Litigation and Trial - Max Kennerly : Philadelphia Trial Lawyer Max Kennerly : Business and Commercial Litigation : Civil Attorney : The Beasley Firm : Philadelphia Pennsylvania

Felix Salmon at Reuters caught something interesting:

[T]he facts of the case are pretty clear. The relationship between JP Morgan and Televisa goes back decades, and so JP Morgan was the natural choice for Televisa to turn to when it decided to buy a fiber-optic cable company called Bestel for $325 million, $225 million of which was to come from Televisa subsidiary Cablevisión.

JP Morgan intended to syndicate the loan, but the timing was bad: the deal closed in 2008, when credit markets were all but closed, and as a result JP Morgan ended up owning all of it. After an attempt by Televisa to help JP Morgan syndicate the loan fell through, JP Morgan then turned to Inbursa, Carlos Slim’s bank.

This was not an obvious choice from the point of view of serving one’s client. Slim and Cablevisión compete fiercely in the telecommunications space, where Slim is the dominant monopolist and Cablevisión is selling telephony and internet access in competition with him. And the rivalry is all the tougher due to the history between the two groups: Slim used to be a major shareholder in Televisa, and to this day Inbursa owns a 22% stake in Cablevisión.

Now there were two ways of selling this loan: JP Morgan could either assign it to Inbursa, which would require Cablevisión’s permission, or else it could participate it to Inbursa, which would not. At first, JPM tried to assign the loan, but unsurprisingly Cablevisión refused to grant their permission for that deal to happen.

You can imagine what happened next: JP Morgan dressed up the "assignment" as a "participation." As Judge Rakoff described it in his order,

JP Morgan, acting in bad faith, used the guise of a purported “participation” to effectuate what is in substance a forbidden assignment, with unusual provisions demanded by Inbursa that are calculated to give Inbursa exactly what the assignment veto in the Credit Agreement was designed to prevent. JP Morgan thereby violated, at a minimum, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing automatically implied by law in the Credit Agreement…

Televisa's request for a preliminary injunction halting the agreement was thus granted.

Salmon wonders what JPMorgan's response to all these allegations is:

So for JP Morgan’s side of the story, all I have to go on is their 40-page memorandum of law in the case, which is quite narrowly legalistic, which was roundly rejected by Rakoff, and which obviously can’t respond to Rakoff’s ruling since it was filed before Rakoff made his ruling.

Since JPMorgan moved for summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, they, like Televisa, were entitled to submit affidavits in support of their position, and it appears they submitted declarations from "Sheldon L. Pollock" and "Jaquelina Truzzell." Both declarations have been unsealed by Judge Rakoff's order, but neither is on the docket.

I doubt the declarations say much; JPMorgan's memorandum of law primarily references the Pollock and Truzzell declarations when discussing side matters, like telephone calls and Televisa's motives for opposing the assignment / participation. Truzzell apparently affirms there are "no side agreements" with Inbursa and that JPMorgan would not release "confidential" information, but that's it. There's nothing about how JPMorgan came to participation terms with Inbursa that, at least on their face, entitle Inbursa to a treasure trove of information about Televisa, far more than provided by JPMorgan's standard participation agreement.

Which I find telling. Though the standard response of most defendants is — for tactical reasons like avoiding getting pinned down to a particular version of events — to "deny and delay" rather than to come forth with an affirmative opposition, under the facts here, JPMorgan really needed to make a better showing. Here's the full quote (excerpted above) from Judge Rakoff's order:

In opposing a preliminary injunction, JPMorgan argues that the Participation Agreement is technically consistent with the Credit Agreement. Superficially, this may be correct. For example, with respect to Cablevisión’s concerns about confidential information, the Credit Agreement permits disclosure of information about the borrower, not just to assignees (who can be vetoed) but also to participants (who cannot), provided that such information is given on a confidential basis. Credit Agreement § 9.16(f)(i). This includes “all information received from the Borrower . . . relating to the Borrower, any of its Related Parties or their respective businesses.” Id. § 9.16. Similarly, there is no express restriction in the Credit Agreement on providing a participant with its pro-rata share of fees received by the lender or an option of first refusal for any further transfer of the loan. Finally, under the Credit Agreement, assignment of the loan without borrower consent is expressly permitted when there is an Event of Default. Id. § 9.04(b)(i).

But this narrow focus obscures the gist of Cablevisión’s argument, which is that JPMorgan, acting in bad faith, used the guise of a purported “participation” to effectuate what is in substance a forbidden assignment, with unusual provisions demanded by Inbursa that are calculated to give Inbursa exactly what the assignment veto in the Credit Agreement was designed to prevent. JPMorgan thereby violated, at a minimum, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing automatically implied by law in the Credit Agreement.

The Court agrees.

JPMorgan could have done more factually, rather than just legally, to rebut the appearance of bad faith. But they didn't; they just argued that they were entitled to do what they did, rather than show that their conduct with Inbursa was appropriate.

Such silence could be, in part, an attempt by JPMorgan to protect Inbursa's confidences, which arguably would have been appropriate. (I say "arguably" because the totality of the circumstances here — primarily Inbursa's attempt to negotiate terms more favorable than those typically provided by a participation agreement — imply that Inbursa has waived its right to keep those discussions confidential from Televisa.) But there's nothing on the docket reflecting an attempt to have Judge Rakoff review any pertinent materials in camera, and so there's no reason for us to speculate that JPMorgan's silence was a product of confidentiality.

It thus may be more appropriate to speculate that JPMorgan's silence was the product of not having a good defense. Again: facts win cases. "Technically consistent" legal arguments don't.

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[UPDATE: The WSJ Law Blog has copies of the letters submitted to the Delaware Chancery Court. Professor Hazard is undoubtedly one of the pre-eminent experts in the field, and he makes a compelling argument that Cravath violated the Rules of Professional Conduct. Yet, showing a violation of the Rules is not enough — to disqualify counsel under Chancellor Chandler's standard, Airgas will have to show the violation will "materially advance" Air Product's position or undermine the fair and efficient administration of justice. So far, I haven't seen anything demonstrating that. The vague references made so far to Cravath's insider knowledge of Airgas's finances isn't enough, since a firewall within Cravath can likely cure that problem.

UPDATE II: As predicted, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania declined to enter an injunction against Cravath, and the Delaware Chancery Court did not disqualify them.]

As has been reported all over the legal media,

Industrial gas producer Airgas filed suit against Cravath, Swaine & Moore on Friday over the firm's role as legal adviser to rival Air Products on that company's $5.1 billion bid for Airgas.

... Air Products filed a complaint on Thursday in Delaware's Chancery Court against Airgas, claiming that the smaller company improperly blocked its board of directors from considering previous Air Products takeover offers. Cravath litigation partners Francis Barron, David Marriott and Gary Bornstein are representing Air Products in the Delaware litigation along with local counsel Kenneth Nachbar (he of sports gambling notoriety) and Jon Abramczyk from Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell. (Click here for the Chancery Court complaint, courtesy of The Times' Dealbook.)

Airgas responded by retaining Cozen O'Connor chairman Stephen Cozen, litigation chair Jeffrey Weil and litigation partner Thomas Wilkinson Jr., for a civil suit against Cravath in state court in Pennsylvania. In the suit, Airgas claims that Cravath has a conflict of interest and breached its fiduciary duty by representing Air Products because it previously advised Airgas on several financings. According to Airgas' complaint against Cravath, the company has had a client relationship with the firm for 10 years and has paid Cravath about $2 million, including a $320,000 payment last October.

There's an obvious question dangling over the Pennsylvania suit filed by Airgas: what basis — or power — does a state court in Pennsylvania have to preclude a New York law firm from representing a Delaware-registered company in Delaware state court litigation against another Delaware-registered company?

Unsurprisingly, that's just what Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas (Commerce Court) Judge Albert Sheppard Jr. wondered before denying Airgas' petition for a temporary restraining order:

In essence, I would be saying to a lawyer you can’t go to Delaware and represent your client. I find that difficult. I don’t want to do that.

Judge Sheppard only had it for two weeks, though, since Cravath, like virtually every out-of-state defendant, promptly removed the case to Federal court, i.e. the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, where it was assigned to Judge Eduardo Robreno (whose work in the Philadelphia Inquirer bankruptcy I've covered before).

Cravath (represented by a team at Conrad O'Brien*) has responded to the suit and has asked Judge Robreno to abstain from hearing the case at all:

First, whatever this Court may ultimately decide with respect to Airgas’s claim for money damages, Airgas’s request for a preliminary injunction is the functional equivalent of a motion to disqualify Cravath from appearing before the Delaware Chancery Court. With all due respect, Cravath submits that a motion precluding counsel from appearing in Delaware Chancery Court is more appropriately decided by Chancellor William B. Chandler III, who presides over the firstfiled Delaware litigation. Just as this Court has full authority over proceedings here, judicial comity warrants according Chancellor Chandler due authority over proceedings in his courtroom. ...

Second, the Delaware Chancery Court is aptly suited to decide the key issue presented by Airgas’s petition to this Court—whether Cravath should be disqualified. Indeed, the dispute concerning Cravath’s ability to represent Air Products is intertwined with the merits of the (firstfiled) Delaware litigation. ...

Third, whereas this Court’s ruling on Airgas’s petition for preliminary relief would be, by definition, provisional, the Delaware Chancery Court’s ruling on the question of whether Cravath should be disqualified will be a final decision on the merits.

(From Cravath's brief, available on RECAP.)

It's hard to argue with that; whatever the merits of the conflict-of-interest allegations, it seems they all relate to the Delaware litigation and so should be decided there.

Of course, there's a reason Cravath wants the case decided in Delaware's Chancery Court (and why Airgas wants it decided elsewhere). As Francis G.X. Pileggi notes:

[Airgas'] separate suit alleging a conflict was filed in Philadelphia. One might speculate that the suit was not filed in Delaware and it was not filed as a motion to disqualify, because the Delaware decisions recently have not granted many motions to disqualify. See, e.g., cases summarized on this blog here.

Indeed, one might speculate that. More on that in a moment.

Back in Delaware, it seems a war of correspondence has broken out:

Airgas (which has retained Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz) began the exchange of correspondence Monday, when it sent a letter to Chancellor William Chandler at Delaware's Court of Chancery ... In its Monday letter to Chandler, Airgas argues that a Pennsylvania courtroom is the proper place for the Cravath hearing. In response, Air Products and local counsel Kenneth Nachbar of Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell drafted their own letter to Chandler, urging him to decide on Cravath's fate in Delaware and accusing Airgas of trying to "circumvent" Chandler's authority by suing in Pennsylvania.

Airgas also has enlisted a legal ethics expert who has issued an opinion letter in which he claims Cravath was working under "a clear and serious conflict of interest" while it was helping Air Products formulate its takeover bid last fall, according to a copy of the letter obtained by The Am Law Daily. In his letter, Geoffrey Hazard Jr., a professor at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, says Cravath ... violated the so-called "hot potato" rule, which holds that a firm cannot get out of a conflict simply by dropping one client on short notice, Hazard wrote.

Like I wrote before, the hot potato rule lives. Here's a recent recitation of the rule:

Courts that have considered the issue have held that a firm will not be allowed to drop a client in order to shift resolution of the conflicts question from Rule 1.7 dealing with current clients, to the more lenient standard in Rule 1.9 dealing with former clients.

El Camino Res., LTD. v. Huntington Nat'l Bank, No. 1:07-cv-598, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67813, at *39–40 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 13, 2007).

On the surface, that's not good for Cravath — if Chancellor Chandler applies a similar analysis, then Cravath will be evaluated as if it was simultaneously representing Airgas and Air Products on both sides of the litigation, which is expressly prohibited by the Delaware, Pennsylvania and New York rules.

But the final analysis is a practical one:

The finding of an ethical violation, however, does not automatically require disqualification. The court should order disqualification only where some specifically identifiable impropriety has actually occurred and the balance of relevant factors requires vindication of the integrity of the legal profession over defendant's interest in retaining counsel of its choice.

Id.

Returning again to why Cravath wants the issue decided in Delaware by Chancellor Chandler, it bears mention here that Chancellor Chandler took a strongly disqualification-unfriendly view in a similar case a year ago, in which Dow Chemical attempted to disqualify Wachtell from representing Rohm and Haas:

I am not persuaded that Wachtell’s access to this information will materially advance Rohm and Haas’s position or undermine the fair and efficient administration of justice. Dow’s defense to specific performance is that conditions in the market and within Dow have changed significantly since December 2008 and that it is no longer feasible for the merger to close. Dow has failed to convince me that the information Wachtell had access to regarding Dow’s strategies and asset values in 2006 and 2007 will substantially advance the interest of Rohm and Haas in this litigation. Additionally, Wachtell has assured the Court that its attorneys who obtained confidential Dow information have not and will not share Dow’s client confidences with the Wachtell attorneys working on this matter. While Dow is correct that the ethical rules impute knowledge of one attorney to other attorneys in the firm, the issue before the Court is not whether there was a violation of the ethical rules. To justify disqualification, the Court must find that allowing the representation to continue would threaten the fair and efficient administration of justice, a threat that is greatly reduced by a credible representation to the Court that the firm will ensure that the attorneys working on this matter do not have access to Dow’s client confidences. Dow has failed to point to information or confidences obtained by Wachtell in its 2006-2007 work for Dow that will have a material influence on the proceedings before me today.

Rohm and Haas Co. v. Dow Chem. Co., No. 4309-CC, 2009 WL 445609, at *3 (Del. Ch. Feb. 12, 2009)(also courtesy of Pileggi).

Truth be told, there's not much distinguishing the Rohm and Haas v. Dow situation from the present case with Cravath, except for the "hot potato" rule aspect, given how Cravath's work for Airgas was much more recent than Wachtell's work was for Dow. Indeed, it seems Cravath's work for Airgas unambiguously overlapped its work for Air Products.

As noted above, though, a mere violation of the rules isn't enough; the question is what prejudice the former client will suffer and if that prejudice can be avoided. Cravath's work for Airgas was comparatively small, and if Cravath sets up an ethical firewall that keeps the former Airgas attorneys away from the Air Products lawsuit, that will likely be enough to satisfy Chancellor Chandler.

- - -

* True story: when I interviewed at Conrad O'Brien, they took me to a nearby fancy seafood restaurant, where I was served a shrimp étouffée with a staple hidden in it. The following exchange ensued me and an attorney who was 'of counsel' with the firm:

Of counsel: Did you bite down on it?

Me: No, I noticed something was wrong and spit it out.

Of counsel [with a grin]: You know, I used to represent personal injury plaintiffs. So let me ask you again: did you bite down?

Other than the joke, however, all we got out of the experience was a free round of a coffee from the restaurant.

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Matthew Belloni at The Hollywood Reporter, Esq., has a copy of the 'Tonight Show' contract that's been the subject of much speculation over the past few weeks. He can't post the contract itself (I asked), but he described with considerable detail the parties' positions:

[W]e've finally tracked down a copy of the O’Brien contract, and -- lo and behold -- NBC did define “Tonight” as the series that airs at 11:35 as far back as 2002. However, what may have emboldened NBC to move the program anyway was the absence of that key language from later amendments to the deal.

Read the whole piece for more.

As Belloni continues,

Insiders familiar with settlement negotiations say NBC jumped on that fact to argue that the "operative" deal was silent on the timeslot issue and even contained some NBC profit-participation boilerplate allowing NBC discretion to move shows as it chooses. 

One problem with that argument: Any lawyer worth his 5% commission knows you've got to read an amended contract in the context of all other prenegotiated elements. O'Brien's 2004 deal incorporated by reference and ratified all the terms of his prior deals -- including the "Tonight Show" definition -- and says any conflicts between NBC's standard terms and the negotiated terms are governed by what's been negotiated.

Fact is, an amendment is still an amendment, not a new deal, even if you also call it a separate agreement. NBC's argument that the amendment — which specifically incorporated the old deal — was nonetheless actually a wholly-new deal would have been charitably described as "novel," which in the law is often synonymous with "bad." I don't doubt that O'Brien's lawyers saw right through NBC's argument and held firm throughout the negotiations.

Most importantly, congratulations to O'Brien and his lawyers for keeping their eye on the ball for all these years: they contracted for — and this is the language in the contract — the "Tonight Show" defined as the "series that airs at 11:35," more specifically the "second network series after the end of primetime."

As I wrote in Time-Tested Advice For Young Lawyers About Contracts Which They Should Ignore, 

In certain circumstances -- like some real estate transactions -- there is language used so frequently that it has become the standard against which all other grammar and syntax is measured. Any deviation will likely be interpreted against the person who suggested it.

If you have one of those situations, be sure you know what the "standard" language is. Otherwise, focus on making the text of the written agreement reflect the reality of the parties' understanding, not on adding in "gobbledygook" to make it look lawyerly.

O'Brien's lawyers realized that and didn't contract just for a particular name or for a bunch of legal gibberish, they contracted for a particular slot in the evening lineup. They understood the client's goals, recognized the potential risk, and dealt with both in the contract in a clear, unambiguous manner that withstood a serious challenge.

Crack open a bottle of champagne, Patty Glaser and Leigh Brecheen, and charge it to Conan's account. You earned it.

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As I’ve written before, health care is “one of the ugliest businesses in America.” Health care litigation is often just as contentious.

Today’s example comes from Robotics v. Deviedma, No. 09-cv-3552, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112077 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2009), which denied in part and granted in part Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

The facts:

Health Robotics, S.r.L. ("HRSRL") is an Italian company that designs, develops, markets and licences robotic medical preparation products. Plaintiff, Devon Robotics, signed two agreements with HRSRL for the distribution of two robotic medication preparation products for hospitals and health care facilities, i.v.Station and CytoCare. … At the time these agreements were negotiated and signed, Mr. DeViedma, one of the Defendants, served as General Counsel for HRSRL. These contracts between Devon Robotics and HRSRL contained an identical arbitration clause which requires all disputes arising from the agreement to be arbitrated in Switzerland.

Plaintiffs claim that on March 1, 2009, Mr. DeViedma was hired as Devon Robotics' Chief Operating Officer ("COO"). In his position as COO, DeViedma was solely responsible for the management of sales, marketing, support and installation of CytoCare robots on Devon's behalf. All of Devon Robotics' employees reported directly to DeViedma. Additionally, Mr. DeViedma served as the primary contact between Devon and HRSRL.

* * *

In December 2008, Devon Robotics began negotiating a contract with McKesson Corporation, another defendant, which would give McKesson the right to distribute CytoCare within a certain territory in the United States. DeViedma played a key role in negotiating the contract as Devon Robotics' COO. On December 22, 2008, Devon Robotics and McKesson entered into a Confidential Disclosure and Non-Competition Agreement prohibiting McKesson from divulging or using any confidential information for any purpose other than analyzing its deal with Devon. After executing the agreement, McKesson engaged in extensive due diligence. According to Plaintiffs, around March 2009, McKesson and Devon reached an oral agreement regarding the material terms of the Exclusive Distribution, Licensing, Services and Support Agreement. The only thing that was needed to finalize the agreement was to allow McKesson's due diligence of HRSRL in Italy. However, DeViedma, in his capacity as an officer of HRSRL, refused to permit McKesson representatives to visit Italy and complete the due diligence.

Later, after McKesson and Devon Robotics failed to come to an agreement, HRSRL terminated the CytoCare Agreement with Devon Robotics on July 30, 2009. Then on August 10, 2009, McKesson and HRSRL entered into a five year agreement granting McKesson distribution rights with regard to CytoCare in various areas in North America which had previously been controlled by Devon Robotics.

Naturally, Devon sued everyone, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, tortious interference with current and prospective contractual relations, defamation, and conspiracy.

Defendants first moved under Rule 12(b)(1) to dismiss on the grounds that the Devon/HRSRL agreements compelled arbitration:

[A]s this Court noted in Miron, the presumption of arbitrability has never been extended to claims by or against non-signatories. Miron v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 342 F. Supp. 2d 324 (E.D. Pa. 2004); see, e.g., Medtronic Ave Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 367 F.3d 147, 100 Fed. Appx. 865 (3rd Cir. 2004) (quoting Sweet Dreams Unlimited, Inc. v. Dial-A-Mattress International, Ltd., 1 F.3d 639, 642 (7th Cir. 1993)). Because arbitration is a matter of contract, exceptional circumstances must apply before a court will impose a contractual agreement to arbitrate on a non-contracting party. AT&T Tech., 475 U.S. at 650. However, as this Court again noted in Miron, there are five established theories under which non-signatories may be bound to the arbitration agreements of others: (1) incorporation by reference; (2) assumption; (3) agency; (4) veil-piercing/alter ego; and (5) estoppel. Thomson-CFS v. American Arbitration Association, 64 F.3d 773, 776 (2d Cir. 1995). Furthermore, where the party seeking enforcement of the arbitration clause is a willing non-signatory an alternative theory of reverse estoppel may apply. Thomson-CFS, 64 F.3d at 779.

The only theory under which DeViedma may be able to enforce the arbitration clause is the alternative estoppel theory. The alternative estoppel theory binds a signatory to arbitrate at a non-signatory's insistence where there is an obvious and close nexus between the non-signatories and the contract or the contracting parties. E.I. DuPont, 269 F.3d at 199. The two-part test for alternative estoppel requires a court to determine whether there is a 'close relationship between the entities involved,' and examine the 'relationship of the alleged wrongs to the nonsignatory's obligations and duties in the contract.' E.I. DuPont, 269 F.3d at 199 (citing Thomson-CSF, 64 F.3d at 779); see also Bannett, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 360. To satisfy the second part of the test, the non-signatory seeking enforcement of an arbitration agreement must show that the claims against them are 'intimately founded in and intertwined with' the underlying obligations of the contract to which they were not a party. E.I. DuPont, 269 F.3d at 199 (citing Thomson-CSF, 64 F.3d at 779).

The essential question in situations such as these is whether plaintiffs would have an independent right to recover against the non-signatory defendants even if the contract containing the arbitration clause were void. 'The plaintiff's actual dependence on the underlying contract in making out the claim against the nonsignatory defendant is therefore always the sine qua non of an appropriate situation for applying equitable estoppel.' Price Plaintiffs v. Humana Ins. Co., 285 F.3d 971, 976 (11th Cir. 2002) (rev'd on other grounds, PacifiCare Health Sys. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401, 123 S. Ct. 1531, 155 L. Ed. 2d 578 (2002)). In In re Humana, the Eleventh Circuit held that equitable estoppel was inappropriate where plaintiffs brought a RICO suit against a non-signatory defendant, because the RICO claims were based on a statutory remedy apart from any available remedy for breach of the underlying contract. In re Humana, 285 F.3d at 976."

Robotics v. Deviedma, No. 09-cv-3552, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112077, at *11–13 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2009). Three strikes, one hit for the defendants:

It is not proper to dismiss this claim in favor of arbitration because the breach of fiduciary duty claim does not arise out of the various agreements between Devon Robotics and HRSRL. …

Plaintiffs' claim of tortious interference with current and prospective contractual relations is not subject to the arbitration clauses in the various agreements between Devon Robotics and HRSRL. Count V of Plaintiffs claim is based on DeViedma's alleged interference with various validation contracts. These contracts are not intimately intertwined with the i.v.Station and CytoCare agreements. …

Plaintiffs' claim of defamation is not subject to the arbitration clauses in the various agreements between Devon Robotics and HRSRL. …

To the extent that Plaintiffs' claim of conspiracy is based on the termination of the CytoCare agreement, their claim is dismissed. Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges that the Defendants conspired to wrongfully terminate the CytoCare agreement. The determination as to whether the agreement was wrongfully terminated will be intimately related to the terms of the agreement. Additionally, there is an extremely close nexus between the non-signatory parties and Devon Robotics.

Id. at 13–16.

Defendants next moved under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss the claims on the merits, with three strikes (on the breach of fiduciary duty, tortious interference with current contractual relations, and defamation claims) and hits on the rest. Most notably, “Devon Robotics has pled that it had several validation contracts with different hospitals, that DeViedma purposefully interfered with those contracts for his own benefit, without justification, and that as a result, Devon lost substantial amounts of business. These pleadings are sufficient to establish a claim for tortious interference with existing contractual relations.”

Though the Court “grant[ed] Plaintiffs leave to amend their tortious interference with prospective contractual relations to include any claims related to the McKesson negotiations,” it added the caveat that “Although the Court granted leave to amend the tortious interference claim and Plaintiffs may choose to attempt to amend their conspiracy claim, it should be noted that the Court likely lacks jurisdiction over any underlying torts asserted in support of the conspiracy claim based on the CytoCare or i.v.Station agreements due to the arbitration clauses in the agreements.”

A big win for Devon Robotics and a guide for future plaintiffs — in the face of an arguably applicable arbitration agreement, they kept alive the core of their suit: breach of fiduciary duty, tortious interference, and defamation.

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[Updated to clarify a distinction between securities suits and investment company act suits.]

This week, the Supreme Court heard arguments in Jones v. Harris. Briefly, the Oakmark complex of mutual funds "hired" Harris Associates as investment advisers, paying Harris 1% (per year) of the first $2 billion of the fund’s assets, 0.9% of the next $1 billion, 0.8% of the next $2 billion, and 0.75% of anything over $5 billion. I write "hired" because the situation is murky: Harris is directly affiliated with Oakmark. Importantly, the fee charged by Harris to Oakmark is more than double the fee it charges unaffiliated mutual funds.

Plaintiffs are investors in Oakmark funds who sued Harris under a variety of claims, including a claim that Harris's fees were "excessive," in violation of Section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act.

Section 36(b), which was added in 1970, is almost poetic in its ambiguity:

For the purposes of this subsection, the investment adviser of a registered investment company shall be deemed to have a fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of compensation for services, or of payments of a material nature, paid by such registered investment company, or by the security holders thereof, to such investment adviser or any affiliated person of such investment adviser. An action may be brought under this subsection by the Commission, or by a security holder of such registered investment company on behalf of such company, against such investment adviser . . . . With respect to any such action the following provisions shall apply:

(1) It shall not be necessary to allege or prove that any defendant engaged in personal misconduct, and the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving a breach of fiduciary duty.

(2) In any such action approval by the board of directors of such investment company of such compensation or payments, or of contracts or other arrangements providing for such compensation or payments, and ratification or approval of such compensation or payments, or of contracts or other arrangements providing for such compensation or payments, by the shareholders of such investment company, shall be given such consideration by the court as is deemed appropriate under all the circumstances. . . .

In essence, the statute says only that the plaintiff can recover against the investment adviser by "proving a breach of fiduciary duty." Subsections (1) and (2) fill in a little detail — i.e., the investor need not prove "personal misconduct" and the court shall "consider" board of directors and/or shareholder ratification — but that's it.

Congress might as well have written, "investors can sue if investment advisers do something bad, but 'bad' doesn't necessarily mean really bad."

Twenty-seven years ago, faced with the same opaque language, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals came up with its own standard for "excessive fee" claims:

[T]he test is essentially whether the fee schedule represents a charge within the range of what would have been negotiated at arm’s-length in the light of all of the surrounding circumstances.

[and]

[t]o be guilty of a violation of §36(b) . . . the adviser-manager must charge a fee that is so disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable relationship to the services rendered and could not have been the product of arm’s-length bargaining.

Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc., 694 F.2d 923, 928 (2d Cir. 1982).

Last year, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals came up with a different standard for "excessive fee" claims:

Having had another chance to study this question, we now disapprove the Gartenberg approach. A fiduciary duty differs from rate regulation. A fiduciary must make full disclosure and play no tricks but is not subject to a cap on compensation. The trustees (and in the end investors, who vote with their feet and dollars), rather than a judge or jury, determine how much advisory services are worth. ...

Federal securities laws, of which the Investment Company Act is one component, work largely by requiring disclosure and then allowing price to be set by competition in which investors make their own choices. Plaintiffs do not contend that Harris Associates pulled the wool over the eyes of the disinterested trustees or otherwise hindered their ability to negotiate a favorable price for advisory services. The fees are not hidden from investors—and the Oakmark funds’ net return has attracted new investment rather than driving investors away.

In short, the Seventh Circuit held that, regardless of what the Investment Company Act says, investment advisers don't have a fiduciary duty to investment companies; instead, they're held to the same fraud and misrepresentation standards as total strangers.

The Seventh Circuit opinion was remarkable not only because it eviscerated the Investment Company Act — which clearly does not require personal misconduct like "pulling the wool over [investors'] eyes" — but also because it produced a sharp disagreement on the underlying economics between Judges Easterbrook and Posner, two of the most notable adherents to the conservative "law and economics" doctrine.

It goes almost without saying that there are reasonable arguments in favor of both the investors and the investment advisers. The statute is ambiguous; there's no clear answer for what the standard "should" be in these cases, but there's also little doubt that something has gone awry with investment adviser fees in the context of affiliated mutual funds.

I write "almost," however, because Professor John Coates of Harvard Law School wants nothing to do with reasonable arguments:

How can such cases make it to the highest court in the land? Plaintiffs’ lawyers are able to file these cases because of three features of the US legal system. First, investors are dispersed, and cannot easily work together to protect their own interests. Collective action costs are often identified as a reason that investors cannot protect themselves from predatory institutions – and sometimes that is true. But those same costs also make it impossible for investors to control the lawyers who nominally represent them. Investors cannot stop lawyers from using weak or even frivolous claims to extract rich legal fees. Nor need lawyers even listen to investors with the most at stake in a case. Unlike the advisers, the lawyers are not required to negotiate with independent trustees, or to submit their lawsuit for approval to the investors. Once lawyers have appointed themselves as investor guardians, they face little competition – again, unlike the advisers, who compete with other advisers to attract new investments.

In Professor Coates' world, a lawyer can, on her own, file a "weak or even frivolous" case and "extract rich legal fees" without any involvement of the actual investors.

What a great racket! Lawyers must be filing these cases all the time and collecting big fat checks for nothing.

Or maybe fewer than 200 securities class actions are filed every year, and maybe only half of them settle for any amount, with the other half of investors and their lawyers recovering nothing for their losses.

Since Coates has never represented any investors in a lawsuit, much less represented a class of investors on a contingent fee, I suppose he needs a few reminders on how the process works.

"Jones" in Jones v. Harris is an investor, not a lawyer. Only investors can bring lawsuits and they can only win if they prove every element of their case. Like I wrote above, most of these cases are sent to the rubbish heap without any payment.

If the investors are in the lucky half that survive years of litigating over dismissal (for reference, Jones v. Harris was filed five years ago and is still at the dismissal stage), the court will carefully analyze which investor should represent the class as the lead plaintiff, giving preference to the investors with the "most at stake in a case." Nonetheless, every investor with a stake in the case, even if not the lead plaintiff, can participate in, and object to any part of, the process, including any settlement and any award of attorneys' fees.

Unsurprisingly, three-quarters of successful investor lawsuits are lead by large institutional investors (p. 27) such as public and union pensions, the ones with "the most at stake in the case."

Coates thus has it backwards: it's not "impossible for investors to control the lawyers who nominally represent them," it's impossible for lawyers to bring and win a lawsuit without the participation and support of the investors, particularly the ones with "the most at stake."

Indeed, in most potential investor class action cases, it's impossible for the lawyers to collect any fee at all: you never know when a court will read an act that says "it shall not be necessary to allege or prove that any defendant engaged in personal misconduct" and nonetheless require the investor prove personal misconduct. Based on this week's oral argument, it looks like the Supreme Court will do just that, leaving the investors and their lawyers with nothing after five years of litigation.

So much for a "rich legal fee." And that's the greatest irony: in the nearly forty years since Section 36(b) was passed, not one single court (see pp. 3–4) has ever held an investment adviser's fee was "excessive."

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The Wall Street Journal's Law Blog points us to a WSJ story on the absurd language used in copyright contracts these days:

Decked out in sequined black and gold dresses, Anne Harrison and the other women in her Bulgarian folk-singing group were lined up to try out for NBC's "America's Got Talent" TV show when they noticed peculiar wording in the release papers they were asked to sign.

Any of their actions that day last February, the contract said, could be "edited, in all media, throughout the universe, in perpetuity."

She and the other singers, many of whom are librarians in the Washington, D.C., area, briefly contemplated whether they should give away the rights to hurtling their images and voices across the galaxies forever. Then, like thousands of other contestants, they signed their names.

...

The terms of use listed on Starwars.com, where people can post to message boards among other things, tell users that they give up the rights to any content submissions "throughout the universe and/or to incorporate it in other works in any form, media or technology now known or hereafter developed."

Lucasfilm Ltd., Star Wars creator George Lucas's entertainment company that runs the site, said the language is standard in Hollywood.

"But, to be honest with you, we have had very few cases of people trying to exploit rights on other planets," says Lynne Hale, a Lucasfilm spokeswoman.

In a May 15, 2008, "expedition agreement" between JWM Productions LLC, a film-production company, and Odyssey Marine Exploration Inc., a shipwreck-exploration outfit, JWM seeks the rights to footage from an Odyssey expedition. The contract covers rights "in any media, whether now known or hereafter devised, or in any form whether now known or hereafter devised, an unlimited number of times throughout the universe and forever, including, but not limited to, interactive television, CD-ROMs, computer services and the Internet."

It reminds me of a draft settlement I received not too long ago that, notwithstanding the statute of limitations, required my client release all claims "from the beginning of the world until the present." Just for fun, I negotiated that down to "from the dawn of mankind."

Ken Adams, the blogosphere expert on contract language (and who is interviewed in the article), blogged about the same problem nearly three years ago, and updated his post today to note:

The phrase occurs most often in contracts in which a consultant or employee assigns to a company all rights to any intellectual property the consultant or employee develops in the course of providing services under the contract. An example: "Employee hereby irrevocably assigns, licenses and grants to Company, throughout the universe, in perpetuity, all rights, if any, of Employee to ...." In that context, saying "all rights" is entirely comprehensive; adding "throughout the universe" constitutes needless elaboration.

Indeed, making your contract apply to "all rights ... throughout the universe" could be worse than applying to "all rights," because it redefines an unambiguous word and makes it more likely that other ambiguous parts of the contract will be interpreted against whoever inserted the "throughout the universe" language.

"All" means "all." "All rights... throughout the universe" means "all" with a caveat. When faced with unambiguous contract terms (e.g., "all") that are specifically defined by the parties (e.g., "throughout the universe"), a court will ask itself, why did someone try to further specify the unambiguous term?

The court will then presume there must have been some reason for the additional language and try to figure that reason out. The danger of needless elaboration like "throughout the universe" is that the court will view additional language as narrowing the unambiguous terms, which is usually not what the party demanding the additional language wanted.

Moreover, the court will presume that, if one party keeps adding language to "clarify" the meaning of general words (such as "all"), then any ambiguity in the contract should be interpreted against that party, because that party was the one with the most control over the contract's language.

In the contexts above, those distinctions are probably irrelevant. But, as Adams notes, "it’s symptomatic of the broader dysfunction in contract language." It's also a bad habit: once you become comfortable with this type of ridiculous language redefining the word "all," how do you know if the ambiguity will stop there?

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I have no problem criticizing Bank of America for deceptive conduct or blaming Wachtell for the failure of a legal stategy, but there's nothing obviously wrong with this:

Eric Roth, a litigation partner at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, apparently was telling the Bank of America Corp. leadership one story about how difficult it would be to escape from the merger with Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc., while singing quite a different tune to the federal government.

E-mails from Roth and in-house lawyers at the bank were among documents released last week from the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, which is investigating the merger. Roth and Bank of America representatives did not return calls for comment on this story.

The e-mails show that early on the morning of Dec. 19 Roth advised the bank's chief executive, Ken Lewis, and its interim general counsel, Brian Moynihan, on how difficult and financially risky it would be to try to invoke a so-called MAC -- or material adverse change -- clause, which would allow the bank to get out of the merger with Merrill.

But another e-mail from associate general counsel Teresa Brenner to Moynihan, sent several hours later and on the same day as Roth's e-mail, says, "Eric made a very strong case as to why there was a MAC" during a conference call with some officials from the Federal Reserve.

The e-mails appear to confirm previous Corporate Counsel stories that the bank was telling federal regulators that it wanted to declare the MAC, even though its own lawyers and leaders knew that legally it probably could not succeed. If the bank were to make public its MAC threat, government regulators have said Merrill would have collapsed, causing severe damage to the shaky U.S. financial system at the time.

Although it's not a given that the Rules of Professional Conduct would apply to an argument before the Federal Reserve, let's assume that, by way of Rule 3.9, all the basic duties of merit, candor and fairness apply.

Under those rules, there's nothing wrong with advocating on behalf of your client an argument you believe "probably could not succeed." There are two sides to every story, and at least two interpretations of every legal issue. The United States uses an adversarial legal system precisely so that these stories and interpretations can be fully developed, critiqued, and challenged.

Indeed, it's clear the Federal Reserve's lawyers knew how weak Bank of America's case was:

Brenner's e-mail states that all questions other than one came from a "prickly" Thomas Baxter Jr., general counsel of the New York Federal Reserve Bank. The other question came from Scott Alvarez, general counsel to the Federal Reserve Board in Washington. Baxter "pointed out that there had never been a successful MAC case before," the e-mail says, but Roth countered "that this one essentially could be the first" because of the magnitude of Merrill's losses

Just as the NY Fed's lawyer had no duty to say if he thought the Bank of America / Merrill Lynch merger could become the first successful material adverse change case, Bank of America's lawyer had no duty to say if he thought Bank of America was unlikely to win. Lawyers have no duty to reveal what they believe are the strengths and weaknesses of their case, nor how likely they believe it is that their client will prevail.

There is, however, an ethical issue lurking deeper under the surface. There is a dispute (and shareholder class action) as to when, exactly, Bank of America learned of Merrill Lynch's losses. The executives at Merrill Lynch have suggested that BoA knew of the losses before it consummated the merger. If that's true, and Bank of America's lawyers knew it, then they're in a tighter spot, since the essence of a "material adverse change" is the change in circumstances after the merger consummation. One wonders how a lawyer could in good faith argue for a "material adverse change" arising from circumstances known before the merger.

But that's an issue for another day.

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Really, you should:

The New York Court of Appeals held Pepper Hamilton had a duty to disclose in advance to the insurers the firm's potential involvement in litigation concerning fraudulent loan securitization activities by its client, Student Finance Corp., according to a New York Law Journal article reprinted in New York Lawyer (reg. req.). The court applied Pennsylvania law in the case, which the parties agreed was controlling.

...

But the undisclosed, foreseeable risk of a SFC-related claim against Pepper Hamilton and partner W. Roderick Gagné, even though they had not been involved in SFC's wrongdoing, violated a "prior knowledge" coverage-exclusion clause in the indemnity policies, the Court of Appeals held. Hence, the carriers are not required to indemnify the firm and Gagné in SFC-related claims.

"Given the law firm defendants' role in the securitization of the loans and Gagné's close involvement with SFC, a reasonable attorney with the law firm defendant's knowledge should have anticipated the possibility of a lawsuit, particularly when millions of dollars may have been lost from activities of which they were aware," writes Judge Theodore Jones Jr. in the court's unanimous 6-0 decision.

In 2002, when the law firm applied for the excess coverage, Gagné told Pepper Hamilton's general counsel, in response to a question about the insurance application, that he knew of two suits related to SFC transactions, the ruling recounts. He was, he told the GC, "not certain" about whether the law firm might be joined in the litigation in the future.

I don't fault Pepper Hamilton for trying, but, really, if there is a multi-million-dollar lawsuit out there related to a fraud perpetrated by a client whose business you were deep into, you should probably tell your insurer about it.

The context, too, was important: SFC went bankrupt and the bankruptcy trustee started looking to third-parties for recovery.

Want to guess where bankruptcy trustees start first?

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At Legal Ethics Blog, Professor Andrew Perlman posts a hypothetical:

I was recently a panelist at the Association of Corporate Counsel's annual conference, and someone in the audience posed an interesting hypothetical.

Imagine that in-house counsel is conducting an internal investigation and speaks with an employee whose conduct may have been unlawful. 

Let me interrupt to point out that the above hypothetical is one of the classical examples used to teach professional responsibility to law students. Employees are frequently confused about the role of the company's lawyers in internal investigations, and frequently do not understand that the lawyer there represents solely the company and not the employees themselves. The context of these interviews — typically involving nothing more than the lawyer coming into the employee's workplace — heightens the likelihood of confusion.

As such, corporate lawyers are under a duty (under Model Rule 1.13(f)) to explain the distinction whenever they deal with directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other corporate constituents.

But Perlman's hypothetical is a bit different:

The employee does not have her own counsel, so the in-house lawyer makes clear to the employee that the lawyer represents the company and not the employee herself. So far, so good.

But now let's imagine that the employee is reluctant to speak with the lawyer. The lawyer then says to the employee, "You are subject to the company's employment policies, which require you to speak with me about this matter."

Several audience members were convinced that such a statement was both commonplace and ethically permissible. It was my position that such a statement, which appears to be giving legal advice to an unrepresented (and potentially adverse) party regarding her obligations under the employment policy, could be unethical under Rule 4.3. What do you think?

Here's the whole text of Rule 4.3:

In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested. When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer’s role in the matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding. The lawyer shall not give legal advice to an unrepresented person, other than the advice to secure counsel, if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the interests of such a person are or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the interests of the client.

It's an interesting question. As I responded in the comments [with minor edits here], I think it comes down to context. If the context has made it clear to the employee that the employee's interests are, or could be adverse, then there is not much problem in the lawyer advancing the views of the company, since the concern about "misunderstanding" expressed by the rule is inapplicable.

If, however, the impression created is one of a neutral investigator, then it seems to be legal advice given to an adverse unrepresented party.

The precise wording also creates a problem for the attorney, because they did not merely assert that the company could do if the employee did not cooperate (e.g., terminate and/or sue them), but instead outright told the employee what their legal obligations were under the employment agreement. That's the essence of legal advice.

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In a comment on Overlawyered, Ted Frank points to his draft paper (with Marie Gryphon), Negotiating in the Shadow of 'Bad Faith' Refusal to Settle: A Game Theory Model of Medical Malpractice Pre-Trial Settlements and Insurance Limits:

Recent empirical studies of Texas data by Hyman et al, Zeiler et al, and Silver et al suggest that insurance limits affect settlements of medical malpractice cases. Writing separately, Silver argues that insurance limits act as a de facto cap on malpractice payouts, that plaintiffs are being underpaid as a result, and that therefore legislative caps on damages are unnecessary. But this hypothesis is inconsistent with the data, which indicates that forty-seven percent of cases in which plaintiffs obtain verdicts above policy limits are subsequently settled above policy limits. We propose to reconcile the data by accounting for the effects that third-party causes of action for alleged bad-faith refusal to settle — known in Texas as a Stowers action — have on pretrial settlement negotiations. If an insurer in Texas is presented with a settlement offer within insurance limits, refuses to settle, and the plaintiff wins an award greater than insurance limits, the plaintiff is entitled to sue the insurer for the full damages amount, plus punitive damages, for refusal to settle. In this paper, we explore the game theory of medical malpractice settlement negotiations in the shadow of Stowers.

Based on their (admittedly, and necessarily, simplistic) model of malpractice settlements, they run a Monte Carlo simulation.

It's not a bad idea, but they've missed one of the most important factors in settlement — the willingness and ability of the plaintiff to fight through years of risky litigation, trials, appeals and bankruptcy, where they must succeed 100% of the time to recover — and haven't shown why the existence of third-party bad faith lawsuits (i.e., those brought by the plaintiff against the defendant's insurer) contribute more towards settlement than the existence of first-party bad faith lawsuits (i.e., those brought by the defendant against their insurer).

Let's start with the biggest missing element from their model:

Silver, et al. suggests that there are polite reasons not to seek more than [the insurance policy limits]. But this hypothesis contradicts both what we know about the incentives of attorneys and the empirical data. Are we to believe that trial lawyers, out of the goodness of their heart, refuse to seek more than [insurance policy limits]? This seems improbable: the insured doctor is likely to have substantial assets, trusts provide limited protection, and the plaintiff attorney’s fiduciary duty to her client requires her to zealously pursue the doctor’s assets.

There are indeed "goodness of heart" considerations: it's psychologically easier to take an insurance company's reserves — which have been collected and maintained for the purpose of compensating injured plaintiffs — than to take an individual's personal assets.

But let's put that aside and focus on the money. Keep in mind that, in most circumstances, the insurer can't just pay their policy limits and wave goodbye to the defendant while the plaintiff goes after the defendant's assets. If the defendant doesn't want to pay any of their own money, then the insurance company will keep defending them to a full and final conclusion, without paying the plaintiff a dime in the meantime.

Most often, the settlement of an above-policy-limits claim at policy-limits is not due to the goodness of anyone's heart: it's the rational choice between either settling at insurance policy limits and walking away with the money now, or refusing the insurance money and then chasing the doctor's assets for years (with five-or-six figure additional costs) through trial, appeals, re-trials, bankruptcy, bankruptcy appeals, and bankruptcy discharge, which often pays unsecured creditors a fraction of their claim's value. And don't forget: the plaintiff has to be successful in each and every one of those proceedings.

If the insurer actually tenders their full policy limits, then my "fiduciary duty" to the client typically compels me to recommend the client take the policy limits now, rather than starve themselves for years and endure the substantial risks of running the entire civil legal gauntlet — where they must succeed 100% of the time to recover anything — for a theoretical shot at more.

To their credit, the authors admit at the end that they haven't included these factors:

This is still a relatively simple model: it assumes instantaneous and frictionless rulings, rather than an expensive process that may take several years with substantial fees for attorneys and medical expert witnesses. We assume that the trial court’s judgment is 100% accurate, and that there will be no appeal. We therefore do not consider the issue of post-trial settlement. In real life, the risk that a favorable judgment will be struck on appeal one reason why so many large judgments are settled so seemingly favorably, but it is impossible to estimate the size of this effect without qualitative data that the Hyman “haircut” study does not have.

Trials take years. We make no effort to compare the value of a settlement in the hand with a judgment several years in the future that is stayed by appeal. On the other hand, Texas has relatively generous post-judgment interest rates with a floor of 5%. Expanding the model to consider the time-value of money from early settlement would be useful in adjudging the merits and effects of the so-called “early offers” reform. As Zeiler notes, such time-value can also result in settlements below policy limits by virtue of aggressive negotiating by insurers.

Those two economic issues — the risk of losing on appeal (and/or retrial) and the time value of money — create a massive disincentive against attempting to pursue assets beyond the insurance policy limits. Post-judgment interest is generally irrelevant in the context of cases with damages/judgments larger than insurance proceeds: unless the plaintiff wants to go all the way through appeals, retrials, judgment execution, and bankruptcy, then, regardless of any post-judgment interest, the plaintiff's recovery is still effectively capped at the insurance policy limits.

That's the first problem: the failure to consider the effect of the willingness and ability of the plaintiff to fight through years of risky litigation on settlement.

Here's the second problem: the authors "add a Stowers factor S, which is equal to expected Stowers recovery given a victory at the underlying medical malpractice trial" but don't say how they calculate S. More importantly, though, they don't explain why a third-party bad faith recovery would be expected to be any larger than the first-party bad faith claim available to the doctor if she believes the insurer did not handle the case properly.

When an insurer worries about a potential bad faith claim, they're not just worried about the plaintiff suing them. Indeed, they're usually more worried about the defendant suing them.

Like Dr. Woo:

Robert C. Woo is a Seattle-area dentist. An online guide praises his "first-class service" and "painless procedures." It is likely that Tina Alberts, his former assistant, disagrees.

Alberts cared for pot-bellied pigs, a frequent topic for office banter. Dr. Woo enjoyed taunting her with accounts of his boar-hunting trips, and a picture of a skinned pig hanging from a hook. He predicted a similar fate for Walter, her beloved pet pig. Dr. Woo informs us that this was all part of a "friendly working environment."

When Alberts required surgery to replace two teeth, Dr. Woo saw an opportunity to cement this self-impression of bonhomie. Once she was completely sedated, he halted the agreed procedure, and began a new one. Replacing her teeth required the temporary installation of standard false teeth. Dr. Woo had secretly ordered a second set of temporary teeth, shaped like boar tusks. Removing her oxygen mask, he inserted the tusks and - we must assume this was part of the friendly working environment - took photographs of her with her eyes and mouth pried open. Returning at last to his professional duties, he removed the tusks and inserted the correct temporary teeth.

A month later, Dr. Woo's staff presented Alberts with the pictures at her birthday party. The fun-loving Woo described them as a "trophy" to take home. Home she went, never to return. Instead, she sued Dr. Woo for battery, invasion of privacy, medical malpractice, and a host of related claims.

Dr. Woo's insurance company refused to defend him in Alberts' lawsuit. Dr. Woo settled the case on his own for $250,000, then sued his insurance company.

And won:

Because his insurer should have defended him, Dr. Woo recovered the $250,000 he had paid Alberts. But he also claimed emotional distress due to his insurer's abandonment. Despite "the absence of any medical, psychiatric or expert testimony" attesting these injuries, a jury awarded him $750,000, which suggests the rather even quality of justice throughout the judicial system of Washington State. And naturally, Fireman's had to pay for Dr. Woo's legal costs.

The end result was exactly what Ted Frank and Marie Gryphon's paper is supposed to focus on: a situation in which an insurance company was forced to pay more than the policy limits for a malpractice claim. Yet, in Dr. Woo's case, the third-party Stowers action had nothing to do with it — it was a purely first-party claim brought by the doctor. 

I hope there's more study down this field; the world of litigation and defense & indemnity insurance is ripe for rigorous game theory analysis. But it needs to be as thorough and rigorous as the study of any other economic situation.

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Via Atrios, we have Stanley Fish's recent NYTimes column, The Rise and Fall of Academic Abstention:

As recently as 1979, legal academics Virginia Nordin and Harry Edwards were able to say that “historically American courts have adhered fairly consistently to the doctrine of academic abstention in order to avoid excessive judicial oversight of academic institutions” (Higher Education and the Law). Academic abstention is the doctrine (never formally promulgated) that courts should defer to colleges and universities when it comes to matters like promotions, curricula, admission policies, grading, tenure, etc. The reasoning is that courts lack the competence to monitor academic behavior; they should get out of the way and let the professionals do the job. “Courts are particularly ill-equipped,” Chief Justice Rehnquist declared in 1978, “to evaluate academic performance.” (Board of Curators of the University of Missouri v. Horowitz)

In 2009, courts still pay lip service to this doctrine but in practice, Amy Gajda tells us in her terrific new book, “The Trials of Academe,” they now boldly go where their predecessors feared to tread. Once, “if a student or faculty member had the temerity to bring a grievance to court, is was likely to be bounced out in short order.” Now, however, “courts feel free to enter . . . from the ground up, parceling out the right and obligations of each disputant down to the last dollar.” Indeed, “litigation and ‘rights talk’ have permeated every crease and wrinkle of academic life.”

Fish concludes,

When I began teaching in 1962 at the University of California in Berkeley, I asked older colleagues about the decorums and rules of the classroom. In response, I was given the Myron Brightfield rule. Brightfield was then a very senior member of the department. His rule (and I paraphrase) was, When you close the door, there’s nothing they can do to you. Those were the days, and they had their injustices as well as their advantages. Now we have justice, or at least the demand for justice, all the time and it may, Gajda suggests, be killing us.

Rubbish.

Fish highlights several cases to make his argument-by-anecdote. Let's look at his "favorite:"

My favorite (and Gajda’s, too) involves a student in osteopathic medicine who, after failing an important rotation, was dismissed because “he didn’t have the basic understanding that he should have as a fourth-year medical student.” The student sued on the grounds that he had been promised a degree by a phrase in a student handbook that described the program he was enrolled in as “a four-year curriculum leading to the DO degree.”

Anyone with the slightest familiarity with the way universities work would know that ‘”leading to” included the qualification “provided that the requirements for graduating were met” — a medical degree is not equivalent to the certificate you get for having completed six weeks of a summer camp — but the courts were persuaded to a more literal (and perverse) reading and awarded the plaintiff a partial tuition reimbursement. But he wanted more and he got it by arguing that he should receive an amount commensurate with the earnings he would have accumulated had the “promised” degree been conferred. Jurors ordered the medical school to pay him $4.3 million.

The case is Sharick v. Southeastern Univ. of the Health Scis., 780 So. 2d 136, (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2000).

Indeed, as Fish says, anyone with "the slightest familiarity" with academia knows that the award of a degree is predicated on meeting the school's requirements — except, of course, for the school in question, which argued the student "contracted with [the school] solely to provide an education in exchange for payment of tuition." Id., 139 (emphasis added).

Got that? The school's argument was that, regardless of whether the student met the requirements, all the school contracted to do was "provide an education" and not actually award the degree. That is to say, the school argued that it was free to destroy the student's career for any reason, a bad reason, or no reason, so long as it had "educated" him in a way the student couldn't possibly use without the actual degree. The court disagreed. So do I. So, too, apparently, does Fish.

Contrary to Fish and Gadja's description, the student didn't allege the school "promised" a degree but didn't give it because he failed, he alleged that "Southeastern's decision to dismiss him [two months before his graduation] was arbitrary, capricious, and/or lacking any discernable rational basis." Id., 138. It's the only way he could recover under Florida law, in light of the "academic abstention" doctrine that Fish claims has been "increasingly narrowed to the point that it is in danger of vanishing."

A jury agreed with the student. In fact, the evidence against the school was so overwhelming that Southeastern didn't even appeal the jury's findings. The school only appealed the trial judge's rejection of their ridiculous and insulting "solely to provide an education" argument.

Let me tell you, as a plaintiff it's not easy to prove "arbitrary and capricious" behavior. It's one of the highest bars a plaintiff can ever face, and typically results in the plaintiff losing. Do you have any doubt that, if Southeastern had any credible defense at all, it would have appealed the jury's findings? All they had to show was some reason — any reason — justifying the student's dismissal and the verdict would have been overturned.

Yet, they didn't even try, presumably because they knew they couldn't. Rather than making things right, however, they forced him into over fifteen years of litigation, litigation which is still going on. See the most recent appeal, Nova Southeastern Univ. of the Health Scis., Inc. v. Sharick, 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 12494 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. Aug. 26, 2009)

How are we to take Fish or Gadja seriously when their "favorite" example shows why academic institutions should not be above the law?

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Hizook.com, "the robotics news portal," relates an unfortunate incident:

Hizook.com has received an amazing flurry of activity in the last 10 days.  We made it to the front page of Slashdot (twice!),  Reddit (twice!), Engadget, Makezine, Hacker News (etc, etc) -- amassing well over 100,000 pageviews!  During the height of the activity, we received an email indicating that Hizook's Google Adsense account was being disabled.  There was no further explanation, no warning, no attempt made to resolve the situation -- in fact, our only recourse was to fill out a web form and hope for a prompt response.  Apparently that is indicative of Google's customer service.  The remainder of our account is chronicled below.  But, as extremely loyal Google users (Search, Gmail, Google Voice, Google Calendar, formerly Adsense, someday Adwords) and Google share holders, we are simply... aghast.

Here is the entirety of the explanation provided by Google, at 11pm on Sunday night, when they unilaterally disabled the account:

Hello,

While going through our records recently, we found that your AdSense
account has posed a significant risk to our AdWords advertisers. Since
keeping your account in our publisher network may financially damage our
advertisers in the future, we've decided to disable your account.

Please understand that we consider this a necessary step to protect the
interests of both our advertisers and our other AdSense publishers. We
realize the inconvenience this may cause you, and we thank you in advance
for your understanding and cooperation.

If you have any questions about your account or the actions we've taken,
please do not reply to this email. You can find more information by
visiting
https://www.google.com/adsense/support/bin/answer.py?answer=57153.

Sincerely,

The Google AdSense Team

I've made the front page of Hacker News twice -- it is indeed quite a traffic spike, and, if I advertised, I would be very upset if my advertiser torpedoed me without notice at the height of the traffic.

So, can they sue?

Let's look at the Google Adsense Terms and Conditions:

9.      No Warranty. GOOGLE MAKES NO WARRANTY, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION WITH RESPECT TO ADVERTISING, LINKS, SEARCH, REFERRALS, AND OTHER SERVICES, AND EXPRESSLY DISCLAIMS THE WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF NONINFRINGEMENT, MERCHANTABILITY, AND FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR PURPOSE. TO THE EXTENT ADS, LINKS, AND SEARCH RESULTS ARE BASED ON OR DISPLAYED IN CONNECTION WITH NON-GOOGLE CONTENT, GOOGLE SHALL NOT HAVE ANY LIABILITY IN CONNECTION WITH THE DISPLAY OF SUCH ADS, LINKS, AND SEARCH RESULTS.

10. Limitations of Liability; Force Majeure. EXCEPT FOR ANY INDEMNIFICATION AND CONFIDENTIALITY OBLIGATIONS HEREUNDER OR YOUR BREACH OF ANY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND/OR PROPRIETARY INTERESTS RELATING TO THE PROGRAM, (i) IN NO EVENT SHALL EITHER PARTY BE LIABLE UNDER THIS AGREEMENT FOR ANY CONSEQUENTIAL, SPECIAL, INDIRECT, EXEMPLARY, OR PUNITIVE DAMAGES WHETHER IN CONTRACT, TORT OR ANY OTHER LEGAL THEORY, EVEN IF SUCH PARTY HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES AND NOTWITHSTANDING ANY FAILURE OF ESSENTIAL PURPOSE OF ANY LIMITED REMEDY AND (ii) GOOGLE'S AGGREGATE LIABILITY TO PUBLISHER UNDER THIS AGREEMENT FOR ANY CLAIM IS LIMITED TO THE NET AMOUNT PAID BY GOOGLE TO PUBLISHER DURING THE THREE MONTH PERIOD IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE DATE OF THE CLAIM. Each party acknowledges that the other party has entered into this Agreement relying on the limitations of liability stated herein and that those limitations are an essential basis of the bargain between the parties. Without limiting the foregoing and except for payment obligations, neither party shall have any liability for any failure or delay resulting from any condition beyond the reasonable control of such party, including but not limited to governmental action or acts of terrorism, earthquake or other acts of God, labor conditions, and power failures.

Google obviously believes the answer is "no," and wrote their contract to prohibit any suits at all.

Yet, like with most tech companies, Google's terms of service provide "This Agreement shall be governed by the laws of California." California is among the most consumer-friendly states in the nation.

So the question isn't so simple:

Under UCC § 2-719(1)(b), '[r]esort to a remedy as provided is optional unless the remedy is expressly agreed to be exclusive, in which case it is the sole remedy.' However, '[w]here circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this code.' UCC § 2-719(2). ... See id.; RRX Indus., Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc., 772 F.2d 543, 547 (1985) ('Under the Code, a plaintiff may pursue all of the remedies available for breach of contract if its exclusive or limited remedy fails of its essential purpose.').

'A limited remedy fails of its essential purpose when the circumstances existing at the time of the agreement have changed so that enforcement of the limited remedy would essentially leave plaintiff with no remedy at all.' Computerized Radiological Servs., Inc. v. Syntex Corp., 595 F. Supp. 1495, 1510 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 786 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1986) (emphasis added). This theory often is raised where a buyer seeks a refund or rescission of the original agreement, but the seller insists that repair is the only available remedy. See, e.g., Gavaldon v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 32 Cal. 4th 1246, 1259-65, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 793, 90 P.3d 752 (2004)."

Stearns v. Select Comfort Retail Corp., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48367, at *16–17 (N.D. Cal. Jun. 5, 2009).

Sure seems like Hizook is left with "no remedy at all" under the contract. It thus seems they could indeed sue for direct and consequential damages, including the lost ad revenue.

The above analysis applies to goods, rather than services, but two points weigh in Hizook's favor: first, the original RRX Indus., Inc. opinion itself found a software system to be a "good," and, second, a number of courts recognize the same analysis for service contracts, too.

Unfortunately, it's probably not worth Hizook's time or energy to sue over it -- which is why some creative Silicon Valley lawyers should be thinking about initiating a class action. Google's search engine shows 16,500 hits for "While going through our records recently, we found that your AdSense account has posed a significant risk to our AdWords advertisers."

As Bruce Schneier has written in the context of security software, liability changes everything. If AdSense users want Google to shape up, it seems they need to sue their way into it.

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Although some physicians continue to claim medical malpractice liability is the biggest problem affecting access to health care (despite the total cost of medical malpractice premiums being $0.50 for every $100 spent on health care, and despite premiums being the lowest they've been in over forty years), the real problem, as alluded to by this American College of Surgeons report, is "declining reimbursement."

That's a euphemism for one of the ugliest businesses in America.

We got a glimpse into that ugly business last week, when Bayonne Hospital Center sued Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of New Jersey (hat tip: Movin' Meat), the largest health insurer in New Jersey, with just under 4 million insureds. The press release is mind-boggling:

The complaint, filed late yesterday in the U.S. District Court in Newark, New Jersey, provides a detailed account of Horizon’s business practices which run counter to the insurer’s contractual duties to its customers, its obligations under state law and its stated commitment to the interest of public health. Some of the most offensive Horizon practices detailed in the complaint include:

• A systematic campaign discouraging patients from seeking emergency care at BHC despite it being the closest and safest option for urgent care for the residents of Bayonne
• Intimidation of patients by threatening denial of coverage if they seek treatment at BHC
• Interference with care by sending couriers to BHC to tell patients undergoing medically necessary treatments to leave BHC and seek care at a hospital that is “in network”
• Indefensible denial of claims, often while the patient is still undergoing care
• Unilateral determinations by Horizon bureaucrats that emergency room patients are medically stable enough to be discharged to home or transferred to other in-network facilities without consulting the patient's attending physician

The complaint not only details Horizon’s atrocious behavior and policies with BHC, but also exposes Horizon’s multi-billion dollar financial success at a time when New Jersey’s hospitals cannot afford to provide healthcare to the communities which they serve. The complaint also reveals Horizon’s gold-plated executive compensation packages and its publicly stated plans for conversion to a “for profit” entity and initial public offering.

Keep than in mind next time someone tells you health care reform might involve "rationing." We've already got rationing, but right now it's done for profit, and done without any regard for your health or safety.

The complaint (a poorly rendered version is available here) alleges thirteen counts, which I break into four main types of claims: antitrust, ERISA, consumer fraud (including Lanham Act), and business torts.

I find that approach a little odd. Most cases involving fraudulent claims denials by insurance companies -- like Grider v. Keystone Health -- primarily allege racketeering ("RICO") claims. Antitrust continues to be notoriously hard to prove, and recent efforts to reform it have already run into trouble. ERISA is a wicked beast of a claim, with dozens of loops and curveballs, and though it quite clearly covers how employers administer the health benefits plans they run, it's not clear how it applies to the health insurance company itself.

That said, these cases aren't easy or simple, and I give the lawyers credit for creativity. They may end up making good law here, and perhaps they'll amend to allege RICO later.

Of course, let's not forget why Grider v. Keystone Health became so prominent: because the defense lawyers for the health insurance company, taking their cues from the client, brought the obstructionism and deception that pervades the health insurance industry into the courtroom, prompting severe sanction from the court.

Like I said: one of the ugliest businesses in America.

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The Blog of The Legal Times talks about the Sotomayor confirmation hearings:

Under questioning from Sen. Ted Kaufman (D-Del.), she spoke in greater detail than she has before about her career as a commercial litigator. She said she learned the importance of predictability in business law when partners would revise the drafts of settlement agreements she had written. The partners, she said, replaced her plain language with what she considered "gobbledygook," in order to conform the agreements to court precedent.

"In business, the predictability of law may be the most necessary," she said, "in the sense that people organize their business relationships based on how they understand the courts interpret their contracts."

When I was a summer associate at a business and transactional firm, the managing partner told me a similar story. Back when he was an associate, a partner at the firm asked him to draft a real estate bill of sale. He did so, with considerable difficulty, and a considerable investment of time, and took it to the partner, who skimmed it and threw it away.

Why?

"Because I don't know what any of that means. I do, however, know what these old agreements I've been using mean. Their meaning hasn't changed in five hundred years."

It seems Sotomayor got the same lesson. Lots of lawyers do.

Let me tell you: the lesson is wrong.

It's not always wrong. In certain circumstances -- like some real estate transactions -- there is language used so frequently that it has become the standard against which all other grammar and syntax is measured. Any deviation will likely be interpreted against the person who suggested it.

If you have one of those situations, be sure you know what the "standard" language is. Otherwise, focus on making the text of the written agreement reflect the reality of the parties' understanding, not on adding in "gobbledygook" to make it look lawyerly.

But even where you have a "standard" contract, the lesson may lead you astray. Long ago, I lost track of the number of times a lawyer told me "court precedent" dictated the use of particular language yet couldn't produce any actual "court precedent" to back that up.

Do you think every partner who told Sotomayor how the contract "should" have been written actually reviewed that "court precedent" prior to rejecting Sotomayor's draft? I doubt it. I'm betting more than a few of those "replaced" agreements included "standard" language that meant something different from what their clients intended.

Pay heed your elders, but shepardize your cases.

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At The National Law Journal, Nick Akerman, a partner at Dorsey & Whitney, has a thorough argument that the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA") should, and likely will, be applied against employees who leave with trade secrets or other proprietary / confidential information for use at their new jobs:

The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, a federal criminal statute outlawing the theft of data, permits a company that "suffers damage or loss" by reason of a violation of the CFAA, to "maintain a civil action against the violator" for damages and injunctive relief. 18 U.S.C. 1030(g). Since [Pacific Aerospace & Electronics Inc. v. Taylor, 295 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1196 (E.D. Wash. 2003)], there has developed a body of district court opinions that refuse to apply the CFAA against employees who steal their employer's data. This article will explain why these opinions are not likely to survive appellate review; it will also provide a strategy to avoid the application of these decisions.

Well worth reading if you come across trade secrets theft in your practice. Akerman may be the most experienced attorney in the country on this developing body of law, and it shows.

I agree with him, but for a more general reason. Since I practice in the Third Circuit (Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Delaware), I'll focus on the Third Circuit's most recent opinion on the CFAA:

The District Court focused on the criminal provisions and found it difficult to infer a civil application within the statutory framework and concluded that it could not do so, although the Court did acknowledge that several other courts had determined to the contrary. However, we conclude that not only the relevant case law, but also the plain language of the statute, militate in favor of the availability of a civil remedy, and specifically, the type of injunctive relief sought by the PC plaintiffs.

Numerous courts have recognized that a civil cause of action is apparent from the text of § 1030(g). Although we acknowledge the criminal thrust of the section in general, as it is found in Title 18, there is ample authority for permitting civil actions to proceed based on violations of the section pursuant to the language of § 1030(g). See, e.g., Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003) ('The civil remedy extends to 'any person who suffers damage or loss by reason of a violation of this section.'') (emphasis in original); I.M.S. Inquiry Mgmt. Sys., Ltd. v. Berkshire Info. Sys., Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 521, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (stating that § 1030(g) affords civil action for any violation of CFAA). Accordingly, we conclude that civil relief is available under § 1030(g).

P.C. Yonkers, Inc. v. Celebrations the Party & Seasonal Superstore, LLC, 428 F.3d 504, 511 (3d Cir. 2005).

In one sense, the above looks like a straightforward review of a criminal statute which permits a civil remedy. The statute says there's a remedy, so we'll enforce it.

In another sense, we're witnessing a big change in the way Circuit Courts and the Supreme Court interpret federal statutes which provide plaintiffs with civil relief for criminal conduct.

Like the CFAA, The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") creates a civil remedy for those persons injured by racketeering activities, typically mail or wire fraud. Also like the CFAA, numerous District Courts have contorted the brief text of the RICO Act to enact confusing, complicated barriers to relief without much basis in the Act itself. For example, numerous District Courts required plaintiffs show "first-party reliance" on the alleged mail or wire fraud (rather than merely injury related to the racketeering as a whole) and required that the plaintiff prove the defendants used a formal racketeering structure.

In the past year, the Supreme Court has torn down both of these barriers. See Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 128 S. Ct. 2131, 2145 (2008)(eliminating the "reliance" requirement, noting "Whatever the merits of petitioners’ arguments as a policy matter, we are not at liberty to rewrite RICO to reflect their — or our — views of good policy. We have repeatedly refused to adopt narrowing constructions of RICO in order to make it conform to a preconceived notion of what Congress intended to proscribe."); Boyle v. United States, ___ U.S. ____, No. 07-1309, 2009 U.S. LEXIS 4159, at *22–23 (Jun. 8, 2009)(eliminating the "structure" requirement, noting "The fact that RICO has been applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates breadth.”).

Like the RICO Act, the broad text of the CFAA "does not demostrate ambiguity[,] it demonstrates breadth." If the Circuit Courts and the Supreme Court interpret the CFAA the same way they've interpreted the RICO Act, we'll see a lot more of these claims in the future.

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UPDATE III: The most thorough critique I've read of Iqbal is Professor Burbank's Senate testimony, available here (PDF). As an empirical matter, Iqbal has had a significant effect, particularly on constitutional rights plaintiffs:

The statistical analysis of 1,039 cases shows that 49% of 12(b)(6) motions were granted (with or without leave to amend) in the cases selected (from May 2005 to August 2009). Further, the rate of granting such motions increased from 46% of motions decided under Conley, to 48% of motions decided under Twombly, to 56% of motions decided under Iqbal. A multinomial logistic regression indicates that under Twombly/Iqbal, the odds of a 12(b)(6) motion being granted rather than denied are 1.5 times greater than under Conley, holding all other variables constant.

Moreover, the largest category of cases in which 12(b)(6) motions are filed was constitutional civil rights. Motions to dismiss in constitutional civil rights cases were granted at a higher rate (53%) than in cases overall (49%), and the rate of granting 12(b)(6) motions in constitutional civil rights cases increased in the cases selected from Conley (50%) to Twombly (55%) to Iqbal (60%).

Personally, I think the powers that be understated the degree to which cases were dismissed before, and now overstate the degree to which Iqbal will increase their likelihood of being dismissed. The odds are indeed worse now, but they're still generally 50/50.

UPDATE II: Judge Posner weighs in, wondering if Twombly and Iqbal are limited to complex cases or those with other compelling interests, such as ensuring high-level officials are not distracted from their duties by suits of doubtful merit. I have a new post referencing Posner's opinion and a separate opinion by Judge Easterbrook that throw cold water on those who believe Iqbal has doomed all but the sharpest of complaints.

UPDATE: The NYTimes has an article on the case as well, also believing it to be a death-knell for plaintiffs, noting that federal judges "have cited it more than 500 times in just the last two months." As I wrote below, citation is not the same thing as impact. The standard is not any different from what courts have been practically applying for years, except to add the word "plausible."

Indeed, you don't have to go far to see the limits of Iqbal; just last month the District Court in Padilla v. Yoo, a similar suit against a high-ranking government official, denied defendants' motion to dismiss, quoting Iqbal as follows:

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (brackets omitted))

To reiterate: the sky is not falling on plaintiffs. They need only plead "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully," something lawyers have been doing for centuries.]

Drug and Device Law points us to an article in Saturday's Wall Street Journal:

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, released in May, will make it harder to bring a lawsuit without specific factual evidence, raising the threshold for moving a case into expensive litigation and possibly saving companies millions of dollars in legal fees. The case was overshadowed by other business rulings on consumer lawsuits, environmental and employment law and other matters in a term set to end Monday, but legal experts said it may be the most important.

"It's the case that will be cited more than any other by a factor of 100," said Tom Goldstein, partner at Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP and founder of the Scotusblog Web site. He called the ruling "an unexpected gift for the business community."

In the case, a Pakistani named Javaid Iqbal sued government officials over his detainment after Sept. 11, 2001. The Supreme Court ruled that Mr. Iqbal didn't have sufficient factual evidence to proceed with his discrimination claims.

"While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations," Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote in the 5-4 opinion. He cited the 2007 decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, an antitrust case that outlined what plaintiffs must assert to make it through initial court proceedings.

As a result of the Iqbal ruling, businesses may find it easier to fend off lawsuits by persuading courts to dismiss complaints early in litigation.

I disagree. Maybe a handful of cases at the fringes with no factual allegations will be dismissed (most of these cases were already dismissed even prior to Twombly), but that's it. Iqbal's casual reference to pleading standards does not change the narrow focus of the actual opinion, which relates to the very specific issue of how "qualified immunity" applies to high-ranking officials in suits against the federal government for deprivations of constitutional rights.

Tom Goldstein is right that the Ashcroft v. Iqbal opinion will be cited all of the time by defendants' motions to dismiss, and will be cited by court opinions evaluating motions to dismiss, but that doesn't mean defendants will get much mileage out of it.

Rather than argue the details why, let me show you what will probably become my standard draft response to such motions:

Defendant's heavy reliance on Iqbal is misplaced. Iqbal was a Bivens action brought by a Pakistani national who alleged ethnically and racially discriminatory treatment in the post-September 11, 2001, period by numerous federal officials while he was detained for charges of defrauding the United States with regard to identification documents, charges to which he plead guilty, prompting his deportation. Iqbal, 556 U.S. ___; Slip op. 1. There was no dispute that the facts alleged by Iqbal stated a Bivens claim against all individuals directly and indirectly involved in his treatment. Id.

The narrow question in Iqbal was whether Bivens liability -- which indisputably does not extend to supervisors through respondeat superior (see Monell) -- attached where the complaint alleged "a supervisor’s mere knowledge of his subordinate’s discriminatory purpose." Slip op., 13. The Supreme Court reiterated that Bivens creates a unique, disfavored and limited cause of action disconnected from normal tort doctrines and reaffirmed that, "[a]bsent vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct." Id.

Such a Bivens-specific holding bears no relationship to the business lawsuit sub judice. Importantly, though, and contra defendant's arguments, the Supreme Court reiterated in Iqbal that "a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint" and that a plaintiff need only "state[] a plausible claim for relief [to] survive[] a motion to dismiss." Slip op. 14-15. Plaintiff has clearly done that here; defendants' heavy reliance on an irrelevant Bivens opinion reveals the lack of any support in existing case law for their request to throw plaintiff out of court entirely. The Supreme Court has always instructed, and continues to instruct, District Courts to assume the facts in the complaint to be true, to make reasonable inferences on behalf of plaintiff's allegations, and to deny dismissal where plaintiff has a "plausible" claim.

Finally, again contra defendants, Iqbal was specifically remanded to the Circuit Court to consider whether the plaintiff there should be permitted to amend his complaint to cure the deficiencies. Such is consistent with this Circuit's precedent, in which leave to amend is to be freely granted prior to dismissal unless such amendment is clearly futile or inequitable.

So there you go. Iqbal soundly rejects Bivens liability for high-ranking government officials merely potentially aware of misdeeds much further down the chain of command (and it reiterates the appealability of an order on qualified immunity), but that's it.

The sky has not fallen on business plaintiffs.

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The WSJ Law Blog finds easter eggs for consumers of financial products buried in the proposed financial regulation overhaul:

The [not-yet-created Consumer Fraud Protection Agency] should be directed to gather information and study mandatory arbitration clauses in consumer financial services and products contracts to determine to what extent, and in what contexts, they promote fair adjudication and effective redress. If the CFPA determines that mandatory arbitration fails to achieve these goals, it should be required to establish conditions for fair arbitration, or, if necessary, to ban mandatory arbitration clauses in particular contexts, such as mortgage loans.

...

Although arbitration may be a reasonable option for many consumers to accept after a dispute arises, mandating a particular venue and up-front method of adjudicating disputes – and eliminating access to courts – may unjustifiably undermine investor interests. We recommend legislation that would give the SEC clear authority to prohibit mandatory arbitration clauses in broker-dealer and investment advisory accounts with retail customers.

Business Insider worries about the unintended consequences:

That seems a clear way of increasing the costs of broker-dealer and investment advisory costs, which may mean that smaller customers find that brokerages are even less likely to deal with them than before. As usual, there seems to be very little thought given to how brokers will react to having the increased risk of litigation imposed upon them.

What's more, there are serious questions about whether it makes sense to burden the court system with additional litigation that a ban on mandatory arbitration will sure spur. In effect, a part of the costs of disputes between brokers and their customers are being transferred to the taxpayer who will pay the costs for the extra-burden on courts. It's far from clear why this shift in cost from the parties to the agreement to taxpayers is warranted. We can squint our eyes and see this as something of a bailout of customers who wind up unhappy with their broker.

Last I checked, "wind[ing] up unhappy with [your] broker" wasn't worth a dime in a court of law, at an arbitration, or anywhere else. The investors aren't "unhappy" because their broker didn't get them a cheese wheel for Christmas, they're "unhappy" because their broker breached their contractual and fiduciary duties and lost a ton of the investor's money. It takes an awful lot of "squinting" to see a months-or-years-long expensive lawsuit to get back the money that someone else lost as a "bailout."

Most "mandatory arbitration clauses in consumer financial services and products contracts" force the disputes be heard in FINRA's Dispute Resolution process. As The National Law Journal reported at the end of March,

FINRA — the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority — oversees nearly 5,000 brokerage firms, 173,000 branch offices and 659,000 registered securities representatives. It describes its chief role as protecting investors by maintaining the fairness of the U.S. capital markets. ...

"We don't have official projections for 2009, but if the trend continues, we're probably looking at a high that will match what we saw in '03 and '04," said FINRA spokesman Brendan Intindola.

Arbitration cases filed in 2003 and 2004 — the largest number in 14 years — almost reached the 9,000 mark and were driven by the bursting of the dot-com bubble and the subsequent decline in the equity markets. In 2007, slightly more than 3,000 cases were filed, and in 2008, nearly 5,000.

Lawyers who represent customers and industry members generally believe that FINRA will be able to manage the dramatic increase in its arbitration workload, but they are divided on whether its arbitration panels — charged with industry bias in the past — now provide a level playing field to those using the process.

"The general perception is it is very tilted," said one practitioner who asked for anonymity. "Even if only one-third of the panel is from industry, that's the person with alleged expertise and who has disproportionate sway on the panels."

Broker/Dealer arbitrations are common, but banning them wouldn't open the floodgates: financial products consumers file under 10,000 claims filed nationwide. Keep in mind that essentially every dispute you have with your broker/dealer is forced into FINRA arbitration, including no-brainer claims like the return of a promissory note, so these numbers may be inflated to some degree. It's hard to say what percent of these filings claim substantial losses due to malfeasance.

More importantly, though glossed over by Business Insider, full-fledged civil litigation in open court is not fun for anyone involved. Even within confidential arbitration, just last month FINRA quietly withdrew a proposal that would have permitted more extensive discovery into the financial records of investors bringing claims against their financial advisers, in light of numerous complaints that such a change would subject investors to a "financial colonoscopy." Moving these types of cases into the civil court system would permit defendant banks and investment advisers to dig very deeply into the personal and financial histories of investors bringing suit, far deeper than they would be permitted to do in an arbitration.

For most of the individual claims, I am not too concerned about the arbitration process, as it provides wealthy investors (who make up most of the filings) a simple, relatively convenient and very private way in which to seek redress for their losses, and they will be adequately represented by paid counsel throughout the process. The problems for everyone else, however, are twofold:

• It's not clear whether a group of injured inventors may pursue a class action against a broker-dealer, investment bank or investment adviser. FINRA's Code says it is not applicable to class actions, and an increasing number of courts have held in other contexts that bans of class actions are illegal, but the law here is not as clear as it should be.
   
• The selection process for these arbitrators is not transparent. @phila_lawyer is right that FINRA seems to prefer arbitrators familiar with the financial industry; that's not necessarily evidence of bias, but it's nonetheless problematic, since it exposes the process to 'capture' by the industry and, as noted above, such 'insiders' often hold undue sway on panels.

As such, it's certainly worth a look into the issue, which is all the Obama plan proposes.

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The National Law Journal fills us in on the whopping $4.1 billion wrongful termination arbitration award against an employer that fired an executive without cause, which was recently upheld by a trial court:

NLJ: How did this award get so big?

MY: It got this way because the defendant, the employer, first of all, apparently had terminated a high-level employee without cause. He [the ousted executive] then sued, and the defendant, who at that time had a lawyer, moved to compel arbitration.

At that point, the defendant made some mistakes. It appears the defendant neglected to, or decided not to, participate in discovery and withheld financial information not only asked for in discovery requests but ordered by the arbitrator.

...

And what happened next is really the telling part: The [retired] judge set the hearing for the arbitration, and the defendant wrote a letter to the arbitrator saying, "I'm not going to show up." When there wasn't any information forthcoming from the defendant, what the arbitrator did was look at what information was available about the financial situation of the company and applied adverse inferences against the defendant, essentially filling in the gaps in the story presuming it would come out in favor of the plaintiff. That was really where the numbers started to scale.

...

NLJ: What was special about this executive compensation agreement?

MY: This agreement said that the employee was going to be paid a commission structure of 5 percent of gross sales. What was significant about this one is that the agreement provided that if he is terminated without cause he is entitled to receive his commissions on an ongoing and permanent basis. ...

One big factor was trying to figure out what those gross sales were going to be. Because the defendant didn't provide any financial information, the arbitrator and plaintiffs didn't have a lot to go with in trying to predict where the company was going to go. They looked at a letter the defendant sent to shareholders talking about revenue in one month being $535,000 and then talking about the expected growth rates of 20 percent or 10 percent per month. It's not a realistic rate [that] the company really would grow 10 percent per month in perpetuity, but because the defendant didn't come forward with any evidence, because they didn't provide anything in discovery, these adverse inferences were then applied and the arbitrator essentially assumed that those figures were going to be correct. If you have a commission structure based on those kinds of growth numbers, you get up to the $1 billion pretty quickly. The punitive damage award was brought in at essentially triple the commission award.

And there you go. It seems like the defendant was destined to lose anyway, otherwise he or his lawyers would have been able to mount a defense initially.

The part that's odd is how he didn't seem to grasp the severe ramifications of the employment agreement, the same one he had used to entice the employee to work there in the first place. I can see the defendant not expecting a $4.1 billion award, but he had to expect a serious walloping from 5% of gross sales forever.

I'm betting the defendant could have reduced that award by far more than 90% if he had fought it. So we'll say that 99.99% of success is showing up.

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An interesting opinion out of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Youtie v. Macy's Retail Holding, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47383 (June 5, 2009) by Senior Judge Thomas N. O'Neill, Jr.:

On August 1, 2000, Macy's acquired all of the publicly-held shares of David's Bridal, Inc. David's Bridal is a corporation and a clothier specializing in bridal gowns and other formal wear and accessories. Plaintiff had purchased David's Bridal in 1972, expanded the operations, partnered with Steven Erlbaum beginning in 1989 or 1990 and with Erlbaum made a public offering of David's Bridal's stock in 1999. After Macy's acquired David's Bridal, plaintiff entered into a contract of employment with a division of Macy's, Macy's Retail, on or about October 1, 2001. In accordance with the terms of the agreement, Youtie served as the Executive Vice-President, Product Development and Sourcing of the David's Bridal division of Macy's Retail. On November 17, 2006, an affiliate of Leonard Green & Partners signed an agreement with Macy's to acquire David's Bridal and consummated the sale and transfer of stock of David's Bridal to the Leonard Green affiliate on January 31, 2007. As part of the transaction, Macy's subsidiary Macy's Retail assigned its employment agreement with plaintiff to David's Bridal.

In short, Plaintiff claimed that the sale of his division to another company was a termination entitling him to severance. He lost; applying Missouri law (per the contract), the Court held:

The employment contract at issue in this case is one for personal services, which, as a general rule, cannot be assigned without the consent of the employee. Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. Koelz, 722 S.W.2d 311, 312-13 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986), citing Alldredge v. Twenty-Five Thirty-Two Broad. Corp., 509 S.W.2d 744, 749 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974). However, a mere change in the form in which a business is owned or conducted should not work to prohibit assignment. Id. at 313. Whether there is a change in partnership personnel or structure, the incorporation of a previously unincorporated business, the dissolution of a corporation or a change in corporate structure, "if there is no material change in the contract obligations and duties of the employee, there is no reason for the transfer of the rights from one entity or form to another to work an assignment putatively prohibited by the rule against assignment of personal service contracts." Id.

That's what happened here, in addition to the employment agreement itself recognizing the possibility of assignment. Hence, summary judgment for the Defendant on Plaintiff's claims.

Plaintiff probably should have left it alone:

Defendants filed an answer, affirmative defenses and counterclaims on December 17, 2007, alleging that plaintiff breached his employment agreement, misappropriated trade secrets and/or confidential and proprietary information, breached his fiduciary duty and duty of loyalty, engaged in tortious interference with business and employment relations, was unjustly enriched and engaged in unfair competition.

Uh oh. Among other allegations:

Plaintiff does not dispute that the "first cost" data at issue is the cost the manufacturer charged David's Bridal to manufacture the designs David's Bridal provided the manufacturer for its Spring 2007 catalogue. Additionally, plaintiff admitted in his affidavit that he "asked for the cost data because [] Erlbaum . . . was interested in what David's Bridal paid various manufacturers for the dresses they manufactured." Plaintiff further admits that he gave a copy of the cost sheet to Erlbaum but believes that plaintiff provided it to Erlbaum after plaintiff recovered from the surgical procedure he underwent after his January trip to Hong Kong.

Plaintiff also admits that he and his former partner Erlbaum had general discussions about Erlbaum returning to the bridal business. 

It's never a good idea to share proprietary information about your current employer with your former business partner.

Plaintiff raise a good issue; most of Defendants' claims were actually a single "trade secrets" claim:

laintiff argues that defendants' counterclaims for misappropriation of trade secrets and/or confidential and proprietary information, unjust enrichment and unfair competition are preempted by the PUTSA. The relevant section of the PUTSA provides as follows:

(a) General rule.--Except as provided in subsection (b), this chapter displaces conflicting tort, restitutionary and other law of this Commonwealth providing civil remedies for misappropriation of a trade secret.

(b) Exceptions.--This chapter does not affect:

(2) other civil remedies that are not based upon misappropriation of a trade secret; or

12 Pa. C.S.A. § 5308. The dominant view of courts in states that have also adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act of 1985 is that preemption exists to the extent that defendants' counterclaims are based on the same conduct that is said to constitute a misappropriation of trade secrets. See e.g., Motorola, Inc. v. Lemko Corp., 2009 WL 383444, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 11, 2009); Hecny Trans., Inc. v. Chu, 430 F.3d 402, 404-05 (7th Cir. 2005); Penalty Kick Mgmt. Ltd. v. Coca Cola Co., 318 F.3d 1284, 1296-98 (11th Cir. 2003); Savor, Inc. v. FMR Corp., 812 A.2d 894 (Del. 2002).

Defendants' counterclaims for misappropriation of trade secrets and/or confidential and proprietary information, breach of fiduciary duty and duty of loyalty, unjust enrichment and unfair competition involve plaintiff's conduct of requesting and disclosing "first cost" data to Erlbaum. These claims each refer to the same "first cost" data and are wholly based on the same conduct as the conduct that comprises a misappropriation of trade secrets claim. The "first cost" data is the sole information at issue in this case and it is either a trade secret or something less. Thus, these counterclaims are preempted only if the "first cost" data at issue constitutes a misappropriation of a trade secret.

And that's what would have kicked out most of these claims, except that the parties forgot to brief if the information was actually a trade secret:

A trade secret under the PUTSA is defined as:

Information, including a formula, drawing, pattern, compilation including a costumer list, program, device, method, technique or process that:

(1) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use.

(2) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.

PUTSA, 12 P.S. § 5302.

However, neither party has properly briefed whether this information qualifies as a trade secret. Plaintiff argues that the PUTSA preempts defendants' counterclaims but states, without sufficient legal analysis, that the information does not qualify as a trade secret to satisfy the PUTSA because it was readily available to anyone who asked for it. These arguments are contradictory; plaintiff cannot have it both ways. See Callaway Golf Co. v. Dunlop Slazenger Group Am., Inc., 295 F. Supp.2d 430, 437 (D. Del. 2003), stating that arguing that information does not constitute a trade secret and also that other claims are preempted by the Trade Secret Act is contradictory. Defendants did not respond with legal analysis on whether the "first cost" data constitutes a trade secret; instead they merely requested leave to file an amended counterclaim complaint if I find such information to be a trade secret. As this information may qualify as a trade secret, I will not find that the data satisfies lesser standards than those required for a trade secret merely because the issue has not been properly briefed. For this reason, I cannot find that defendants' counterclaims of misappropriation of trade secrets and/or confidential and proprietary information, breach of fiduciary duty and duty of loyalty, unjust enrichment and unfair competition are preempted at this time because defendants may still be able to recover under such theories in the event that the "first cost" data does not constitute a misappropriation of a trade secret under the PUTSA. Cenveo Corp. v. Slater, 2007 WL 527720, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2007), stating "that the cases holding that the Trade Secrets Act does not preempt common law tort claims when it has yet to be determined whether the information at issue constitutes a trade secret take the better approach." 

 

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New to the site? Haven't been here in a while? Here are some of the most popular posts over the past few weeks.

Litigations and Trials:

• Three Ways To Lose Your Business Lawsuit - Wachtell and The Failed Hexion / Huntsman Merger
• Does The Fumo Juror's Twittering Warrant A Mistrial?
• Harvard Law Professor Bungles Rules of Civil Procedure for Deposing Third Parties
• American College of Trial Lawyers Report Encourages Frivolous Civil Discovery Objections
• Another Preventable Small Business Lawsuit Horror Story

Law Practice:

• How To Write Your Brief So That The Judge Will Hate You
• "How Low Could Associate Salaries Go?" Depends On How Desperate Firms Want To Appear
• Contingent Fee Business Lawyers As Venture Capitalists
• A Great Trial Lawyer, Lucius Seneca, On Keeping Your Law Practice In Perspective
• How To Deal With A "Non-Ruling" By A Trial Judge

Current Events:

• Another Mangled Prescription for Health Courts to Evaluate Medical Malpractice Claims
  
• How AIG Shareholders (Like the US Gov't) Can Sue to Get Back The Bonuses
• "The 'Hot News' Tort and the New Media" -- It's Too Late For Copyright To Sink Blogs
• LinkedIn's Terms of Use: We Own All Content, Ex-Users Agree To Update Our Database Forever 

Recent Court Opinions: 

• Third Circuit Predicts Pennsylvania Supreme Court Would Require Independently Actionable Conduct To Prove Tortious Interference With Contractual Relationships
• Third Circuit Upholds Philadelphia Police's Ban On Headscarves Without A Word On The First Amendment
• E.D.Pa. Threads The Needle On "Gist of the Action" and "Parol Evidence Rule" In Mixed Fraud / Breach of Contract Cases
• Ricci v. DeStefano: The Problem of Granting Certiorari After Summary Judgment

 

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I'm somewhat surprised this issue comes up as often as it does:

"Scholarly commentary has recognized that Pennsylvania law has been riven with 'considerable confusion as to the nature of the covenant of good faith, when that covenant is implicated, and how claims arising from a breach of the covenant are enforced.' Seth William Goren, Looking for Law in all the Wrong Places: Problems in Applying the Implied Covenant of Good Faith Performance, 37 U.S.F. L. Rev. 257, 258 (2003). As the parties' discussion of the law illustrates, it has not always been clear 'whether the covenant is implicated in every contractual relationship or only some . . . and whether a breach of the covenant of good faith gives rise to an independent cause of action or is merely a tool of contract interpretation.' Id. at 260. According to Goren this confusion 'derived from confusing the contract-tort of bad faith with breaches of the general covenant [of good faith] present in all contracts.' Id. at 303. Whatever its source, this confusion has largely been resolved: 'The majority of Pennsylvania cases through the 1990s to today . . . have refused to permit independent claims for breach of the covenant of good faith outside of an insurer-insured relationship. Thus, in general, a 'breach of such covenant is a breach of contract action, not an independent action for a breach of a duty of good faith and fair dealing.'' Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Seiple v. Comty. Hosp. of Lancaster, No. 97-cv- 8107, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5093, 1998 WL 175593, at (E.D. Pa. April 14, 1998) ('Pennsylvania does not recognize a claim for breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing as an independent cause of action.')).

Recent case law confirms this as the prevailing rule in Pennsylvania. See, e.g., LSI Title Agency, Inc. v. Eval. Servs., Inc., 2008 PA Super 126, 951 A.2d 384, 391 (Pa. Super.2008), appeal denied, 960 A.2d 841 (Pa.2008) (citing cases holding that Pennsylvania does not recognize separate breach of contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing where that claim is subsumed by separately pled breach of contract claim.); JHE, Inc. v. SEPTA, No. 1790 NOV. TERM 2001, 2002 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 78, 2002 WL 101894,1 at (Pa. Com. Pl. May 17, 2002) (''[T]he implied covenant of good faith does not allow for a claim separate and distinct from a breach of contract claim . . . [A] claim arising from a breach of the covenant of good faith must be prosecuted as a breach of contract claim, as the covenant does nothing more than imply certain obligations into the contract itself.') (collecting cases from other jurisdictions adopting same rule) (emphasis in original); Commonwealth v. BASF Corp., No. 3127, 2001 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 95, 2001 WL 1807788, at (Pa. Com. Pl. Mar.15, 2001) ('Pennsylvania law does not allow for a separate cause of action for breach of either an express or implied duty of good faith, absent a breach of the underlying contract.').

Federal courts construing Pennsylvania law have adhered to the same rule. See e.g., Chanel, Inc. v. Jupiter Group, Inc., Civ. No. 3:04-CV-1540, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43363, 2006 WL 1793223, at (M.D .Pa., June 27, 2006) (agreeing and citing cases holding that claim for breach of good faith and fair dealing is not independent cause of action, but part of a breach of contract claim); In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 338 F. Supp.2d 517, 549 (D.N.J. 2004) ('Although Pennsylvania imposes a duty of good faith and fair dealing on each party in the performance of contracts, there is no separate cause of action for breach of these duties . . . .') (citations omitted); Blue Mt. Mushroom Co. v. Monterey Mushroom, Inc.., 246 F. Supp. 2d 394, 400-01 (E. D. Pa. 2002) ('Pennsylvania law does not recognize a separate claim for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.'); McHale v. NuEnergy Group, No. Civ. A. 01- 4111, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3307, 2002 WL 321797, at (E.D. Pa. Feb.27, 2002) (internal citations omitted) (same)."

McHolme/Waynesburg, LLC v. Wal-Mart Real Estate Bus. Trust, No. 08-961, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38934, at *5–8 (W.D. Pa. May 7, 2009).

I suppose from the plaintiff's perspective it is an issue of "why not? If the claim is recognized, it could have been malpractice for me not to include it," but I wonder about the ramifications if a plaintiff actually gets one of these "independent" good faith claims through trial.

What are the elements of proving it? What are your damages? Do they overlap your breach of contract damages? Can you recover twice? 

Is there any doubt the defendant will appeal such a verdict? Any doubt it will get your case reversed and re-tried?

I think the down side including such a claim -- particularly the distraction from the real issues in the case and the loss of some credibility with the court -- outweigh any potential benefits.

Just include it as more evidence of the breach of contract.

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In the world of venture capitalism, Fred Wilson’s blog, “A VC” is essential reading, and Fred is particularly generous with his insight and information about the field.

I read Fred’s blog partly because it’s darn interesting and partly because there are a lot of parallels between venture capitalism and contingent fee litigation. We both take on a lot of risk and invest a lot of time and money for the potential of a big payoff down the road, as compared to regular and steady income.

Yesterday, Fred wrote an interesting post about the venture capitalism industry as a whole, and how the math doesn't add up. There are just not enough “exits” (through a merger / acquisition or an initial public offering) to justify the size of the venture capitalism industry as a whole.

So I commented, he responded, and we had a short conversation about the economics of contingent fee litigation and the potential for creating a market for contingent patent infringement defense.

But that’s not what this post is about. At the end, Brad Feld chimed in: 

If they did one-way loser pays (e.g. plaintiff has to cover defendants cost if the plaintiff loses) and they prohibited contingency fee relationships that would solve a lot of problems.

That’s a common sentiment among businesses, from big corporations to entrepreneurs to mom and pop stores, a sentiment that usually disappears the moment they need an attorney but can't afford the risk of paying for years of litigation without a guaranteed return.

I’ve written before about loser pays and how it’s unfair to penalize the party that bears the burden of proof on an issue from failing to meet that burden, and that loser pays serves as a strong deterrent against meritorious claims.

But let me focus on the contingent fee aspect. As part of my discussion with Fred, I talked about some of the numbers when the plaintiff wins a big case:

[A big win in the litigation business] depends on the resources devoted to it, so let me give some examples based on actual costs and number of attorneys on the case.

(Someone might ask, "why not use billable hours for resources?" Well, contingent fee attorneys almost never devote themselves entirely to one case, and each minute spent on the case instantly becomes a sunk cost, so we generally ignore time already spent on a case and focus on two things: actual costs and opportunity cost due to the lawyer(s) having to turn down other work. I refer to the latter as "bandwidth," i.e. the availability of a lawyer to take on other work. Keep in mind also you're paying these attorneys (including yourself) a salary, and thus have a significant carry cost, although the salary on a 'per case' basis is quite low given how most attorneys have over 10 cases, even those on substantial matters.)

A large-damages personal injury / product liability / medical malpractice lawsuit can be done by one or two attorneys and costs below $250,000, with recovery of $5-$10m within 1.5-3 years. That's a big win: you put in $250k out of pocket, likely didn't impair bandwidth, and recovered $2-$4m in attorneys' fees.

The numbers aren't too much different for most small business cases, with breach of contract, unfair competition, etc.

A regional-market antitrust / mid-sized patent infringement case can be done with 3-6 attorneys, $1-$5m in costs, with a recovery of $15-$50m in 2-4 years. Another big win: you put in $1-$5m out of pocket, moderately impaired bandwidth, and recovered $7-$20m in attorneys' fees.

A massive shareholder class action / national antitrust / large patent infringement case can be done with 10-40 attorneys, $10-40m in costs, and a recovery of >$100m in 4-10 years. Think of the Blackberry patent infringement case, which ended with a $612m settlement and over $200m in fees (resulting in profits-per-partner than year over $4m).

Big money, right? Why not file lawsuits all day long?

The difference is, those are the big winners, the venture capital equivalent of starting a company that gets bought out by Microsoft or which enters the public market with a heralded IPO proceeded by weeks of favorable press, like Google. It’s great, but it’s also rare.

Day in and day out, the primary thing a contingent fee law firm does is spend lots of money. In addition to all the normal costs of a business (rent, staff, etc.), you have to pay your attorneys salaries which are competitive in the market, even against hourly billing firms, and you have to dump loads of money and time into cases for experts, motions, discovery, trials, appeals and negotiations, none of which earn you a dime until the very end.

So I'd say it's no different from Brad's or Fred's ventures: we have as strong an incentive against taking frivolous or vexatious claims as they have against investing in unprofitable businesses. The last thing I want to do is spend years of my life and five, six or seven-figures pursuing a case that returns nothing. Like a venture capital fund, our contingent fee law firm turns down far more cases than it accepts.

Do vexatious or extortionate law suits happen? Sure, potentially more for cases which are high stakes and expensive to defend, like shareholder class actions or patent infringement. That's why I think a limited form of fee-shifting is appropriate, like when the patent being sued upon is declared invalid as a matter of law.

But loser pays and no contingency would close the courthouse doors to all but the wealthiest of parties, since no one would be able to afford pursuing even the best of claims without a massive war chest, particularly in the extremely-expensive shareholder class action, antitrust and patent infringement contexts.

It'd be like stripping venture capital funds of limited liability and restricting them to using secured debt, not equity, to fund investments, forcing them to do little more than invest in the biggest companies in the world.

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Trial courts in Pennsylvania (particularly the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania) continue their organic development of the "gist of the action" doctrine in the absence of explicit guidance from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.*

The latest comes from EDPA Judge Jan E. DuBois in Farmaceutisk Laboratorium Ferring A/S v. Shire United States, Inc., CA NO. 08-941 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30209 (April 8, 2009), who finds an interesting way to thread the needle between the gist of the action doctrine, the parol evidence rule, and the common sense acknowledgment that fraud can and does occur amongst the parties to a contract.

First, the gist of the action:

Pennsylvania's gist of the action doctrine "bars claims for allegedly tortious conduct where the gist of the alleged conduct sounds in contract rather than tort." Hospicomm, Inc. v. Fleet Bank, N.A., 338 F. Supp. 2d 578, 582 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (internal quotation marks & citations omitted). The purpose of the doctrine is to "preclude[] plaintiffs from re-casting ordinary breach of contract claims into tort claims." eToll v. Elias/Savion Adver., Inc., 811 A.2d 10, 14 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (citation omitted). Although a breach of contract can give rise to an actionable tort, "to be construed as in tort, . . . the wrong ascribed to defendant must be the gist of the action, the contract being collateral." Bash v. Bell Tel. Co., 601 A.2d 825, 829 (Pa. Super. 1992) (internal quotation marks & citation omitted). "In other words, a claim should be limited to a contract claim when 'the parties' obligations are defined by the terms of the contracts, and not by the larger social policies  embodied by the law of torts.'" Bohler-Uddeholm Am., Inc. v. Ellwood Group, Inc., 247 F.3d 79, 104 (3d Cir. Pa. 2001) (citing Bash, 601 A.2d at 830).

Fraud in the inducement claims are not barred by the gist of the action doctrine where the fraud involves representations of fact independent of promises of performance made in the contract. See eToll, 811 A.2d at 17; TruePosition, Inc. v. Sunon, Inc., No. 05-CV-3023, 2006 WL 1451496, at *3 (E.D. Pa. May 25, 2006) (DuBois, J.); Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Eaton Metal Prods. Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 329, 341 (E.D. Pa. 2003). "[F]raud to induce a person to enter into a contract is generally collateral to (i.e., not interwoven with) the terms of the contract itself." Air Prods., 256 F. Supp. 2d at 341 (citing eToll, 811 A.2d at 17) (internal quotation marks omitted). On the other hand, when fraud in the inducement is based on statements made with regard to performance of the contract, such claims are barred under that doctrine. In such circumstances a plaintiff's remedy lies in contract. See Williams v. Hilton Group PLC, 93 F. App'x 384, 386-87 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding that fraud in the inducement claim that defendant had no intention of honoring [*25] the contract was barred by gist of the action doctrine). "Moreover, promises made to induce a party to enter into a contract that eventually become part of the contract itself cannot be the basis for a fraud-in-the-inducement claim under the gist of the action doctrine." Freedom Props., L.P. v. Landsdale Warehouse Co., No. 06-CV-5469, 2007 WL 2254422, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 2, 2007) (citations omitted).

The Court notes that "caution should be exercised in determining the gist of an action at the motion to dismiss stage. Judicial caution is appropriate because often times, without further evidence presented during discovery, the court cannot determine whether the gist of the claim is in contract or tort." Interwave Tech., Inc. v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., No. 05-CV-398, 2005 WL 3605272, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 2005) (internal quotation marks & citations omitted).

And now the parole evidence rule:

Pennsylvania law concerning the application of the parol evidence rule to claims of fraudulent inducement is well established. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained the law as follows:

Where the alleged prior or contemporaneous oral representations or agreements concern a subject which is specifically dealt with in the written contract, and the written contract covers or purports to cover the entire agreement of the parties, the law is now clearly and well settled that in the absence of fraud, accident or mistake the alleged oral representations or agreements are merged in or superseded by the subsequent written contract, and parol evidence to vary, modify or superseded the written contract is inadmissible in evidence.

HCB Contractors v. Liberty Place Hotel Assocs., 652 A.2d 1278, 1279 (Pa. 1995) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The exception to the parol evidence rule for fraud covers fraud in the execution, i.e., the oral representations were fraudulently omitted from the contract, not fraud in the inducement. Dayhoff, Inc. v. H.J. Heinz Co., 86 F.3d 1287, 1300 (3d Cir. 1996); Freedom Props., L.P. v. Landsdale Warehouse Co., No. 06-CV-5469, 2007 WL 2254422, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 2, 2007); Interwave Tech., Inc. v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., No. 05-CV-398, 2005 WL 3605272, at *16 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 2005). Applying the parol evidence rule to bar claims of fraudulent inducement, as in Pennsylvania, is the minority rule. Regent Nat'l Bank v. Dealers Choice Auto. Planning, Inc., No. 96-CV-7930, 1997 WL 786468, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 26, 1997). Pennsylvania courts justify this position under the rationale that if the parties "relied on any understanding, promises, representations or agreements made prior to the execution of the written contract . . . , they should have protected themselves by incorporating into the written agreement the promises or representations upon which they now rely . . . ." 1726 Cherry St. P'ship v. Bell Atl. Props., Inc., 653 A.2d 663, 666 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (internal quotation marks & citation omitted). Thus, where there is an integrated agreement and the asserted misrepresentations giving rise to fraud in the inducement are addressed by the agreement, the parol evidence rule bars extrinsic evidence of such a fraud claim.

To apply the HCB Contractors rule, courts must determine whether there is an integrated agreement and whether the asserted prior representations are specifically covered by the written agreement. Interwave Tech., 2005 WL 3605272, at *17; Quorum Health Res. v. Carbon-Schuylkill Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 430, 433 (E.D. Pa. 1999). One key factor in concluding whether an agreement is integrated is the presence or absence of an integration or merger clause in the written agreement. See HCB Contractors, 652 A.2d at 1280; Interwave Tech., 2005 WL 3605272, at *18; Quorum Health, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 433; G. Daniel Glass v. Singer Optical Group, Inc., No. 95-CV-308, 1995 WL 717411, at *3-4 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 1995). To determine whether the written contract specifically addresses the subject of the oral representations, courts ask whether "they relate to the same subject matter and are so interrelated that both would be executed at the same time and in the same contract . . . ." Hershey Foods Corp. v. Ralph Chapek, Inc., 828 F.2d 989, 995 (3d Cir. 1987) [*31] (internal citation omitted).

In this case, the 2005 Settlement Agreement does not contain an integration or merger clause.  ... The only section of the 2005 Settlement Agreement that possibly covers such a representation is section 2.4 As discussed in Part III.D, supra, the language of section 2.4 is ambiguous, particularly with respect to whether it requires defendant to market all new oral 5-ASA drugs as PENTASA(R). In light of this ambiguity, the Court cannot determine at this stage whether the written agreement specifically addresses the content of the alleged oral representations such that they would be barred by the parol evidence rule. "For the Pennsylvania parol evidence rule to bar a claim for fraudulent inducement, the contract must be written, unambiguous, and fully integrated." Coram Healthcare Corp. v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 2d 589, 594-95 (E.D. Pa. 1999). As the Court concludes that the 2005 Settlement Agreement is ambiguous and not fully integrated, it will not dismiss plaintiffs' fraudulent inducement claim as barred by the parol evidence rule.

Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings was thus denied. I don't agree with the whole approach here -- I think Bell and eToll hold only that a plaintiff can't simultaneously recover under negligence and breach of contract -- but, importantly, Judge DuBois didn't throw out half of plaintiff's claims for failure to "prove" an issue that should be left to the jury. However phrased or theorized, the core ability to recover where one party may have defrauded the other in the context of a contract is preserved.

* I don't mean to imply it's necessarily wrong for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to permit this organic development. The United States Supreme Court, for example, routinely denies cert on cases up until a general consensus has development among the Circuit Courts of Appeal.

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Amy Kolz has an extensive article at The American Lawyer detailing a merger debacle which settled last winter for $1 billion after "Vice-Chancellor Stephen Lamb [of the Delaware Chancery Court] declared that Wachtell's client, an Apollo Management, L.P., portfolio company called Hexion Specialty Chemicals, Inc., had 'knowingly and intentionally breached' its merger agreement with Huntsman Corporation in a deliberate effort to walk away from their $10.6 billion deal."

If you're interested in the subject, you should read the article.

I highlight three elements fundamental to their defeat, and the defeat of many business litigation plaintiffs:

Evading The Obvious Spirit of the Agreement:

Huntsman and its lawyers at Shearman & Sterling and Vinson & Elkins were able to negotiate a merger agreement that all but locked Hexion into the acquisition. There was no "financing out," which meant that Hexion would have to pay a $325 million termination fee if it failed-despite using best efforts-to obtain debt financing. The material adverse effect clause, as Lamb would later remark, was also "narrowly tailored." And though one of the parties had to deliver a solvency letter to the banks funding the deal, there was no "solvency out" for Hexion.

The deal also included a provision that later proved harmful to Apollo. Though the agreement capped Hexion's liability at $325 million if it couldn't complete the deal despite making "best efforts," it allowed for uncapped damages in the event of a "knowing and intentional breach of any covenant" by Hexion, a provision more often seen in deals with strategic acquirors.

If you want to be able to back out of an agreement, leave in place mechanisms by which you can. Huntsman smartly negotiated an agreement locking Hexion / Apollo into the deal.

I've seen plenty of sophisticated individuals and business make or break contracts in a manner charitably described as commercially unreasonable. I can't fix those mistakes. If you walked away from a good deal because you were afraid, I can't enforce it. If you consented to an air-tight contract because you desperately wanted the deal, I can't undo it. There's a lot I can do, but where the case would revolve around an issue fairly negotiated and clearly incorporated into the contract, that usually ends the story unless you can show fraud or fraudulent misrepresentation.

I don't know what fee arrangement Apollo had with Wachtell; Wachtell does a fair amount of contingent fee work, particularly in the mergers & acquisitions arena, and it seems like they really believed in their case, as Marty Lipton apparently assured Apollo victory at trial.

But that's not always the situation. We represent business litigation clients on a contingent fee, most of whom quickly pick up on the idea of a partnership in the litigation. Frankly, if your lawyer isn't willing to shoulder some of the risk of your lawsuit, you should ask yourself why not.

Making The Facts Fit Your Lawyer's Strategy:

Apollo arrived at the meeting, according to testimony from Apollo partner Jordan Zaken, focused on the contract's material adverse effect clause: If Huntsman's declining numbers constituted an MAE, Hexion could walk away without even paying the deal's $325 million termination fee. But Wolinsky had to know that was a long shot. Delaware courts have never found a MAE in the context of a merger agreement, and Wolinsky himself helped to litigate the precedent-setting case on the issue, IBP, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., in 2001.

Instead, Apollo and Wachtell began to consider the combined company's potential insolvency as a possible way out of the merger. The strategy was certainly intriguing. If the merger would result in an insolvent company, the banks could refuse to finance it, leaving Hexion with no choice but to abandon the deal. And if it were the banks-not Hexion-scuttling the deal, Hexion would be liable for, at most, the breakup fee.

Lawyers are smart, creative and innovative (or should be). They can change their strategies to meet a wide variety of fact patterns.

But facts are stubborn things. Trying to create facts, even in the midst of litigation, create a huge risk that the judge or jury will find your whole case to be a farce constructed for their benefit, which is what happened here: Judge Lamb ruled that insolvency wasn't even ripe for judgment.

Voiding Your Legal Protections, Like Attorney-Client Privilege:

Wolinsky explained that Wachtell was potentially interested in a formal solvency opinion, but also wanted to hire Duff in a "consultative arrangement to assess the solvency analysis," according to testimony from Duff's Philip Wisler. The firm would use Duff & Phelps, in other words, for two roles: a litigation consulting team that would provide various financial analyses to assess the possibility of deal litigation, and an opinion team that would be engaged if Hexion decided "to go forward with a particular course of action," namely litigation to end the merger.

...

From the beginning, Duff's efforts to separate the consulting and opinion teams were imperfect, at best. Wisler, for instance, attended the May 20 kickoff meeting for the litigation consulting team at Apollo's New York offices, even though he was to be the author of the insolvency opinion. The same Duff expert performed modeling work for both teams. And litigation team leader Pfeiffer, at Wachtell's request, e-mailed Wisler various deal models for the opinion analysis; Wisler later testified that he was unaware he was supposed to be walled off from Pfeiffer's work.

...

The blurry line between Duff's consulting and opinion work would later come back to haunt Wachtell in Delaware. Vice-Chancellor Lamb ultimately concluded that Duff's consulting assignment cast doubt on the objectivity of its solvency opinion. Moreover, the dual role destroyed any potential work-product privilege claim over the Hexion team's communications with both the Duff litigation consultants and solvency experts. Duff had to provide comprehensive discovery to Huntsman, which was a huge gift to Huntsman's Vinson & Elkins litigators.

Remember the Watchmen suit where a witness' testimony was so guarded and unhelpful the Court precluded the witness from testifying on the subject again, thereby warranting summary judgment?

If you misuse or abuse the law's protections and privileges, you run the risk of having them deemed waived or void by the court, as happened here. It's the same when clever businesses set up a variety of undercapitalized or alter ego LLCs and S-Corporations to evade liability -- odds are good the court will respond by striking the house of cards and seeing what's left standing, often nothing.

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You can't click two links on a law practice website these days without getting a good dose of how important it is that lawyers get up to speed with social media. Kevin O'Keefe, head of LexBlog (which hosts this site), suggests focusing on the big three: blogs, Twitter, and LinkedIn.

I got my blog. I got my Twitter.

LinkedIn?

Here's how Gina Rubel, as part of her extensive "Social Media for Lawyers" series at The Legal Intelligencer's blog, described LinkedIn:

Linkedin is one of the oldest and most established professional networking sites on the Web. ... Linkedin is conservative, professional, adheres to a strict set of rules, business-oriented, highly visible in search engines and an easy point of entry for lawyers. For the most part, it serves as an online curriculum vitae (C.V.) or resume which can be linked to your firm’s Web site.

True. It's also true that LinkedIn treats users with same respect in drafting its terms of service that consumers have come to expect from used car dealers, credit card companies, and subprime lenders.

Read their User Agreement:

1.  Your Obligations — What You Must Do

License and warrant your submissions: You do not have to submit anything to us, but if you choose to submit something (including any User generated content, ideas, concepts, techniques and data), you must grant, and you actually grant by concluding this Agreement, a nonexclusive, irrevocable, worldwide, perpetual, unlimited, assignable, sublicenseable, fully paid up and royaltyfree right to us to copy, prepare derivative works of, improve, distribute, publish, remove, retain, add, and use and commercialize, in any way now known or in the future discovered, anything that you submit to us, without any further consent, notice and/or compensation to you or to any third parties. By submitting any information to us, you represent and warrant that such submission is accurate, is not confidential, and is not in violation of any contractual restrictions or other third party rights. You further agree to inform LinkedIn in the event that any such information has changed since your registration with LinkedIn and, if appropriate, you agree to make such modifications yourself to your profile.

It's just as bad as Facebook's hated and rescinded Terms of Use, which claimed to own all of your content forever, with an added bonus in the last two sentences: you agree that everything you submitted is accurate and you agree to keep LinkedIn's information up-to-date.

Got that? Apparently most people don't; I found only one blog post on the subject, a month ago at Web.Tech.Law. Technorati says no one has linked to it. I found one link on a "social media roundup."

That needs to change.

LinkedIn is building its Web 2.0 Yellow Pages, and by ever submitting anything -- like your name, address, place of business, connections, recommendations and content like forum posts -- you agree to let LinkedIn use it forever and that you will take the initiative to update all of it if any of it ever changes.

But what if I terminate my account?

You granted them an "irrevocable" and "perpetual" license to all content and information you ever submit to the site, and imposed a duty on yourself to keep that content and information accurate and current, so what makes you think it could really be a "revocable" or "limited duration" license?

Before you turn those wheels, note that their User Agreement details exactly what happens when you terminate:

7.  Consequences of Termination

Upon termination, you lose access to LinkedIn. The terms of this Agreement shall survive any termination, except Sections 2 and 3 hereof.

The perpetual duty for users to supply accurate and current information for LinkedIn's business is in Section 1. It "survives."

What gets terminated? Section 2, "Your Rights — What You May Do" and Section 3, "Our Rights and Obligations — What We Must And May Do." Termination ends only "Your Rights" and Their "Obligations."

Will LinkedIn ever exercise these rights in an adversarial fashion? 

Probably not. Like I wrote yesterday, "A right with a remedy worse than the harm is not a right anyone will enforce." Trying to enforce these rights would likely cause a mass exodus from the platform.

But that's just theory, contradicted by the plain meaning of the words in the agreement. Moreover, all bets are off if the company goes into distress. Regardless, the core question remains: if LinkedIn doesn't plan on compelling users to keep its professional database accurate and current or to use its users' content commercial without permission, then why does it need these terms?

Ask a used car dealer.

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Fresh off the presses is Acumed LLC v. Advanced Surgical Servs., 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 5854 (3d Cir., March 20, 2009), a charming setup in the insanely hostile and competitive world of medical devices:

Acumed is a manufacturer of surgical implants and related devices, and appellant [Morris] and [Advanced Surgical Services] are in the business of distributing surgical implants and other medical devices for various manufacturers, including Acumed, to hospitals and surgeons. ... At the trial, Ryan Crognale, a sales representative for appellant, explained his view of the events that Casey described at Nazareth Hospital. Crognale testified that Morris directed him to deliver the implants to Nazareth and to attend the surgery. He then stated that after his earlier delivery of Acumed implants, he returned to the hospital and saw Casey in the operating room and observed that the physician doing the procedure was "not using my stuff anyway." Consequently, Crognale took the tray of instruments he previously had delivered and left the operating room. Thus, it appears that the physician performing the procedure used materials Acumed supplied through Surgical, its authorized representative.

As Crognale was leaving the surgery center, he encountered Casey, and an argument between the two representatives ensued. Appellant contends that during the argument Casey loudly accused Crognale of illegally selling Acumed inventory, an incident that appellant contends led Dr. Robert Frederick, a doctor at Nazareth, to stop doing business with it. Moreover, appellant contends that because of Dr. Frederick's connection with a large group of physicians in Philadelphia, the confrontation was a factor in a decision by Jefferson Hospital in Philadelphia to exclude Morris from its operating theater for one year. As a result of the incident at Nazareth Hospital, Acumed sent another notice to its customers stating that Surgical was its only authorized representative in eastern Pennsylvania and southern New Jersey.

Can you guess what happened next?

Appellees filed the complaint in this action against appellant in the District Court charging it with violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125, violation of Pennsylvania's Anti-Dilution statute, 54 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1124 (West 1996), unfair competition, breach of a non-disclosure provision in the Advanced-Acumed Agreement, conversion, unjust enrichment, and tortious interference with existing or prospective contractual relationships.

...

Appellant filed a four-count counterclaim against appellees. In counts I, II, and III appellant charged that Acumed breached its contract with appellant by not providing timely notice of termination of their relationship and by failing to pay the contractually required buy-out fee that became due to appellant when Acumed terminated their relationship. In addition, appellant charged that Acumed's failure to pay the buy-out fee violated the Pennsylvania Commissioned Sales Representatives statute, 43 P.S. §§ 1471 et seq. (West 1991). In count IV ("counterclaim IV") appellant alleged that Acumed and Surgical ". . .converted property belonging to Advanced, defamed and disparaged Advanced maliciously and falsely, intentionally interfered with Advanced's contractual and business relationships and competed unfairly against Advanced."

After a little more than a week of trial...

The jury returned a verdict on March 21, 2007, finding for appellees on their count against appellant for tortious interference with existing or prospective contractual relationships with appellees' customers. The jury, however, rejected appellees' claim that appellant had tortiously interfered with Acumed's and Surgical's contractual relationship between themselves and also rejected appellees' other claims, including appellees' Lanham Act claims. The jury also found against appellant on the portions of its counterclaims that had survived the District Court's dismissals, i.e., the claims predicated on breach of contract and violation of the Pennsylvania Commissioned Sales Representatives statute. The jury awarded $ 20,000 in compensatory damages to Surgical and $ 0 in compensatory damages to Acumed on the tortious interference claim but found that both Acumed and Surgical were entitled to punitive damages. ... The jury then returned a verdict awarding $ 1 in nominal damages to Acumed and punitive damages to both Acumed and Surgical Resources in the amount of $ 100,000 each.

Uh oh.

As we indicated above, to recover on a tortious intentional interference with existing or prospective contractual relationships claim in Pennsylvania, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant was not privileged or justified in interfering with its contracts: "While some jurisdictions consider a justification for a defendant's interference to be an affirmative defense, Pennsylvania courts require the plaintiff, as part of his prima facie case, to show that the defendant's conduct was not justified." Triffin v. Janssen, 426 Pa. Super. 57, 626 A.2d 571, 574 n.3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (citing Thompson Coal 412 A.2d at 471 n.7); Silver v. Mendel, 894 F.2d 598, 602 n.6 (3d Cir. 1990). We hasten to add, however, that our conclusion does not depend on the allocation of the burden of proof on the privilege issue, as we would reach our result even if appellant had the burden of proof to establish the privilege as a defense, because the evidence established conclusively that appellant did so.

Pennsylvania has adopted section 768 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which recognizes that competitors, in certain circumstances, are privileged in the course of competition to interfere with others' prospective contractual relationships. See Gilbert v. Otterson, 379 Pa. Super. 481, 550 A.2d 550, 554 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988). The law necessarily recognizes this privilege because if more than one party seeks to sell similar products to prospective purchasers, both necessarily are interfering with the other's attempt to do the same thing. Moreover, even if an entity has an existing contractual relationship with another entity, a stranger to the relationship must be privileged to seek to replace one of the entities lest competition be stifled. Thus, under section 768: "[o]ne who intentionally causes a third person not to enter into a prospective contractual relation with another who is his competitor or not to continue an existing contract terminable at will does not interfere improperly with the other's relation if: (a) the relation concerns [*37] a matter involved in the competition between the actor and the other; (b) the actor does not employ wrongful means; (c) his action does not create or continue an unlawful restraint of trade; and (d) his purpose is at least in part to advance his interest in competing with the other."

...

Comment e to section 768 elaborates on the type of conduct that constitutes wrongful means: "If the actor employs wrongful means, he is not justified under the rule stated in this Section. The predatory means discussed in § 767, Comment c, physical violence, fraud, civil suits and criminal prosecutions, are all wrongful in the situation covered by this Section." Courts relying on comment e have interpreted the wrongful means element to require that a plaintiff, to be successful in a tortious interference action, demonstrate that a defendant engaged in conduct that was actionable on a basis independent of the interference claim. See Brokerage Concepts, 140 F.3d at 531 (citing DP-Tek, Inc. v. A T & T Global Info. Solutions Co., 100 F.3d 828, 833-35 (10th Cir. 1996)). Moreover, we noted in 2000 that even though the Pennsylvania courts have not interpreted the "wrongful means" element of section 768, it is likely that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would adopt this meaning, that is, for conduct to be wrongful it must be actionable for a reason independent from the claim of tortious interference itself. See Nat'l Data Payment Sys., Inc. v. Meridian Bank, 212 F.3d 849, 858 (3d Cir. 2000); see also CGB Occupational Therapy, Inc. v. RHA Health Servs. Inc., 357 F.3d 375, 389 (3d Cir. 2004). Nothing in later Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions to which the parties have directed our attention or of which we are aware leads us to change our view of this issue.

I'm sure you can imagine what happened next.

We therefore will reverse the District Court's order of May 21, 2007, to the extent that it denied appellant a judgment as a matter of law on the tortious interference claim, and will remand the case to the District Court for it to enter judgment as a matter of law in favor of appellant on that claim and to set aside the prior judgment on the claim. As a result, we also will reverse the jury's award of compensatory and punitive damages against appellant and the District Court's grant of an injunction in appellees' favor.

That's why business contingent fee cases demand such a high fee and why commercial litigators have to be so selective in the cases they take. On the most basic level, appellees won in the District Court and at trial and post-trial after years of complicated, intense litigation and trial.

How complicated? The Third Circuit Court of Appeal's opinion is a whopping 18,785 words, about one-fifth the length of a typical paperback novel. The briefs from the complaint to the appeal no doubt exceeded 100,000 words.

And the plaintiffs walked away with nothing.

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In law school, financial fraud is so simple -- Gollum tells Frodo something that isn't true, Frodo relies on the false statement, then Gollum steals the precious and runs away.

The reality is a little more complicated. Take, for example, what New Line Cinema did to Peter Jackson for the Lord of the Rings trilogy, prompting Jackson to sue:

The suit charges that the company used pre-emptive bidding (meaning a process closed to external parties) rather than open bidding for subsidiary rights to such things as "Lord of the Rings" books, DVD's and merchandise. Therefore, New Line received far less than market value for these rights, the suit says.

Most of those rights went to other companies in the New Line family or under the Time Warner corporate umbrella, like Warner Brothers International, Warner Records and Warner Books. So while the deals would not hurt Time Warner's bottom line, they would lower the overall gross revenues related to the film, which is the figure Mr. Jackson's percentage is based on.

According to people on both sides of Mr. Jackson's lawsuit, the claim strikes at the heart of the modern vertically integrated media company. One of the apparent - though largely unproven - benefits of media integration is the ability of conglomerates like the Walt Disney Company, Time Warner, the News Corporation, Viacom, Sony and General Electric to sell subsidiary rights to the many divisions within the company.

After 408 docket entries, including such fun as a $125,000 sanction order for defendant's refusal to comply with discovery, the case was settled.

In my own practice, these types of unfair insider deals with alter-ego entities comprise the bulk of financial fraud amongst members of a partnership, limited liability company (LLC), or corporation. The method of the fraud is dependent upon the target. If a partner wants to defraud another partner, they will set up a sham alter-ego entity and then engage in blatantly unfair transactions with it. If a partner or group of partners want to defraud an outside auditor or shareholders, they will set up a sham alter-ego entity and then unload assets or liabilities onto that entity.

That's what Enron and AIG both did to hide the fact that both were taking on liabilities and debt far greater than they could hope to repay if the market went south: they created baloney entities and deals that masked the source and destination of funds, assets and liabilities.

Given the frequency of this fraud, and Wall Street's evident skill in utilizing it, I was none too pleased to see Geithner's WSJ Op-Ed and this announcement:

• The Process for Purchasing Assets Through The Legacy Loans Program: Purchasing assets in the Legacy Loans Program will occur through the following process:
  • Banks Identify the Assets They Wish to Sell: To start the process, banks will decide which assets – usually a pool of loans – they would like to sell. The FDIC will conduct an analysis to determine the amount of funding it is willing to guarantee. Leverage will not exceed a 6-to-1 debt-to-equity ratio. Assets eligible for purchase will be determined by the participating banks, their primary regulators, the FDIC and Treasury. Financial institutions of all sizes will be eligible to sell assets.
  • Pools Are Auctioned Off to the Highest Bidder: The FDIC will conduct an auction for these pools of loans. The highest bidder will have access to the Public-Private Investment Program to fund 50 percent of the equity requirement of their purchase.
  • Financing Is Provided Through FDIC Guarantee: If the seller accepts the purchase price, the buyer would receive financing by issuing debt guaranteed by the FDIC. The FDIC-guaranteed debt would be collateralized by the purchased assets and the FDIC would receive a fee in return for its guarantee.
  • Private Sector Partners Manage the Assets:Once the assets have been sold, private fund managers will control and manage the assets until final liquidation, subject to strict FDIC oversight.

Liberal economists like Paul Krugman are on balance opposed, with the notable exception of Brad Delong.

But let's put aside economics and look at it from the perspective of a Wall Street banker.

Considering the Treasury's stubborn refusal to even identify the recipients of existing bailout funds (with rare exceptions, like the partial list of AIG counterparties) and penchant for creating its own slew of vehicles (for example, the Term Auction Facility, the Term Securities Lending Facility, the Primary Dealer Credit Facility, the Commercial Paper Funding Facility, the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility, the Money Market Investor Funding Facility, and Maiden Lane I, II and III), I have little doubt the new process will be as transparent as a chunk of coal.

Wall Street and their lawyers -- one of whom almost got a top spot at Treasury -- will have little trouble creating a slew of Special Purpose Vehicles / Entities (or repurposing existing, loss-laden hedge funds) for the sole purpose of bidding the price even higher than the expected value and unleashing that huge, 85% no-recourse Federal loan guarantee.

That makes the whole thing a win-win for Wall Street: it's like setting up "Toxic Assets LLC" then using an >85% government subsidy to "buy" everything at your own garage sale at inflated prices.

If your junk is worthless, it doesn't matter, since you set a price more than high enough to make a profit when you first sold it, taking into consideration the modest capital you put into Toxic Assets LLC.

I'm sure Treasury will put together a handful of half-hearted competitive bidding limitations that will say the exact same company that owns the assets can't bid on them, and I'm sure Wall Street will have no trouble finding its way around these limitations. I then expect to see these "legacy assets" go for sale at impressive, expectation-shattering levels, which will be hailed as a success.

A few months or years later, totally unexpected, the entities that bought these "legacy assets" will go bankrupt, pleading that they did the best they could to help the American taxpayer, and, gee whiz, we lost some money, too.

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The top officials at Treasury have already set aside all of the broad governmental powers available (claiming we are a "nation of laws"), so let's look at the United States purely as an angel investor which saw a large company faltering and swooped in with an 80% equity investment. Uncle Sam has just learned about the following (AIGFP is the “Financial Products” division of AIG, the morons responsible for wiring the global economy to explode by writing trillions of dollars in undercapitalized “credit default swap” policies):

In the first quarter of 2008 [a few months prior to the equity purchase], AIGFP adopted a retention plan for about 400 employees that provided guaranteed payments to employees if they worked through specified payment dates (or either resigned for good reason or was terminated without cause before the relevant dates). At the time, AIGFP was expected to have a valuable, on-going role at AIG. The plan was implemented because there was a significant risk of departures among employees at AIGFP, and given the $2.7 trillion of derivative positions at AIGFP at that time, retention incentives appeared to be in the best interest of all of AIG’s stakeholders. The program was evidenced by a written plan distributed to employees and by individual agreements executed by them.

For senior management the plan provides that 2008 and 2009 compensation will be 75% of 2007 expected compensation levels. Other participants are set at the full 2007 level. This resulted in a $313 million total for 2008 and a $327 million total for 2009 (because some employees who had other guaranteed compensation for 2008 were excluded for that year).

Frustratingly, had AIG merely gone bankrupt instead being saved by the investment, then these would likely be voidable by the trustee as excessive insider transactions under 11 USC § 547. (Indeed, if AIG goes bankrupt soon, we’re still within the “1 year and 90 days” window to use § 547.)

At the moment, we don’t have the text of the contracts, and so can’t determine if any of the doctrines listed in this exhaustive Concurring Opinions post would apply. Personally, I think commercial impracticability / frustration of purpose are realistic options here given AIG’s total dependence upon the government’s grace.

But let’s assume the contract is, on its face, iron-clad, properly drafted, formed, accepted, and with all conditions met.

What’s a cheated shareholder to do?

Unsurprisingly, American International Group, Inc., was incorporated in Delaware, the least-shareholder-friendly jurisdiction in the country (which is why management loves it), so we’ll look to Delaware law.

Generally, prior to launching a derivative suit on behalf of the company, a shareholder must send a demand letter to the board of directors, demanding they, in this instance, not go through with the transaction. Here, however, a court would likely find the demand letter requirement excused as “futile” given AIG CEO Edward Liddy’s letter to Treasury Secretary Geithner asserting that AIG intended to go through with the payments despite his complaints.

So we’re past the first hurdle, and can sue on behalf of AIG, as shareholders at the time this payment is being made. But the bar is set quite high for us. Unsurprisingly,

The AIG certificate of incorporation has a § 102(b)(7) clause that insulates AIG's directors from liability for monetary damages for any harm flowing from their gross negligence. See Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1095-96 (Del. 2001) (affirming the dismissal of a duty of care claim where the corporation's charter had an exculpatory provision).

We'll get to the source of this quote in a minute. For now, "gross negligence" isn't even enough to sue a director.

So who do we sue and what do we allege?

Like most plaintiffs, we start hobbled by a lack of information. What the heck does the white paper mean that “This amount is due pursuant to a retention plan entered into in early 2008?” Entered into by whom, and with whom, after what process?

Talking Points Memo points us to the NY Daily News regarding how AIGFP functioned:

Company auditor Joseph St. Denis became concerned about the Financial Products unit, but [Joseph Cassano, head of AIG Financial Products] barred him from checking.

St. Denis later quoted Cassano as saying, "I have deliberately excluded you ... because I was concerned that you would pollute the process."

St. Denis would recall Cassano saying he did not want to be promoted even further up the corporate ladder "because it would separate [him] from the money." St. Denis would remember Cassano telling him "AIG's corporate management was "scared to death" of him."

Oh my. That's not much of an internal process at all. It sounds like they're just running a criminal organization in there, or at the very least had inadequate internal controls that were too easily bypassed by the insiders.

We don't have to look far to figure out if we can sue for that. Just a month ago, the Delaware Court of Chancery (New Castle) refused to dismiss a shareholder complaint against AIG because,

The Complaint fairly supports the assertion that AIG's Inner Circle led a -- and I use this term with knowledge of its strength -- criminal organization. The diversity, pervasiveness, and materiality of the alleged financial wrongdoing at AIG is extraordinary. The proposition that Matthews and Tizzio, who the Complaint fairly alleges were directly knowledgeable of and involved in much of the wrongdoing, did not also know that AIG's internal controls were inadequate and too easily bypassed is not, for present purposes, an interpretation to ground a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal order on. Indeed, for present purposes, it is inferable that even when Matthews and Tizzio were not directly complicitous in the wrongful schemes, they were aware of the schemes and knowingly failed to stop them. In that regard, I find it inferable that Matthews and Tizzio were aware of misconduct that should have been brought to the attention of AIG's independent directors (including the Audit Committee) but chose to conceal their knowledge, despite having a fiduciary duty to speak."

Am. Int'l Group, Inc. v. Greenberg, No. C.A. No. 769-VCS, 2009 Del. Ch. LEXIS 15, at *77–78 (Del. Ch. Feb. 10, 2009). For more, see the Delaware Corporate & Commercial Litigation Blog which, alongside The D&O Diary and the Harvard Law School Corporate Governance Forum, sets the bar for reporting on these cases.

In that suit, Greenberg, Matthews and Tizzio were all directors, who are the normal targets of shareholder suits, because their actions are generally insured by policies previously paid for by the company.

But we're not limited to them -- recent amendments to 10 Del. C. § 3114 assure us jurisdiction in Delaware over directors, trustees, members and officers of all corporations incorporated in Delaware. It's not clear exactly what Cassano's position was, but the "head" of anything is generally an officer of some sort. So we've got him, even if he's never set foot in Delaware. At the very least, we can sue whatever directors or officers were involved in this transaction -- several hundred million dollars doesn't walk out the door without someone blessing it.

Then what? Assuming even we can't prove outright fraud by these 400 employees, we still have the blatant breach of fiduciary duty by excluding the auditor. As such, the whole plan, even as it relates to "innocent" parties, can be reformulated under Delaware law:

The glaring problem with the defendants' argument is again a category error -- this is not a contract case involving the reformation of a contract to effectuate the parties' intent; it is a fiduciary duty case, and this court has broad discretion to remedy breaches of fiduciary duty, including reformation when, as here, that is appropriate to remedy a fiduciary violation. See, e.g., Thorpe v. CERBCO, Inc., 676 A.2d 436, 445 (Del. 1996) ('Delaware law dictates that the scope of recovery for a breach of the duty of loyalty is not to be determined narrowly.'); Taylor v. Jones, 2006 Del. Ch. LEXIS 100, 2006 WL 1510437, at (Del. Ch. May 25, 2006) (noting that a resulting trust may be an appropriate remedy even though the prerequisites to a resulting trust under the modern, majority approach were not present and that this court's 'historical readiness to adapt to the circumstances of each case and craft appropriate remedies . . . should not be lightly discarded or circumscribed'); Cantor Fitzgerald L.P. v. Cantor, 2001 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70, 2001 WL 536911, at (Del. Ch. May 11, 2001) (awarding fee shifting in as a remedy for a breach of the duty of loyalty despite an express contractual provision providing otherwise and explaining that 'when the facts demonstrate behavior as egregious as that here, the Court's normal deference to pre-negotiated partnership agreement provisions will yield to a conscientious effort to craft an appropriate remedy')."

GPC XLI L.L.C. v. Loral Space & Communs. Consol. Litig. (In re Loral Space & Communs. Consol. Litig.), C.A. No. 2808-VCS, C.A. No. 3022-VCS, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 136, at *7–123–5–3–124 n.161 (Del. Ch. Sept. 19, 2008).

If we are a "nation of laws," why not use some of them?

UPDATE Steven M. Davidoff at DealBook gets it:

This was not a boilerplate contract. Rather, it was highly negotiated. And it was highly negotiated to pay retention fees at high levels without regard to performance. This is obviously shocking. But it makes me wonder: perhaps one area of direction here should be actually looking at who negotiated this and why?

It strikes me that the A.I.G. financial products division received an unbelievably sweet deal. Did its managers slip it under the radar? Did the managers act in good faith? And who at A.I.G. signed off on this and did they focus on the risks and rewards? Yet more avenues for possible litigation.

But of course, this is all merely a diversion for what should be the main focus: Where did the $170 billion go that taxpayers spent on A.I.G and why, and what we are going to do with A.I.G. going forward.

 

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New to the site? Haven't been here in a while? Here are some of the most popular posts over the past few weeks.

Litigations and Trials:

• Managing Expectations in Defamation Cases: A Legendary Trial Lawyer Faces His First Malpractice Suit
• $120 Million In Hourly Billing For A Single Trial: What Happened In Robertson v. Princeton?
• How Not To Spend $120 Million In Hourly Fees On A Single Trial: A Few Questions for Robertson v. Princeton
• The Watchmen Movie Ruling: How Typical Lawyer Obstructionism Can Destroy Your Case
• "Quinn Emanuel Hit With Malpractice Suit" -- More Business Contingent-Fee Madness

Law Practice:

• Creating "The Black Triangle," A Critical Step Before Any Trial, Deposition or Brief
• "The End of Leverage"? What Are BigLaw Associates Really Worth?
• "Remember That Profits Equal Revenues Minus Costs" - The Real Reason for the Billable Hour's Impending Demise

Current Events:

• Can the Octuplets Sue for Medical Malpractice? (Part 1 of 2)
• Differential Diagnosis, Defensive Medicine and Medical Malpractice: Coumadin Edition
• 25 Things About Facebook's Terms of Use and Your Rights
• Facebook and the Law of Stealth Changes in Consumer Contracts

Recent Court Opinions:

• Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court Limits the Special Value to the Plaintiff Damages Doctrine
• Reminder: Contract Disputes Act Requires You Exhaust Administrative Remedies Before Suing the United States Government
• An Ounce of Prevention: Dismissal Upheld In Derivative Suit Because of Independent Inquiry
• The Third Circuit's 1:1 Punitive Damages Ruling: The Lingering Complications of State Farm v. Campbell

 

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After the firestorm of criticism last week, including on this blog, Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg announced (on Facebook's blog and in a media conference call):

Beginning today, we are giving you a greater opportunity to voice your opinion over how Facebook is governed. We're starting this off by publishing two new documents for your review and comment. The first is the Facebook Principles, which defines your rights and will serve as the guiding framework behind any policy we'll consider—or the reason we won't consider others. The second document is the Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, which will replace the existing Terms of Use. With both documents, we tried hard to simplify the language so you have a clear understanding of how Facebook will be run. We've created separate groups for each document so you can read them and provide comments and feedback. You can find the Facebook Principles here and the Statement of Rights and Responsibilities here. Before these new proposals go into effect, you'll also have the ability to vote for or against proposed changes.

Credit where it is due: the new "Statement of Rights and Responsibilities" describes the legal relationship between users and Facebook the way that Facebook's officers have been describing it.

In short: users retain total control over their content, and can terminate Facebook's license at will. Users still can't really sue Facebook for anything, but might be able to sue developers or operators of third-party applications if they breach the new terms.

In long, start with governing law:

14.1 You will resolve any claim, cause of action or dispute (“claim”) you have with us arising out of or relating to this Statement or Facebook in a state or federal court located in Santa Clara County. The laws of the State of California will govern this Statement, as well as any claim that might arise between you and us, without regard to conflict of law provisions. You agree to submit to the personal jurisdiction of the courts located in Santa Clara County, California for the purpose of litigating all such claims.

Good news! As noted before, California has very pro-consumer laws. You'll also notice that Facebook got rid of the class action waiver (which was likely illegal anyway) and the arbitration requirement, too. No longer must you drop $6,000 or more just to start an arbitration against them.

Then, the licensing, the part that caused so much trouble last time:

You own all of the content and information you post on Facebook, including information about you and the actions you take (“content”). In order for us to share your content and provide you with our services, you agree to the following:

2.1 You give us permission to use, store, and share content you post on Facebook or otherwise make available to us (“post”), subject to your privacy and application settings.
2.2 You may delete your content or your account at any time with the understanding that removed information may persist in backup copies for a reasonable period of time (but will not be generally available to other users), and that content shared with others may remain until they delete it.
2.3 For content that is covered by intellectual property rights (like photos and videos), you specifically give us the following permission, subject to your privacy and application settings: you grant us a non-exclusive, transferable, sub-licensable, royalty-free, worldwide license to use, copy, publicly perform or display, distribute, modify, translate, and create derivative works of (“use”) any content you post on or in connection with Facebook. This license ends when you delete your content or your account.
2.4 We always appreciate your feedback or other suggestions about Facebook, but you understand that we may use them without any obligation to compensate you for them (just as you have no obligation to offer them).

(Emphasis mine). Finally! No more fussing around with ambiguity: Facebook twice reiterates that their license is "subject to your privacy and application settings," and that deleting either your content or your account terminates the license to that content.

That is exactly how users expect the system to operate. Facebook also omitted the annoying and erroneous "irrevocable" from the license.

I'll have more to say later. But let me raise one really interesting issue:

9. Special Provisions Applicable to Developers/Operators of Applications and Websites

If you are a developer or operator of a Platform application or a website using Connect (“application”), the following additional terms apply to you:

9.2 When users add your application or connect it to their Facebook account, they give permission for you to receive certain data relating to them. Your access to and use of that data will be limited as follows:
9.2.1 You will only use the data you receive for your application, and will only use it in connection with Facebook.
9.2.2 You will make it clear to users how you are going to use, display, or share their data.
9.2.3 You will not use, display, or share a user’s data in a manner inconsistent with the user’s privacy settings without the user’s consent.
9.2.4 You will delete all data you received from us relating to any user who removes or disconnects from your application unless the user gives you permission to keep it.
9.2.5 You will delete all data you received from Facebook if we disable your application or ask you to do so.
9.2.6 We can require you to update any data you have received from us.
9.2.7 We can limit your access to data.
9.2.8 You will not transfer the data you receive from us without our prior consent.
9.3 You will not give us data that you independently collect from a user or a user’s content without that user’s consent.

...

That would appear to make users "third-party beneficiaries" to Facebook's relationship with developers / operators of Facebook or Connect services. Which means users would likely have standing to sue if that developer / operator violated the terms, including violations of privacy settings (under 9.2.3).

Here's a California appellate court from just two weeks ago:

"Under Civil Code section 1559, a third party can enforce the terms of a contract 'made expressly for the benefit of [the] third person.' 'Expressly' in this context is interpreted to mean 'merely the negative of 'incidentally.'' (Gilbert Financial Corp. v. Steelform Contracting Co. (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 65, 70 [145 Cal. Rptr. 448].) The contract need not be exclusively for the benefit of the third party in order to permit enforcement, and the third party does not need to be the sole or the primary beneficiary. Further, the third party need not be identified as a beneficiary, or even named, in the contract. (Prouty v. Gores Tecology Group, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1232–1233.) 'If the terms of the contract necessarily require the promisor to confer a benefit on a third person, then the contract, and hence the parties thereto, contemplate a benefit to the third person. The parties are presumed to intend the consequences of a performance of the contract.' (Joson v. Holmes Tuttle Lincoln-Merc. (1958) 160 Cal.App.2d 290, 297 [325 P.2d 193].)"

National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. Cambridge Integrated Services Group, Inc., No. A120072, 2009 Cal. App. LEXIS 170, at *25–26 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2009).

Here's the statute itself:

A contract, made expressly for the benefit of a third person, may be enforced by him at any time before the parties thereto rescind it.

Cal Civ Code § 1559 (2008).

That's great for users, but I'm sure developers and operators will have something to say about it Are they ready to be legally bound to users by Facebook's terms?

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Now that Facebook has rescinded its "new" Terms, let's talk about 13 problems with the Terms, 2 questions to consider about the site, and 10 changes Facebook should make.

If you see “new Terms” below, that refers to the Terms Facebook enacted on February 4, 2009, then rescinded. “Old Terms” refers to the Terms in place before then, which are now the current terms.

13 THINGS YOU SHOULD KNOW ABOUT FACEBOOK'S CURRENT TERMS OF USE

1. Facebook wants to make money using your information. That doesn't make them evil; users worldwide are fine with Google, another free service,  reading their searches and emails to target advertising. But Facebook isn't a charity, and their current business model is aimed at sending you targeted advertising or at finding a way to monetize what they know about you. Keep that goal -- and not the goal of "sharing" -- in mind when you consider Facebook's Terms.  Keep in mind, too, what would happen with your information if Facebook was sold to another company. 

2. Facebook has the right to use your  information and content  "for any purpose, commercial, advertising or otherwise." Your use "automatically grants" them "an irrevocable, perpetual, non-exclusive, transferable, fully paid, worldwide license" to anything you  put on the service, and, for the new Terms, anything you enabled someone else to post, like if you put a "Share on Facebook" button on your blog. The old Terms permit you to terminate this license by removing your content from the site. The new Terms did not recognize that right of termination; Facebook could use your content forever, for any purpose, without your permission. That's what the hoopla was all about.

3. Facebook collects information on you from sources other than your posted content. As their Privacy policy says, "We may use information about you that we collect from other sources, including but not limited to newspapers and Internet sources such as blogs, instant messaging services, Facebook Platform developers and other users of Facebook, to supplement your profile."

4. Facebook has, in the past, broadcast user's private information in ways users didn't want or expect. Two notable examples were the "Beacon" service, which defaulted to broadcasting what users did on third-party sites (e.g., what products they bought) and the misleading "deactivation" policy, in which closing an account merely "deactivated" it without prohibiting access to any of the  content . Facebook has also been criticized for confusing privacy settings -- for example, by inputing your location you have automatically joined that locality's "network," and thus by default are accessible through searches by people in that area.

5. Facebook wants to use your name, likeness and image for their commercial purposes. The new Terms had a license not just your content, but your very identity,  which they could use  for commercial  purposes like using your name to endorse or market products.The reason Facebook wanted this additional license seems clear: the "Beacon" service above, which Facebook had to retreat from, likely violated existing laws in many states, particularly New York, prohibiting the use of another's likeness in an advertisement without proper consent and compensation. The new Terms tried to run  around those laws. Recall, too, that Facebook would have had that right forever.

6. Facebook can sell information about you to third parties. Their privacy policy says they may "use" your information "without identifying you as an individual," and that they "do not provide contact information to third party marketers without your permission." Everything else is fair game.

7. Facebook can delete your whole account without warning. Under both Terms, Facebook can pull the plug "for any or no reason, at any time in our sole discretion, with or without notice."

8. The content Terms are so onerous they ban even the "25 Things" meme. "User conduct" says "you agree not to use the Service or the Site to ... upload, post, transmit, share or otherwise make available any ... chain letters." Oops. The old Terms also ban "any content that we deem to be harmful, threatening, unlawful, defamatory, infringing, abusive, inflammatory, harassing, vulgar, obscene, fraudulent, invasive of privacy or publicity rights, hateful, or racially, ethnically or otherwise objectionable." The new Terms went a long way towards cleaning up those ridiculous prohibitions.

9. Facebook does not permit any commercial use whatsoever. The old Terms are very clear: "You understand that except for advertising programs offered by us on the Site (e.g., Facebook Flyers, Facebook Marketplace), the Service and the Site are available for your personal, non-commercial use only." The new Terms changed all that, requiring that your profile be for personal uses but allowing you to create Pages for commercial purposes.

10. Facebook isn't responsible if a third-party application abuses your personal information. From Facebook's privacy page: "However, while we have undertaken contractual and technical steps to restrict possible misuse of such information by such Platform Developers, we of course cannot and do not guarantee that all Platform Developers will abide by such agreements."

11. Facebook isn't liable if they lose your content, give you a virus or allow your account to be hacked. Under both Terms, the "Disclaimers" and "Limitation on Liability" have multiple provisions preventing you from suing them for just about anything. Here's one example: "Under no circumstances will the Company be responsible for any loss or damage, including any loss or damage to any User Content or personal injury or death, resulting from anyone's use of the Site or the Service, any User Content or Third Party Applications, Software or Content posted on or through the Site or the Service or transmitted to Users, or any interactions between users of the Site, whether online or offline."

12. If you can find a way to sue Facebook, you have to go through arbitration. The old Terms made you use the American Arbitration Association in the location determined by the AAA Rules (likely your domicile), whereas the new Terms make you use Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services in Santa Clara County, California, though you're permitted to appear by phone. It's unclear why Facebook switched from AAA to JAMS; either way, be glad they're not using the National Arbitration Forum, which has been accused of stacking the deck in favor of defendants like credit card companies.

13. If you can find a way to sue and win in arbitration, your compensation is severely limited. The old terms' "limitation on liability" limit you to "the amount paid, if any, by you to company for the service during the term of membership," capped at $1000. The new terms entitle you to a minimum of $100, with a cap of "the amount paid by you, if any, to Facebook during the twelve months immediately preceding the day the act or omission occured that gave rise to your claim."

2 THINGS TO CONSIDER ABOUT FACEBOOK'S SITE:

14. What should the default privacy settings be? Should Facebook presume you want to share everything, some things, or nothing? And with whom should it presume you want to share? Your friends? Their friends? Their friends’ friends? What about people in your location or your former classmates? The default settings are very powerful, since they’re often not changed and because users are often confused by what the changes even mean, so they should be chosen carefully.

15. When one user deletes a post on Facebook, what should happen to other users' comments to that post? This scenario represents a larger issue for Facebook, one they were likely attempting to address with the new Terms. Facebook's primary purpose is to facility communication, usually in the form of one user posting a status update, link or photo and other users commenting in response to that update, link or photo. So who "owns" those comments?  Who "owns" a comment which quotes the original post? Don't look to the law:  the point of Terms is to  establish a relationship and  settle  questions.  How do users want or expect such a deletion to function?

10 THINGS USERS SHOULD ADVOCATE BE INCLUDED IN FACEBOOK'S NEW TERMS OF USE:

16. Users should retain the right to remove their own content from the system. Users expect and should have the right to remove any content from Facebook, and thereby terminate Facebook's license, at any time. That’s what the old Terms permitted, and it’s essential for any artist who, down the road, is asked to grant an “exclusive” license to their content.

17. Facebook should not have any rights to user’s name, likeness or image except where specifically permitted. It’s reasonable for Facebook to get a blanket, revocable license from you for your content; the whole service works by distributing your content to others, and a blanket license enables them to easily introduce new features that distribute your content in new ways. Name and likeness are a completely different matter. Given Facebook’s poor history in the past regarding likenesses (e.g., the “Beacon” service), Facebook should be upfront about when it is going to use your likeness for a commercial purpose and should ask you for permission for that specific use.

18. Facebook’s Terms should be written (or summarized) in plain English. The controversial “licenses” term was a 120-word sentence that “granted” a “license” (a “license” defined by six adjectives) over the course of two subclauses (“(a)” and “(b),” which together included twenty different verbs), two sub-subclauses (“(a)(i)” and “(a)(ii)”), and a modifying end-clause (“each of (a) and (b)”) that ended with a legalese preposition (“thereof”). Possibly worse, the license included an ambiguous clause – “subject only to your privacy settings” – which caused numerous users to conclude, wrongly, that Facebook’s entire license was limited to the user’s privacy settings. The clause, at most, limited the license only for content posted, not content shared or the user’s likeness, and, at worst, actually reinforced that users retained no license control at all, but instead “only” the ability to limit privacy settings.

19. Facebook’s Terms should be built on trust, not distrust. “You agree” appears eleven times in the old Terms and fifteen times in the new Terms; “Facebook agrees” does not appear in either. Both Terms bear far more in common with the release people signed to be ridiculed by Borat than a mutual agreement. If Facebook says, like Gmail, that “We will not use any of your content for any purpose except to provide you with the Service,” they theoretically increase the likelihood of being sued, but they also make the relationship much clearer and more trusting.

20. Facebook should bear some legal and financial responsibility. As noted above, you are essentially a guest on Facebook's servers, and they can kick you off whenever they want, for "any or no reason." Unless the Terms include provisions that are legally enforceable, in an affordable manner, users have no “rights.” When Facebook says, “you can’t sue us, just trust us,” they really mean “we don’t trust ourselves enough not to make mistakes and get sued.” Even if you come up with a way to sue them, your damages are limited to what you paid Facebook ($0), a big problem given how a basic JAMS arbitration costs almost $8,000 just to get the ball rolling. Facebook has cause to be concerned about exposing itself to liability among 175 million users, but there is a comfortable middle ground where Facebook’s liability isn’t open-ended but users are still protected.

21. Facebook should only be permitted to delete or restrict your account for “cause.” As noted above, Facebook both can delete your account without warning and prohibits you from myriad activities online. 175 million users includes a lot of trolls, spammers, harassers, and con artists, and that’s okay – Facebook can reserve for itself broad reason for “cause,” like the new Terms included, such as if a user “intimidates or harasses any user” or “does anything that is illegal, infringing, fraudulent, malicious or could expose Facebook or the Facebook Service users to harm or liability.”

22. Facebook should agree to take reasonable steps to secure user’s personal information and should be required to report any disclosures. Know what happens if Facebook goofs and sends your personal, identifying information to third parties? Nothing. What happens if Facebook knows a third-party application is harvesting personal addresses and selling them to spammers and scam artists? Nothing. The liability here doesn’t have to be unlimited, but it should be something, possibly a set fee, like $250 per violation per user.

23. Facebook should guarantee the security of your content. Facebook expects and wants its users to put a substantial portion of their lives online, including extended conversations with friends. Users have every reason to expect, and to make Facebook responsible for, guaranteeing their data will not be lost or corrupted. Again, Facebook doesn’t have to be completely responsible for every lost customer a business suffers, but they should have a meaningful level of legal and financial responsibility.

24. Facebook should permit a jury trial of class actions against Facebook, with attorneys fees and costs if Facebook loses. The old terms illegally prohibit class actions. The new terms permit class actions, so long as you first arbitrate whether you can bring a class and you waive your right to a jury trial. Such a limitation might be illegal, too, and it flies in the face of Zuckerberg's claim that "we need to make sure the terms reflect the principles and values of the people using the service." There needs to be real, meaningful, enforceable responsibility when Facebook breaches one of the terms above.

25. Facebook should keep many of the new Terms. The new Terms changed the governing law to California (likely out of convenience), one of the most pro-consumer states in the nation. That’s great. It was also great how Facebook came up with specific ways for people to conduct business through Facebook. Finally, Facebook really did shorten the Terms and make them a little bit more coherent (such as in areas like “User Content”) and they shouldn’t shy away from that.

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[Update - see also 25 Things About Facebook's Terms of Use and Your Rights, discussing the current problems and where we go from here.]

Facebook responded swiftly to the social media uproar over its new Terms of Use by reverting to the old Terms.

Great news, with one problem: the old Terms aren't that great. Mark Zuckerberg described Facebook's old Terms as "overly formal and protective," and promised to revise them promptly.

He's being euphemistic.

Some of the "old" (now "current") Terms were downright illegal and unenforceable, like making users responsible for checking for updates to the Terms and making users waive class action status, as covered in my first post.

Other "old" Terms followed the carpet bombing and kitchen sink methods of contract drafting, with the same point made multiple times in multiple excessive ways that rendered the Terms a farce.

Here's one example: in response to the controversy, Facebook started a Group to discuss the Terms, "Facebook Bill of Rights and Responsibilities." The Discussion Board for that Group was promptly swarmed by racist trolls.

That's a problem for the trolls themselves, as the "User Conduct" section says users "agree not to use the Service or the Site to:"

upload, post, transmit, share, store or otherwise make available any content that we deem to be harmful, threatening, unlawful, defamatory, infringing, abusive, inflammatory, harassing, vulgar, obscene, fraudulent, invasive of privacy or publicity rights, hateful, or racially, ethnically or otherwise objectionable;

Awfully broad, no? The "new" (now "rescinded") Terms narrowed that whole paragraph to "intimidate or harass any user."

But under the "old" Terms such trolling is  also a problem for Facebook, since their "User Content Posted on the Site" section says:

You are solely responsible for the photos, profiles, messages, notes, text, information, music, video, advertisements, listings, and other content that you upload, publish or display (hereinafter, "post") on or through the Service or the Site, or transmit to or share with other users (collectively the "User Content"). You may not post, transmit, or share User Content on the Site or Service that you did not create or that you do not have permission to post.

Who "published," "displayed," "transmitted to" or "shared with other users" the messages in that Group? Why, the creators and administrators of that Group, Simon Axten, Mark Zuckerberg, and Barry Schnitt. All Facebook employees, one of them the CEO.

Who are now arguably made responsible for those messages.

Hmmm. Probably not what Facebook intended or what users expect.

I'll have more about what was different in the "new" (now "rescinded" ) Terms and what Facebook should put in their Terms.

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[I've posted a followup in light of Facebook's response, i.e. rescinding the new terms -- Facebook Rescinds Its New, Unfriendly Terms of Use in Favor of Its Old, Unfriendly Terms of Use. Further, 25 Things About Facebook's Terms of Use and Your Rights, discussing the current problems and where we go from here. Also, some thoughts on the even newer, much better Terms Facebook has proposed.]

Now that we've covered whether Facebook can slip new terms into the service and whether they can enforce their terms at all, it's time to look at what the new "Licenses" terms mean.

Facebook's new "Licenses" section says:

You hereby grant Facebook an irrevocable, perpetual, non-exclusive, transferable, fully paid, worldwide license (with the right to sublicense) to

(a) use, copy, publish, stream, store, retain, publicly perform or display, transmit, scan, reformat, modify, edit, frame, translate, excerpt, adapt, create derivative works and distribute (through multiple tiers), any User Content you

(i) Post on or in connection with the Facebook Service or the promotion thereof subject only to your privacy settings

or

(ii) enable a user to Post, including by offering a Share Link on your website

and

(b) to use your name, likeness and image for any purpose, including commercial or advertising,

each of (a) and (b) on or in connection with the Facebook Service or the promotion thereof. 

We'll come back to the bolding. For now, I reformatted it to make the distinct sections clearer* and italicized the portions that aren't unusual, as you can see from Amanda French's comparison of the terms at MySpace, Yahoo's Flickr, Google's Picasa, YouTube, LinkedIn and Twitter. For any of these sites to function, they need at lease some license to use your content.**

The main difference is that MySpace, Flickr, Picasa, YouTube and Twitter all explicitly recognize that their license to such "User Content" ends upon your termination of the service or your removal of content. Facebook and LinkedIn don't -- once you provide content, they have a license to use it forever.

There are three other important licensing differences. Under the new Terms you:

1. grant Facebook a license to all content you enabled someone else to post,
2. grant Facebook a right to use your name and likeness, and
3. grant Facebook the right to use content and your likeness not just for purposes of Facebook's service, but also in Facebook's promotional efforts.

That's a lot to swallow, particularly since you can't ever revoke any of it.

Good thing Mark Zuckerberg, Founder, CEO and Board Member of Facebook (keep those last two in mind), jumped in to respond to the criticism:

One of the questions about our new terms of use is whether Facebook can use this information forever. When a person shares something like a message with a friend, two copies of that information are created—one in the person's sent messages box and the other in their friend's inbox. Even if the person deactivates their account, their friend still has a copy of that message. We think this is the right way for Facebook to work, and it is consistent with how other services like email work. One of the reasons we updated our terms was to make this more clear.

In reality, we wouldn't share your information in a way you wouldn't want. The trust you place in us as a safe place to share information is the most important part of what makes Facebook work. Our goal is to build great products and to communicate clearly to help people share more information in this trusted environment.

We still have work to do to communicate more clearly about these issues, and our terms are one example of this. Our philosophy that people own their information and control who they share it with has remained constant. A lot of the language in our terms is overly formal and protective of the rights we need to provide this service to you. Over time we will continue to clarify our positions and make the terms simpler.

Soothing words, or much more? 

Go back to the bolded portion of the license term above, which limits the license users granted to being used "on or in connection with the Facebook Service or the promotion thereof." What the heck does that mean? The Terms define "Facebook Service" as follows:

The "Facebook Service" means the features, services and properties that Facebook makes available through (a) www.facebook.com or any other Facebook-branded or co-branded website (including, without limitation, any and all sub-domains and all international, mobile versions and successors thereof), (b) the Facebook Platform and (c) other media, devices or networks now existing or later developed.

That doesn't really help -- what does it mean for content to be used "in connection with" Facebook?

Would that include, say, Facebook leveraging the "25 Things" meme and publishing its own book of other people's "25 Things" posts? Or could Facebook, as the founder of Rocketboom worried, use Rocketboom's videos 30 years down the road?

Under the literal meaning of the new Terms, both would appear possible, and there would be nothing users could do about it. Zuckerberg's reference to "email" is a dodge -- email services don't arrogate to themselves any publishing rights beyond your initial sending, certainly no rights to use your emails to promote the email service.

But Zuckerberg's dodgy, soothing email has much more legal meaning than he and his team probably realized. The Terms themselves note that "We reserve the right, at our sole discretion, to change or delete portions of these Terms at any time without further notice."

Did they just do that? That is, does Zuckerberg, the CEO and a Board Member, have the authority to bind Facebook to changes in their Terms?

Recall that disputes under the new Facebook Terms are governed by California law, under which "a corporate officer may have express authority to enter into an agreement on behalf of the corporation." Snukal v. Flightways Mfg., 23 Cal. 4th 754, 779, 3 P.3d 286, 305, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 22 (2000).

Even if Zuckerberg doesn't have the express authority to change the Terms, he may have the implied authority given his preeminent role in the company and, perhaps most importantly, he has the apparent authority to bind the company to contractual terms.***

Users thus have every reason to incorporate Zuckerberg's blog post into their interpretation of the terms. Zuckerberg specifically said that "control" over sharing "has remained constant" across the new and old Terms and that "we wouldn't share your information in a way you wouldn't want." 

That is to say, Zuckerberg just clarified what's meant by "in connection with the Facebook Service:" the "Facebook Service" has a philosophy of ensuring user "control" over content sharing, and does not share information in a way users don't want.

Would that fly in front of the JAMS-appointed arbitrators in Santa Clara county?**** Facebook doesn't know the answer to that any better than I do, but I bet it would work. Companies are cross-examined with the words of their CEOs and officers every day in trials and arbitrations across the country.

It's a legal risk I'm personally willing to take.

Until they modify the Terms again, that is.

 

Footnotes:

* Did you catch the typo at the beginning of (b)? They split the infinitive "to use" at subsection (a) but repeated "to" a section (b). Reading the terms literally says you grant Facebook "... worldwide license (with the right to sublicense) to to use your name, likeness ..."

** Facebook has replied that they don't "own" your content, and that's partly true, the Terms don't claim any exclusive license or ownership right to your content, but they do claim a transferrable, non-exclusive license, which is all they could really want from you anyway.

*** Indeed, under the Snukal case it's quite possible that Zuckerberg would be considered as having both "operational" and "recordkeeping or financial duties," making his words irrefutably binding on the company, just as they were for the defendant in that case. 

**** Also a new provision, which I'll discuss tomorrow.

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[Update -- I've posted followups, What Do Facebook's New Terms of Use Mean for Your Content? and Facebook Rescinds Its New, Unfriendly Terms of Use in Favor of Its Old, Unfriendly Terms of Use. Finally, 25 Things About Facebook's Terms of Use and Your Rights, discussing the current problems and where we go from here.]

Yesterday we talked about Facebook's new "Terms of Use," delivered to users by stealth, and how users who wanted to leave could likely enforce the old terms, which didn't include the new controversial licensing provisions.

Right now we'll talk about whether the new terms are enforceable, and later we'll talk about what they mean for your content.

There are two general types of website Terms of Use (or Service): "click wrap" and "browse wrap." Both unfortunately named after "shrink wrap" terms, i.e. the terms of software programs that purported to apply to the buyer the moment they tore off the plastic shrink-wrap around the box the software came in.

And that's about as concrete as the law gets here. As noted by a recent law review article, depressingly not available online, "amazingly few appellate opinions on point exist, and generally, the opinions are unrefined in their analyses." Cyber-Surfing on the High Seas of Legalese, 18 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 79 (2008).

As noted previously, Facebook's new Terms state that California's laws govern any dispute, so that's where we should look for guidance, but California law isn't much help. The California Supreme Court, which would decide the issue, hasn't spoken on click wrap or browse wrap terms at all.

The most recent case I found was an unpublished California state appellate court opinion upholding a browsewrap agreement, noting that “there was nothing inherently unfair in requiring [the consumer] access contractual terms via hyperlink." Cohn v. Truebeginnings, 2007 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6232.

But an unpublished state court appellate opinion is among the weakest authorities you can have -- California's own courts frown on even mentioning them in legal briefs.

The most persuasive authority available seems to be Specht v. Netscape Communs. Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002), a ruling on California law by a Federal appellate court that doesn't even serve California (it serves Connecticut, New York, and Vermont):

It is true that ‘[a] party cannot avoid the terms of a contract on the ground that he or she failed to read it before signing.’ Marin Storage & Trucking, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 651. But courts are quick to add: ‘An exception to this general rule exists when the writing does not appear to be a contract and the terms are not called to the attention of the recipient. In such a case, no contract is formed with respect to the undisclosed term.’ Id.; cf. Cory v. Golden State Bank, 95 Cal. App. 3d 360, 157 Cal. Rptr. 538, 541 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979)

...

We conclude that in circumstances such as these, where consumers are urged to download free software at the immediate click of a button, a reference to the existence of license terms on a submerged screen is not sufficient to place consumers on inquiry or constructive notice of those terms.

Specht, 306 F.3d at 32.

Hmmm. Do we go with the unpublished California state appellate court or the published Federal appellate court opinion that has no authority in California?

Neither. The law is simply too unsettled to give a "right" answer one way or the other.

Which means common sense, tempered with caution, prevails: if you were a judge asked to decide whether a user in your shoes was bound to Facebook's new Terms, how would you decide?

If you're reading this post, you're obviously aware of the new terms, so your continued use would appear to demonstrate an acceptance of the Terms.

But what if, as the Facebook Group "People Against the new Terms of Service (TOS)" has recommended, you email or otherwise notify Facebook of the following:

Notice to Facebook: Notwithstanding FB's new Terms of Use, any use of my content is always subject to my privacy settings and FB's use terminates upon my termination of my account or removal of my content, whichever is the earlier, unless longer to display my shared content on the accounts of my friends.

Truth is, no one knows. Keep in mind that, if it comes down to a lawsuit, if you want to enforce those terms you're going to simultaneously argue that your use didn't constitute acceptance of Facebook's Terms while Facebook's providing service to you constituted acceptance of your Terms.

What does your common sense tell you about that argument?

Next up we'll look at the terms themselves and what they mean for your content.

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[Update -- I've posted a few followups: Are Facebook's New Terms of Use Enforceable?, What Do Facebook's New Terms of Use Mean for Your Content? and Facebook Rescinds Its New, Unfriendly Terms of Use in Favor of Its Old, Unfriendly Terms of Use. Finally, 25 Things About Facebook's Terms of Use and Your Rights, discussing the current problems and where we go from here.]

Facebook earned itself the wrath of Twitter by revising its Terms of Use (a/k/a Terms of Service) to grant itself a perpetual license to use all of your content (which is typical of social media sites), even if you leave the site (which is not typical).

We'll get to the substance of the change later. For now, a simple question: can Facebook unilaterally change terms of use without notifying users?

We get hints at the answer by comparing Facebook's old Terms, dated May 24, 2007, to the current Terms, dated February 4, 2009.

Here's what's really the most important change:

The old Terms:

By visiting or using the Site and/or the Service, you agree that the laws of the State of Delaware, without regard to principles of conflict of laws, will govern these Terms of Use and any dispute of any sort that might arise between you and the Company or any of our affiliates.

The new Terms:

You agree that all claims and disputes between you and Facebook that arise out of or relate in any way to the Terms or your use of the Facebook Service will be governed by the laws of the State of California (and United States federal laws applicable therein), without regard to principles of conflict of laws.

That's much better for Facebook users: California has some of the most pro-consumer laws in the nation.

Let's get back to Facebook's unilateral, stealth change.

Old Terms:

We reserve the right, at our sole discretion, to change, modify, add, or delete portions of these Terms of Use at any time without further notice. If we do this, we will post the changes to these Terms of Use on this page and will indicate at the top of this page the date these terms were last revised. Your continued use of the Service or the Site after any such changes constitutes your acceptance of the new Terms of Use. If you do not agree to abide by these or any future Terms of Use, do not use or access (or continue to use or access) the Service or the Site. It is your responsibility to regularly check the Site to determine if there have been changes to these Terms of Use and to review such changes.

New Terms:

We reserve the right, at our sole discretion, to change or delete portions of these Terms at any time without further notice. Your continued use of the Facebook Service after any such changes constitutes your acceptance of the new Terms.

Streamlined? Nope. The difference was probably Douglas v. United States Dist. Court, 495 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2007), decided a month after Facebook's old Terms, which held:

Parties to a contract have no obligation to check the terms on a periodic basis to learn whether they have been changed by the other side. Fn 1 Indeed, a party can't unilaterally change the terms of a contract; it must obtain the other party's consent before doing so. Union Pac. R.R. v. Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R., 549 F.2d 114, 118 (9th Cir. 1976). This is because a revised contract is merely an offer and does not bind the parties until it is accepted." 

Fn 1: Nor would a party know when to check the website for possible changes to the contract terms without being notified that the contract has been changed and how. Douglas would have had to check the contract every day for possible changes. Without notice, an examination would be fairly cumbersome, as Douglas would have had to compare every word of the posted contract with his existing contract in order to detect whether it had changed.

That is to say, a month after Facebook claimed a unilateral right to modify its Terms without any notice to users of the change, the 9th Circuit (the Federal appellate court for California) ruled that companies were required to give notice. (Tech bloggers, like Ars Technica, picked this ruling up at the time, so I'm sure Facebook did, too.)

Arguably, Douglas does not directly apply to this circumstance, where Facebook and its users nominally agreed to permit such secret changes through the old contract, but it's unlikely such an argument would fly under California law, which often throws out unfair mass contract provisions like these for "unconscionability." See, e.g., Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., 498 F.3d 976, 986 (9th Cir. 2007)(throwing out class arbitration waiver as "unconscionable and unenforceable under California law.")

Did I just mention a class arbitration waiver? Note that Facebook changed that part of their Terms, too.

Old:

To the fullest extent permitted by applicable law, NO ARBITRATION OR CLAIM UNDER THESE TERMS OF USE SHALL BE JOINED TO ANY OTHER ARBITRATION OR CLAIM, INCLUDING ANY ARBITRATION OR CLAIM INVOLVING ANY OTHER CURRENT OR FORMER USER OF THE SERVICE, AND NO CLASS ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS SHALL BE PERMITTED.

New:

With respect to any claims or disputes you intend to bring on behalf of a class, you agree to arbitrate whether a class could be certified before bringing such action in a court of law. If the arbitrator refuses to certify the class, you will continue to resolve your individual claims or disputes through binding arbitration. If the arbitrator finds that a class should be certified, you may file the class action in a court of law provided you waive any right to a trial by jury. Claims for injunctive or other equitable relief may also be brought in a court of law.

Another changed required by law, particularly California law.

So, are these changes valid or not? The plaintiff in Douglas kept using the services for years without noticing the changes, and even so they weren't applied to him. The same may not be true to users, like you, who are aware of these changes and keep using Facebook.

But what about your old content? If you leave now, does Facebook still have an non-exclusive license to use your content?

Likely not, given Douglas above, which holds, in essence, that Facebook's new Terms don't apply to you until you have actually assented to them. Facebook knows that, which is why their new Terms don't have that " It is your responsibility to regularly check the Site" garbage anymore.

But you're going to need to make some choices soon, since your continued use might be considered "assent" to the new Terms. We'll talk about that more tomorrow, as well as the deeper meaning of the Terms, particularly in light of Facebook's response to the controversy.

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You can see the impulse to try to sue directly in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania:

"Plaintiff entered into a lease agreement with defendants dated July 16, 2003 for a term of five years for a space located at the Philadelphia Navy Yard, Building 6, Suite 320, 4900 S. Broad Street, Philadelphia, PA 19102 which was occupied by the United States Department of Agriculture. The lease ended on August 31, 2008 and plaintiff alleges that defendants [the Department of Agriculture]  have failed to vacate the premises despite plaintiff's demands that they do so. Paragraph 6(d) of the addendum to the lease requires defendants to vacate upon termination of the lease and to quit and deliver up to plaintiff the premises peacefully and quietly.

Plaintiff alleges that it requested that defendants vacate the premises and on September 8, 2008, defendants responded that they were 'looking for space' and could not vacate the premises until they found new space. Defendants also allege that they have continued to pay rent for the premises and that plaintiff has accepted it. Plaintiff alleges that he has a new tenant ready to occupy the premises when it becomes vacant and that the new tenant has stated that it needs possession of the premises as soon as possible or it will look for other space."

4900 S. Broad St. Associates-Tenant, L.P. v. USDA, No. 8-4646, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4023, at *1–2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 21, 2009, O'Neill, Jr., J.).

But you just can't do it:

"The United States is immune from suit unless it has consented or has waived immunity in an act of Congress. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586, 61 S. Ct. 767, 85 L. Ed. 1058 (1941). To survive a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, plaintiff has the burden of showing that sovereign immunity has been waived to the satisfaction of the Court. In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prod., Liab. Litig., 264 F.3d 344, 361 (3d Cir. 2001). The primary congressional acts waiving sovereign immunity for tort and contract suits against the government are the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (FTCA), and the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (CDA), 41 U.S.C. § 607(g)(1) and § 609(a)(1). Waiver of government immunity is narrowly construed. Id. at 362.

The Little Tucker Act, 1 which is simply a subsection of the FTCA, states that immunity is expressly waived for those claims not sounding in tort that are not subject to sections 8(g)(1) and 10(a)(1) of the CDA. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2). These sections state that contract claims against the United States must either originate in the United States Court of Federal Claims or claimants must first exhaust their administrative remedies. U.S. v. Slaey, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55699, 2008 WL 2845351, at (E.D. Pa. 2008)."

Everyone who tries one of these suits against the United States in their local district court has a hook (the better 'hook' being equitable claims), and here's where these guys get shot down:

"Plaintiff also alleges jurisdiction under the [Administrative Procedures Act] and the [Declaratory Judgment Act]. However, the APA does not provide an independent basis for jurisdiction. that 'provision is not an independent grant of subject-matter jurisdiction.' Fanning v. U.S., 346 F.3d 386, 402 (3d Cir. 2003), citing Your Home Visiting Nurse Services, Inc. v. Shalala, 525 U.S. 449, 457-58, 119 S. Ct. 930, 142 L. Ed. 2d 919 (1999), citing Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 97 S. Ct. 980, 51 L. Ed. 2d 192 (1977). Neither does the DJA provide an independent cause of action or confer subject matter jurisdiction where it does not already exist. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Obusek, 72 F.3d 1148, 1153 (3d Cir. 1995), citing Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671, 70 S. Ct. 876, 94 L. Ed. 1194 (1950)."

 Better luck next time! 

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Starting January 1st, PGW bumped up rates by over 5%, even as natural gas prices remain low and consumers elsewhere see cuts.

Why? Because CDR Financial Products, the financial advisory firm close to former Mayor Street (and previously, and currently, under FBI investigation), was paid $225,000 to set up a terrible "bond" deal with JP Morgan to finance $310 million PGW bonds in 2006 that netted JPM millions and will leave PGW's customers holding the bag.

Part of the deal was merely a bad idea: instead of issuing traditional fixed-rate bonds, PGW engaged in an "interest-rate swap," which is a specialty of CDR, a complicated form of variable-rate financing in which the borrower generally ends up taking on some risk of interest rates rising, but not as much as if they had simply issued a variable-rate bond.

Interest rates rose and now PGW is paying an extra $6 million per year over what they could have had with a fixed-rate bond issue. The fixed rate would have been 5.25; the original 'effective rate' of the swap was 3.67 and is now 7.25, hence the additional payments.

That happens, it's an accepted risk of interest-rate swaps, and a lot of entities and municipalities were still foolishly investing in variable-rate products in 2006, despite the obvious interest rate increases on the horizon.

The "biggest problem," however, as described by the Philadelphia Inquirer, is not so understandable:

When bond markets froze in the summer, FSA, like most other bond insurers, saw its credit ratings cut, and investors started fearing the bonds could default. They began dumping PGW bonds back to JPMorgan and the other banks.

...

JPMorgan told PGW in the fall that it couldn't afford to keep owning the bonds indefinitely. Under the deal, if the bonds can't be sold by July, PGW must pay the banks $60 million a year, for the next five years, until the value of the bonds is paid off. PGW says it can't afford that with its other debt.

PGW can cancel the swap agreement but, under the deal, might have to pay JPMorgan more than $30 million to compensate the bank for ending the arrangement early.

Or it can find a new lender willing to sell new bonds, probably at higher rates, Bisgaier added. "We have six months to fix this."

None of that should be PGW's problem. JPMorgan agreed to underwrite the bonds; at that point, the bonds should have become JPMorgan's responsibility. Normally, if the underwriter can't place the bonds, they hold on to them. If bondholders have clauses in their purchase agreement with JPM permitting them to rescind the deal and send the bonds back to JPM, that should be JPM's problem.

But that's not what happened here. For a less than 2% discount on the initial interest rate, PGW took on all of the risk of the bonds, including the risk of increased interest rates, the risk of bond insurer rating decline, and the risk of investors and their underwriter changing their minds.

That's exactly the opposite of how a 'bond' is supposed to work. A bond is supposed to provide the borrower with capital under the single requirement that they make timely interest and premium payments, which PGW continues to do. It should be just like a mortgage -- so long as the interest and premium is paid, a bank can't simply call a mulligan and ask for the money back if it's unhappy with the market for mortgages.

Indeed, the rigid nature of instruments like interest rate swaps is supposedly a big part of what's causing so much trouble on Wall Street, and why the Federal government has already provided banks $350 billion-plus in assistance to help them with these assets, with a loss of $64 billion and counting.

More questions need to be asked about this "deal" -- in the midst of systemic bank malfeasance and irrational exhuberance, how did PGW, and not JPM, end up on the losing end of a commonplace transaction? 

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The American Lawyer describes the case:

Quinn Emanuel Urquhart Oliver & Hedges has been hit with a malpractice lawsuit that claims the firm botched a $48.8 million settlement even as it took in some $12 million in contingency fees.

... The complaint against Quinn Emanuel highlights how -- as a result of a contingency agreement that essentially guaranteed Quinn Emanuel half of any amount recovered up to $20 million and 20 percent thereafter -- the firm has received approximately $12 million in fees for representing Kurtin. That amount is equal to what Kurtin himself has gotten to date from the settlement, which was reached a little more than four months after Quinn Emanuel took on the case.

... An initial payment of $21 million, which Quinn Emanuel essentially split with Kurtin, was received. But, according to court documents, a payment due June 30, 2006, of $13.1 million, as well as an additional payment outlined in the settlement agreement, was never sent.

... Kurtin initially retained Quinn Emanuel again to try to enforce the settlement agreement through arbitration. The firm even offered up the services of litigation partners Ken Chiate, Jeff McFarland and Bruce Van Dalsem at its "half-rate" of $300 per hour. According to the amended engagement agreement, those partners usually bill out at between $650 and $775.

I've written about Quinn Emmanuel's contingency-fee practice before; it's not quite the plaintiff's firm writ large it's reputed to be, since the bulk of their work is not on a contingency fee.

I'm baffled by this new story. Under the fee agreement as described, Quinn is entitled to another 20% of the remaining $27.8 million, yet they were unwilling to enforce the agreement except on a discounted hourly rate?

Maybe I'm charitable, but I don't think I would need someone to pay me more by the hour to chase down $5.56 million in fees via arbitration of an iron-clad settlement agreement. In fact, it sounds like the additional hourly fees with be comparatively small even at >$650 -- you're arbitrating a settlement agreement you executed! -- and would cause more client dissatisfaction than they would be worth.

There's another wrinkle:

A public relations representative at SunCal Cos. did not return calls seeking comment. In an interview in March with the Orange County Register, a company executive said that Kurtin's suit was without merit and that the company had previously met all its obligations to him.

In general, a lawyer's comment to the media is one of three possibilities: 

1. The other side's case is frivolous garbage.
2. There may be legitimate issues, but I'll win.
3. No comment.

I would expect a party that was knowingly in default of a settlement agreement to go with #3 since a properly drafted settlement agreement should be easily enforceable. To hear the settlor go with #1 suggests they really don't think they are in default, which makes me wonder how the two parties to the settlement could have such radically differing views of their obligations. Sure, commercial litigation settlements can be complicated, but this settlement seemed pretty simple: it's just money instead of a continuing relationship.

Which leaves us to ponder only two explanations for Quinn Emmanuel's proposed hourly rates:

1. Quinn Emmanuel thought their client's settlement enforcement action had merit, but chose to let $5.56 million in their own fees sit unless they could bill $300 an additional hour recovering them.
2. Quinn Emmanuel thought their client's settlement enforcement action had no merit but were willing to fight it anyway, on a discount.

#1 does not make any sense. #2 could have a lot of possible explanations, none of them flattering.

Maybe the story is incorrect or incomplete. Maybe the case will reveal some more important facts. As it stands, this case does not look good for them.

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Yesterday we discussed the outrageous attorneys fees in the Robertson v. Princeton suit, which amounted to $80 million in pre-trial litigation costs and $40 million in projected trial costs. Based on those fees, it seems each side had a team of 6 lawyers working all day, every day, for all 6.5 years of the litigation, all for a case more comparable in size to a complicated personal injury / wrongful death case than a major commercial or business case.

It's time to ask some basic business / commercial litigation questions.

Did the lawyers engage in 'total war' litigation? Did the clients understand that decision?

Unfortunately, Mercer County (in New Jersey, where the litigation took place) doesn't keep its hearing and docket lists up permanently or publish its orders. Did the Robertsons decide it would be tactically advantageous to pummel Princeton with discovery requests? Did Princeton decide it would be tactically advantageous to stonewall every discovery request? Did everything require a motion or two?

When there's a paying client (as opposed to an insurance carrier or a contingent fee agreement), most litigators will sit down with their client early in the case and ask: how do you want me to handle it? If a client asks for 'the works,' an experienced, tough litigator would have no trouble churning through $500,000 in fees on a simple bread-and-butter business contract dispute. Add in any variables -- like sophisticated accounting, extensive documentation or novel issues -- and you'll start the process at $1 million, breaching $5 million well before trial.

But that's still not $40 million apiece.

Did the clients understand the workflow at the law firms?

Even if we generously assume that some of the $80 million comes from work in the years preceding the actual lawsuit, we still have whole teams of lawyers working full time.

Pareto's 80/20 rule applies just as much to litigation as it does to any other business. Did either of these clients recognize what, exactly, the firms were doing?

• Did the lawyers assert privilege as broadly as possible and then force litigation on every issue?
• Did the lawyers apply any thought to whom they should depose, or did they depose everyone who arguably was aware of discoverable facts?
• Was every brief right at the page limit, chock full of barely-relevant cases that took hours to track down even on issues where the judge had considerable discretion?

That is to say, did either party hire a liitigation consultant, ask their in-house counsel, or use their common sense to assess if the work was really needed or if the litigation attorneys were churning through hours as fast as they could?

Did the lawyers and clients consider alternative dispute resolution?

The core of Robertson involved dry and technical issues of legal interpretation, accounting and oversight. There was no "pain and suffering" component. Witness credibility was not the critical factor. All of the main reasons a party would either want non-lawyers or a jury of twelve reviewing a case were absent.

Why, then, did the parties subject the Mercer County Superior Court to this punishment? Did the clients really understand the ramifications of staying in state court and the delays and additional attorneys' fees that usually come with such a decision? Did the parties even consider arbitration?

In an antitrust case much larger than Robertson (a different antitrust case from the one mentioned above), Visa, Mastercard and AmEx resolved their multi-billion-dollar largely-legal dispute in arbitration. Why not here? Discovery probably would have gone much more smoothly, with Princeton more easily obtaining confidentiality and the Robertsons more easily obtaining documents.

Did the lawyers and clients consider alternative fee arrangements?

The Robertsons, as plaintiffs, paid an effective fee of 44% of their total recovery of $90 million.

A 40% gross-recovery contingent fee agreement is not uncommon in complex, expensive and/or risky business disputes; here, however, the client received none of the benefits of a contingent fee. As best I can tell, the lawyers bore no risk and paid no expenses out of pocket -- the clients did.

Did the Robertsons consider a contingent fee agreement? 40% would have been cheaper and during the six years of litigation their foundation could have held onto the money, investing it tax-free. They could also have done a blended agreement, with the Robertsons covering costs and expenses and the attorneys claiming, say, one-third of the recovery.

Princeton, in turn, paid $40 million over six years to defend a claim they later settled for $90 million. Making matters worse, the $40 million likely came in the unpredictable form that managers hate, with huge swings depending on the litigation, invoiced in a manner completely opaque to non-lawyers and lawyers not familiar with the case.

Did Princeton consider, say, a flat fee? The controversy had been brewing for almost forty years, with Princeton well aware of the major factual issues. The major legal issues are all apparent on the face of the complaint, which is only 68 pages long. Obviously, there will be an extensive accounting, lots of discovery and document review, and a couple big motions for summary judgment with regard to characterizations of various payments and the duties of your clients.

It's a big case but it's not unbounded in scope. It's not a class action or antitrust case sprawling over dozens of parties and whole industries; it's a dispute between a university and a foundation over a specific sum of money and a specific grant.

You could do it with the "feeding frenzy" team: two lead attorneys and a handful of associates and paralegals.

They could have blended that fee as well: Princeton covers external costs and expenses, like the accounting firm and deposition costs, with a flat fee payable every six months for attorneys' fees. Going off of our big firm average hourly rate of $348, estimating the case will take up half of their 12,000 billable hours per year available time, puts us at $1 million every six months. Princeton would have ended the case for less than $18 million, including all costs and expenses. 

These are all just ideas, any one of which would have likely saved millions.

Was anyone really looking out for the client? Are non-profits the new profit centers for lawyers?

Maybe in the end we have another example of the dangers of using "OPM." No individual or for-profit enterprise paid a dime for this excess and waste; it all came out of "charity."

The Robertsons paid for the suit via the Banbury Fund, which they control. As best I can tell, they exhausted most of the Fund's assets on this suit, though they are being reimbursed under the settlement.

Princeton paid for it out of their multi-billion-dollar endowment; as part of the settlement, the funds expended will be deducted from the Robertson Foundation as it is dissolved into Princeton's general endowment.

So, there you have it. $80 million in litigation fees to move $50 million from one charity to another. Princeton President Shirley M. Tilghman called the whole case "a tragedy" because the legal fees could have been spent on education. I'd agree, except that I can't help but wonder what steps Princeton could have taken to reign in their costs; you can't blame the other side for everything.

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Thomas Friedman misses the boat:

I have no sympathy for Madoff. But the fact is, his alleged Ponzi scheme was only slightly more outrageous than the "legal" scheme that Wall Street was running, fueled by cheap credit, low standards and high greed. What do you call giving a worker who makes only $14,000 a year a nothing-down and nothing-to-pay-for-two-years mortgage to buy a $750,000 home, and then bundling that mortgage with 100 others into bonds — which Moody's or Standard & Poors rate AAA — and then selling them to banks and pension funds the world over? That is what our financial industry was doing. If that isn't a pyramid scheme, what is?

Funny thing is, there really was a "legal" scheme connected to Madoff: it appears a substantial part of the money invested with him was not directly from clients, but through investment advisers who were specifically being paid huge sums of money (some on the 2% investment / 20% returns hedge fund fee scale) to perform due diligence and to ensure the investments were safe.

A number of these "advisers" -- perhaps all of them given the obviousness of the fraud -- did absolutely nothing at all to earn their money other than hand the money over to Madoff, no questions asked.

Textbook breach of fiduciary duty. If they misrepresented what due diligence they did, it's fraud, too.

There will be a reckoning.

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In theory, Pennsylvania recognizes a duty in every contract for both parties to act with the utmost good faith and to engage only in fair dealing with one another.

In practice, these claims rarely succeed, like a week ago in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania:

Pennsylvania law recognizes an independent cause of action for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing only in "very limited circumstances," such as insureds' dealings with insurers and franchisees' dealings with franchisees. Northview Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 227 F.3d 78, 91 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Creeger Brick and Building Supply, Inc. v. Mid-State Bank and Trust Co., 560 A.2d 151, 153-53 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989). In Northview Motors, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit predicted that Pennsylvania courts would limit the application of claims for breach of the covenant to situations where they were "essential" and would not recognize an independent cause of action for breach of the covenant where the parties had entered into a detailed contract setting forth their obligations and rights. Id.; see also McHale v. NuEnergy Group, 2002 WL 321797 at *8 (E.D. Pa. February 27, 2002) (finding that "Pennsylvania law would not recognize a claim for breach of [the] covenant of good faith and fair dealing as an independent cause of action" where the allegations underlying the breach of covenant claims are "essentially the same" as those underlying the plaintiff's claim for breach of contract).

The Court similarly finds that Pennsylvania would not recognize an independent claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in this case. As in Northview Motors, the parties here entered into a detailed contract setting forth their rights and obligations with respect to the purchase of the property at issue. The facts that Sentry Paint alleges give rise to its claim for breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing are the same as those that form the basis for its breach of contract claims. Under these circumstances, Sentry Paint's breach of covenant claims are subsumed in its breach of contract claims and cannot be maintained as a separate cause of action. Fn 20:

Fn 20: In support of its separate cause of action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Sentry Paint cites to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Birth Center v. St. Paul Co., 787 A.2d 376 (Pa. 2001) and the decision of the Lawrence County Court of Common Pleas in Harlan v. Erie Ins. Group, 2006 WL 1374502 (Lawrence Co. CCP February 16, 2006). Both Birth Center and Harlan involved contractual bad faith claims by an insured against an insurer, one of the "limited circumstances" in which Pennsylvania recognizes an independent cause of action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Neither case supports recognizing an independent cause of action here in an action involving an arms-length purchase of property.

Sentry Paint Techs. v. Topth (EDPa, October 31, 2008, McLaughlin, J.).

C'est la vie. Hard to know what their damages would be anyway in this case, if not damages arising out of a breach of the explicit terms of the contract. To me, outside of those quasi-fiduciary situations described above, the "good faith and fair dealing" seemed like a catch-all where it was hard to prove exactly what the breach was, except for a bad faith failure to perform.

But don't despair, business plaintiff trial lawyers — this case was at summary judgment, so you can even use it in support of alleging the claim in your complaint when they file a motion to dismiss or motion for judgment on the pleadings.

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If you've ever done business or commercial litigation, you've done tortious interference with contractual / business relations. It's alleged virtually every time a party switches suppliers or customers, and virtually every time the lawsuit involves more than two parties.

But did you know you can claim non-pecuniary damages (so long as you have some economic damages) and get an injunction  before the damage occurs?

From the Eastern District of Pennsylvania:

The damages element of a claim for intentional interference with contractual relations (the fourth element) requires a plaintiff to prove that the alleged interference has caused an actual pecuniary loss, the benefits of which flowed from the contract itself. Although an actual pecuniary loss must be established, non-pecuniary harms are also recoverable under this tort. Shiner v. Moriarty, 706 A.2d 1228, 1239 (Pa.Super. 1998); Perry v. H&R Block Eastern Enterprises, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22406, 2007 WL 954129, at *10 (E.D.Pa. March 27, 2007)(McLaughlin, J.).

Moreover, the actual pecuniary loss requirement does not defeat actions for tortious interference with contractual relations, such as this one, which seek to enjoin the interfering conduct before it is successful. In Adler, Barish, Daniels, Levin & Creskoff v. Epstein, 482 Pa. 416, 436 n.21, 393 A.2d 1175, 1185 n.21 (1978), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania specifically held that notwithstanding the actual pecuniary loss requirement, "[i]t  is well settled that equity will act to prevent unjustified interference with contractual relations." See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766, comment u.

Similarly, in affirming the issuance of a preliminary injunction in a case based upon tortious interference with contractual relations and trespass claims, the Third Circuit recognized that injunctive relief may be appropriate before an actual pecuniary loss is sustained. In this regard, the Third Circuit held that a preliminary injunction may issue where the claimant has demonstrated that there is a "presently existing actual threat of injury". Ride the Ducks of Philadelphia, LLC v. Duck Boat Tours, Inc., 138 Fed.Appx. 431, 434 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Continental Group, Inc. v. Amoco Chemicals Corporation, 614 F.2d 351, 359 (3d Cir. 1980)).

Hospitality Assocs. of Lancaster, L.P. v. Lancaster Land Development, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76772 (September 20, 3008, Gardner, J.).

Shiner v. Moriarty, cited above, quotes Pawlowski v. Smorto, 403 Pa. Super. 71, 588 A.2d 36 (Pa.Super. 1991), for the damage element of the tort involving "the loss of the benefits of the contract or prospective relation or consequential, emotional or reputational losses resulting from the defendant's conduct."

Did you plead all that last time? If not, perhaps you should consider amending...

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The plain meaning rule is to litigators what hammers are to contractors. It may be easy to use, but since you're going to use it on every job, you need to get good with it.

When interpreting a statute, rule, regulation, contract, or other legal document, courts first look to the plain meaning of the language in the document itself. If the language is unambiguous, then that plain meaning will be applied, regardless of any external factors or policy interpretations.

The bailout bill added the following to Section 13(c) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1823(c)) [the bolded language is the most relevant here]:

(11) UNENFORCEABILITY OF CERTAIN AGREEMENTS. No provision contained in any existing or future standstill, confidentiality, or other agreement that, directly or indirectly

"(A) affects, restricts, or limits the ability of any person to offer to acquire or acquire,

"(B) prohibits any person from offering to acquire or acquiring, or

"(C) prohibits any person from using any previously disclosed information in connection with any such offer to acquire or acquisition of,

all or part of any insured depository institution, including any liabilities, assets, or interest therein, in connection with any transaction in which the Corporation exercises its authority under section 11 or 13, shall be enforceable against or impose any liability on such person, as such enforcement or liability shall be contrary to public policy.

Assume Citigroup has an "agreement"  with Wachovia, an "insured depository instutition," that contains a "provision" that "directly... limits the ability of any person to offer to acquire or acquire" Wachovia. Then Wells Fargo comes in and acquires Wachovia.

Citigroup sues for damages. What result?

There is no law whatsoever interpreting the above language. Thus, Wachovia offered a restrained 15 pages explaining how the above is so unambiguous it needs no further argument, while Citigroup filed a downright svelte 7 pages of argument as to how the statute reflectled a precisely contrary unambiguous meaning. (Both briefs are available at the WSJ Law Blog).

I believe Congress did not mean what it wrote, and that the Court will ignore the "plain meaning" rule to get at what Congress probably did mean.

Citigroup has a very strong argument that 126(c) limits enforceability and liability only of the "person" described immediately above, which would be the acquirer (Wells Fargo), and not the institution (Wachovia). If Congress, say, wanted to void the provision entirely, they could have do so by writing:

Any provision in an agreement that purports to limit the ability of a person to acquire, or to offer to acquire, all or part of any insured depository institution is hereby declared void.

In that case, the provision would have been blown up, eliminating all liability. It's not like Congress didn't know how to "void" an agreement. Here's what happens if a shifty promoter tries to skirt securities exchange regulations protecting investors, as per 15 USCS § 78cc:

(a) Waiver provisions. Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of this title [15 USCS §§ 78a et seq.] or of any rule or regulation thereunder, or of any rule of an exchange required thereby shall be void.

Blammo! The "provision ... shall be void."

And here's what happens when a Member of Congress tries to make a deal with the United States or its agencies, as per 18 USCS § 431:

Whoever, being a Member of or Delegate to Congress, or a Resident Commissioner, either before or after he has qualified, directly or indirectly, himself, or by any other person in trust for him, or for his use or benefit, or on his account, undertakes, executes, holds, or enjoys, in whole or in part, any contract or agreement, made or entered into in behalf of the United States or any agency thereof, by any officer or person authorized to make contracts on its behalf, shall be fined under this title.
 
All contracts or agreements made in violation of this section shall be void; and whenever any sum of money is advanced by the United States or any agency thereof, in consideration of any such contract or agreement, it shall forthwith be repaid; and in case of failure or refusal to repay the same when demanded by the proper officer of the department or agency under whose authority such contract or agreement shall have been made or entered into, suit shall at once be brought against the person so failing or refusing and his sureties for the recovery of the money so advanced.

Wham! "All ... agreements ... shall be void."

Here, however, in 126(c), Congress didn't do that. They gave us a long, detailed description of a "provision" they thought should not "be enforceable against or impose liability on such person," a "person" they specifically described above as one who was attempting to acquire or actually acquiring an institution.

Congress knew how to "void" an unwanted provision of an agreement and chose not to do so here. That weighs heavily in Citigroup's favor.

But there's a problem: how would an agreement between Citigroup and Wachovia ever "be enforceable" or "impose [ ] liability" on Wells Fargo? 

Wells Fargo is a third-party to the agreement between Citigroup and Wachovia. The agreement creates much that can be enforced against, and which imposes liability on, Wachovia, because it is a party to the agreement. Wells Fargo, though, is not bound at all by the agreement.

That's not to say Wells Fargo is without liability. The claim here is simple: Citigroup is suing Wachovia for breach of contract and Wells Fargo for tortious interference with contractual relations. That's it; Citigroup's claim against Wells Fargo arises as a matter of tort, not as a matter of contract.

Citigroup thus has not and cannot allege that Wells Fargo somehow breached an agreement with Citigroup, since there isn't one.

So here's our problem: if you read the the statute literally, the plain meaning destroys a type of "enforceability" and "liability" that rarely, if ever, exists. Not unless the acquirer had some type of non-competition agreement with a second company not to attempt to acquire a third-party institution, which is not the case here. Frankly, such an agreement — e.g., Wells Fargo agreeing with Citigroup not to acquire Wachovia — would likely invite an antitrust inquiry, not to mention a very upset Hank Paulson asking why they're trying to deep freeze an already frozen market.

So 126(c) is like a law excusing me from enforcement or liability arising from the agreement you have with your phone company. I was never obligated to follow that agreement in the first place.

So, now what? Here is where I suspect the plain meaning rule will fail, and the court will disregard an unambiguous meaning to reach the result it believes Congress intended.

As described above, I think the "plain meaning" interpretation of the section is clear: any agreement in which a potential acquiring company has agreed not to acquire an FDIC-institution is unenforceable. That's not the situation in the Citigroup versus Wells Fargo case (since Wells Fargo was not party to any such agreement), and so the statute is wholly inapplicable. Period. The suit goes forward against both Wells Fargo and Wachovia.

But that is probably not what will happen. 126(c) was obviously intended to apply to this deal specifically, hence the "in connection with any transaction in which the Corporation exercises its authority under section 11 or 13," which describes the FDIC-approved Citigroup/Wachovia deal. As such, I predict the court will read this statute as an attempt by Congress to protect Wells Fargo from liability arising from that agreement, even if the "plain meaning" would seem only to apply if Wells Fargo itself signed on to that agreement.

Wachovia, however, has a much longer road ahead. I think it's fatal to their defense that Congress didn't just up and void the whole agreement.

Given how Congress works, maybe the above really is what they intended: Wells Fargo gets Wachovia, but in the process they have to pay Citigroup's damages. Indeed, Citigroup's "negotiated" agreement to withdraw the request for injunctive relief suggests to me that's precisely the compromise, likely entered into with Federal, shall we say, persuasion.

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If you've been following the multi-billion-dollar fight going on for Wachovia (Scribd copy of the Exclusivity Agreement at issue here, courtesy of Dealbook), you may have noticed the following:

In the Sunday night ruling, the Appellate Division of [New York] State Supreme Court threw out an order by Justice Charles Ramos issued late Saturday at the request of Citigroup; the order would have extended the time under which Wachovia and Citigroup had to complete their deal.

Citigroup, which announced on Sept. 29 that it had received federal government backing to acquire the banking assets of Wachovia Corp. for $2.1 billion, or the equivalent of about $1 a share, said it would appeal the decision.

The fight was also waged in federal court, where Wachovia asked U.S. District Judge John Koeltl to declare invalid part of the Citigroup deal that would have restricted Wachovia from considering competing bids.

Citigroup sued Wachovia and Wells Fargo in state court to enjoin them and order specific performance of the agreement, while Wachovia filed in federal court for a declaratory judgment affirming the enforceability of the Wells Fargo deal. The claims are analytically distinct, but factually exactly opposite: C wants to blow up WF's deal and enforce C's deal, while W & WF want to blow up C's deal and enforce W & WF's deal.

Now what?

Of course, the issue could have been partly resolved back when C and W reached their agreement by choosing a single court in which the agreement and its enforceability would be interpreted, but instead they went for the same boilerplate language you will find on almost all business contracts:

This agreement shall be governed by, and construed in accordance with, the laws of the State of New York. The parties hereby irrevocably and unconditionally submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of any state or federal courts sitting in New York City, Borough of Manhattan, over any suit, action or proceeding arising out of or relating to this letter agreement.

Why do businesses always consent to "state or federal" jurisdiction? Presumably, the advanages of one over the other are apparent at the time of the signing, so it would make sense to pick one or the other. "Flexibility" doesn't make sense as an explanation — you just end up with the situation we have here.

One would think the problem of simultaneous federal and state suits would have been addressed by the Constitution itself, but it's wholly silent on the issue. The answer arises from the Anti-Injunction Act of 1793, which in its current form reads:

A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a state court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.

The Act has teeth: unless one of the statutory exceptions applies, a federal injunction restraining prosecution of a lawsuit in state court is absolutely prohibited. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 228-29, 32 L. Ed. 2d 705, 92 S. Ct. 2151 (1972). Moreover, "The mere existence of a parallel action in state court does not rise to the level of interference with federal jurisdiction necessary to permit injunctive relief under the 'necessary in aid of' exception." Lou v. Belzberg, 834 F.2d 730 (9th Cir., 1987).

Thus, the federal court cannot stop the state court even if it wanted to, nor can the state court stop the federal court.

So what happens? Usually, one of them voluntarily bows out.

In Pennsylvania, the challenge of a "prior pending action" falls under the general rubric of lis pendens, requiring the challenger establish the following three prongs:

A plea of former suit pending must allege that the case is the same, the parties the same, and the rights asserted and the relief prayed for the same...

Hillgartner v. Port Auth., 936 A.2d 131 (Pa. Commw. Ct., 2007). In Hillgartner, the state court pulled out in light of a parallel federal court action "because the first action in federal court includes and therefore adequately protects all Plaintiffs' state claims for compensatory and punitive damages. Thus, Plaintiffs seek the same amount of money damages measured in the same way in both federal and state courts ..."

On the flip side, Federal courts will frequently decline to exercise jurisdiction over primarily state law questions (like the interpretation of contracts), which is what everyone expects to happen here, hence Wachovia's novel "federal" argument:

Wells and Wachovia went to federal court to argue that a provision in the new $700 billion Economic Stabilization Act, signed into law on Friday, made the dispute a federal matter. Last night, U.S. District Court Judge John G. Koetl gave lawyers until tomorrow to file briefs. According to Tulane law prof Elizabeth Nowicki, who reached out to us yesterday, Wachovia is arguing that, under federal law, Section 126(c) of the bailout bill voids the exclusivity agreement between itself and Citi, meaning that that Wachovia is free to negotiate with any entity it pleases. While Judge Koetl is apparently willing to entertain that argument, Professor Nowicki tells us she thinks the argument is a non-starter.

You can read more about Section 126(c) at the link above, then you can pause to marvel how the Senate passed a bill specifically addressing this exclusivity deal fewer than 48 hours after it was reached, in spite of Art. I, Sec. 10 of the Constituion, which prohibits laws impairing the obligations of contracts. Now that's what I call lobbying power.

At the end of the day, there's more than enough leeway in the law for both courts to keep going simultaneously, engaging in the dreaded and unseemly 'race to judgment.' My bet is that the Federal court will either bow out or drag its feet as a lesson to those who would try to make a federal case out of their humdrum multibillion-dollar contracts.

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We're aiming for new heights of nerdom here at Litigation & Trial, combining comic books, movies, old law school contract cases, equitable principles, permanent injunctions, and recent circuit splits in one post. The Watchmen lawsuit -- which is less copyright infringement and more commercial litigation, since the dispute is largely over contract terms -- gives us license (har har) to do so.

Graphic novels (née "comic books") are serious money these days, at least when adapted for the big screen. In addition to the normal superhero adaptations, like Iron Man and The Incredible Hulk (which have generally done quite well), particular attention has been paid to noir comics like Sin City and 300. (The Nolans' Batman adaptations are a hybrid, drawing from noir variations on Batman, like The Dark Knight Returns.)

Watchmen, published in 1986-87, is perhaps the most heralded of the noir comics, a complex and character-driven drama set in a alternative-history 1980s United States in which superheroes (the bulk of which have no obvious superpower) have been suppressed as unaccountable vigilantes, while Nixon is on his fifth term as president.

Such a complicated tale obviously presents numerous visual, thematic and temporal problems for moviemakers, in addition to normal stress of taking a work revered by a subculture and making it widely appealing without offending the subculture or alienating the masses. Multiple attempts to make the movie since the story was published have fizzled out; even Terry Gilliam, who has no trouble bringing madness to the big screen, deemed it unfilmable.

But Zack Snyder, who directed the enormously successful 300 (which made $450 million on a $60 million budget), has apparently done it and done it well.

Since he's appearing on this blog, you can guess what happened next: the production company, Warner Brothers, was sued.

The movie buzz is that the case has substantial merit and could turn the movie into a loss for WB, and the original documents are available online for your perusal. In essence, Fox bought the complete rights to Watchmen, tried to begin production, gave up, quitclaimed the rights to the producer (with the terms of that quitclaim disputed), then entered into multiple disputed subsequent agreements. Here's the Court's outline (as formatted by Deadline Hollywood):

1986-90: Fox acquires motion picture rights in The Watchmen.

1990: Fox enters into a domestic distribution agreement with Largo Entertainment, a joint venture of JVC Entertainment Inc., Golar (Larry Gordon), and BOH, Inc. The “Largo Agreement” established Fox’s domestic distribution rights, through a license from Largo, in “subject pictures” as defined in the agreement.

June 1991: Fox enters into a “Quitclaim Agreement” with Largo International, through which Fox “quitclaims to Purchaser all of Fox’s right, title and interest in and to the Motion Picture project presently entitled Watchmen, which included specifically described literary materials. Notably, the agreement provides that, “if Purchaser elects to proceed to production, the Picture shall be produced by Purchaser and shall be distributed by Fox as a Subject Picture pursuant to the terms of the Largo Agreement ...” In consideration for the rights to Watchmen, Fox was to be reimbursed for its development costs ($435,600) plus interest plus a profit participation in the worldwide net proceeds of any Watchmen picture.

Nov. 1991: The Largo Agreement was amended; Watchmen was listed as a project quitclaimed to Largo.

Nov. 1993: Larry Gordon, through Golar, withdraws from the Largo Entertainment joint venture; Largo conveys any rights it has in Watchmen to Gordon/Golar. Based on the 1991 quitclaim, the Court may infer that Gordon now stood in the shoes of Largo with respect to Watchmen and held whatever rights it acquired through the 1991 Quitclaim, which left Fox with the distribution rights it retained through that agreement.

1994: Fox negotiated a “Settlement and Release” agreement with Gordon which contemplated that the Watchmen project would be put in “perpetual turnaround” to Lawrence Gordon Productions, Inc. The “turnaround notice” gave Lawrence Gordon Productions “the perpetual right . . . to acquire all of the right, title and interest of Fox [Watchmen] pursuant to the terms and conditions herein provided.” The turnaround notice then described the formula for determining the buy-out price in the event that Gordon elected to acquire Fox’s interest. Thus, the document suggests that Gordon acquired an option to acquire Fox’s interest in Watchmen for a price. In fact, the notice obligated Gordon to pay the buy-out price on the commencement of any production of a Watchmen film. The notice also provided that the agreement was personal to Gordon and that, “prior to payment of the Buy-Out Price,” he could not assign rights or authorize any person to take any action with respect to the project.

(emphasis mine) WB now argues the full rights were quitclaimed multiple times; Fox claims they granted an option the producer failed to exercise, so the rights are still their's. A court last week denied WB's motion to dismiss. Variety summarizes:

At the heart of Fox’s suit, filed in February, is the contention that it never ceded rights to the property. And according to the federal Judge Gary Allen Feess, Fox retained distribution rights to the graphic novel penned by Alan Moore and illustrated by Dave Gibbons through a 1991 claim. Furthermore, Feess appears to agree that under a 1994 turnaround deal with producer Larry Gordon, Gordon acquired an option to acquire Fox’s remaining interest in "Watchmen," which was never exercised, thereby leaving Fox with its rights under the 1994 agreement.

Frankly, I agree with the Court's ruling (denying the motion to dismiss) but not the reasoning, which I'll get to below. For now, it's a motion to dismiss: all disputed facts and ambiguities are resolved in the plaintiff's favor and all reasonable inferences are  made in the plaintiff's favor. The meaning could be as Fox alleges, but that'll require some testimony and extrinsic evidence.

But that's not what this post is about. This post is about the remedy requested in paragraph 30 of Fox's complaint:

Fox is entitled to preliminary and permanent injunctive relief enjoining and preventing Defendants, their agents' and employees, and all persons acting in concert or participation with Defendants, from having, copying, distributing, displaying or making any other unauthorized use of The Watchmen in a manner inconsistent with Fox's rights as detailed herein.

As a practical matter, I can assure all graphic novel fans that no one wants to stop or even delay this movie. Fox doesn't want to scrap the picture, they want as big a piece as they can get, and they want the injunction for leverage. We're watching a negotiation-by-litigation.

Yet, as a legal matter, if they prevail, they can halt distribution entirely.

But, you say, recalling first year contract law, wouldn't that be a tremendous waste of money, the type of economic destruction generally discouraged by a long line of post-formalist, legal realism cases, like Jacob & Youngs v Kent, 230 NY 239; 129 NE 889 (N.Y. 1921, Cardozo, J.)(denying specific performance where home contractor used wrong brand of plumbing pipes)? Yes, but that's the choice you made through your elected representatives and the copyright laws they have enacted.

So how can the law allow Fox to sit by while WB (and their producers, directors, actors, etc) pours their sweat, tears and money into a work, just to later bring a lawsuit requesting not a cut of the profits but total destruction of the work?

It may not sit by. The doctrine of laches was created to thwart people to squat on their rights, lie in wait, and choose not to sue until it will most damage and prejudice the other party.

The doctrine of laches is a judicial escape hatch enabling courts to dismiss or limit lawsuits that, though brought within the statute of limitations, would be inequitable to permit because of the conduct of the party bringing the lawsuit. It's closely related to the doctrine of unclean hands, a similar tool courts use to deny equitable remedies to those who have behaved badly in the context of the dispute.

Since the doctrine of laches has its roots back in the English common law, the elements in all 50 states are roughly the same, so we might as well look to Pennsylvania:

Laches bars relief when the plaintiff's lack of due diligence in failing to timely institute an action results in prejudice to another. Because it is an affirmative defense, the burden of proof is on the defendant or respondent to demonstrate unreasonable delay and prejudice. See Weinberg v. State Bd. of Exam'rs. of Pub. Accountants, 509 Pa. 143, 147, 501 A.2d 239, 242 (1985). Thus, "[t]he party asserting laches as a defense must present evidence demonstrating prejudice from a lapse of time . . . [such as] that a witness has died or become unavailable, that substantiating records were lost, or that the defendant has changed [her] position in anticipation the opposing party has waived his claims." Richard, 561 Pa. at 496, 751 A.2d at 651. Furthermore, "[t]he question of laches is factual and is determined by examining the circumstances of each case." Weinberg, 509 Pa. at 148, 501 A.2d at 242 (quoting Leedom v. Thomas, 473 Pa. 193, 200-01, 373 A.2d 1329, 1332 (1977)).

Commonwealth ex rel. Corbett v. Griffin, 946 A.2d 668, 676-677 (Pa. 2008). Like most equitable doctrines, it has essentially no elements: the court finds it or it does not.

Obviously, such equitable powers apply to common law claims. Can it apply to statutory claims like copyright infringement?

In most circuits, yes. The Eleventh Circuit just grappled with that in Peter Letterese & Assocs. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enterprises et al, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 14496; Copy. L. Rep. (CCH) P29,589 (July 8, 2008). They unearthed a fantastic Learned Hand quote:

It must be obvious to every one familiar with equitable principles that it is inequitable for the owner of a copyright, with full notice of an intended infringement, to stand inactive while the proposed infringer spends large sums of money in its exploitation, and to intervene only when his speculation has proved a success. Delay under such circumstances allows the owner to speculate without risk with the other's money; he cannot possibly lose, and he may win.

That describes Fox's conduct precisely: they couldn't make it, so they waited for someone else to get it together then filed suit after WB tests Synder and crew out on 300, figures out a plausible script, puts together a cast and crew, films it, and makes its way through a good deal of post-production. But that was before there was an explicit 3-year federal statute of limitations for copyright claims. What now? The Eleventh Circuit sums up other responses:

In answering the question of whether the defense of laches may be interposed in a copyright infringement suit, therefore, we cannot agree with the conclusion of the Fourth Circuit, which is an unqualified "no." See Lyons P'ship, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 798 (4th Cir. 2001). Prather recognized the applicability of general equitable doctrines, and like tolling, laches falls into that category. Cf. Teamsters & Employers Welfare Trust of Ill. v. Gorman Bros. Ready Mix, 283 F.3d 877, 882 (7th Cir. 2002) ("What is sauce for the goose (the plaintiff seeking to extend the statute of limitations) is sauce for the gander (the defendant seeking to contract it)."). However, we remain mindful of the Fourth Circuit's invocation of separation of powers principles which counsel against the use of "the judicially created doctrine of laches to bar a federal statutory claim that has been timely filed under an express statute of limitations." Lyons P'ship, 243 F.3d at 798. We therefore answer this question with a presumptive "no"; there is a strong presumption that a plaintiff's suit is timely if it is filed before the statute of limitations has run. Only in the most extraordinary circumstances will laches be recognized as a defense. Cf. Chirco v. Crosswinds Communities, Inc., 474 F.3d 227, 234 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting the limited applicability of laches to copyright cases in "what can best be described as unusual circumstances"); Jacobsen v. Deseret Book Co., 287 F.3d 936, 951 (10th Cir. 2002) ("Although it is possible, in rare cases, that a statute of limitations can be cut short by the doctrine of laches, we see no reason to supplant the statute of limitations in this case." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

But we're not yet done:

Even where such extraordinary circumstances exist, however, laches serves as a bar only to the recovery of retrospective damages, not to prospective relief. As the former Fifth Circuit explained in a patent infringement action:

Although laches and estoppel are related concepts, there is a clear distinction between the two. The defense of laches may be invoked where the plaintiff has unreasonably and inexcusably delayed in prosecuting its rights and where that delay has resulted in material prejudice to the defendant. The effect of laches is merely to withhold damages for infringement which occurred prior to the filing of the suit.

Estoppel, on the other hand, "arises only when one has so acted as to mislead another and the one thus misled has relied upon the action of the inducing party to his prejudice." Estoppel forecloses the patentee from enforcing his patent prospectively through an injunction or through damages for continuing infringement.

Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbH v. Eastman Kodak Co., 616 F.2d 1315, 1325 (5th Cir. 1980) (internal citations omitted).

Arguably, the big damages here have yet to occur, and will occur when the film is distributed for hundreds of millions of dollars. But I still don't understand why WB didn't raise laches as an affirmative defense in their Answer to Fox's Complaint. There's a legitimate argument that the real infringement damages occured during scripting, casting, filming, and post-production, where Fox was shut out of the creative process it presumably wanted to control.

Moreover, the quitclaim agreement itself (the source of most of Fox's claimed rights) includes a clause where, if the movie is ever made, Fox is entitled to the money it initially spent (at least half a million, circa 1990) plus interest. That's serious money by now, at least enough to warrant adding one line about laches to your Answer and briefing the issue.

THE POINT (other than to learn):

There's been a lot of hoopla about this sentence in the judge's order:

It is particularly noteworthy that nothing on the face of the complaint or the documents supplied to the Court establishes that Gordon, the claimed source of Warner Brothers' interest in 'Watchmen,' ever acquired any rights in 'Watchmen.'

That's a problem, but it's not the end of the road. Let's presume Fox still legally has the rights to Watchmen. Now what? Do they get an injunction?

As the Eleventh Circuit continued,

Rather, under "well-established principles of equity, a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test before a court may grant such relief," and a court's decision to grant or deny such relief is within the exercise of its discretion.  [eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391, 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1839 (2006)]

A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.

Id.

Even if laches doesn't directly apply, and even though "irreparable injury" is presumed in copyright cases, Fox may have waived its "irreparable injury" by allowing virtually all of Watchmen to be completed (excepting some post-production) before filing suit in February 2008. Fox did exactly what Learned Hand complained about: waiting for WB to finish what Fox could not, then suing when they got wind that it was good.

They're no longer in it for protection of their creative endeavor; they're in it just for the money. That won't do. WB's goal is to show that to the judge.

But I think Fox has a bigger problem: the 1994 agreement. Under that, the last of all agreements with Fox, Gordon (the producer) has a perpetual right to exercise his option to make the film. Fox's complaint mentions the 1994 agreement but does not claim breach of it, just breach of the 1991 quitclaim, which means Gordon (now WB) can still exercise the option, buying out the rights.

And that raises yet another problem for Fox when they then try to claim their due under the 1994 option: laches, which can completely bar a contract claim, not just pre-suit damages. When did Fox first know Gordon was trying to make the movie? Recall from the Court's outline, "The notice also provided that the agreement was personal to Gordon and that, “prior to payment of the Buy-Out Price,” he could not "assign rights or authorize any person to take any action with respect to the project."

Here's a 2001 article about an attempt, long after the relevant agreements with Fox. Did Fox move to protect its rights then? Did it tell Gordon not to "authorize any person to take any action with respect to the project?" Here's a rumor:

[P]rivately, Warner Bros execs are decrying to me what they say is Fox's "opportunistic claim," noting that "Fox sat on its so-called rights for years while other studios in town developed this property. In fact, Paramount greenlit the movie for production and Fox never said a word! Fox even had an opportunity to re-acquire the project at some point and it passed on it!"

Did Fox try to "speculate without risk with the other's money?"

I'd say "we shall see," but we probably won't. Once the injunction and the option are decided, the case will likely be sufficiently narrowed to be settled easily; the spread won't be worth the risk anymore.

 

UPDATE: On December 24, 2008, District Judge Gary A. Feess issued a brief ruling holding "Fox owns a copyright interest consisting of, at the very least, the right to distribute the Watchmen motion picture," with a promise to issue a more definite ruling soon. It's hard to say what the practical effect is of such a holding (it's obviously not good news for WB); I still believe an injunction is unlikely. I'll write more when the full order comes out.

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As deemed by the American Association for Justice (which, really, should have been renamed to The Justice League of America):

1.  Allstate

2.  Unum

3.  AIG

4.  State Farm

5.  Conseco

6.  Wellpoint

7.  Farmers

8.  United Health

9.  Torchmark

10.  Liberty Mutual

Lines up with this intriguing website, which also lists Allstate the worst and Chubb the best.

I'm inclined to agree. I've been very impressed by Chubb's claims handling. I once had to interpret their "Masterpiece" policy to see if it covered a particular act which a jury could easily find was intentional (and, if proven, would have been criminal). Amazingly, it did, and without any weasely insurance-coverage language designed to tie up such a question in the courts for years.

I switched my own homeowner's to it promptly.

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Fortune Legal Pad on the French eBay injunction:

On June 30, the Commercial Court of Paris granted a sweeping injunction sought by LVMH Moët Hennessy Louis Vuitton (LVMUY) that would not only require eBay to block all sales of counterfeit Louis Vuitton Malletier and Christian Dior Couture products on its site — a feat eBay has claimed is not technologically feasible — but  also to block all sales of genuine LVMH perfumes being sold there by unauthorized distributors.

The latter prohibition would effectively force eBay to block all sales of the specified perfumes — Christian Dior, Guerlain, Givenchy, and Kenzo — since no licensed LVMH distributor is authorized to sell over eBay. The practice of selling genuine products through unauthorized channels — sometimes called gray marketeering — is generally lawful in the United States because it is thought to benefit the consumer.

The commercial court also ordered eBay to pay various LVMH units $60.8 million in damages for past counterfeit or unauthorized sales. The key issues presented by the decision (available here in French) are well summarized in this New York Times article. (eBay’s official statement about the ruling is here; LVMH’s is here.)

The day the commercial court ruled, eBay asked the French Court of Appeals to stay the injunctive portion of it while it appealed the rest of the lower court’s ruling. Without the stay, the injunction — enforceable by daily fines of 50,000 euros (about $80,000) — takes effect as soon as copies of the decision have been formally delivered to eBay’s headquarters in San Jose, California, and its international subsidiary in Berne, Switzerland. (It’s unclear if that has happened yet.) LVMH has agreed to postpone enforcement, however, until the Court of Appeals rules on the stay application, according to an eBay spokesperson. That court told the lawyers today that it would rule Friday.

It's quite a fascinating case, particularly as it touches upon appealability in the European system, the distinction of internet service providers being merely a "host" versus a "broker," and Louis Vuittion's (I think outrageous) attempts to halt re-sale of their products.

My focus, however, is on how powerful the remedy here is -- the fine is huge and the equitable remedy requires eBay do something they claim they can't.

In normal commercial litigation, it is very rare for a court to order a losing defendant change their practices in a way that could potentially destroy the business. Normally, the defendant pays compensation for what they have done wrong and goes about their business again; indeed, in Pennsylvania and the general rule is that punitive damages are not available in breach of contract cases.

Such restraint vanishes in the realms of copyright and patent (particularly patent), where the very idea appears to be strong deterrence against either the defendant or anyone else behaving like that ever again.

The end result is, liking securities litigation, few copyright or patent claims actually reach a resolution on the merits, because the stakes are simply too high, and lawyers tend to believe that such cases are so complicated that there's a high likelihood jurors, judges or arbitrators will become confused even in a slam-dunk case, resulting in uncertainty about the outcome. (See this legal malpractice case arising from a large, complex commercial dispute where "The company claims Linklaters advised it that its case had a 70 percent chance of success if it were to go to arbitration, but at a later date reduced that to 50 percent. It says that, based on Linklaters' advice, it turned down three settlement offers.")

The initial application of bad for business lawyers is obvious, and, indeed, in most business lawyers will recommend their client cease and desist the moment there's any copyright or patent claim that isn't clearly frivolous.

But I think there is another lesson learned here. Big cases settle. Notice how eBay and LVMH are still trying to figure it out.

Except sometimes they don't. How about: big cases should settle; where the law forces the case to be big, it usually settles.

So how can we, as litigators and trial lawyers, make clear to the other side that our case is really big? I'll address that more in latter posts.

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The Unincorporated Business Law Prof Blog says:

Prof. Larry Ribstein has posted Reforming Limited Liability Company Fiduciary Litigation on SSRN.  He presented this paper at last week's LLCs at 20 symposium at Suffolk.  Here's the abstract:

Derivative suits are designed for publicly held corporations. In limited liability companies, the remedy creates significant costs and complications. These costs are unnecessary because more appropriate remedies member-authorized and direct suits are available. The application of the derivative remedy to LLCs is an example of lawmakers applying rules across business entities without adequately thinking through which rules belong in a coherent business association statute.

I'm not sure that I agree.  If nothing else, minority-member lawsuits are likely to get labeled at "entity" lawsuits, rather than direct, individual lawsuits.

(Note: Pennsylvania law (15 Pa.C.S. § 8992) permits derivative actions in limited liability companies.)

There are plenty of issues in an LLC that cannot be addressed appropriately by direct action. More importantly, retaining derivative actions answers two questions that have frustrated and confused a number of lawyers and judges: do individual members of an LLC have standing to sue when the majority of LLC members engage in tortious or intentional conduct, and, if so, what remedies are available?

Answering that question by reference only to contract law is usually impossible, because the vast majority of the LLC operating agreement have no provision for what should happen in the event of a breach, they just generally affirm the principle of majority rule. Viewed literally, most LLC operating agreements permit, by silence, the majority members to frustrate the reasonable expectations of the minority members and freeze them out of the business.

Courts are supposed to avoid absurd and unjust results, and most will not allow an operating agreement to cheat a minority member merely because of the absence of a "don't cheat" provision.

How do courts do then? There are a variety of options, including the common law proposition that "bad faith conduct" constitutes a breach of contract, regardless of whether the conduct specifically breaches the text of the agreement. But each one of those options relies heavily on discretion, resulting in inconsistent outcomes across similar cases before different judges.

I think the bigger question is: what's the harm of allowing a derivative action? A lawsuit is a lawsuit, and I fail to see how a derivative lawsuit in an LLC will result in any more discovery, costs, or anything else. In the context of an LLC, it's largely a different style of pleading.

Indeed, even if there is a harm, the American Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate Governance (2-7 § 7.01) says, in the case of a closely held corporation, the court in its discretion may treat an action raising derivative claims as a direct action, exempt it from those restrictions and defenses applicable only to derivative actions, and order an individual recovery, if it finds that to do so will not (i) unfairly expose the corporation or the defendants to a multiplicity of actions, (ii) materially prejudice the interests of creditors of the corporation, or (iii) interfere with a fair distribution of the recovery among all interested persons.

That, in essence, can make all derivative actions direct if the court is so inclined, creating an escape hatch for situations in which derivative actions are inappropriate. No corollary exception exists to permit derivative recovery where direct is inappropriate; that's why it needs to be there by statute.

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A Pennsylvania business / partnership question:

Can I remove my property from a failing business without my partners knowledge and not face criminal charges?

My reply:

In theory, yes. In practice, no, don't remove anything without your partners' knowledge.

Generally,  partners are entitled to retrieve property that has remained in their personal ownership, but not entitled to seize, unilaterally, assets that are owned by the partnership (because such assets are owned by all the partners together).

You might think it is crystal clear that whatever you're talking about is "your" property, but if you are wrong, you may in fact end up facing criminal charges as well as a civil lawsuit.

I strongly advise you speak with an attorney who can review all of partnership material and make an assessment about the status of the property in question.

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The court speaks frankly in this breach of contract action:

Church contends: "In order to establish a cause of action for breach of a construction contract by a contractor, the owner must allow the contractor a reasonable time to rectify the alleged defects." Appellant's brief at 11, citing Hood v. Meininger, 377 Pa. 342, 105 A.2d 126 (1954). Church contends the Tentarellis failed to establish they gave him the opportunity to cure after terminating him on July 22, 2003, and, as such, he was entitled to a compulsory non-suit on the Tentarellis' counter-claim.

Both the legal premise and the factual conclusion of Church's argument are irreparably flawed. Church's reliance on Hood is wholly misplaced. Hood does not stand for the proposition that a plaintiff must establish he gave a contractor a reasonable opportunity to rectify defects in order to establish a cause of action for breach of a construction contract, and no case of which we are aware cites Hood for this proposition. Frankly, we are unaware of any case which stands for this proposition. While cure and mitigation are unquestionably relevant to the issue of damages in a contract dispute as a general matter, there is simply no support in our caselaw for the proposition Church advances. Notably, Church does not contend the Tentarellis' alleged failure to allow him to cure warrants a diminution of the Tentarellis' damage award.

Church v. Tentarelli, 2008 PA Super 139 (June 30, 2008). It seems to be the natural progression after LJL Transp., Inc. v. Pilot Air Freight Corp., 2006 PA Super 176; 905 A.2d 991(2006)("there are circumstances where the nature of the breach permits the aggrieved party to immediately terminate the contract despite a "cure" provision.").

That said, I think the Superior Court went a little bit far. There's precedent suggesting the party be offered an opportunity to cure the defect. For example,

In determining materiality for purposes of breaching a contract, we consider the following factors:

    a) the extent to which the injured party will be deprived of the benefit which he reasonably expected;
    
    b) the extent to which the injured party can be adequately compensated for that part of the benefit of which he will be deprived;
    
    c) the extent to which the party failing to perform or to offer to perform will suffer forfeiture;
    
    d) the likelihood that the party failing to perform or offer to perform will cure his failure, taking account of all the circumstancesincluding any reasonable assurances;
    
    e) the extent to which the behavior of the party failing to perform or offer to perform comports with standards of good faith and fair dealing.

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 241 (1981). Accord Jennings v. League of Civic Organizations of Erie County, 180 Pa. Super. 398, 119 A.2d 608 (1956).

Either way, it's worth noting the apparent shift towards not requiring the breaching party be offered an opportunity to cure their failure, even where the contract specifically says they should be.

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Via an insurance / breach of contract case in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania:

Although the Court has found that Hotaling's contacts  [*18] with Pennsylvania are sufficient to support the Court's exercise of personal jurisdiction, it does not follow automatically that venue in this district is proper. As the language of Section 1331(a) makes clear, the focus in assessing venue is not on the "defendants' 'contacts' with a particular district, but [on] the location of those' 'events or omissions giving rise to the claim.'" Cottman Transmission Sys. v. Martino, 36 F.3d 291, 294 (3d Cir. 1994). In order to establish specific jurisdiction, a plaintiff must show only that at least one contact on the part of the Defendant related to the Plaintiff's claim. O'Connor, 496 F.3d at 318 (citing Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414). The inquiry with respect to proper venue, however, is significantly more circumscribed, requiring a showing that a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred in the district. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a)(2).

Pullman Fin. Corp. v. Hotaling, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48359 (W.D.Pa. June 24, 2008). Defense motion for transfer of venue granted.

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From Wartsila Nsd N. Am., Inc. v. Hill Int'l, Inc., 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 13099, a business litigation opinion just released:

Three exceptions have been identified where the public interest will render an exculpatory clause [in a contract] unenforceable: (1) when the party protected by the clause intentionally causes harm or engages in acts of reckless, wanton, or gross negligence; (2) when the bargaining power of one party to the contract is so grossly unequal so as to put that party at the mercy of the other's negligence; and (3) when the transaction involves the public interest. Wolf, 644 A.2d at 525-26. None of these exceptions is applicable here.

Although the jury concluded that Hill was negligent, there was no evidence that Hill engaged in willful misconduct, such as "intentional harms" or "the more extreme forms of negligence, i.e., reckless, wanton, or gross." Id. at 525. At trial, Wartsila argued that Hill violated the Agreement by committing fraud. The jury expressly concluded in its verdict, however, that Hill had not committed fraud. This finding eviscerates any argument that the exculpatory clause should be disregarded because of the nature of Hill's alleged misconduct.

To get around the exculpatory clause, all the plaintiff had to do was prove the defendant's conduct was reckless, wanton, or grossly negligent. Yet, apparently they only asked the jury if the defendant was negligent or if they committed fraud.

It is thus entirely possible that every single juror thought the defendant was grossly negligent, a factual finding that would have destroyed the exculpatory clause, a yet on the facts presented to the Third Circuit plaintiff's claim has been "eviscerated."

Oops.

Continuing on:

The District Court erred in failing to exclude evidence of "incidental,  special, indirect, or consequential" damages. Further, the Court did not ask the jury to identify which portion of its award was based on Hill's breach of contract or its alleged negligence. Thus, we cannot tell from the jury's verdict what portion of its award of damages was based on direct damages and what amount was based on consequential damages. In order to give effect to the exculpatory clause agreed to by these parties, there must be a new trial on the issue of damages.

Again, the jury could have already answered this question, but now the parties have to go back for new trial, and the plaintiff is denied resolution and compensation another day.

Maybe that is in their best interest, since they just had the exculpatory clause enforced as a matter of law, and now they can focus their case on the permissible damages. Somehow I doubt that was their plan all along...

UPDATE: See Philly JD's comment below -- the outcome is even worse than I thought, as the final verdict is now capped at a level that makes re-trial unprofitable for the client and the attorney.

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An Eastern Pennsylvania civil litigation question:

can someone who says they are owed money win in court without proof and what kind of proof would they need

I reply:

You need just enough proof to win your case: no less, no more.

Seriously, there's only a small subset of cases -- generally those relating to real estate or long-term agreements -- where a particular type of proof, like a written contract, is required. (Those cases fall under the "statute of frauds," which really is just a list of a dozen or so particular circumstances).

For every other breach of contract, like an agreement to buy equipment, or an agreement to do some minor contracting work, there's no legal requirement the plaintiff show a writing to prove their claim.

Is a writing more persuasive than just oral testimony? Usually. But it's not a legal requirement. The only 'legal' requirement in most cases is that you show, through first-hand knowledge (e.g., your testimony or someone else's) that you're entitled to the money you claim. Then a judge or jury will consider your testimony and the defendant's and reach a factual conclusion.

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