria such as general medical expertise and reputation, or knowledge and experience regarding a particular therapeutic area.

...

Companies should not use consultant arrangements as inducements or rewards for prescribing a particular medicine or course of treatment.

...

Train representatives to ensure general science and product-specific information so that representatives can provide accurate, up-to-date information, consistent with FDA requirements.

That's voluntary? It should be mandatory. No praise will come from these quarters, I don't consider it a "good deed" to encourage member companies follow FDA requirements. It's the law.

In 2008 we have to remind (it wasn't part of the old code!) pharmaceutical companies not to mislead people with promotional materials. What a shame.

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A reminder courtesy of the Pennsylvania Superior Court:

Initially, we must address the Seller's position that since Buyer appealed from the order denying post-trial motions rather than the pretrial ruling limiting his claim for consequential damages, we "lack jurisdiction" to "hear his complaints about the pretrial ruling." Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant Michael Bupp at 24, 26. The law is to the contrary.

The pretrial order in question was an interlocutory order because it merely limited the damages recoverable in this action and did not resolve all issues as to all parties or otherwise terminate the litigation. See Pa.R.A.P. 341(b). The final order in this action was the one that disposed of post-trial motions, which resolved all outstanding claims as to the two parties and from which Buyer filed his timely appeal. It is established that a notice of appeal filed from the entry of the final order in an action draws into question the propriety of any prior non-final orders. K.H. v. J.R., 573 Pa. 481, 826 A.2d 863 (Pa. 2003). As we recently stated:

[I]nterlocutory orders that are not subject to immediate appeal as of right may be reviewed in a subsequent timely appeal of a final appealable order or judgment. Stephens v. Messick, 2002 PA Super 117, 799 A.2d 793, 798 (Pa.Super. 2002); see also Bird Hill Farms, Inc. v. United States Cargo & Courier Service, Inc., 2004 PA Super 66, 845 A.2d 900, 903 (Pa.Super. 2004) (stating that "[o]nce an appeal is filed from a final order, all prior interlocutory orders are subject to review"). Accordingly, interlocutory orders . . . become reviewable on appeal upon the trial court's entry of a final order[.]

Basile v. H & R Block, Inc., 2007 PA Super 159, 926 A.2d 493, 498 (Pa.Super. 2007).

Seller also suggests that Buyer did not "otherwise" preserve his issues for appellate review. Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant Michael Bupp at 24. Again, we disagree. Buyer raised the propriety of the order limiting his consequential damages in his post-trial motions, which are devoted entirely to this question. The ruling also was contested pretrial. Thus, we cannot ascertain the basis upon which Buyer urges a finding of waiver.

Quinn v. Bupp, 2008 PA Super 161 * 13 (emphasis added).

Of course, don't throw the book at the appellate court. See Kanter v. Epstein, 2004 PA Super 470 (by overwhelming the court with issues, "[Defendants] frustrat[ed] this Court's ability to engage in a meaningful and effective appellate review process"). But make sure all the important court orders, not just the post-trial ones, are addressed.

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Concurring Opinions picks up an interesting dispute between a Western District of Pennsylvania trial judge and the Third Circuit:

["How Closely Can Judges' Opinions Mirror Filings?"] was the question at issue in the remand of Bright v. Westmoreland Cty., 341 F.Supp.2d 525, where the Third Circuit had suggested that the district judge's opinion was a little too close to the defendant's proposed order (well, actually, almost a verbatim copy). Here's the judge's response [on remand]:

[T]he starting point of numerous documents, eventually signed by this Court, and by other district court judges in this and other districts, may initially be counsel's work product. Why are district courts throughout this country receiving attorney work product on “computer disk/cd,” if they are not to be used as a starting point? It never occurred to me at that time that anyone would view as improper the practice of an attorney's work product serving as a starting point for a Memorandum Opinion from this Court. . . .

[Moreover,] In addition to “two substantive changes,” I made over sixty (60) “markings,” including correction of citation form, verb changes, tense changes, spelling corrections, etc. My training as a law clerk for a well-respected Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and as a member of the Virginia Law Review, as well as over thirty (30) years of trial practice, taught me that such matters were important.

The conflict reminds me of the recent controversy over a judicial nominee accused of "appropriat[ing] without attribution . . . substantial portions" of an article. Both situations suggest that judicial and scholarly independence require a commitment to "make it new;" perhaps only stylistically for the judge, but substantively for the scholar.

I have to side with the District Judge there. While a wholesale adoption of a party's argument could reveal laziness by the judge, the simple truth is that many of us lawyers take our jobs very seriously, and many of us spend a lot of time and effort perfecting our legal arguments.

If you see a written pleading from me, odds are that I have tried to word every sentence in there as best I could, paying close attention to style, length, word choice, cadence, fidelity of my arguments to the cases therein cited. I also strive to ensure that the arguments I put forth are consistent with the relevant legal principles in general, enabling them to be applied or distinguished in other cases. (That may sound like a waste given the case-particular duty of zealous advocacy but, once you've seen your overzealous arguments blown away at appeal, you'll see the merits of a cautious, consistent approach).

Judges should always verify the arguments made to them by counsel -- even putting aside malicious intent, mistakes do happen -- but if a judge reads the words I agonized over, taking into account all my understanding of the case, well, that may just mean I did my job well, not that the judge did anything wrong.

How'd the story end? On second appeal, the District Court was affirmed in what is an important state-created danger / 1983 opinion in the Third Circuit. Bright v. Westmoreland County, 443 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2006). I guess the carbon copied lawyer was right the first time around.

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Another day, another breach of contract case alleging "fraud in the inducement, unjust enrichment, and tortious interference with contractual and business relationships." Sheinman Provisions, Inc. v. Nat'l Deli, LLC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54357 (E.D.Pa. 2008). Here's what inevitably happens:

Based upon the parties' pleadings and the Court's own review of the contract at issue, we find that the Asset Rental Agreement is a fully integrated contract, which contains an express provision stating that in entering the Asset Rental Agreement, neither party has relied on any claims, representations or warranties made by the other, except as expressly set forth therein. Therefore, the parole evidence rule squarely applies here because Plaintiff is seeking to offer evidence of representations made prior to the execution of the Asset Rental Agreement to contradict an express provision thereof. As it is well established that "fully integrated contracts preclude fraudulent inducement claims," this claim will be dismissed as barred by the parole evidence rule. Because the fraudulent inducement claim is defeated by the parole evidence rule, we do not need to address Defendant's arguments based on the gist of the action doctrine and Rule 9(b).

...

In this case, the agreement at issue is a fully integrated contract and, by its terms, it governs the entire relationship of the parties. Therefore, we disagree with Plaintiff's argument that Rule 8(d)(2) allows pleading in the alternative in this case. Rule 8 only allows alternative claims to be plead if all of the claims are sufficient on their own. Here, even if the breach of contract claim fails, the unjust enrichment claim is still insufficient because Pennsylvania law prohibits unjust enrichment claims where a contract governs the relationship of  the parties, as is the case here. The bar to this type of claim is not altered when unjust enrichment is plead in the alternative to an unsuccessful breach of contract claim as the relationship of the parties is still governed by a valid contract, and therefore, there is no reason to apply the quasi-contract doctrine of unjust enrichment. Plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim will be dismissed.

...

Sheinman's tortious interference claim alleges almost identical facts: that Defendant intentionally interfered with Plaintiff's business and contractual relationships to cause its customers, vendors and suppliers to discontinue purchasing from Plaintiff and deal directly with Defendant. Following the Third Circuit's holding in Chemtech, we find that the duties allegedly breached by Defendant were not imposed as a matter of social policy, but rather flowed from the Asset Rental Agreement. Therefore, the gist of the action doctrine bars Plaintiff's tortious interference claim here as the duties  allegedly breached were grounded in the contract between the parties.

Ouch! Those all look like pleading problems: if you're doing to allege claims outside breach of contract, make sure the facts you allege can support them -- the claims can't simply be naked alternatives to your breach of contract. From looking at the facts (a wholly integrated contract only breached in a few, but important, ways), I really don't see how the plaintiffs could have pulled it off.

I can't blame the plaintiffs for trying, though: if they had not alleged these claims, and then evidence later revealed they should have, the defendants would have inevitably cried foul with the statute of limitations, and probably would have won, since the amendment would have been for entirely new claims. It was largely a waste of everyone's time, but unless defense counsel's in the mood for a tolling agreement (hint: they're not), you don't have a choice.

Hate the game, not the players.

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The normal rule is that a party cannot get an injunction without demonstrating "irreparable harm," and that monetary harm is not "irreparable." Plaintiffs always try to get around this limitation by coming up with novel ways that the particular harm is "irreparable." In Bennington Foods LLC v. St. Croix Renaissance Group, LLP, 528 F.3d 176 (3d Cir. 2008), plaintiff claimed the damage to business goodwill was "irreparable," won in the District Court, then lost at the Court of Appeals:

The District Court found that failing to issue a mandatory injunction would cause irreparable harm to Bennington. Specifically, it found that failure to issue the injunction would harm Bennington's reputation for being able to deliver scrap metal on time. How ever, a plaintiff in a breach of contract case cannot convert monetary harm into irreparable harm simply by claiming that the breach of contract has prevented it from performing contracts with others and that this subsequent failure to perform will harm the plaintiff's reputation. ...

The inability to gain possession of the scrap metal at issue here creates at most a monetary loss. In the event that subsequent failure to deliver scrap metal to others might create a cognizable risk of irreparable harm to the plaintiff's reputation, Bennington has not demonstrated, except by Bennington's president's personal assertions, that the scrap metal business is different from other types of commerce in such a way that normal breach of contract remedies could not provide a remedy. Nor has Bennington identified any contracts to resell the scrap metal which it has been unable to perform, any third parties with whom it has suffered a loss of reputation, or any attempts—futile or otherwise—it has made to fulfill contracts to deliver scrap metal by obtaining it from other sources.

The Third Circuit goes on to note that damage to ordinary business goodwill is different from continuing trademark infringement (Pappan Enterprises, Inc. v. Hardee's Food Systems, Inc., 143 F.3d 800 (3d Cir. 1998)) and a suspension from horse racing for suspected cheating (Fitzgerald v. Mountain Laurel Racing, Inc., 607 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1979)), both of which cause "irreparable" harm.

They then note an apparent split with the Fourth Circuit:

Bennington, however, cites to Blackwelder Furniture co. of Statesville, Inc. v. Seilig Manufacturing Co., Inc., 550 F.2d 189, 197 (4th Cir. 1977), a case in which the trial court denied a preliminary injunction. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the district court's finding of no irreparable harm was clearly erroneous. Id. at 196. In so concluding, the court stated that

The harm posed to Blackwelder's general goodwill by its inability to fill outstanding and accumulating orders in excess of $ 15,000 for furniture listed in its catalogues is incalculable not incalculably great or small, just incalculable.

Id. at 197.

We are not bound by the holding in Blackwelder and we question whether irreparable harm was sufficiently demonstrated there. In addition, we note that Blackwelder has been distinguished from other preliminary injunction cases on the basis that Blackwelder “involved a manufacturer's refusal to supply its entire product line to a particular retailer, treatment which discriminated against that particular dealer.” ... As we mention above, there is nothing in the record before us to demonstrate that Bennington was unable to fulfill any contracts, was unable to find other sources of scrap metal when the Virgin Islands scrap metal could not be shipped, or lost reputation with any specific customers.

I boldfaced those two parts to show that the apparent against showing irreparable harm through secondary harm to business goodwill isn't really the problem, the problem is a failure to produce evidence.

But there's a chicken and egg problem -- in determining an injunction, factual questions are left to the discretion of the district court judge, who here had evidence of the damage to goodwill: the testimony by Bennington's president. So, really, the problem wasn't a failure to produce any evidence, but a failure to produce sufficient evidence.

I suppose, then, that the rule here recognizes business goodwill as capable of "irreparable harm," it just requires a showing of unfulfilled contracts, inability to find other providers, and/or harm to specific customers.

Good to know.

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John F. Olson and Amy L. Goodman, partners at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, follow up on Marty Lipton's article (which I previously discussed here):

In our upcoming paper, we will address some of the issues that deserve focus from shareholders, directors, business executives and other interested stakeholders.

• First, and not necessarily in order of importance, we need to develop effective methods of board/shareholder communication that build on new electronic capabilities but are not burdensome and do not increase liability risks.

• Second, boards and business executives need to effectively and regularly communicate corporate strategy and the board’s oversight role to investors, the business press and analysts, once again without fear of increased liability.

• Third, companies need to make good investor relations, and “good listening” a day to day corporate priority, and shareholders need to take advantage of these opportunities to present their views to business executives and directors.

• Fourth, shareholders need to think for themselves and reduce their reliance on proxy advisory services and be more transparent in their proxy voting decision-making processes.

• Fifth, companies, boards and their advisors need to figure out a way for directors to spend more time addressing strategy and risk and less time on compliance.

• Finally, while efforts to better educate directors about corporate governance and their fiduciary responsibilities has been salutary, we now need to shift our efforts to better educating directors in understanding the businesses, including the risks, of their companies.

Hey, that sounds like what I wrote:

I thus foresee over the next few years growth in mid-size and large private corporations where the investors have extensive access to the records in real-time; perhaps not the same level as in a small private company, but far more than investors and public companies now have. We've already started to see that trend with the recent explosion of private equity groups like Blackstone

But I don't think any of them will change the fundamental problem of the public corporation, in which the investor experiences a 'distance' from the nuts and bolts of the operation that is hard to accept in the rapid pace of the 21st century. Hence I still believe there will be a continuing move to private equity, which a corresponding rise in intra-company commercial litigation and arbitration there, as I wrote before.

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The Unincorporated Business Law Prof Blog says:

Prof. Larry Ribstein has posted Reforming Limited Liability Company Fiduciary Litigation on SSRN.  He presented this paper at last week's LLCs at 20 symposium at Suffolk.  Here's the abstract:

Derivative suits are designed for publicly held corporations. In limited liability companies, the remedy creates significant costs and complications. These costs are unnecessary because more appropriate remedies member-authorized and direct suits are available. The application of the derivative remedy to LLCs is an example of lawmakers applying rules across business entities without adequately thinking through which rules belong in a coherent business association statute.

I'm not sure that I agree.  If nothing else, minority-member lawsuits are likely to get labeled at "entity" lawsuits, rather than direct, individual lawsuits.

(Note: Pennsylvania law (15 Pa.C.S. § 8992) permits derivative actions in limited liability companies.)

There are plenty of issues in an LLC that cannot be addressed appropriately by direct action. More importantly, retaining derivative actions answers two questions that have frustrated and confused a number of lawyers and judges: do individual members of an LLC have standing to sue when the majority of LLC members engage in tortious or intentional conduct, and, if so, what remedies are available?

Answering that question by reference only to contract law is usually impossible, because the vast majority of the LLC operating agreement have no provision for what should happen in the event of a breach, they just generally affirm the principle of majority rule. Viewed literally, most LLC operating agreements permit, by silence, the majority members to frustrate the reasonable expectations of the minority members and freeze them out of the business.

Courts are supposed to avoid absurd and unjust results, and most will not allow an operating agreement to cheat a minority member merely because of the absence of a "don't cheat" provision.

How do courts do then? There are a variety of options, including the common law proposition that "bad faith conduct" constitutes a breach of contract, regardless of whether the conduct specifically breaches the text of the agreement. But each one of those options relies heavily on discretion, resulting in inconsistent outcomes across similar cases before different judges.

I think the bigger question is: what's the harm of allowing a derivative action? A lawsuit is a lawsuit, and I fail to see how a derivative lawsuit in an LLC will result in any more discovery, costs, or anything else. In the context of an LLC, it's largely a different style of pleading.

Indeed, even if there is a harm, the American Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate Governance (2-7 § 7.01) says, in the case of a closely held corporation, the court in its discretion may treat an action raising derivative claims as a direct action, exempt it from those restrictions and defenses applicable only to derivative actions, and order an individual recovery, if it finds that to do so will not (i) unfairly expose the corporation or the defendants to a multiplicity of actions, (ii) materially prejudice the interests of creditors of the corporation, or (iii) interfere with a fair distribution of the recovery among all interested persons.

That, in essence, can make all derivative actions direct if the court is so inclined, creating an escape hatch for situations in which derivative actions are inappropriate. No corollary exception exists to permit derivative recovery where direct is inappropriate; that's why it needs to be there by statute.

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The court speaks frankly in this breach of contract action:

Church contends: "In order to establish a cause of action for breach of a construction contract by a contractor, the owner must allow the contractor a reasonable time to rectify the alleged defects." Appellant's brief at 11, citing Hood v. Meininger, 377 Pa. 342, 105 A.2d 126 (1954). Church contends the Tentarellis failed to establish they gave him the opportunity to cure after terminating him on July 22, 2003, and, as such, he was entitled to a compulsory non-suit on the Tentarellis' counter-claim.

Both the legal premise and the factual conclusion of Church's argument are irreparably flawed. Church's reliance on Hood is wholly misplaced. Hood does not stand for the proposition that a plaintiff must establish he gave a contractor a reasonable opportunity to rectify defects in order to establish a cause of action for breach of a construction contract, and no case of which we are aware cites Hood for this proposition. Frankly, we are unaware of any case which stands for this proposition. While cure and mitigation are unquestionably relevant to the issue of damages in a contract dispute as a general matter, there is simply no support in our caselaw for the proposition Church advances. Notably, Church does not contend the Tentarellis' alleged failure to allow him to cure warrants a diminution of the Tentarellis' damage award.

Church v. Tentarelli, 2008 PA Super 139 (June 30, 2008). It seems to be the natural progression after LJL Transp., Inc. v. Pilot Air Freight Corp., 2006 PA Super 176; 905 A.2d 991(2006)("there are circumstances where the nature of the breach permits the aggrieved party to immediately terminate the contract despite a "cure" provision.").

That said, I think the Superior Court went a little bit far. There's precedent suggesting the party be offered an opportunity to cure the defect. For example,

In determining materiality for purposes of breaching a contract, we consider the following factors:

    a) the extent to which the injured party will be deprived of the benefit which he reasonably expected;
    
    b) the extent to which the injured party can be adequately compensated for that part of the benefit of which he will be deprived;
    
    c) the extent to which the party failing to perform or to offer to perform will suffer forfeiture;
    
    d) the likelihood that the party failing to perform or offer to perform will cure his failure, taking account of all the circumstancesincluding any reasonable assurances;
    
    e) the extent to which the behavior of the party failing to perform or offer to perform comports with standards of good faith and fair dealing.

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 241 (1981). Accord Jennings v. League of Civic Organizations of Erie County, 180 Pa. Super. 398, 119 A.2d 608 (1956).

Either way, it's worth noting the apparent shift towards not requiring the breaching party be offered an opportunity to cure their failure, even where the contract specifically says they should be.

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In New York comes word of an attorney being ordered to repay $403,000 for mishandling a judge's estate. To wit:

Nearly half of the $403,000 Ambrosio ordered Taylor to pay to Phillips' estate stemmed from her handling of the $696,000 in net proceeds from a court-approved sale of one of Phillips' properties.

Taylor acknowledged taking the funds from the proceeds to cover legal fees for work she performed for Phillips before she was appointed his guardian. The payments were made without court approval.

Citing the difficulty of determining the "precise amount" Taylor had paid herself for legal work without court approval, Ambrosio ordered her to repay the $197,000 she admitted taking from the proceeds.

"What exactly she purports to have done to earn $2,500 a week in counsel fees from [Phillips'] funds for seventy-four straight weeks remains a mystery," the judge wrote. "In paying herself counsel fees without any prior court approval, Taylor made herself final arbiter of the reasonableness of her fees. This self-dealing conduct clearly conflicted with her obligation as guardian."

Taylor was suspended late last year from the practice of law by the Appellate Division, 1st Department. Ambrosio wrote that she was suspended for "at best, withdrawing funds from the guardianship account for legal fees without court permission, or, at worst, intentionally converting guardianship funds."

Yep, that will do it. The unauthorized taking of client funds, particularly where the client is incompetent, dead, or otherwise unable to defend themselves, is the surest way to get hit with malpractice and/or a judicial order compelling repayment.

Regardless of if you take any, always know by what right you're even touching the client's funds.

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Martin Lipton, who knows a thing or two about corporations, presents:

On June 25, I presented a paper entitled “Shareholder Activism and the “Eclipse of the Public Corporation”: Is the Current Wave of Activism Causing Another  Tectonic Shift in the American Corporate World?” at the 2008 Directors Forum of The University of Minnesota Law School. The paper discusses the pressures that have been pervasively eroding the centrality of the board of directors and transforming its role in the governance structure of public companies, with the end game being a new conception of the corporate organization. Against the backdrop of the subprime and leveraged loan financial crisis and other recent events, the paper addresses what I regard as the crux of the issue affecting public companies today: whether the institution of the corporate board can cope with these pressures and survive as the vital governing organ of public companies. Or, will a forced migration from director-centric governance to shareholder-centric governance, along with a concomitant transformation of the role of the board from guiding and advising management to ensuring compliance and performing due diligence, simply overwhelm American business corporations?

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Via an insurance / breach of contract case in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania:

Although the Court has found that Hotaling's contacts  [*18] with Pennsylvania are sufficient to support the Court's exercise of personal jurisdiction, it does not follow automatically that venue in this district is proper. As the language of Section 1331(a) makes clear, the focus in assessing venue is not on the "defendants' 'contacts' with a particular district, but [on] the location of those' 'events or omissions giving rise to the claim.'" Cottman Transmission Sys. v. Martino, 36 F.3d 291, 294 (3d Cir. 1994). In order to establish specific jurisdiction, a plaintiff must show only that at least one contact on the part of the Defendant related to the Plaintiff's claim. O'Connor, 496 F.3d at 318 (citing Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414). The inquiry with respect to proper venue, however, is significantly more circumscribed, requiring a showing that a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred in the district. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a)(2).

Pullman Fin. Corp. v. Hotaling, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48359 (W.D.Pa. June 24, 2008). Defense motion for transfer of venue granted.

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SCOTUSBlog, of course, gets the jump on the first analysis of Heller v. DC, striking down the gun ban, noting:

Second, what standard of review will apply [to future cases]? Scalia rejects rational basis (note 27 page 56, which the District did not urge) and says that the District law falls under any other standard, without exactly saying why. The SG offered a fairly relaxed standard (except as applied to the DC law), but the Court did not bite. Federal laws regulating guns, and perhaps those increasing sentences for gun use, are likely to be challenged, whatever the standard and chance of success.

Here's the note:

27 JUSTICE BREYER correctly notes that this law, like almost all laws, would pass rational-basis scrutiny. Post, at 8. But rational-basis scrutiny is a mode of analysis we have used when evaluating laws under constitutional commands that are themselves prohibitions on irrational laws. See, e.g., Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agriculture, 553 U. S. ___, ___ (2008) (slip op., at 9–10). In those cases, “rational basis” is not just the standard of scrutiny, but the very substance of the constitutional guarantee. Obviously, the same test could not be used to evaluate the extent to which a legislature may regulate a specific, enumerated right, be it the freedom of speech, the guarantee against double jeopardy, the right to counsel, or the right to keep and bear arms. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152, n. 4 (1938) (“There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption
of constitutionality [i.e., narrower than that provided by rational-basis review] when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments. . .”). If all that was required to overcome the right to keep and bear arms was a rational basis, the Second Amendment would
be redundant with the separate constitutional prohibitions on irrational laws, and  would have no effect.

That's awfully circular -- the right to equal protection under the laws is obviously a "specific, enumerated right," but it is well-settled that there are numerous classes of discrimination that get different standards of review. For example, discrimination based on race is reviewed strictly, discrimination based on sexual orientation is reviewed for rational basis, while discrimination based on gender is reviewed on an intermediate standard.

Same goes for the "specific, enumerated right" of free speech -- limitations on indecent speech are reviewed differently from political arguments.

it sounds like the Supreme Court could not get a majority to agree on a standard, so they dodged the question entirely. Sometimes that is understandable, but not here, where they are completely overhauling the interpretation of a constitutional amendment.

My bet is that this case goes the way of the failed Commerce Clause cases of the 1990s: a sweeping constitutional protection that disappears when the absence of popular support is revealed. There will be new challenges to gun laws, but not a complete repeal of the existing system.

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At Electronic Discovery Blog, "Employee’s motion to quash granted where employer cannot establish that employee had no expectation of privacy in using employer’s computer system:"

Requestor defendant employer subpoenaed third party producer to produce “all electronically stored information on all computers, laptops, PDA’s, portable media or other devices” between plaintiff employee’s husband and plaintiff regarding the litigation. Employee moved to quash on the grounds of overbreadth and that the records were protected by the spousal privilege. Employer responded that the records were not protected because of the employer state’s system use policy, which provides that “’no user should have any expectation of privacy in any message, file, image, or data created, sent, retrieved, or received by use of the Commonwealth’s equipment and/or access’” and “that state agencies have the right to monitor e-mail sent or received by agency users;” although the policy did permit personal use of work computers. Employer stated that as both employee and her husband were employees of the state at the time, the policy prevented any expectation of privacy. Id. at *3-*4.

...

In the current case, there was “no…evidence…offered as to knowledge, implementation, or enforcement of the Policy:”

There is no showing that Mr. or Mrs. Sprenger were notified of the Policy by a log-on banner, flash screen, or employee handbook and whether Mr. or Mrs. Sprenger were ever actually aware of the Policy. It is unclear whether third parties had a right of access to the e-mails. The record also does not show whether the Policy was regularly enforced and whether the state employees’ computer use was actually monitored.

Id. at *13. The employer thus failed to meet its burden demonstrating employees’ waiver of the privilege. The court therefore granted the employee’s motion to quash, although inviting the employer to contact the Clerk of the Court to set up an evidentiary hearing on the waiver issue of they sought to pursue the matter further.

EDD notes that conflicts with U.S. v. Etkin, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12834 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2008), where the marital communication privilege could not be claimed in a different, but awfully similar, situation.

There is a serious conflict brewing here, one that I believe will inevitably end up in the Supreme Court.

On the surface, the question appears to be if e-mails sent from a work account can be privileged in a world in which an employer is free to monitor such e-mails, thereby eliminating any expectation of privacy (which is required to claim privilege).

Looking deeper, though, there is an even more basic question: who bears the burden of persuasion may in a privilege? In some sense, the answer is simple. Since a lack of expectation of privacy is generally thought of as a waiver of privilege, the burden is on the party requesting the information to show such privilege was waived. That's what was done in the case at bar.

But that interpretation is not set in stone. The burden of establishing any privilege at all lies with the party trying to raise the privilege, and there is a good argument that, where the communication began on the employers computer system, it was never privileged to begin with, and thus we never even reach the question of waiver.

In Pennsylvania, Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fleming, 924 A.2d 1259 (Pa. Super. Ct., May 21, 2007), clearly requires the party claiming the privilege first establish the communication was privileged -- and as part of their analysis the court looked into the recipients of the email. A court could hold that, in a work email situation like the one at the beginning of this post, the email starts its life unprivileged, and so there's no issue of waiver at all. That would put the burden on the party claiming the privilege, rather than the party requesting the document.

Either way, clients should be encouraged to play it safe and not send e-mails relating to personal legal matters from work accounts. Ask your clients about it today.

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From Wartsila Nsd N. Am., Inc. v. Hill Int'l, Inc., 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 13099, a business litigation opinion just released:

Three exceptions have been identified where the public interest will render an exculpatory clause [in a contract] unenforceable: (1) when the party protected by the clause intentionally causes harm or engages in acts of reckless, wanton, or gross negligence; (2) when the bargaining power of one party to the contract is so grossly unequal so as to put that party at the mercy of the other's negligence; and (3) when the transaction involves the public interest. Wolf, 644 A.2d at 525-26. None of these exceptions is applicable here.

Although the jury concluded that Hill was negligent, there was no evidence that Hill engaged in willful misconduct, such as "intentional harms" or "the more extreme forms of negligence, i.e., reckless, wanton, or gross." Id. at 525. At trial, Wartsila argued that Hill violated the Agreement by committing fraud. The jury expressly concluded in its verdict, however, that Hill had not committed fraud. This finding eviscerates any argument that the exculpatory clause should be disregarded because of the nature of Hill's alleged misconduct.

To get around the exculpatory clause, all the plaintiff had to do was prove the defendant's conduct was reckless, wanton, or grossly negligent. Yet, apparently they only asked the jury if the defendant was negligent or if they committed fraud.

It is thus entirely possible that every single juror thought the defendant was grossly negligent, a factual finding that would have destroyed the exculpatory clause, a yet on the facts presented to the Third Circuit plaintiff's claim has been "eviscerated."

Oops.

Continuing on:

The District Court erred in failing to exclude evidence of "incidental,  special, indirect, or consequential" damages. Further, the Court did not ask the jury to identify which portion of its award was based on Hill's breach of contract or its alleged negligence. Thus, we cannot tell from the jury's verdict what portion of its award of damages was based on direct damages and what amount was based on consequential damages. In order to give effect to the exculpatory clause agreed to by these parties, there must be a new trial on the issue of damages.

Again, the jury could have already answered this question, but now the parties have to go back for new trial, and the plaintiff is denied resolution and compensation another day.

Maybe that is in their best interest, since they just had the exculpatory clause enforced as a matter of law, and now they can focus their case on the permissible damages. Somehow I doubt that was their plan all along...

UPDATE: See Philly JD's comment below -- the outcome is even worse than I thought, as the final verdict is now capped at a level that makes re-trial unprofitable for the client and the attorney.

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I spotted this intriguing entry with regard to the Bear Stearns indictment and the duty of corporate counsel to employees:

[Defendant Tannin] raised the issue of whether to approach a lawyer regarding his doubts about the market. “Who do we talk to about this?” wrote Tannin in an e-mail, sent from his private account, to co-defendant Ralph Cioffi. “Outside counsel? (And here we have to be careful because our outside counsel is [Bear Stearns Asset Management’s counsel] NOT our counsel — This is another very big issue we at least need to think about.)”

He was right -- if he had talked to Bear Stearns' lawyer, they would not have told him what was in his best interest. They would have told him what was in the best interest of the company. More below the fold.
Continue Reading...

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Good to know!

The Court rejects Dr. Scott's argument . . . and holds that BI's e-mail policy is critical to the outcome here. . . . A “no personal use” policy combined with a policy allowing for employer monitoring and the employee's knowledge of these two policies diminishes any expectation of confidentiality. . . .

As there is no New York case on point to determine whether the communication here was made in confidence or not, we look for guidance to In Re Asia Global Crossing, which is a federal bankruptcy case virtually identical to this case and a case upon which both parties rely. In re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd., 322 B.R. 247 (S.D.N.Y.2005). In Asia Global, executives used their employer's e-mail system to communicate with their personal attorney concerning actual or potential litigation with the employer, the owner of the e-mail system. 322 B.R. at 256. The issue in the case was identical to the issue here. Id. at 251. The Court looked at a variety of federal cases which addressed whether an employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her office e-mail, but where attorney client privilege was not an issue. 322 B.R. at 257-258. The Asia Global Court concluded that, the attorney-client privilege would be inapplicable if “(a) ... the corporation maintain[s] a policy banning personal or other objectionable use, (b) ... the company monitor[s] the use of the employee's computer or email, (c) ... third parties have a right of access to the computer or emails, and (d) ... the corporation notif[ies] the employee, or was the employee aware, of the use and monitoring policies?” 322 B.R. at 257.

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According to Blawgletter one of those big deals that makes a whole bunch of rich people a whole lot more money just fell apart. Barry wonders if the buyers can pull out or not under the agreement upon a misrepresentation or breach of warranty resulting in a "Company Material Adverse Effect:"

Ready to put it all together?  Okay.  Here we go.

   1.      KKR and Goldman have the right to terminate the APM (upon payment of $225 million) if Harman misrepresented something or breached a warranty in the APM unless the misrepresentation or warranty breach would not have a CMAE.

   2.      A false rep or warranty doesn't have a CMAE if it results (a) from a general industry downturn or problems in the credit or securities markets or (b) from a reaction to Harman's failure to meet projections, except that the "underlying" reasons for the disappointing results may otherwise reflect a CMAE.

Who has to prove a CMAE?  We would imagine the burden rests on KKR and Goldman.  But can they simply point to a misrepresentation or breach of warranty and require Harman to show that it "would not . . . have a Company Material Adverse Effect"?  We don't know offhand, but we do expect a fight over that very issue.

As a practical matter, KKR and Goldman probably should have the initial burden, since they're the ones trying to exercise an escape clause to excuse continued performance.

But I'm not convinced! Though KKR and Goldman have the initial burden of proving the occurrence of a condition excusing performance (#1 of Randy's list), the definition saying what isn't a CMAE (#2) begins "provided, however," making it an exception to the definition of CMAE that precedes it.

The case also looks like a classic non-jury trial or litigation-as-prolonged-negotiation. A judge gets tremendous discretion in a non-jury trial to ask questions, ask for findings of fact afterwards, et cetera, which allows the judge to figure out what really happened and issue an opinion that goes into detail about the facts and the law, separating the two, streamlining appeal and reducing the odds of remand or reversal.

A jury gets a single blast of information where they can't ask questions, after which they are locked in a room to decipher vague "instructions" before issuing an entirely opaque opinion that will inevitably result in some modification post-trial or remand on appeal.

The lawyers should consider all of the above before filing suit. Love lies bleeding in my hand...

UPDATE: Looks like Sallie Mae and J.C. Flowers are litigating the very issue.

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