Litigation and Trial - Max Kennerly : Philadelphia Trial Lawyer Max Kennerly : Business and Commercial Litigation : Civil Attorney : The Beasley Firm : Philadelphia Pennsylvania

One of the true gems of the Internet is TED (Technology, Entertainment, Design), a nonprofit that invites luminaries from a wide variety of fields to give brief presentations about their signature ideas. A quick googling of "Best TED Talks" is well worth the hours of education and inspiration that will ensue.

I was thus disappointed to see that TED invited Philip K. Howard to talk about "Four ways to fix a broken legal system."

I have debunked Mr. Howard's work before (see my thoughts on his "Life Without Lawyers," his "health courts," and his claims about public support for tort reform). The bulk of his talk presents more of the same argument-by-anecdotes and generalized assertions that don't withstand a moment's scrutiny. Despite his claim around the 14:00 mark, I can safely assure my readers that we, as a society, do in fact still have seesaws, swingsets, and jungle gyms. Moreover, his overall argument that these problems are so insidious that you don't even notice them is, to me, unpersuasive.

About halfway through, Mr. Howard moves onto his four propositions, which are:

1. Judge law mainly by its effect on society, not individual situations
2. Trust in law is an essential condition of freedom. Distrust skews behavior towards failure
3. Law must set boundaries protecting an open field of freedom, not intercede in all disputes
4. To rebuild boundaries of freedom, two changes are essential: simplify the law and restore authority to judges and officials to apply law.

To call these propositions "vague" is an understatement.

That said, I generally agree with the first three. Indeed, it seems the irony of Mr. Howard's first proposition was lost on him; although his talk only mentions the former, for each funny story of a fishing lure with a warning label, there's a car manufacturer that bragged about avoiding a recall and ended up needlessly and carelessly endangering millions of people.

The fourth proposition, however, is where Mr. Howard and I diverge. It's not that I believe the law shouldn't be simple or that judges shouldn't apply the law; of course I do. I just don't believe it how he means it, which is to deny individuals the right to a jury trial.

But there's a bigger problem with his talk: the "authority to judges and officials to apply law" he claims should be "restored" never existed, and for good reason.

As part of his simplification argument, Mr. Howard gives, as an example, the United States Constitution. It's "only 16 pages" yet "worked well for over 200 years." Let's take a look at the Seventh Amendment thereto:

In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.

(See the link for primary sources on the Amendment.)

I don't know what Mr. Howard thinks the words "common law" and "rules of the common law" mean there, but to the Framers of the Constitution, "common law" referred to hundreds of years of confusing — and sometimes contradictory — English court opinions.

So much for simplification.

But simplification isn't really what Mr. Howard wants; he wants to get rid of "the right of trial by jury."

That's not "rebuilding" freedom, nor is it "restoring" the way the Founders intended the civil justice system to work. It is a rescission of the freedoms guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment, which expressly preserved the same right to jury trial that was embodied in the Magna Carta and was recognized long before.

Indeed, the English "common law" of which the Framers were so enamored did not give judges any "authority" to usurp the fact-finding role of the jury. Mr. Howard claims that he wants to give judges the power "to apply law," but they have always had that power -- what Mr. Howard really wants is to give judges the power to determine facts, a power that the Framers of the Constitution expressly denied them.

Mr. Howard doesn't want to fix the legal system, he wants to break it.

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It's no secret: plaintiffs like state court and defendants like federal court.

The reasons include: 

• federal juries, by virtue of their larger geographic range, include fewer urban jurors and more rural jurors, and thus (according to lawyers' lore) will award lower verdicts;
• the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure place express limits on the amount of discovery available;
• federal courts are (and were even before Ashcroft v. Iqbal) more prone to grant motions to dismiss (and motions for summary judgment) than state courts.

Even if a plaintiff files their lawsuit in state court, the defendant can "remove" the case to federal court if the case could have been filed in federal court.

There are two ways a case 'could have been filed in federal court': first, if the claim arises under federal law; second, if all plaintiffs and all defendants are citizens of different states. The latter is called "diversity" jurisdiction, and it has a long history of being "disfavored" by federal courts. As I wrote before, in discussing one of the games defendants play to remove cases, "much like how we prefer federal courts preside over cases bringing federal claims, we prefer state courts preside over cases bringing state claims."

So how do we determine of which States a corporation is a "citizen?" 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) says, "a corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of business."

Incorporation is simple enough; all corporations are incorporated in one, and only one, state, most commonly Delaware.

But where is the corporation's "principle place of business?"

The Supreme Court's answered that question yesterday in Hertz Co. v. Friend et al. Here's the facts from the opinion, with substantial edits for clarity by yours truly:

In September 2007, Melinda Friend and John Nhieu, two California citizens, sued the Hertz Corporation in California state court for violations of California’s wage and hour laws as part of a potential class action on behalf of other California citizens similarly-situated to them.

Hertz removed the case to federal court claiming that the plaintiffs and the defendant were citizens of different States, and thus the federal court had diversity jurisdiction over the claims. Friend and Nhieu, however, claimed that the Hertz Corporation was a California citizen, like themselves, and that, hence, diversity jurisdiction was lacking.

To support its position, Hertz submitted a declaration by an employee relations manager that claimed Hertz’s “principal place of business” was in New Jersey, not in California, because — though its California operations accounted for 273 of Hertz’s 1,606 car rental locations, about 2,300 of its 11,230 full-time employees, about $811 million of its $4.371 billion in annual revenue and about 3.8 million of its approximately 21 million rentals — the leadership of Hertz and its domestic subsidiaries is located at Hertz’s corporate headquarters in Park Ridge, New Jersey, where its core executive and administrative functions are carried out, except for some lesser, but still substantial, administrative operations in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.

Let's start with the big picture: this case has no business being in federal court. It's a class action brought solely by California residents alleging solely California-law claims against a company that has more business in California than anywhere else. None of the concerns underlying federal jurisdiction are present. There is no reason to believe that Hertz would be prejudiced by having the case heard by a California state court, and there are no federal issues in the case.

As the Supreme Court noted yesterday, two-hundred-and-one years ago, the Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion by Chief Justice Marshall, scoffed at the very notion that a corporation was a "citizen" entitled to diversity jurisdiction: “the term citizen ought to be understood as it is used in the constitution, and as it is used in other laws. That is, to describe the real persons who come into court, in this case, under their corporate name.” Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch 91–92 (1809); see Slip op., p.5. If that was the law today, Hertz would not be entitled to remove any state-law case from any state court, since it would be a "citizen" everywhere.

But that was then, this is now. The statute we have today says Hertz is a citizen "of any State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of business." If Hertz is sued anywhere else, it can remove the case to federal court. So where is its "principle place of business?"

Prior to the Hertz opinion yesterday, the answer depended upon the Circuit in which the case was brought. Friend's case was brought in the Ninth Circuit,

which instructs courts to identify a corporation’s “principal place of business” by first determining the amount of a corporation’s business activity State by State. If the amount of activity is “significantly larger” or “substantially predominates” in one State, then that State is the corporation’s “principal place of business.” If there is no such State, then the “principal place of business” is the corporation’s “‘nerve center,’” i.e., the place where “‘the majority of its executive and administrative functions are performed.’”

Slip op., p. 3. Other courts, like those in the Seventh Circuit, jumped straight to the "nerve center" approach.

Yesterday, the Supreme Court held that the "nerve center" test is the only test, that "the phrase 'principal place of business' refers to the place where the corporation’s high level officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation’s activities." Slip op., p. 1.

The opinion is a classic example of Justice Breyer's methodology; long on "administrative simplicity" (p. 13), short on the plain meaning rule. I will leave, as an exercise for the reader, the question of whether the Court's unanimous opinion is consistent with the originalism and formalism pressed by four, sometimes five, members of the Court.

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Warren Buffet often gets credit for coining the phrase "skin in the game" — even though it's not his — and his definition is, shall we say, on the money. "Skin in the game" makes a difference:

Mutual funds whose directors have "skin in the game" significantly outperform their competitors, according to a study by Syracuse University Prof. David Weinbaum. His results confirm the commonly held belief that directors who are invested in the funds that they oversee act as better stewards than directors who don't have any money on the line.

It's not the first time Prof. Weinbaum has shown that.

I'm a big believer of "skin in the game" — virtually all of my clients are on a contingent fee — and have written before about how contingency fees reduce frivolous litigation and how third-party investment in lawsuits can level the playing field against well-funded defendants.

So I was happy to read Why Investment Bankers Should Have (Some) Personal Liability at The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation:

We have written a short paper for a symposium on the work of Adolf Berle in which we advocate reintroducing some measure of personal liability for bankers, as was the case in Berle’s day, and indeed up through the 1980’s. We describe in our paper the broad outlines of a proposal to impose some measure of personal liability for a bank’s debts on the most highly paid bankers. The proposal would revive two mechanisms that imposed personal liability in an earlier era: general partnership, which was common for investment banks prior to the 1980s, and assessable stock, which was relatively common in corporations including some commercial banks through the 1930s.

It is difficult to imagine the investment banking business returning to the partnerships of old. General partnership – with the illiquidity and liability it imposes on general partners and the constraints it imposes on a bank’s ability to raise capital – probably will not be considered a viable option. It is also difficult to imagine corporations in the financial services industry issuing assessable stock to all of their shareholders or regulators seeking to require them to do so.

Our objective is to design another way to impose some of the risks of unlimited liability on the most highly compensated managers and other decision makers at investment banks and other financial services and trading firms. We seek to do so without requiring the firm itself to switch to general partnership form or to make any other change in its organizational or capital structure. We discuss below two alternatives, each one based on historical precedent.

We could argue all day about whether the theoretical incentives investment bankers have are good enough to keep them from crashing the whole financial system — a whole cottage industry has developed in the pages of the Wall Street Journal, Forbes and Business Week to do just that. But the facts are undeniable: our banking industry is broken, dangerously so.

I don't see how we can fix that without giving the bankers some "skin in the game."

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Before Ashcroft v. Iqbal improperly re-wrote the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly foolishly imposed a new hurdle for plaintiffs who brought antitrust claims. Specifically, in Twombly the Supreme Court held,

In applying these general standards to a §1 claim [e.g., a price-fixing claim], we hold that stating such a claim requires a complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made. Asking for plausible grounds to infer an agreement does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement. ...[A]n allegation of parallel conduct and a bare assertion of conspiracy will not suffice. Without more, parallel conduct does not suggest conspiracy, and a conclusory allegation of agreement at some unidentified point does not supply facts adequate to show illegality. Hence, when allegations of parallel conduct are set out in order to make a §1 claim, they must be placed in a context that raises a suggestion of a preceding agreement, not merely parallel conduct that could just as well be independent action.

... A statement of parallel conduct, even conduct consciously undertaken, needs some setting suggesting the agreement necessary to make out a §1 claim; without that further circumstance pointing toward a meeting of the minds, an account of a defendant’s commercial efforts stays in neutral territory. An allegation of parallel conduct is thus much like a naked assertion of conspiracy in a §1 complaint: it gets the complaint close to stating a claim, but without some further factual enhancement it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of “entitle[ment] to relief.”

A number of defense lawyers — and, unfortunately, courts — have interpreted the above language to mean that an antitrust plaintiff can only "raise[ ] a suggestion of a preceding agreement" by proving, at the beginning of the lawsuit, that the defendants secretly agreed to raise prices together.

But how do you prove a secret agreement before you can use court processes to conduct an investigation?

Normally, you can't.

Catch-22.

Thankfully, the Second Circuit has just corrected those errors in reversing dismissal of a price-fixing case against several digital music companies. As the opinion (PDF) holds:

Defendants’ arguments that plaintiffs have failed to state a claim are without merit. Defendants first argue that a plaintiff seeking damages under Section 1 of the Sherman act must allege facts that “tend[] to exclude independent self-interested conduct as an explanation for defendants’ parallel behavior.” Appellee’s Br. 15-17. This is incorrect. Although the Twombly court acknowledged that for purposes of summary judgment a plaintiff must present evidence that tends to exclude the possibility of independent action, 550 U.S. at 554, and that the district court below had held that plaintiffs must allege additional facts that tended to exclude independent self-interested conduct, id. at 552, it specifically held that, to survive a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs need only “enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made,” id. at 556; see also 2 Areeda & Hovenkamp § 307d1 (3d ed. 2007) (“[T]he Supreme Court did not hold that the same standard applies to a complaint and a discovery record . . . . The ‘plausibly suggesting’ threshold for a conspiracy complaint remains considerably less than the ‘tends to rule out the possibility’ standard for summary judgment.”).

Defendants next argue that Twombly requires that a plaintiff identify the specific time, place, or person related to each conspiracy allegation. This is also incorrect. The Twombly court noted, in dicta, that had the claim of agreement in that case not rested on the parallel conduct described in the complaint, “we doubt that the . . . references to an agreement among the [Baby Bells] would have given the notice required by Rule 8 . . [because] the pleadings mentioned no specific time, place, or person involved in the alleged conspiracies.” 550 at 565 n.10. In this case, as in Twombly, the claim of agreement rests on the parallel conduct described in the complaint. Therefore, plaintiffs were not required to mention a specific time, place or person involved in each conspiracy allegation.

Starr et al v. Sony BMG et al., slip op., 08-5637 (2d Cir., January 13, 2010), pp. 15-16.

It's hard to call the opinion a "win" for antitrust plaintiffs — Twombly should have been better decided — but it definitely leaves antitrust plaintiffs better off than they were before.

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Oh, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, will we ever stop blogging about you?

The newest online debate pits the class action defense lawyers at Drug & Device Law against University of Pennsylvania Law School Professor Stephen Burbank at PENNumbra, the online supplement to UPenn's Law Review.

Beck and Herrmann open with a defense of Iqbal on several grounds, including:

[C]ourts have no legitimate basis for favoring plaintiffs when interpreting pleading standards. A just system does not pick sides in advance, but instead establishes neutral rules. We reject the normative view that it is somehow “better” to let unmeritorious cases proceed than to risk that meritorious cases will be dismissed. Either way represents error, and neither error is inherently better than the other. Indeed, given the enormous transaction costs that litigation entails, Type II errors (false negatives) are probably preferable to Type I errors (false positives) from a purely economic perspective.

From a "purely economic perspective" it is better if corporations stop wrongfully causing damage in the first place, which they will only do if they have an economic incentive like the threat of legal liability.

But there's a bigger problem with Beck and Herrmann's argument.

It is an "error" when a court dismisses a meritorious case. It is a particularly unjust, unfair, and avoidable "error" when a court dismisses a meritorious case prior to any discovery.

It is not, however, an "error" for a court to refuse to dismiss a case that may be unmeritorious.

Why not? Because the case may be meritorious and, if it is not, the defendant has four more opportunities to resolve the case favorably by testing the merits of plaintiff's claim: judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, trial, and post-trial relief. That is to say, even after the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff's claims will be assessed, re-assessed, re-re-assessed, then re-re-re-assessed. Then there's an appeal to re-re-re-re-assess each and every element of plaintiff's claims and each and every element of plaintiff's damages.

When a court declines to dismiss an unmeritorious case, there is ample room for error-correction down the road to ensure plaintiff's claims have merit. It's why we have a civil justice system: to provide a thorough airing and evaluation of disputes.

When a court dismisses a meritorious case, however, the only error-correction is a single appeal that will be evaluated under the same unfair anti-plaintiff standard established by Iqbal.

Beck and Herrmann have it exactly backwards: there is "no legitimate basis" for not favoring plaintiffs when interpreting pleading standards. Their "neutral" interpretation of pleading rules is not "neutral" at all, but rather a "normative view" that plaintiffs are not entitled to the same error-correcting procedures to which defendants are entitled.

A "just system" wouldn't pick defendant's side in advance.

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"Removal" is the process by which a defendant in a state court case "removes" the case to federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) makes it sound so simple:

Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties. Any other such action shall be removable only if none of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.

There are two ideas behind removal, each expressed in their own sentence above. (If you're in the mood for some light reading of 18th century constitutional debates, here's primary source material on federal court jurisdiction.)

The first idea (in the first sentence) is that defendants have the right to have claims made against them under federal law heard by a federal court. For example, if plaintiff brings a claim under the RICO Act, a claim for violation of federal constitutional rights, or a claim under the Lanham Act, then the defendant has the right to remove the case to federal court so that a federal court will preside over the federal claims.

The second idea (in the second sentence) dates to the beginning of our Republic: federal courts, where the judges were appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, were (and still are) perceived as being less likely to be biased in favor of local litigants than state courts, where the judges were either elected by the public or appointed by state officials. The "other such actions" described by 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) refer to cases brought under "diversity" jurisdiction, which allows plaintiffs in one state to sue defendants in another state in federal court, regardless of the claims brought. Thus, out-of-state defendants concerned about bias in a plaintiff's home state can remove cases if the case could have been filed in federal court in the first place under "diversity" jurisdiction.

Diversity jurisdiction, however, is disfavored by the federal courts. Personally, I think the most simple reason for the federal courts' dislike for diversity jurisdiction is because, much like how we prefer federal courts preside over cases bringing federal claims (as reflected by the first part of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)), we prefer state courts preside over cases bringing state claims. Much like how a defendant has an interest in having federal law claims against them heard in federal court, a plaintiff has an interest in having their state law claims heard in state court.

The United States Constitution provides for a limited federal government, including a limited federal judiciary. Thus, the requirements for removal have been strictly construed, since loosely construing them would violate basic principles of federalism:

Because lack of jurisdiction would make any decree in the case void and the continuation of the litigation in federal court futile, the removal statute should be strictly construed and all doubts resolved in favor of remand." Abels v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 F.2d 26, 29 (3d Cir. 1985) (citations omitted). If there is any doubt as to the propriety of removal, that case should not be removed to federal court. See Boyer v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108, 111 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1085, 111 S. Ct. 959, 112 L. Ed. 2d 1046 (1991).

Brown v. Francis, 75 F.3d 860, 864–865 (3d Cir. 1996). 

The latest "fad" among defense lawyers — more on the source of the word "fad" in a moment — is to hire companies to monitor state court dockets for suits against big corporations, particularly class actions alleging product liability. The moment a plaintiff files a lawsuit that includes any out-of-state defendants, the big corporations collude to have the out-of-state defendant file for removal, on the grounds that the in-state defendants haven't been "properly joined and served" yet.

It doesn't matter if the case involves 99 in-state defendants and 1 out-of-state defendant. It doesn't matter, if, quite obviously, the case could not have been filed in the first instance as a diversity case, since it involves in-state defendants, too. The big corporations found themselves a dubious loophole and decided to run with it.

And run with it they have: the defense gurus at Drug & Device Law have tallied a few dozen of these cases across the country. The defense argument is always the same: under the "plain meaning" of the statute, we can remove any case we want if the in-state defendants haven't been served yet.

It's a silly argument: the plain meaning rule does not permit a court to find a "plain" meaning “demonstrably at odds with the intentions of the drafters.” United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989). There is, of course, no indication that Congress intended to let defendants avoid the strict, centuries-old federal policies against diversity jurisdiction and against removal by setting up a computer program that downloads the state court dockets every 10 minutes.

The more compelling "plain meaning" of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) is that Congress wanted to ensure the in-state defendants were "proper" defendants, and thus prevent plaintiffs from adding bogus in-state defendants to a lawsuit.

The defendants' game worked for a while, but the tide is turning.

Via Gregory P. Joseph's Complex Litigation Blog, we see the Northern District of Ohio rejecting the "properly joined and served" silliness:

Comerica's interpretation of §1441(b) suggests that the language "properly joined and served" creates an exception to the forum defendant rule. This argument is not novel; in fact, it has been the topic of much jurisprudential debate with varying success across the country. I, however, have no need to survey such case law because the Northern District of Ohio recently rejected Comerica's argument in a case of first impression. In Ethington v. Gen. Elec. Co., 575 F. Supp. 2d 855, 861 (N.D. Ohio), my colleague, District Judge Dan Aaron Polster, engaged in a thorough review of available case law.

And what does Ethington say?

The Court further notes that the growing trend among district courts wrestling with this latest litigation fad is to grant a timely motion to remand. While a review of the Frick, Thomson, and Ripley cases indeed shows that the judges in those cases abided by the plain meaning interpretation of the forum defendant rule, the GE Defendants' assertion that the New Jersey federal district courts 'ha[ve] rejected Plaintiffs' argument' is disingenuous at best; it fails to acknowledge that Frick (issued February 23, 2006), Thomson (May 22, 2007), and Ripley (Aug. 16, 2007) were each issued well in advance of the more recent case law from the District of New Jersey -- starting with Judge Chesler's opinion in DeAngelo-Shuayto -- that in fact rejected the approach taken in those three earlier cases. See, e.g., DeAngelo-Shuayto, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92557, at 5, 2007 WL 4365311, at *3 (finding that '§ 1441(b) must bar removal by a forum defendant, whether it has been served or not'); Fields, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92555, at *12-13, 2007 WL 4365312, at *5 (rejecting the plain language approach because it would create an 'untenable result' that would 'eviscerate the purpose of the forum defendant rule,' and holding that 'the 'properly joined and served' language of § 1441(b) does not encompass the situation in which the removing party is a forum defendant, and that in such situations removal to federal court is improper.'). See also, Brown, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55490, at *8, 2008 WL 2833294, at *5 (adopting magistrate judge's report and recommendation with additional analysis, explicitly embracing the reasoning provided in the R&R, DeAngelo-Shuayto, and Fields, and stating 'this Court agrees with [the conclusion] that § 1441(b) must be read to preclude removal by an in-state defendant whether it has been served or not.'); Brown v. Organon USA Inc. (hereafter 'Brown R&R'), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50179, at *24-25, 2008 WL 2625355, at *8 (D.N.J. June 27, 2008) (M.J. Salas) (magistrate judge's R&R concluding that '[t]he Court agrees with DeAngelo-Shuayto' and finding 'that § 1441(b) bars a forum defendant from removing to federal court even if they have not been 'properly joined and served.''); Optec Displays, Inc. v. Am. Maint., Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47562, at *3, 2008 WL 2510633, at *2 (D.N.J. June 16, 2008) (J. Debevoise) (remanding removed case with forum defendant, and explaining that 'even if [defendant] was not properly joined and served, it is still precluded, as a forum defendant, from removing the action to federal court.') (citing DeAngelo-Shuayto, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92557, at *15, 2007 WL 4365311, at *3)).).

Notably, these more recent New Jersey federal district court cases are not alone in adopting Judge Chesler's reasoning and analysis on the proper way to interpret § 1441(b). Other federal district courts as of late have likewise followed the reasoning articulated in DeAngelo-Shuayto. See, e.g., Allen, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42491, at *13-15, 17-18, 2008 WL 2247067, at *4-6; Vivas v. Boeing Co., 486 F. Supp. 2d 726 (N.D.Ill. 2007) (J. Lefkow). (See also, ECF No. 30-2, Pls.' Rep. Mem., Ex. A to Aff. Dec. of Mitchell M. Breit, 1-6 (remand order in Evans v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, Civ. A. No. 07-5046 (Jan. 10, 2008) (J. Brody); remand order in Hance v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, Civ. A. No. 07-5047 (Jan. 10, 2008) (J. Brody); remand order in Malone v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, Civ. A. No. 07-5048, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97461 (Dec. 4, 2007) (J. Savage) (citing Oxendine v. Merck & Co., Inc., 236 F. Supp. 2d 517, 524-25 (D. Md. 2002)); remand order in Scott v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, No. 07-CV-5049, Order of March 11, 2008, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84490, n.1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2008) (J. Joyner)).) But see Flores v. Merck & Co. (In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig.), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57473, at *37-38, 2008 WL 2940560, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 2008) (a recent federal district court opinion invoking the plain language of § 1441(b) with little analysis to deny plaintiff's motion to remand).

After considering Sixth Circuit precedent on statutory interpretation and carefully reviewing case law on both sides of a federal district court split, the Court finds that applying the plain language of § 1441(b) would produce a result demonstrably at odds with Congressional intent underpinning the forum defendant rule, and specifically with the 'properly joined and served' language. Accordingly, the Court hereby joins the DeAngelo-Shuayto line of cases, and in so doing, the Court incorporates and adopts the well-reasoned, thorough analysis and holdings of Judge Chesler in DeAngelo-Shuayto as the basis for the instant ruling.

Ethington v. GE, 575 F. Supp. 2d 855, 864 (N.D. Ohio 2008). A "fad" that is "demonstrably at odds with Congressional intent." 

Told you so.

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[Updated to clarify a distinction between securities suits and investment company act suits.]

This week, the Supreme Court heard arguments in Jones v. Harris. Briefly, the Oakmark complex of mutual funds "hired" Harris Associates as investment advisers, paying Harris 1% (per year) of the first $2 billion of the fund’s assets, 0.9% of the next $1 billion, 0.8% of the next $2 billion, and 0.75% of anything over $5 billion. I write "hired" because the situation is murky: Harris is directly affiliated with Oakmark. Importantly, the fee charged by Harris to Oakmark is more than double the fee it charges unaffiliated mutual funds.

Plaintiffs are investors in Oakmark funds who sued Harris under a variety of claims, including a claim that Harris's fees were "excessive," in violation of Section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act.

Section 36(b), which was added in 1970, is almost poetic in its ambiguity:

For the purposes of this subsection, the investment adviser of a registered investment company shall be deemed to have a fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of compensation for services, or of payments of a material nature, paid by such registered investment company, or by the security holders thereof, to such investment adviser or any affiliated person of such investment adviser. An action may be brought under this subsection by the Commission, or by a security holder of such registered investment company on behalf of such company, against such investment adviser . . . . With respect to any such action the following provisions shall apply:

(1) It shall not be necessary to allege or prove that any defendant engaged in personal misconduct, and the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving a breach of fiduciary duty.

(2) In any such action approval by the board of directors of such investment company of such compensation or payments, or of contracts or other arrangements providing for such compensation or payments, and ratification or approval of such compensation or payments, or of contracts or other arrangements providing for such compensation or payments, by the shareholders of such investment company, shall be given such consideration by the court as is deemed appropriate under all the circumstances. . . .

In essence, the statute says only that the plaintiff can recover against the investment adviser by "proving a breach of fiduciary duty." Subsections (1) and (2) fill in a little detail — i.e., the investor need not prove "personal misconduct" and the court shall "consider" board of directors and/or shareholder ratification — but that's it.

Congress might as well have written, "investors can sue if investment advisers do something bad, but 'bad' doesn't necessarily mean really bad."

Twenty-seven years ago, faced with the same opaque language, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals came up with its own standard for "excessive fee" claims:

[T]he test is essentially whether the fee schedule represents a charge within the range of what would have been negotiated at arm’s-length in the light of all of the surrounding circumstances.

[and]

[t]o be guilty of a violation of §36(b) . . . the adviser-manager must charge a fee that is so disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable relationship to the services rendered and could not have been the product of arm’s-length bargaining.

Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc., 694 F.2d 923, 928 (2d Cir. 1982).

Last year, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals came up with a different standard for "excessive fee" claims:

Having had another chance to study this question, we now disapprove the Gartenberg approach. A fiduciary duty differs from rate regulation. A fiduciary must make full disclosure and play no tricks but is not subject to a cap on compensation. The trustees (and in the end investors, who vote with their feet and dollars), rather than a judge or jury, determine how much advisory services are worth. ...

Federal securities laws, of which the Investment Company Act is one component, work largely by requiring disclosure and then allowing price to be set by competition in which investors make their own choices. Plaintiffs do not contend that Harris Associates pulled the wool over the eyes of the disinterested trustees or otherwise hindered their ability to negotiate a favorable price for advisory services. The fees are not hidden from investors—and the Oakmark funds’ net return has attracted new investment rather than driving investors away.

In short, the Seventh Circuit held that, regardless of what the Investment Company Act says, investment advisers don't have a fiduciary duty to investment companies; instead, they're held to the same fraud and misrepresentation standards as total strangers.

The Seventh Circuit opinion was remarkable not only because it eviscerated the Investment Company Act — which clearly does not require personal misconduct like "pulling the wool over [investors'] eyes" — but also because it produced a sharp disagreement on the underlying economics between Judges Easterbrook and Posner, two of the most notable adherents to the conservative "law and economics" doctrine.

It goes almost without saying that there are reasonable arguments in favor of both the investors and the investment advisers. The statute is ambiguous; there's no clear answer for what the standard "should" be in these cases, but there's also little doubt that something has gone awry with investment adviser fees in the context of affiliated mutual funds.

I write "almost," however, because Professor John Coates of Harvard Law School wants nothing to do with reasonable arguments:

How can such cases make it to the highest court in the land? Plaintiffs’ lawyers are able to file these cases because of three features of the US legal system. First, investors are dispersed, and cannot easily work together to protect their own interests. Collective action costs are often identified as a reason that investors cannot protect themselves from predatory institutions – and sometimes that is true. But those same costs also make it impossible for investors to control the lawyers who nominally represent them. Investors cannot stop lawyers from using weak or even frivolous claims to extract rich legal fees. Nor need lawyers even listen to investors with the most at stake in a case. Unlike the advisers, the lawyers are not required to negotiate with independent trustees, or to submit their lawsuit for approval to the investors. Once lawyers have appointed themselves as investor guardians, they face little competition – again, unlike the advisers, who compete with other advisers to attract new investments.

In Professor Coates' world, a lawyer can, on her own, file a "weak or even frivolous" case and "extract rich legal fees" without any involvement of the actual investors.

What a great racket! Lawyers must be filing these cases all the time and collecting big fat checks for nothing.

Or maybe fewer than 200 securities class actions are filed every year, and maybe only half of them settle for any amount, with the other half of investors and their lawyers recovering nothing for their losses.

Since Coates has never represented any investors in a lawsuit, much less represented a class of investors on a contingent fee, I suppose he needs a few reminders on how the process works.

"Jones" in Jones v. Harris is an investor, not a lawyer. Only investors can bring lawsuits and they can only win if they prove every element of their case. Like I wrote above, most of these cases are sent to the rubbish heap without any payment.

If the investors are in the lucky half that survive years of litigating over dismissal (for reference, Jones v. Harris was filed five years ago and is still at the dismissal stage), the court will carefully analyze which investor should represent the class as the lead plaintiff, giving preference to the investors with the "most at stake in a case." Nonetheless, every investor with a stake in the case, even if not the lead plaintiff, can participate in, and object to any part of, the process, including any settlement and any award of attorneys' fees.

Unsurprisingly, three-quarters of successful investor lawsuits are lead by large institutional investors (p. 27) such as public and union pensions, the ones with "the most at stake in the case."

Coates thus has it backwards: it's not "impossible for investors to control the lawyers who nominally represent them," it's impossible for lawyers to bring and win a lawsuit without the participation and support of the investors, particularly the ones with "the most at stake."

Indeed, in most potential investor class action cases, it's impossible for the lawyers to collect any fee at all: you never know when a court will read an act that says "it shall not be necessary to allege or prove that any defendant engaged in personal misconduct" and nonetheless require the investor prove personal misconduct. Based on this week's oral argument, it looks like the Supreme Court will do just that, leaving the investors and their lawyers with nothing after five years of litigation.

So much for a "rich legal fee." And that's the greatest irony: in the nearly forty years since Section 36(b) was passed, not one single court (see pp. 3–4) has ever held an investment adviser's fee was "excessive."

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Business Week points us to the major cases.

As Litigation & Trial is a legal, rather than a business, blog, I'm going to take their list of cases but replace their description of each with the actual legal issue at stake, along with links to SCOTUSWiki, which hosts all of the relevant briefs for your reading pleasure:

Bilski v. Kappos: Whether a “process” must be tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or transform a particular article into a different state or thing (”machine-or-transformation” test), to be eligible for patenting under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and whether the “machine-or-transformation” test for patent eligibility, contradicts Congressional intent that patents protect “method[s] of doing business” in 35 U.S.C. § 273.

Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, et al.: Whether the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is consistent with separation-of-powers principles - as the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board is overseen by the Securities and Exchange Commission, which is in turn overseen by the President - or contrary to the Appointments Clause of the Constitution, as the PCAOB members are appointed by the SEC.

Black et al. v. United States: Whether the “honest services” clause of 18 U.S.C. § 1346 applies in cases where the jury did not find - nor did the district court instruct them that they had to find - that the defendants “reasonably contemplated identifiable economic harm,” and if the defendants’ reversal claim is preserved for review after they objected to the government’s request for a special verdict.

American Needle Inc. v. NFL, et al.: Whether NFLP, the NFL, and the teams functioned as a “single entity” when granting the company an exclusive headwear license and therefore could not violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, which requires proof of collective action involving “separate entities.”

United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa: Where a debtor declares to discharge a student loan debt in his Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan, has the debtor satisfied the due process requirements of Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co, and does the fact that the debtor failed to initiate an adversary proceeding render the enforceability of the discharge order under 11 U.S.C. 1327(a)inapplicable?

Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Company: Can a state legislature properly prohibit the federal courts from using the class action device for state law claims?

Hemi Group, LLC, et al v. City of New York: Whether city government meets the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act standing requirement that a plaintiff be directly injured in its “business or property” by alleging non commercial injury resulting from non payment of taxes by non litigant third parties.

Graham County Soil and Water Conservation Dist v. ex rel. Wilson: Whether federal courts have jurisdiction over False Claims Act suits based on revelations in administrative reports or audits issued by state or local governments, as opposed to the federal government.

Stay tuned for more discussion of each in upcoming posts.

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As Ashby Jones at the WSJ Law Blog notes:

For all those who’ve made lists of cases to watch heading into the fall, may we kindly suggest adding the Google Books case, if you haven’t already.

The backstory: Manhattan judge Denny Chin is currently sitting on a settlement reached last year between the search engine giant and publishers that would allow Google to sell digital books online. (A hearing on the case is scheduled for Oct. 7.)

Since the settlement was announced, a chorus of objectors has emerged, many of whom have howled that, were the deal allowed to go forward, Google would be allowed a near-monopoly on the publication of out-of-print books and other titles.

You can read the Google Books Settlement press release and proposed settlement here, where I casually described it as "good news for everyone," largely on the assumption that the Author's Guild had reached a settlement that would both make orphan works more accessible and provide compensation for such use. Such was how the settlement was described.

But the settlement is much bigger than that. Walter Olson at Overlawyered rounds up some criticism:

One blogger turns thumbs down on Google Books settlement [Patrick at Popehat] “Laundering orphan works legislation through a class action lawsuit”? [James Grimmelmann, ACS Blog via Mass Tort Lit] Much more: Lynn Chu/Writer’s Reps (who, I should note, has represented my literary interests on matters unrelated to this); WSJ Law Blog; Pasquale/ConcurOp.

The objections are worth considering. Principally, the objection is, as Chu writes,

The Google Book Settlement far exceeds any mere litigation settlement. Settlement is about damages for specific, past harms. This, by contrast, is a business proposal. The plaintiffs' claim was about the harm from Google’s book copying before January 5, 2009. After four years of self-serving business planning, what the parties now place before the court is no “settlement” of this claim at all, but a 335 page publishing and union contract—a proposal for a business venture they wish to present to the class.

Google, although generally a good corporate citizen, has often been cavalier about the rights and interests of individuals, particularly with regard to privacy and copyright, which, like the book settlement, affect the ability of individuals to control the content they produce. As such, there is reason to be suspicious.

One issue, however, seems to be missing from the debate so far: a general principle of governance is that, in the absence of regulation, social policy issues will be determined by litigation.

It is the second half of 2009.  He have affordable technology to unlock much of the collective wisdom of humanity and make it immediately accessible anywhere in the world. Indeed, we even have a well-regarded company ready and willing to do it for free.

That is not a mere business proposal. That is a social policy issue of considerable importance, one will may affect us for generations to come, particularly if, as academics have warned, the inaccurate metadata used by Google Books represents a "train wreck" for scholars. It should be the subject of legislative and executive attention; that is why we have representative government in the first place, to assess and to act upon (or intelligently decide not to act upon) social policy issues.

But it is not the subject of much legislative or executive attention, likely because our intellectual property regime is captive to a handful of corporations that believe they can and should control the bulk of culture forever. They like how things are going for them. They're not going to rock the boat over mere books; indeed, they probably like seeing Google centralize control over publishing the way the RIAA and MPAA have centralized control over music and film.

One consequence of this laissez-faire approach by the government is, as we see in the Google Books settlement, creation of "policy" by the judicial branch by way of litigation. Litigation, however, is particularly ill-suited to solve these problems, for the very reasons mentioned by the objectors, such as the lack of notice to, and participation by, millions of interested parties, including parties which will become interested in the future.

As such, we're stuck. An internationally-and-instantly-accessible, free-of-charge Library of Alexandria is, in theory, a wonderful idea. But so is reasonable protection for the rights of authors (and so is the assurance that appropriate metadata has been captured). And who will decide the wisdom of the new Library of Alexandria?

Judge Denny Chin. I have nothing against Judge Chin -- he may issue a ruling far superior to that which could have been produced by any Congressional subcommittee -- but I can assure you that the Framers of the Constitution had no intention of leaving such matters to him alone.

[UPDATE: Ask, and ye shall receive. The House of Representatives' Committee on the Judiciary is holding a hearing entitled, "Competition and Commerce in Digital Books." Hopefully, prepared remarks will be available on the site soon.]

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Hizook.com, "the robotics news portal," relates an unfortunate incident:

Hizook.com has received an amazing flurry of activity in the last 10 days.  We made it to the front page of Slashdot (twice!),  Reddit (twice!), Engadget, Makezine, Hacker News (etc, etc) -- amassing well over 100,000 pageviews!  During the height of the activity, we received an email indicating that Hizook's Google Adsense account was being disabled.  There was no further explanation, no warning, no attempt made to resolve the situation -- in fact, our only recourse was to fill out a web form and hope for a prompt response.  Apparently that is indicative of Google's customer service.  The remainder of our account is chronicled below.  But, as extremely loyal Google users (Search, Gmail, Google Voice, Google Calendar, formerly Adsense, someday Adwords) and Google share holders, we are simply... aghast.

Here is the entirety of the explanation provided by Google, at 11pm on Sunday night, when they unilaterally disabled the account:

Hello,

While going through our records recently, we found that your AdSense
account has posed a significant risk to our AdWords advertisers. Since
keeping your account in our publisher network may financially damage our
advertisers in the future, we've decided to disable your account.

Please understand that we consider this a necessary step to protect the
interests of both our advertisers and our other AdSense publishers. We
realize the inconvenience this may cause you, and we thank you in advance
for your understanding and cooperation.

If you have any questions about your account or the actions we've taken,
please do not reply to this email. You can find more information by
visiting
https://www.google.com/adsense/support/bin/answer.py?answer=57153.

Sincerely,

The Google AdSense Team

I've made the front page of Hacker News twice -- it is indeed quite a traffic spike, and, if I advertised, I would be very upset if my advertiser torpedoed me without notice at the height of the traffic.

So, can they sue?

Let's look at the Google Adsense Terms and Conditions:

9.      No Warranty. GOOGLE MAKES NO WARRANTY, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION WITH RESPECT TO ADVERTISING, LINKS, SEARCH, REFERRALS, AND OTHER SERVICES, AND EXPRESSLY DISCLAIMS THE WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF NONINFRINGEMENT, MERCHANTABILITY, AND FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR PURPOSE. TO THE EXTENT ADS, LINKS, AND SEARCH RESULTS ARE BASED ON OR DISPLAYED IN CONNECTION WITH NON-GOOGLE CONTENT, GOOGLE SHALL NOT HAVE ANY LIABILITY IN CONNECTION WITH THE DISPLAY OF SUCH ADS, LINKS, AND SEARCH RESULTS.

10. Limitations of Liability; Force Majeure. EXCEPT FOR ANY INDEMNIFICATION AND CONFIDENTIALITY OBLIGATIONS HEREUNDER OR YOUR BREACH OF ANY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND/OR PROPRIETARY INTERESTS RELATING TO THE PROGRAM, (i) IN NO EVENT SHALL EITHER PARTY BE LIABLE UNDER THIS AGREEMENT FOR ANY CONSEQUENTIAL, SPECIAL, INDIRECT, EXEMPLARY, OR PUNITIVE DAMAGES WHETHER IN CONTRACT, TORT OR ANY OTHER LEGAL THEORY, EVEN IF SUCH PARTY HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES AND NOTWITHSTANDING ANY FAILURE OF ESSENTIAL PURPOSE OF ANY LIMITED REMEDY AND (ii) GOOGLE'S AGGREGATE LIABILITY TO PUBLISHER UNDER THIS AGREEMENT FOR ANY CLAIM IS LIMITED TO THE NET AMOUNT PAID BY GOOGLE TO PUBLISHER DURING THE THREE MONTH PERIOD IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE DATE OF THE CLAIM. Each party acknowledges that the other party has entered into this Agreement relying on the limitations of liability stated herein and that those limitations are an essential basis of the bargain between the parties. Without limiting the foregoing and except for payment obligations, neither party shall have any liability for any failure or delay resulting from any condition beyond the reasonable control of such party, including but not limited to governmental action or acts of terrorism, earthquake or other acts of God, labor conditions, and power failures.

Google obviously believes the answer is "no," and wrote their contract to prohibit any suits at all.

Yet, like with most tech companies, Google's terms of service provide "This Agreement shall be governed by the laws of California." California is among the most consumer-friendly states in the nation.

So the question isn't so simple:

Under UCC § 2-719(1)(b), '[r]esort to a remedy as provided is optional unless the remedy is expressly agreed to be exclusive, in which case it is the sole remedy.' However, '[w]here circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this code.' UCC § 2-719(2). ... See id.; RRX Indus., Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc., 772 F.2d 543, 547 (1985) ('Under the Code, a plaintiff may pursue all of the remedies available for breach of contract if its exclusive or limited remedy fails of its essential purpose.').

'A limited remedy fails of its essential purpose when the circumstances existing at the time of the agreement have changed so that enforcement of the limited remedy would essentially leave plaintiff with no remedy at all.' Computerized Radiological Servs., Inc. v. Syntex Corp., 595 F. Supp. 1495, 1510 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 786 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1986) (emphasis added). This theory often is raised where a buyer seeks a refund or rescission of the original agreement, but the seller insists that repair is the only available remedy. See, e.g., Gavaldon v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 32 Cal. 4th 1246, 1259-65, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 793, 90 P.3d 752 (2004)."

Stearns v. Select Comfort Retail Corp., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48367, at *16–17 (N.D. Cal. Jun. 5, 2009).

Sure seems like Hizook is left with "no remedy at all" under the contract. It thus seems they could indeed sue for direct and consequential damages, including the lost ad revenue.

The above analysis applies to goods, rather than services, but two points weigh in Hizook's favor: first, the original RRX Indus., Inc. opinion itself found a software system to be a "good," and, second, a number of courts recognize the same analysis for service contracts, too.

Unfortunately, it's probably not worth Hizook's time or energy to sue over it -- which is why some creative Silicon Valley lawyers should be thinking about initiating a class action. Google's search engine shows 16,500 hits for "While going through our records recently, we found that your AdSense account has posed a significant risk to our AdWords advertisers."

As Bruce Schneier has written in the context of security software, liability changes everything. If AdSense users want Google to shape up, it seems they need to sue their way into it.

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AmLawDaily catches Merck passing the reins from Cravath, Swaine & Moore to Williams & Connolly for its petition to the Supreme Court regarding the consolidated Vioxx securities litigation. In a moment, we'll look at Merck's (likely very, very expensive) brief, and marvel at the Catch-22 it proposes.

But first, some background, courtesy of the Third Circuit's opinion:

Appellants, purchasers of Merck & Co., Inc. stock, filed the first of several class action securities fraud complaints on November 6, 2003, alleging that the company and certain of its officers and directors (collectively, “Merck”) misrepresented the safety profile and commercial viability of Vioxx, a pain reliever that was withdrawn from the market in September 2004 due to safety concerns. The District Court granted Merck’s motion to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, holding that Appellants were put on inquiry notice of the alleged fraud more than two years before they filed suit, and thus their claims were barred by the statute of limitations. Appellants argue that the District Court erred in finding as a matter of law that there was sufficient public information prior to November 6, 2001 to trigger Appellants’ duty to investigate the alleged fraud.

The Third Circuit agreed with Appellants and reversed the dismissal. That's what Merck has appealed to the Supreme Court.

Although Merck had internal doubts over Vioxx's safety long before it was even approved by the FDA, it never made those doubts public (they were only discovered through litigation). After the "VIGOR" study released in 2000 suggested Vioxx had an increased risk of cardiovascular incidents over another pain reliever, naproxen, Merck argued the difference was due to a protective effect of naproxen, rather than any danger due to Vioxx. In September 2001, the FDA sent Merck a warning letter, which noted:

Although the exact reason for the increased rate of [myocardial infarctions] observed in the Vioxx treatment group is unknown, your promotional campaign selectively presents the following hypothetical explanation for the observed increase in MIs. You assert that Vioxx does not increase the risk of MIs and that the VIGOR finding is consistent with naproxen’s ability to block platelet aggregation like aspirin. That is a possible explanation, but you fail to disclose that your explanation is hypothetical, has not been demonstrated by substantial evidence, and that there is another reasonable explanation, that Vioxx may have pro-thrombotic properties.

The issue remained controversial and disputed until October 2003, when a "study by the Harvard-affiliated Brigham and Women’s Hospital in Boston that found an increased risk of heart attack in patients taking Vioxx compared with patients taking Celebrex and placebo." A week after that study was made public, the investors sued Merck.

Merck's argument is that the FDA warning letter alone -- which it vigorously disputed in public, while concealing its own internal doubts -- was evidence enough that they committed securities fraud, thereby putting investors on "inquiry notice" and beginning the statute of limitations.

Thanks to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, and the Supreme Court's 2007 decision in Tellabs Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., investors alleging fraud need to show facts, in their initial complaint, which create an "inference of scienter" (i.e., the defendant’s intention “to deceive, manipulate, or defraud) that is

more than merely “reasonable” or “permissible”—it must be cogent and compelling, thus strong in light of other explanations. A complaint will survive, we hold, only if a reasonable person would deem the inference of scienter cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference one could draw from the facts alleged.

It's a high bar to meet, a "heightened pleading requirement" to be sure. In essence, investors filing a shareholder fraud suit have to prove, when they file suit, that they'll likely win.

Keep that in mind while reading Merck's brief to the Supreme Court:

With regard to those elements that are required for a violation of Section 10(b), moreover, it is not necessary that the plaintiff possess sufficient information to satisfy any heightened pleading requirements applicable to those elements before the limitations period begins running. In the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA)—enacted after this Court first set out the limitations period for Section 10(b) actions in Lampf—Congress adopted heightened pleading requirements for private securities-fraud actions, including the requirement that the complaint “state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.” 1934 Act § 21D(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. 78u-4(b)(2).

In Rotella, this Court considered and rejected the argument that the existence of heightened pleading requirements should drive application of the discovery
rule. Specifically, the Court rejected the plaintiff’s contention that it should adopt a broader version of the discovery rule for civil RICO claims on the ground that, in
many cases, those claims were subject to the heightened pleading requirement for fraud claims in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). 528 U.S. at 560-561. While acknowledging the plaintiff’s concern that a narrower rule could “allow[] blameless ignorance to defeat a claim,” the Court concluded that “we simply do not think such a concern should control the decision about the basic limitations rule.” Id. at 560 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Although the PSLRA operates differently in some respects from Rule 9(b), the basic point remains the same: under the discovery rule, the limitations period may be triggered even when a plaintiff will not possess sufficient information to satisfy any applicable heightened pleading requirements.

It is therefore true, at least as a theoretical matter, that, under Section 1658(b), a plaintiff may not be in a position to file a securities-fraud complaint that would survive a motion to dismiss before the limitations period runs. Even when the discovery rule is applicable, however, the purpose of the limitations period itself is to give the plaintiff a specified period of time in which to “prepare a case against [the] perpetrators”—not to sit on his complaint once it is ready. Lampf, 501 U.S. at 378 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Fujisawa Pharm. Co. v. Kapoor, 115 F.3d 1332, 1334 (7th Cir. 1997). As the government has previously explained in another case involving the discovery rule, “statutes of limitations are designed to induce prospective plaintiffs to investigate and act; they are not designed to offer a period of leisure between the completion of an investigation and the filing of suit.” U.S. Br. at 13, Kubrick, supra (No. 78-1014). The possibility that a heightened pleading requirement “will exact some cost,” insofar as some plaintiffs may be unable to prepare valid complaints within the limitations period, is thus an insufficient basis for adopting a broader interpretation of the discovery rule. Rotella, 528 U.S. at 560.

Like I said: Catch-22. According to Merck, you can't sue until you have enough evidence to show a "strong inference" of scienter, but you have to sue within two years of the first sign -- determined in hindsight -- of when you should have been "induce[d] ... to investigate and act," even if there was no evidence of scienter.

It's odd that Cravath and Williams & Connolly didn't put more effort into this argument. Rotella reached its conclusion by analogizing the racketeering claims at issue there -- brought by a psychiatric patient eleven years after discharge against a facility which, he alleged, fraudulently kept him there to boost profits -- to medical malpractice, where the patient is typically put on "notice" of their claims at the time of their injury.

Such bears little resemblance to the Merck case, in which the investors were arguably vaguely "injured" by the 2001 FDA letter regarding Merck's marketing, but had nothing even suggesting deliberate concealment of Vioxx's risks until 2003.

Moving on to the next two paragraphs in Merck's brief: 

Significantly, in extending the limitations period for Section 10(b) claims from one year to two years in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Congress acted out of concern that the preexisting one-year period would foreclose plaintiffs who were unable to prepare complaints sufficient to satisfy the PSLRA’s heightened pleading requirements in time. In its report, the Senate Judiciary Committee observed that “[t]he one year statute of limitations from the date the fraud is discovered is * * * particularly harsh on innocent defrauded investors,” because “the complexities of how the fraud was executed often take well over a year to unravel, even after the fraud is discovered.” S. Rep. No. 146, supra, at 9. Specifically, the committee noted that, “[w]ith the higher pleading standards that * * * govern securities fraud victims, it is unfair to expect victims to be able to negotiate such obstacles in the span of 12 months.” Ibid. That concern would have been wholly misplaced if the one-year period did not begin to run until the plaintiff possessed enough information to satisfy the PSLRA’s heightened pleading requirements in the first place.

Conversely, if the limitations period were triggered only once a plaintiff was able to bring suit, the practical effect of Congress’s adoption of heightened pleading requirements in the PSLRA would have been to postpone the start of the limitations period, sometimes significantly, in many cases. Given that the PSLRA’s primary purpose was to “check * * * abusive litigation by private parties,” Tellabs Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 313 (2007), it is implausible that, in enacting the PSLRA, Congress would have wanted effectively to extend the time for filing private securities fraud actions—and thus to enable more plaintiffs to use securities-fraud actions as a hedge against downside risk. See pp. 48-49, infra. In sum, the limitations period in Section 1658(b) is triggered by something short of the ability to file a viable complaint, and there is therefore no valid statutory basis for the court of appeals’ rule that a plaintiff must possess information specifically relating to scienter in order to be on inquiry notice.

That misses the point entirely. If Congress wanted to "check abusive litigation," then it is similarly "implausible" that Congress wants to force investors to file suit before they "possess sufficient information to satisfy any heightened pleading requirements."

Which is what Merck suggests.

The investors' brief is due in October. The Supreme Court has not yet scheduled oral argument.

But it will raise an interesting question: should investors be required to sue companies at the first hint of trouble, or can they wait until they have facts suggesting wrongdoing? Do we really want to encourage suits which even the plaintiffs don't know are meritorious?

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In today's Wall Street Journal:

Good news: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has agreed to hear an unusual but important legal challenge in a case involving Governor Ed Rendell’s hiring of a contingency fee law firm to sue a drug manufacturer on behalf of the state.

The lawsuit—which we first wrote about in April—concerns Bailey Perrin & Bailey, a Houston law firm tapped by the Rendell administration to prosecute Janssen Phamaceuticals over the marketing of its antipsychotic drug Risperdal. When states lack the resources or expertise to bring certain suits, it’s not uncommon for them to seek help from private lawyers. ...

In agreeing to hear the challenge, the state Supreme Court said it will consider, among other things, “whether Bailey Perrin Bailey, LLP, should be disqualified because the due process guarantees of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions prohibit the Commonwealth from delegating the exercise of its sovereign powers to private counsel with a direct contingent financial interest in the outcome of the litigation.”

The WSJ makes a big deal out of donations the firm made to Governor Rendell's campaign while negotiating the contract. If there's an issue there, this appeal won't address it.

Drug & Device Law has a copy of the petition for review, which bizarrely claimed companies accused of ripping off taxpayers have a due process right to force the government to hire only lawyers who are "impartial."

Of course, everyone wants government officials to be "impartial." But once those impartial officials have made the decision to sue, common sense dictates they hire lawyers who will "act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client’s behalf," as required by the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct.

The real issue is whether the Commonwealth may hire lawyers on the same terms as businesses and individuals do every day or if the Commonwealth is forced to use a particularly wasteful system invented by corporate lawyers that came to prominence in the 1970s (and is being rejected today) as a means of extracting greater profits from business clients by creating unnecessary work for recent law graduates.

You can guess what I think: the appeal is a blatant attempt to make litigation more expensive for the government, thereby making it harder for the government to sue companies when they cheat or injure taxpayers.

If there was pay-for-play, that's obviously illegal and unethical, but contingent fee litigation itself is a win-win for taxpayers, as it protects the public coffers (no fee if they lose), preserves state cash for other use (no billables to pay at the end of each month), and ensures the matter will be prosecuted in a prompt and efficient manner, rather than through the relentless fee churning that characterizes complex litigation billed by the hour.

Examples of waste by the hour aren't hard to find: the litigation (excluding trial) of a few trust documents at Princeton was reached $40 million for each side. The white collar criminal defense of an executive for accounting fraud was a "feeding frenzy" of $12 million. Compare that to the $0.00 that Pennsylvania taxpayers have paid so far for the prosecution of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc.

It should be noted that the "among other things" to be considered by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court are:

A. Whether 71 P.S. § 732-103 dictates that Petitioner lacks standing to
seek disqualification of Bailey Perrin Bailey, LLP on the basis of alleged
violations of constitutional law.

B. Whether the Attorneys Act, 71 P.S. § 732-101 et seq., authorizes the Office
of General Counsel’s contingent fee arrangement with Bailey Perrin Bailey, LLP.

C. Whether Bailey Perrin Bailey, LLP, should be disqualified because the
General Assembly did not authorize the contingent fee arrangement between
the Office of General Counsel and the law firm, such that the agreement
violates Article III, § 24 and the separation of powers mandate of the
Pennsylvania Constitution.

The first question is a substantial one. 71 P.S. § 732-103 reads in full:

No party to an action, other than a Commonwealth agency including the Departments of Auditor General and State Treasury and the Public Utility Commission, shall have standing to question the authority of the legal representation of the agency.

Such would appear to be a clear indication by the General Assembly that choice of counsel is a political question.

Nonetheless, an interesting and important case to watch. Will Pennsylvania taxpayers be required to open their wallets again?

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Judge Timothy J. Savage of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania had a straightforward job.

All he had to do was:

• survey the laws of all fifty states with regard to unjust enrichment and breach of the implied warranty of merchantability,
  • Huber v. Taylor, 469 F.3d 67, 82-83 (3d. Cir. 2006) (consideration of the requirements for certification must be conducted in light of the correct jurisdiction's law); see also In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1010 (3d Cir. 1986).;
• determine whether there were actual or real conflicts between those laws,
  • Hammersmith v. TIG Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 220, 230-31 (3d Cir. 2007)
• where there was such a conflict, assess which state has the greater interest in the application of its law to determining the liability for defective aircraft crankshafts that were allegedly more vulnerable to stresses in their ordinary and foreseeable use,
  • Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563, 267 A.2d 854, 856 (Pa. 1970); Melville v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 584 F.2d 1306, 1311 (3d Cir. 1978)
• and consider whether applying that law to all plaintiffs and class members violates the Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses through individualized scrutiny of the claims asserted by each member of the plaintiff class.
  • Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13, 101 S. Ct. 633, 66 L. Ed. 2d 521 (1981) (plurality opinion); see generally, 1 Joseph M. McLaughlin, McLaughlin on Class Actions: Law and Practice § 5:46 (4th ed. 2007).

Simple, right? Apparently not:

Our review of the record persuades us that the choice-of-law examination here had its shortcomings. As one instance, the District Court observed in its unjust enrichment analysis that a true conflict existed between the relevant states' laws because Pennsylvania and some others preclude recovery if the parties had an express contract.  Believing unjust enrichment to be a hybrid of contract and tort law, the Court purportedly weighed the factors from sections 188 (concerning contracts) and 148 (relating to torts involving fraud and misrepresentation) of the Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws and concluded that Pennsylvania 'has the most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties.' Defendants were sued in Pennsylvania, manufactured the crankshafts there, 'issued service bulletins and instructions . . . about the crankshafts . . . in Pennsylvania, and plan[] to replace [them] [t]here.'"

Powers v. Lycoming Engines, No. 07-4710, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 6785, at *10–12 (3d Cir. Mar. 31, 2009).

Unfortunately, the above was in error because:

Pennsylvania, however, does not consider unjust enrichment to be either an action in tort or contract. Unjust enrichment, rather, an equitable remedy and synonym for quantum meruit, is 'a form of restitution.' Mitchell v. Moore, 1999 PA Super 77, 729 A.2d 1200, 1202 n.2 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999); see also Ne. Fence & Iron Works, Inc. v. Murphy Quigley Co., 2007 PA Super 287, 933 A.2d 664, 667 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007); Sack v. Feinman, 495 Pa. 100, 432 A.2d 971, 974 (Pa. 1981) (citing Restatement of Restitution § 1 (1937) as a source for the elements of an unjust enrichment claim); Meehan v. Cheltenham Twp., 410 Pa. 446, 189 A.2d 593, 595 (Pa. 1963) (same). The Restatement views restitution as an area of the law 'which is neither contract nor tort.' Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 221 introductory note (1971)."

If there is a claim under Pennsylvania law that falls within the scope of restitution under the Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws, [Fn 3] the following factors should have been addressed in the choice-of-law examination: (1) the place where the parties' relationship was centered; (2) the state where defendants received the alleged benefit or enrichment; (3) the location where the act bestowing the enrichment or benefit was done; (4) the parties' domicile, residence, place of business, and place of incorporation; and (5) the jurisdiction "where a physical thing . . . , which was substantially related to the enrichment, was situated at the time of the enrichment." Id. § 221(2) (1971).

Id. Footnote 3 notes:

Although we have found no instance in which Pennsylvania has adopted section 221, our case law, in explaining the state's choice-of-law approach, directs courts to "use the Second Restatement of Conflict of laws as a starting point." Berg Chilling Sys., Inc. v. Hull Corp., 435 F.3d 455, 463 (3d Cir. 2006). "[T]o properly apply the Second Restatement and remain true to the spirit of Pennsylvania's 'flexible approach,' [courts] must . . . characterize the particular issue . . . in order to settle on a given section of the Restatement for guidance." Id. Because Pennsylvania considers unjust enrichment to be a form of restitution, we believe applying section 221 would be proper.

In other words, Judge Savage, having no Pennsylvania precedent at all to rely on, incorrectly predicted which way Pennsylvania would go in making the archaic distinction between claims in law and claims in equity in the choice of law context. The Third Circuit predicted that, if Pennsylvania courts had to decide if unjust enrichment was a tort or contract claim, the Pennsylvania courts would say, "neither, it's a claim in equity," and so should be evaluated under different standards in determining which state's laws should be evaluated for potential application in a class action filed in Pennsylvania.

Oh.

Nonetheless, in light of Judge Savage's lengthy opinion analyzing most of the relevant issues under the similar, but erroneous, standard he used, it's hard to see how the outcome will change by this ruling.

A model of efficiency, class actions are not.

I don't have an easy answer for how class actions should be prosecuted and evaluated. Judge Savage and the Appellate Judges (Ambro, Weis and Van Antwerpen) clearly did the best they could; fact is, class actions are complicated, time-consuming, expensive and just plain hard to litigate and to decide. It's not uncommon to bounce back and forth between the trial court and the appellate court several times prior to even beginning discovery, much less trial. Then comes the "real" post-trial appeal from a final order.

Plaintiff's complaint was filed July 10, 2006, more than two-and-a-half years ago. Plaintiff and his lawyers have gone essentially nowhere since then, and still have years of litigation ahead, all at substantial time and expense to the plaintiff's counsel, who likely represents plaintiff on a contingent fee, a fee that will depend not only on winning, but on the judge's own evaluation of whether the claimed fee is fair and reasonable. All years down the road.

Something to keep in mind when you hear about all these "unfair" counsel fees in class actions.

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 You may have seen this article in The American Lawyer:

Simpson Thacher & Bartlett partner Barry Ostrager isn't exactly mincing words in his assessment of the counsel that guided Chubb Insurance to the U.S. Supreme Court, where on Monday it will square off against Ostrager's insurance company client, Travelers Indemnity. "Whoever has been advising Chubb," he told the Litigation Daily on Friday, on a train en route to Washington, "gave them the worst advice any lawyer ever gave a client." ...

Way back in 1986, Manhattan federal bankruptcy court judge Burton Lifland confirmed the Chapter 11 reorganization plan of the granddaddy of all asbestos companies, Johns-Manville Corp. The plan was groundbreaking. It created a trust, to be funded by Johns-Manville and its insurers, through which all asbestos claims against the company would be processed. ...

Fast-forward to 2001, when asbestos plaintiffs lawyers began testing new theories of liability against insurance companies. They filed tortious interference suits -- which have become known as "direct action" claims -- asserting that insurers had an independent duty to warn potential victims of the dangers of asbestos. In 2002, Travelers asked Judge Lifland -- the Manville bankruptcy judge -- to enjoin the "direct action" cases. ...

At this point, Chubb became involved. Chubb hadn't been part of the Manville deal but it was worried that if Judge Lifland approved the Travelers settlement, it would be precluded from suing Travelers in cases in which they shared liability. Chubb aligned with the asbestos plaintiffs lawyers to challenge the bankruptcy court's power to enjoin suits against parties other than the debtor. (That's the decision that Ostrager has scorned.)

That bothered Stephen Cozen enough that he wrote a letter to The American Lawyer, deriding Ostranger as a "noncredible source ... launching ad hominem attacks."

The irresistible part is that this feud involves none other than the In re Johns Manville Corp. constellation of cases, including 06-2320 (2nd Cir., Jan. 17, 2007), in which Mr. Ostrager's cross-appeal was rejected because:

Travelers had 14 days to file its notice of cross-appeal. However, the firm calculated the 14 days from the date it received the notice, not from the date the notice was actually filed. The district court denied Traveler’s motion to extend the deadline by one day, explaining that this was a case of “garden variety attorney inattention” and not excusable neglect. The Second Circuit affirms.

Doh! But let's focus on the supposed worst advice ever.

The Travelers / Simpson argument is that Chubb / Cozen should have kept their mouths shut and not attempted to intervene, because the arguments they made (or the precedent created) in support of intervention could be used by plaintiffs attempting to sue Chubb in a later "direct action" case involving an asbestos trust.

There is something to be said for not putting forth your best argument in a particular case as part of a broader strategy involving other cases. That something is: you should not sandbag your own arguments in one case unless there is clear and convincing evidence that it will help you in other cases.

The law of unintended consequences applies to the practice of law just as it applies to everything else. What, exactly, did Travelers / Simpson believe would happen in the absence of the Chubb / Cozen intervention? That the billion-dollar asbestos plaintiffs lawyers industry would not realize a bankruptcy court's injunction protecting a non-debtor raised serious statutory and constitutional concerns?

We already know exactly the opposite is true, and that the asbestos plaintiffs lawyers were already challenging the power of the court to enjoin the "direct action" cases against insurance companies. These issues were already destined for the Circuit Courts and the Supreme Court. The difference was the names on the briefs.

Where then would that have left Chubb if Cozen had told them to sit on their rights and not intervene? Had the Supreme Court denied certiorari for the appeal, or if the Supreme Court agrees with the Second Circuit in prohibiting the bankruptcy court from enjoining these suits, then Chubb would have been left out in the cold, potentially precluded from raising issues relating to hundreds of millions of dollars in insurance coverage and tort liability.

Could that be in the running for the worst advice a lawyer ever gave a client?

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Kevin LaCroix at The D&O Diary delivers news that surprises no one, a securities class action based upon Bank of America's untimely disclosure of Merrill Lynch's catastrophic losses:

As has been well-publicized, within a matter of weeks of closing its acquisition of Merrill Lynch, Bank of America announced previously undisclosed 4Q08 operating losses at Merrill of $21.5 billion that required BofA to obtain an emergency $20 billion cash injection from the U.S. Treasury, as well as an additional $118 billion asset backstop. BofA’s stock market valuation has dropped more $100 billion since the day before the merger was announced through the company’s January 16 earnings release.

As the Wall Street Journal reported (here), questions immediately arose following BofA’s announcement of the Merrill losses, such as why BofA’s CEO Kenneth Lewis "didn’t discover the problems prior to the Sept. 15 deal announcement" and "why he didn’t disclose the losses prior to the vote on the Merrill deal on Dec. 5 or before closing the deal on Jan. 1."

With these kinds of questions circulating, it comes as no surprise that plaintiffs’ attorneys have initiated litigation. There were actually two different lawsuits announced on January 21, 2009 relating to these circumstances. Both of the lawsuits purport to be filed on behalf of persons who held BofA securities on October 10, 2008, the record date for the December 5, 2009 special meeting of shareholders to approve the merger.

LaCroix, no stranger to director and officer liability, has a thorough take on it, and Ideoblog raises the possibility of a "national interest" exception to securities disclosure laws due to the circumstances: on December 17, Lewis had become so concerned that he went to DC to meet with Bernanke and Paulson for guidance, both of whom, Lewis said, "[were] firmly of the view that terminating or delaying the closing...could result in serious systemic harm."

The Fed denied they requested Lewis to keep quiet. Either way, Lewis obviously knew of the trouble by the December 17 meeting with the Fed, but didn't report the losses publicly until Bank of America's next earnings statement on January 16. That's problematic.

The WSJ Law Blog also flags another action, this one brought by Susman Godfrey, alleging the same, with a particular paragraph of interest in their complaint:

As reported in The Wall Street Journal, just three days after shareholders voted to approve the merger, on December 8, 2008, Merrill’s CEO John Thain addressed a meeting of Merrill’s Board of Directors. Thain reported that Merrill suffered significant losses in November, which Thain described as one of the worse months in Wall Street history. Despite the size of these losses, Thain told Merrill’s board the losses were in line with BOA’s estimates. Neither BOA nor Merrill, nor any of the Individual Defendants, ever disclosed any such estimates . . . to their shareholders in the Proxy Statement. Likewise, no loss estimates were disclosed in any subsequent filings.

Ruh-roh!

• September 15 -- Deal is reached. BoA and ML get to work on details.
• October 31 -- Proxy statement issued to shareholders (you can find it here) in conjunction with the special meeting.
• December 5 -- Special meeting of shareholders, who vote to approve the deal.
• December 8 -- Thain tells ML board of significant losses in November, losses "in line with BOA's estimates."
• "Mid December" -- Lewis learns of ML's losses.
• December 17 -- Lewis meets with Bernanke and Paulson
• January 16 --  BoA discloses losses to shareholders.

Lewis & Thain's stories are not consistent. Either:

1. BoA didn't provide ML estimates like Thain suggested;
2. Lewis didn't know about BoA's own estimates, even though Thain did; or,
3. Lewis knew sbout ML's losses sometime significantly before December 8.

The plaintiffs are betting on #3, though they could make hay out of #2. It's hard to see how anyone could sue for #1 -- the BoA deal was the best thing that could have happened to ML, without which ML probably would have collapsed.

Of course, there's another issue here: both Bank of America and Merrill Lynch were effectively insolvent throughout the plaintiffs' class period. Both are completely dependent upon emergency government policies to stay operating, and the government has already stepped in to convert the messy merger into a complicated loan and guarantee program.

That is to say, anyone who bought shares of Bank of America in this time frame knew they were buying an effectively insolvent company, and the damages of the Merrill transaction may be, at most, to rearrange the form of Bank of America's insolvency -- possibly to its advantage.

(If you're not familiar with Section 14(a) shareholder class actions, there's a little background below the fold.)

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Overlawyered leads us to this line from a Posner opinion in Mirafasihi v. Fleet Mortgage Co., decided December 30, 2008:

It is an example of the typical pathology of class action litigation, which is riven with conflicts of interest ...

The case alleged numerous violations of state (every state) consumer protection statutes and the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act. Specifically, Fleet Mortgage Corporation wrongfully used private financial and personal information it had on home mortgages to solicit (with deceptive practices, no less) 1.6 million of its homeowners with offers for financial services. 190,000 of them took the bait and purchased some of these services.

Suit was filed with two proposed classes, one for the 15% who were financial victims and one for the 85% who were 'merely' privacy victims. A settlement was eventually negotiated and approved simultaneously with class certification.

It was an awesome deal: the 1.4 million who merely had their privacy illegally violated so that a national bank could attempt to swindle them received nothing. Nothing despite state statutes imposing an average penalty-per-violation of over $1,000.

Wait, that's not fair, they did get something: they were to be precluded from ever filing suit individually.

Judge Posner was right: the situation presented a huge conflict of interest. Fleet almost certainly exploited the fact that the same lawyers represented both classes, and so likely deliberately negotiated with the intent to split the 190,000 financial victims from the 1.4 million privacy victims. The quote referenced above comes from this passage in Posner’s opinion:

We are disheartened that the litigation by the information-sharing class has been allowed to drag on for eight years, when it had no merit—and that as a matter of law, without need to take evidence. It is an example of the typical pathology of class action litigation, which is riven with conflicts of interest, as we discussed recently in Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., supra, 547 F.3d at 744–46. The lawyers for the class could not concede the utter worthlessness of their claim because they wanted an award of attorneys’ fees. The lawyers for Fleet were reluctant to argue the utter worthlessness of the claim because they were able to negotiate a settlement that cost their client virtually nothing—provided they did not take such a strong stand that it jeopardized the class lawyers’ shot at a generous award of attorneys’ fees, and hence the settlement.

That’s all well and good, and it is exactly why we permit members of a proposed class action settlement to file objections to the proposed settlement.

And that is what happened here: some of the 1.4 million homeowners whose privacy was intentionally violated as part of a fraud objected to the settlement on the grounds that they would receive nothing and no steps were going to be taken to ensure that neither Fleet nor anyone else would do this again.

The district court denied the first objection and approved the settlement, so the objectors appealed and won. The district court then approved a newly negotiated settlement with the privacy victims getting nothing, but with a quarter million going to consumer law public interest attorneys.

The objectors appealed again and won again.

The district court then went back, looked at the value of their claims, and concluded it was right the first two times. It also awarded, for the twice-successful appeals, $18,750 to the objectors' attorneys.

For reference, an appeal in a basic slip-and-fall case will cost at least $15,000 in hourly fees. Most humdrum state tort appeals cost between $20,000 and $50,000.

So what did Posner do on the third appeal? Blamed the objectors and their lawyers, forced them to be part of a settlement that extinguishes their claims for nothing, and affirmed the paltry attorneys' fee award for two prior successful appeals to the exact same court for which Posner was writing, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Then he accused the objectors' attorneys of "chutzpah" for daring to request fees on par with the original attorneys, the one's Posner accused of representing clients amid a conflict of interest.

Posner continued by blaming the district court for insufficiently analyzing the merits of plaintiff’s claims, apparently missing the irony of his own court waiting for the third appeal to point out that plaintiffs’ federal claims were "waived" before the first appeal and that the objectors' state claims had been “worthless” on their face the whole time.

And so the “typical pathology of class action litigation, which is riven with conflicts of interest” continued unabated, with the objectors and their attorneys penalized with foreclosed claims and massive losses in fees for only winning two out of three appeals, on grounds that evaded everyone for years except Posner.

Chutzpah, indeed.

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