The Downside of Folding Medical Malpractice Into The Federal Tort Claims Act

Walter Olson at Point of Law refers us to a proposal by a Democratic legislator in Maryland:

Primary-care providers who practice at federally qualified health centers do not need to purchase medical malpractice insurance. Why? The government promises to cover any claims against them under the Federal Tort Claims Act. If a patient has a successful malpractice case against the health center provider, the government becomes the insurer and agrees to pay the claim.

The national health reform debate should include a proposal to expand Federal Tort Claims Act coverage to all primary care providers, regardless of where they practice, and to certain specialists (such as obstetricians) where access to care is threatened. Doing so would have multiple benefits: Doctors, nurse practitioners and other primary care providers would be freed from the burdens of finding and paying for costly malpractice insurance; future medical students would have an incentive to choose primary care, addressing a critical shortage; and we would finally begin to bend the "cost curve" in health care.

A number of states, including Pennsylvania, already have state-administered medical malpractice insurance. In Pennsylvania,

32. What is Mcare?

“Mcare” stands for the Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error Fund. It was created under Act 13 of 2002 and is the successor to the Medical Professional Liability Catastrophe Loss Fund, better known as the “CAT Fund.”

33. How does Mcare work?

Currently, Pennsylvania law requires physicians to carry a minimum of $1 million of medical malpractice coverage per incident, and physicians must have this coverage in order to be licensed. The first $500,000 of medical professional liability coverage per incident, which is called the basic or primary insurance layer, is obtained through the private insurance market. The second $500,000 of coverage per incident is provided by the state-administered Mcare Fund. Hospitals must also maintain medical malpractice coverage and their required amounts are higher -- $1 million worth of coverage for each incident and $4 million total coverage per year.


The fund is paid for primarily by a $.25 tax on every pack of cigarettes sold in Pennsylvania. Right now, the fund has a whopping $414 million surplus. All though the fund says that the surplus was caused by "the improvement in the medical malpractice climate in Pennsylvania," that's not the whole story.

Government-administered casualty insurance programs run the gambit from fair and equitable, like the September 11 fund administered by Kenneth Feinberg, to hostile and vexatious, like the Pennsylvania Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association (intended to cover insurance claims against insurers that have become insolvent), which has been reprimanded by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court for its "slash and burn approach to protecting PPCIGA’s assets."

Pennsylvania's MCARE fund sits somewhere in the middle, and is not without its faults. Let me give you an example.

Not too long ago, I attended a court-ordered settlement conference in a medical malpractice action brought against two physicians and a hospital. The case was quite serious, with seven-figure damages, the absence of any good explanation for why the defendants did what they did, and highly damaging testimony by another physician at the hospital who had recognized the problem in a timely manner and yet had their recommendations for emergency treatment overruled.

The federal judge hearing the case (we were in federal court because the plaintiffs did not live in Pennsylvania) ordered the parties come to the conference with authority from the insurance carriers to settle. Such naturally included MCARE, which often ends up matching the contributions of the physicians and/or hospitals in a suit.

At the settlement conference one physician showed up ready to tender policy limits. The other physician and the hospital showed up with substantial authority and a willingness to negotiate.

MCARE sent a representative with little knowledge of the case and no authority to even begin negotiations, much less offer money. Such was, of course, a blatant violation of the court's order requiring the insurance carriers appear with authorization.

The judge was not amused, and so requested the MCARE representative phone home until they reached someone who could authorize a settlement.

The representative's efforts failed; not only did the representative not have any authority, but they couldn't find anyone who did. Such would have been a typical example of settlement-conference rope-a-dope but for the authorization phrase in the court's order. After the representative couldn't find anyone, the judge started making the calls, until they found the highest-ranking officer who was available, who they calmly informed was in violation of a federal court order, and as such should prepare for a visit by U.S. Marshals.

After that, MCARE changed its tune, and we settled the case by the end of the day. Like I said: MCARE is somewhere in the middle. Had it been PP&CIGA, I wouldn't have been surprised if they just dared the judge to send the Marshals out.

All of which is to say, it's not crazy to think that the government can run a liability insurance company, but the devil is in the details (Feinberg wrote a book about the difficulties of evaluating damages in 9/11 Fund), because government-administered casualty insurance programs have the same institutional incentives to thwart claimants, but don't have the same disincentives (such as the potential for bad faith lawsuits) against dilatory and obdurate conduct.

Issues and Briefs in the Major Business Cases in the Supreme Court's 2009-2010 Term

Business Week points us to the major cases.

As Litigation & Trial is a legal, rather than a business, blog, I'm going to take their list of cases but replace their description of each with the actual legal issue at stake, along with links to SCOTUSWiki, which hosts all of the relevant briefs for your reading pleasure:

Bilski v. Kappos: Whether a “process” must be tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or transform a particular article into a different state or thing (”machine-or-transformation” test), to be eligible for patenting under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and whether the “machine-or-transformation” test for patent eligibility, contradicts Congressional intent that patents protect “method[s] of doing business” in 35 U.S.C. § 273.

Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, et al.: Whether the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is consistent with separation-of-powers principles - as the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board is overseen by the Securities and Exchange Commission, which is in turn overseen by the President - or contrary to the Appointments Clause of the Constitution, as the PCAOB members are appointed by the SEC.

Black et al. v. United States: Whether the “honest services” clause of 18 U.S.C. § 1346 applies in cases where the jury did not find - nor did the district court instruct them that they had to find - that the defendants “reasonably contemplated identifiable economic harm,” and if the defendants’ reversal claim is preserved for review after they objected to the government’s request for a special verdict.

American Needle Inc. v. NFL, et al.: Whether NFLP, the NFL, and the teams functioned as a “single entity” when granting the company an exclusive headwear license and therefore could not violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, which requires proof of collective action involving “separate entities.”

United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa: Where a debtor declares to discharge a student loan debt in his Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan, has the debtor satisfied the due process requirements of Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co, and does the fact that the debtor failed to initiate an adversary proceeding render the enforceability of the discharge order under 11 U.S.C. 1327(a)inapplicable?

Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Company: Can a state legislature properly prohibit the federal courts from using the class action device for state law claims?

Hemi Group, LLC, et al v. City of New York: Whether city government meets the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act standing requirement that a plaintiff be directly injured in its “business or property” by alleging non commercial injury resulting from non payment of taxes by non litigant third parties.

Graham County Soil and Water Conservation Dist v. ex rel. Wilson: Whether federal courts have jurisdiction over False Claims Act suits based on revelations in administrative reports or audits issued by state or local governments, as opposed to the federal government.

Stay tuned for more discussion of each in upcoming posts.

Health Insurance "Rescission" Three Times More Likely Than Losing Russian Roulette

You might recall last week's post Hospital Sues Health Insurance Company For Cheating Patients Out of Emergency Care. The allegations were depressing and outrageous, nothing less than an insurance company intimidating patients into risking their own health and safety so that the insurer could cheat a hospital out of reimbursements.

This week it's time to look at the practice of "rescission," whereby the insurance company digs deep into ambiguous policy questionnaires to find any excuse to deny coverage after a large claim has been made.

Taunter Media has a detailed analysis everyone needs to understand when health insurers and their enablers say rescission is "rare," that it affects only one-half of one-percent of insureds:

Half of the insured population uses virtually no health care at all.  The 80th percentile uses only $3,000 (2002 dollars, adjust a bit up for today).  You have to hit the 95th percentile to get anywhere interesting, and even there you have only $11,487 in costs.  It’s the 99th percentile, the people with over $35,000 of medical costs, who represent fully 22% of the entire nation’s medical costs.  These people have chronic, expensive conditions.  They are, to use a technical term, sick.

* * *

If the top 5% is the absolute largest population for whom rescission would make sense [because the cost of care over time might substantially exceed premiums], the probability of having your policy canceled given that you have filed a claim is fully 10% (0.5% rescission/5.0% of the population).  If you take the LA Times estimate that $300mm was saved by abrogating 20,000 policies in California ($15,000/policy), you are somewhere in the 15% zone, depending on the convexity of the top section of population.  If, as I suspect, rescission is targeted toward the truly bankrupting cases – the top 1%, the folks with over $35,000 of annual claims who could never be profitable for the carrier – then the probability of having your policy torn up given a massively expensive condition is pushing 50%. One in two.  You have three times better odds playing Russian Roulette.

Of course rescission is targeted towards the most expensive claims; there's no point rescinding potentially profitable insureds, the point is to minimize payouts by the insurance company.

Every patient can be assured that, upon filing a major claim for chemotherapy or neurosurgery or the like, the insurance company will scour their medical records and application to find for any excuse to deny coverage.

The outrageous part is that half of these investigations of expensive claims result in rescission. Does anyone believe half of these people lied on their insurance forms? The insurance companies certainly don't, which is why the insurance companies refused Congress' suggestion they limit recission to cases of intentional fraud.

If you have health insurance, you have a 99% chance of never needing to worry about rescission because you won't end up costing the company much more than you pay in premiums.

But if you find yourself at any point in that 1% -- as hundreds of thousands of people in America will each year -- then your odds of actually having insurance when you need it are no better than a coin toss.

Patients on government-run Medicare or Medicaid need not worry about rescission.

Like I wrote before: keep these facts in mind next time someone tells you health care reform might involve "rationing." We've already got rationing, but right now it's done for profit, and done without any regard for your health or safety.

Legal Malpractice Case Sends Dismissed Appeal Back To Appellate Court To Say What It Would Have Done

When the going gets weird, the weird turn pro.

Here's how it starts:

Nancy Kanter, Esquire ("Kanter") referred a case to Alan B. Epstein, Esquire ("Epstein"). The case involved a claim by a child in the foster system who was abused by her prospective adoptive foster parents (the "Tara M. case"). Kanter had served as a guardian ad litem for the child. When Kanter referred the case to Epstein, he agreed to pay her a referral fee. However, this agreement was not reduced to writing. Subsequently, Epstein joined the firm of Spector Gadon and Rosen, P.C. ("SGR") while he was handling the Tara M. case. Eventually, the Tara M. case was settled for $ 4,310,000. From that amount, Epstein realized attorney's fees of $ 1,293,000. Kanter claimed that she was entitled to a referral fee of $ 431,000. However, Epstein and SGR refused to pay Kanter a referral fee.

Kanter v. Epstein, 2004 PA Super 470, 866 A.2d 394, 395–96 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004).

Kanter sued and won $215,500 at trial, exactly half what she claimed. The jury then considered, and declined, punitive damages.

Then things got ugly:

On August 16, 2002, counsel for SGR informed the court that she would be taking a pre-paid vacation and requested that the briefing schedule be adjusted to accommodate her vacation. ... Following on-the-record discussions, the trial court summarized the agreement of all parties that the Rule 227.4 deadline [the time at which judgment can be entered and appeals taken] would be extended until March 14, 2003. ...

Despite the fact that they had executed a written agreement and had agreed on the record to extend the Rule 227.4 deadline until March 14, 2003, the Defendants filed a praecipe to enter judgment on January 8, 2003, and judgment was entered that same day.

Why did defendants' counsel jump the gun on their own extension? Who knows. Either way, after filing the judgment, defendants filed two appeals.

Bad idea. The Superior Court later knocked out these first two appeals because:

Accordingly, the judgment entered on January 9, 2003 was improvidently entered as a result of the Defendants' breach of their agreement to extend the Rule 227.4 deadline. As a result, Defendants' appeal of the trial court's December 30, 2002 contempt Order was interlocutory and not appealable at the time that the Defendants filed their appeals at 186 and 187 EDA 2003. Accordingly, the appeals filed at Nos. 186 and 187 EDA 2003 are quashed.

Back at the trial court, after the premature appeal things got uglier:

The trial court ultimately issued an Order dated March 10, 2003, in which the trial court denied the Defendants' post-trial Motions and granted Kanter's post-trial Motion, in part. Essentially, the trial court granted: (1) Kanter's request for additur, increasing the award to $ 431,000; (2) pre-and post-judgment interest; (3) Kanter's request for punitive damages; and (4) Kanter's Motion for sanctions.

Let me fill in the amounts. Interest bumped the compensatory award to $461,429, then punitive damages added another $ 645,000, and then sanctions (for attorney's fees) topped it off with another $124,219.86, bringing Kanter's total to $1,230,648.86, about $60,000 less than the total fee collected by Epstein in the first place.

Defendants appealed that, too.

In the Pennsylvania Superior Court, things got even uglier:

In this case, the trial court ordered the Defendants to file concise statements of the issues to be raised on appeal. However, the Rule 1925(b) Statements filed by the Defendants were anything but concise. SGR's fifteen-page Rule 1925(b) Statement included fifty-five issues that it purportedly sought to raise on appeal and also incorporated by reference the forty-nine issues raised by Epstein in his Rule 1925(b) Statement. Likewise, Epstein filed a fifteen-page Rule 1925(b) Statement that raised the forty- nine issues, and also incorporated by reference the fifty-five issues raised by SGR. 7 In total, the Defendants identified 104 issues in their Rule 1925(b) Statements. Furthermore, we note that many of the issues identified by each of the Defendants also included multiple sub-issues.

Kanter v. Epstein, 2004 PA Super 470, 866 A.2d 394, 400–401 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004).

The Superior Court dismissed that appeal as well, leaving defendants with nothing. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court and United States Supreme Court both denied certiorari.

So defendants sued their appellate lawyers.

There's an old saying that legal malpractice cases are hard to win because they require the plaintiff prove a "case within the case;" i.e., the plaintiff have to prove they would have won the original case in order to prove the malpractice case.

How do you do that for a bungled appeal? Do you try to convince a jury of non-lawyers what an appellate court would have done with 104 distinct legal issues?

My preferred quote for describing legal malpractice cases is, when the going gets weird, the weird turn pro.

As the Court of Common Pleas for Philadelphia County held last winter:

Whereas, the Kanter action appeal was quashed by the Superior Court of Pennsylvania without reaching a decision on the merits of the appeal;

Whereas, this action is based on the contention the Kanter action appeal was quashed due to the alleged malpractice by defendant, Saul Ewing;

Whereas, the existence of actual loss sustained by plaintiffs to the malpractice by defendant depends on the outcome of the “case within the case” and whether plaintiffs would have received appellate relief and the extent of appellate relief in the Kanter action if plaintiffs’ appeal had not been quashed by the Superior Court;

Whereas, the parties agree that the “case within the case” presents questions of law for the Court to decide and not a jury trial issue;

Whereas, the parties agree to bifurcate the proceedings to present the “case within the case” to the court for decision prior to a trial (if necessary) on the remaining issues for plaintiffs’ malpractice claim and defendant’s counterclaim. …

It is hereby ordered that … the “case within the case” is bifurcated from the other issues in this action and the Court will decide whether and the extent to which plaintiffs would have received appellate relief if their appeals had not been quashed in the Kanter Action … Following the Court’s decision of the “case within the case,” the court will entertain a request for immediate appeal of the decision of the “case within the case” if the decision is not a final order and no party shall oppose the request of another party to immediately appeal the court’s decision of the “case within the case” even if not a final order to resolve the “case within the case” prior to trial of other issues.

Good idea! Three weeks ago, the trial court issued its full order for the inevitable appeal:

A reading of the Trial Judge's Opinion, dated February 26, 2004, reflects his disappointment with the persistently adversarial, over-zealous, and non-cooperative posturing among all trial counsel for more than two years under his jurisdiction, and in his courtroom. As a result, this distinguished jurist may have inadvertently ordered overlapping financial sanctions for punitive damages, additur, Contempt and attorneys fees. An objective review brings a different result. With that in mind, the Superior Court most probably would be constrained to reverse. ...

This Reviewing Court believes that the Superior Court would be unable to find support in this record for the sua sponte alternative. Delaying tactics during trial, including objections and side bar conferences are annoying, but not the sort of wanton or reckless conduct that meet the criteria for a punitive damage award. ...

Ms. Kanter's request for additur was premised on her belief that the triers of fact were required to award her the full amount of her claim. The Superior Court would have reviewed the record and determined that the triers of fact are free to believe all or part or none of the testimony. ...

The Trial Court ordered attorneys fees and contempt as sanctions "relating to punitive damages only" (emphasis in original), however, for all the reasons set forth above finding that conversion and punitive damages should not have been part of this case, the Superior Court would not have remanded the record to the Trial Court for a hearing.

Epstein v. Saul Ewing, LLP, 2009 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 83 (Pa. C.P. 2009).

And so back they go to the Superior Court, to rule on what it would have done had it considered the original appeal.

The weird have definitely gone pro.

"Investing in Lawsuits" - The Free Market Counterpart to Liability Insurance

I've written before about Contingent Fee Business Lawyers As Venture Capitalists and Lawyers Who "Don't Take Possible Losers," so I was thrilled to read the NYTimes yesterday:

Richard W. Fields says he has come up with a win-win financial strategy for the downturn. He is investing in lawsuits.

Not in trip-and-fall cases, mind you, but in disputes that are far larger, more costly and potentially more lucrative, often pitting major corporations against each other.

Mr. Fields is chief executive of Juridica Capital Management. which runs a fund that invests in one side of a lawsuit in exchange for a share of any winnings.

Larry Ribstein has the most thorough commentary on it:

Litigation financing can be viewed as simply another way for the capital markets to help firms exploit productive assets. Of course there are special problems relating to outsiders stirring up claims by simply funding actions by others (maintenance), particularly where the investor gets some of the proceeds (champerty) or the claims are groundless (barratry).  Also, confidentiality and privilege rules may forbid disclosure of litigation information to outside funders, making these particularly difficult investments. The basic problem, as discussed in my earlier blog post, is that "it turns litigation into a business rather than the search for corrective justice."

With respect to the excessive litigation point, it's worth noting that the hedge funds aren't financing the most abusive types of strike suits. These aren’t consumer class actions, but b2b litigation. ...

I asked Larry in comments for some support for that latter point, to no avail, and I stick by my point that "There's no shortage of patent, copyright, antitrust and securities regulation defense attorneys willing to opine that those 'b2b' areas are as ripe with abuse as any other legal field."

In any event, we already have an industry in which billions (potentially trillions) of dollars of investments are pooled to fund litigation directed towards a particular result. We call it "insurance."

There is a good reason that plaintiff's trial lawyers up against insurance companies (not just in personal injury cases like wrongful death or medical malpractice, but also a variety of "b2b" claims like director & officer liability) accept it as an article of faith that they will not get any reasonable settlement offers until the eve of trial. The economic relationship between insurance companies, defense lawyers, and policyholders creates a situation in which no one mentally accepts the legitimacy of the claim -- much less a reasonable value of it -- until they are staring down the barrel of a verdict.

Thanks to defense liability insurance, even the most obvious of cases will be met with denial and furious litigating of any and all liability, including a denial of basic common sense principles such as a truck driver being the "agent" of the trucking company or a hospital having a duty to its patients.

Why?

To roll the dice: spending a couple thousand dollars litigating the issue could save them the cost of the entire judgment, or at least cause the plaintiff and their lawyer to worry and accept a smaller settlement.

So count me as deeply unimpressed by fears that these hedge funds will spur frivolous plaintiff's litigation: we've already got plenty of frivolous defense litigation and no one raises a peep.

Moreover, as I've mentioned time and again, investing in lawsuits is a risky business. The potential downside is 100%. Look at Juridica's cautious business model:

The investing companies say that because they do not take control of the lawsuit from the company and lawyers waging it, their most important task is identifying cases likely to produce a substantial return. That means, for example, rejecting claims that raise novel legal questions or that will probably end up before a jury, Mr. Fields said.

“Juries are a coin toss,” and that is too much uncertainty, he said. The company also avoids cases where the outcomes are difficult to predict because they could draw political attention or could be reversed on appeal, and cases in which the other side lacks deep pockets.

Let me reiterate that: these litigation investment hedge funds only take non-jury cases with simple issues and low odds of appeal.

That's a small fraction of the litigation and trial market, one with no "frivolous" cases at all. The funds are investing solely in the cases they believe are very likely to win.

The "danger" of frivolous cases is thus non-existent: the real "danger" is when plaintiffs with meritorous cases can't afford to pursue them.

"Life Without Lawyers" -- i.e. Dangerous Without Warning or Responsibility

Via Overlawyered, George Will at the Washington Post favorably reviews Philip K. Howard's "Life Without Lawyers:"

Long Beach, N.J., removed signs warning swimmers about riptides, although the oblivious tides continued. The warning label on a five-inch fishing lure with a three-pronged hook says "Harmful if swallowed"; the label on a letter opener says "Safety goggle recommended."

...

Defensive, and ludicrous, warning labels multiply because aggressiveness proliferates. Lawsuits express the theory that anyone should be able to sue to assert that someone is culpable for even an idiotic action by the plaintiff, such as swallowing a fishing lure.

Oh no! Not warning labels. Heaven forbid a company slap a sticker on their product pointing out some of the dangers that the manufacturer, which spent years testing and developing the product, has discovered.

I've never heard of any swallowed-fishing-lure lawsuits and George Will doesn't give any examples. I'd be surprised if a jury heard such "idiotic action" and didn't send the plaintiff home penniless. If a manufacturer thinks that's worth warning about, that's their business. How much does a sticker add to their bottom line? Less than 0.1% of the cost of the good?

Will saves the meat for, of course, a runaway jury:

A predictable byproduct of this theory is brazen cynicism, encouraged by what Howard calls trial lawyers "congregating at the intersection of human tragedy and human greed." So:

A volunteer for a Catholic charity in Milwaukee ran a red light and seriously injured another person. Because the volunteer did not have deep pockets, the injured person sued the archdiocese -- successfully, for $17 million.

The Charity Governance blog has a description of the case and a link to the Court of Appeals' opinion, which was upheld due to an even split by the Wisconsin Supreme Court.

George Will is tilting at windmills. The theory of 'respondeat superior' -- in which a 'master' is responsible for the conduct of their 'agent' -- is centuries old. In the Milwaukee case, it was undisputed the volunteer was acting in the course of her volunteering for the Christ King Legion of Mary, a volunteer organization staffed and run entirely by the Christ King church.

The question was whether the volunteer was also acting on behalf of Christ King itself, which had a poorly-worded insurance policy that appeared to cover volunteers working on behalf of church employees.

Mr. Hjalmer Heikkiknen (yes, the greedy, cynical man has a name) was 82-years-old at the time. Liability was not denied, as the volunteer had admittedly run a red light.

The accident caused Mr. Heikkiknen to lose a leg as well as all bladder and bowel function, so that he's now completely dependent on others, including his wife. The $17 million was broken down as $558,366.06 for past medical expenses, $750,000 for future medical expenses, $10,000,000 for past pain, suffering and disability, $5,000,000 for future pain, suffering and disability, and $500,000 to Amelia Heikkinen for loss of society and companionship.

Let's not be coy: Mr. Heikkiknen's will spend the rest of his life confined to his bed, with most of time directed towards cleaning and managing his bodily fluids because someone deliberately ran a red light in a rush to deliver a statue. $17 million sounds large, but it's less than half of the $40 million in coverage available. The church will pay not one penny for the case.

I doubt Mr. Heikkiknen will be around to spend much of it. Assuming Congress fixes the bizarre 0% estate tax rate that occurs solely in 2010, then after credits and deductions Mr. Heikkiknen's estate will likely be charged a tax between 30-50% of what's left when he passes away, making the government the principle beneficiary of the verdict.

The bigger issue here is what, exactly, was driving this case. There was no dispute the driver was negligent and no dispute the driver was acting in the course of her work for the church's volunteer group. One "dispute," if you want to call it that, is if the church's ambiguously worded insurance policy also covered the church's volunteer group. The other "dispute" was the exact number it would take to make Mr. Heikkiknen whole again.

It's possible that the insurance company promptly offered a reasonable settlement to cover Mr. Heikkiknen's medical bills, future cost of care, and an amount to alleviate the misery he has and will suffer, and Mr. Heikkiknen nonetheless held out from settling, possibly to leave behind a large inheritance for his wife and children.

It's also unlikely. More likely, the insurance company offered nothing or a pittance, banking that either they would eventually prevail on the terms of the ambiguous insurance contract they themselves drafted or Mr. Heikkiknen would die, severely reducing the potential award by proving that he 'only' spent a few months or years in his catastrophically injured state.

They almost won that bet, except that Wisconsin Supreme Court split evenly. Now the money the insurance company was investing (who knows where, likely the same mixture of public and private equity and government debt as most insurance companies) has now been converted into tax revenue, different investments in the same market, payments to medical providers, and some personal expenses for the Heikkiknen family.

And that's the worst example Howard and Will could find. I'm not impressed.

[UPDATE: Unsurprisingly, other plaintiffs' attorneys, like Brooks Schuelke, are unimpressed.]

The Third Circuit's 1:1 Punitive Damages Ruling: The Lingering Complications of State Farm v. Campbell

On Christmas Eve, the Third Circuit issued its opinion in Jurinko v. The Medical Protective Company and The Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error (MCARE) Fund, a fascinating insurance bad faith claim arising from the failure to tender policy limits in a medical malpractice case, prompting an article in yesterday’s Legal Intelligencer and a flurry of twitter and blog activity. Perhaps it’s a lesson to all of us in the limitations of twitter and blogs and other rapid-response social media. Bob Ambrogi’s tweet “3rd Circuit imposes 1-1 ratio for punitive to compensatory damages” was technically correct, as was this AmLawDaily blog post summarizing the holding:

The court, citing two U.S. Supreme Court rulings (including the Exxon case), ruled that the award was excessive under a test the high court devised in a 2003 case. The judges went further, though, in concluding that the Supreme Court's general path points toward a 1-1 ratio between compensatory and punitive damages becoming a general guidepost. Good news for corporate defense lawyers.

Both, however, miss the point: the Third Circuit didn’t create or recognize a brightline 1-to-1 ratio. It’s a little more complicated than that.

Taking the “precedential” and “non-precedential” designations at face value (in spite of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 making such designations irrelevant), the non-precedential Jurinko opinion must give way to the precedential CGB Occupational Therapy v. RAJ Health Services, et al. opinion of August 23, 2007, which reduced a verdict of 18-to-1 punitive-to-compensatory damages down to 7-to-1 in another case also involving purely economic damages (and thus falling squarely under State Farm and Gore).

On the face of the two opinions, the take-home message is that, in the wake of recent Supreme Court precedent, trial and appellate courts will give very little weight to jury’s punitive damages awards and will instead look anew at the facts to determine, in the court’s own judgment, the degree to which the plaintiff established the State Farm v. Campbell elements for exceeding the 1-to-1 ratio:

(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct; (2) the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3) the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the [factfinder] and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418 (2003). (I note here how courts frequently overturn jury verdicts awarding punitives but never overturn verdicts denying punitives.)

Viewed that way, the distinction between the cases is clear: the conduct of Medical Protective was not nearly as reprehensible as the conduct of Sunrise (the company responsible for the most wrongful conduct in CGB Occupational Therapy), because Medical Protective merely acted in an outrageous manner to protect its own financial interests, rather than intentionally setting out to harm the plaintiff, as Sunrise did. The size of the respective underlying compensatory awards was also critical: in Jurinko, the jury awarded $1,658,345 in compensatory damages, as compared to the $109,000 awarded in CGB.

In essence, as a defendant’s conduct becomes worse, punitives above 1-to-1 are allowed but will be discounted by the size of the compensatory damages. (Again, note how no opinion will conclude, for example, “because the jury did not recognize how truly reprehensible the defendant’s conduct was, we hereby triple the punitive damages awarded.”)

Which brings me to what I believe is the real meaning behind both of these cases: courts have begun to take an economic, as opposed to legal, view of punitive damages. In line with the Supreme Court’s criticism in Exxon v. Baker of “the stark unpredictability of punitive awards” – an economic, not legal, concern – courts are increasingly unwilling to uphold verdicts designed to financially punish defendants (one of the explicit goals of punitive damages), even where the defendant has acted in a manner the court itself has recognized as “outrageous” and “reprehensible.”

I think that’s a shame, particularly given the mechanism by which such civil immunity from bankruptcy is being enacted: constitutional interpretation, the second most powerful weapon in the legal arsenal after constitutional amendment. If the duly-elected legislature decides that unlimited punitive damages awards are outweighed by the need for “predictability” after outrageous and reprehensible conduct, that’s one matter, but to see the courts usurp an economic policy determination under the rubric of constitutional interpretation is quite another.

"Bloggers Offered Insurance, Legal Training"

Legal Blog Watch points us to an interesting development:

A project spearheaded by the Media Bloggers Association will provide bloggers access to first-of-its-kind liability insurance along with free training in media law. The insurance program, called BlogInsure, will provide coverage for claims against bloggers involving defamation, invasion of privacy and copyright infringement. According to the MBA's announcement, its members will be eligible to purchase liability insurance at a "significant discount." Offered through Media/Professional Insurance, a division of AXIS Insurance, the policy will cover costs and damages for claims against bloggers and will parallel coverage offered to tradition media organizations.

In conjunction with this announcement, the MBA has partnered with The Poynter Institute's News University and the Berkman Center's Citizen Media Law Project to create a free e-learning course on media law designed specifically for bloggers and other online publishers. Bloggers wishing to join the MBA and take advantage of its insurance program will be required to take this course and take a test on what they learn (and pay an MBA membership fee of $25). But the course is open to anyone to take, free of charge, by registering at News University.

It is usually good for everyone involved when previously uninsured parties become both insured and educated in how not to to cause damage in the first place.

Of course, there is a flip side: there will likely be a substantial increase in the number of defamation suits filed against bloggers.

Is that necessarily a bad thing? No. Given how truth is an absolute defense to defamation, and the burden rests with the plaintiff to prove falsity, defamation suits are by and large only filed in the most egregious cases, when a defendant knowingly lies about someone else and refuses to correct the mistake. As such, defamation suits serve an important counterbalance to the ease with which rumor and innuendo can spread in the modern age.

I think the real impact of this policy will be to provide costs of defense for generally honest bloggers, thereby protecting them from meritless suits filed solely to intimidate them into silence, suits which could crush (or at least distract) those without insurance coverage. And that's a good thing.

Pennsylvania Bad Faith in Title Insurance Policies

A Pennsylvania insurance coverage / bad faith question:

I bought my home 5 years ago from estate.  Now, I'm selling my home, the buyer's title insurance company found 3 problems, including a tax lein of 55.00 plus penalties.  My title insurance company offered ademity letter to new title insurance company.  They don't want that, they want problems resolved.  My title insurance company says too bad.  Not worth the money to find my file.  They don't know whether claims are valid or not.  Will not resolve them or see if they need to be resolved.  Won't even look at file!  This seems wrong.  What should I do?  We had a closing date of Sept.29 that will probably have to be moved.  May lose sale.  Do I need a lawyer?

And my response:

You should speak with a plaintiff's attorney experienced in bringing bad faith claims against insurance company.

When an insurance company breaches the terms of the insurance policy the insured can bring a claim for breach of contract and recover the damages resulting from the insurance company's breach. A number of title insurance policies include a requirement that the title insurance company actively work to resolve title issues, and every one I've seen requires the title insurance company at least pay for all damages resulting from such title issues, up to the policy limits. It sure seems like your title insurance company is refusing to do that, which is a breach.

Moreover, in Pennsylvania, every insurance company has a legal duty to promptly and reasonably evaluate and adjust claims in good faith. If they don't, there is a specific legal claim available against them which can include the award of attorneys fees, interest and punitive damages. It does not seem like your claim has been evaluated fairly.
 

AIG: Has the Federal Reserve Become Both a Receiver and an Insurance Guaranty Fund?

I don't mean to intrude upon the jurisdiction of the financial blogs. If you'd like to know more about the financial aspect of the AIG loan, here's The Big Picture and the Economist's View, both of which link all over the place.

I'd like to talk about the legal structure of the "loan," given its resemblance to an entity that plaintiffs' attorneys like myself frequently encounter: the insurance guaranty assocation. As we'll see below, the loan creates obligations similar to those of a guaranty association, but with a problematic twist: the federal government now not only must decide how to conserve capital available for future insurance claimants, but also what to do with the assets and value of the insurance company itself, two functions typically given to different parties in ordinary insurance company liquidations.

More below.

[UPDATED: The powers that be have deigned to fill us in on the details. The loan is quite traditional, despite prior reporting, and the Federal Reserve does not hold an interest unless and until the loan is not repaid in 24 months. The below analysis thus still applies, but not until that default in two years.

UPDATED AGAIN: It's happened already (so much for two years!), we now directly own $40 Billion of AIG.]

Here's part of the Federal Reserve's statement:

The Board determined that, in current circumstances, a disorderly failure of AIG could add to already significant levels of financial market fragility and lead to substantially higher borrowing costs, reduced household wealth, and materially weaker economic performance.

The purpose of this liquidity facility is to assist AIG in meeting its obligations as they come due. This loan will facilitate a process under which AIG will sell certain of its businesses in an orderly manner, with the least possible disruption to the overall economy.

The AIG facility has a 24-month term. Interest will accrue on the outstanding balance at a rate of three-month Libor plus 850 basis points. AIG will be permitted to draw up to $85 billion under the facility.

The interests of taxpayers are protected by key terms of the loan. The loan is collateralized by all the assets of AIG, and of its primary non-regulated subsidiaries.  These assets include the stock of substantially all of the regulated subsidiaries.  The loan is expected to be repaid from the proceeds of the sale of the firm’s assets. The U.S. government will receive a 79.9 percent equity interest in AIG and has the right to veto the payment of dividends to common and preferred shareholders.

Pretty harsh; 850 basis points puts the "loan" at over 10% right now, and it only lasts two years. Moreover, with the taxpayers now owning 80% of the business (why not 100%?), the purpose is not to keep the business afloat but rather to have an orderly liquidation. [Update: ownership does not change unless and until a default in 24 months; Updated again: The US has already taken $40 Billion in ownership, see above update.]

AIG isn't the first insurance company to go under; as the NCIGF points out, "Since 1976, there have been about 600 insolvencies of property and casualty insurers." When an insurer goes under on the state level, two processes go into motion: 

  1. The insurer goes into bankruptcy and a governmental conservator / receiver is appointed, like in the Thabault v. PriceWaterhouseCoopers suit, where the Insurance Commission for Vermont is the receiver for the defunct Ambassador Insurance Company.
  2. The insurer's obligations are picked up by a state-run non-profit guaranty association, like The Pennsylvania Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association (PP&CIGA).

The two then work in tandum, with the receiver trying to get money wherever they can and the guaranty association operating to ensure at least some compensation for the claimaints against parties insured by the defunct insurer.

Both insurance receivers and insurance guaranty associations have a reputation for being aggressive. In Thabault, the Commissioner in Vermont just had a $182.9 million verdict against the insurer's negligent accountants affirmed by the Third Circuit. In Pennsylvania, just last year PP&CIGA was reprimanded by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court for its “slash and burn approach to protecting PPCIGA’s assets." Carrozza v. Greenbaum, 591 Pa. 196, 215, 218 (2007).

So why didn't that happen here? Two reasons.

First, there's no Federal guaranty assocation. Nothing, nada. There's no structure in place at all for the Federal government to assume operational responsibility for AIG's coverage. Maybe the old Resolution Trust Corporation could come back, as some big names have proposed, but they don't know how an insurance company operates, so that's probably not a good idea for AIG.

Second, as the Bankruptcy Litigation Blog has covered quite thoroughly, the 2005 BAPCPA amendments fundamentally altered bankruptcy for financial contracts:

To provide enhanced protection to the financial services industry, Congress added or expanded the Code's definitions for such industry staples as "forward contracts" (§101(25)), "repurchase agreements" (§101(47)), and "swap agreements" (§101(53B)). Various other Code provisions were amended or added to reflect Congress's desire to enable a nondebtor party–without hesitation–to terminate, liquidate or accelerate its securities contracts, commodity contracts, forward contracts, repurchase agreements, swap agreements or master netting agreements with the debtor.

That renders the "automatic stay" that normally comes with bankruptcy useless with regard to a wide variety of financial contracts, which were the source of AIG's problems. If AIG declares bankruptcy, it opens itself up to a fantastically disordered liquidation. So bankruptcy is out of the question, too.

But why do I think the Federal Reserve is acting like a guaranty assocation? As the D&O Diary points out,

 Finally, I must address the interests of policyholders. On Tuesday, AIG released a statement (here) that its insurance subsidiaries "remain adequately capitalized and fully capable of meeting their obligations to policyholders." Along those lines, it is important to keep in mind that AIG’s current predicament is not the result of insurance losses, so the separately capitalized insurance companies’ ability to meet its obligations essentially remains unchanged.
 
Moreover, the collateral securing the Fed’s lending facility does not include the insurance companies’ assets, so even if the parent company heads south in a big way despite the $85 billion loan, the insurance companies’ existing surplus should remain to address policyholder claims, subject of course to the effects of claims payment.

In the days ahead it will be very important to understand how the current operating circumstances will affect the insurance companies and their operations, and in particular whether there are any other implications for policyholder surplus and the insurance companies’ claims paying ability.

In theory, the insurance companies are protected. Their assets are apparently not even part of the collateral for the Federal Reserve loan. But there's a problem, as raised earlier in Kevin's post:

The government wants to get repaid, so it wants the "orderly sale" of the businesses to produce sales values sufficient to effect repayment. That implies that the operating companies should continue operating. But among the insurance companies, for example, there are many practical questions that only active and engaged management can decide – risk appetite, level of pricing aggressiveness, extent of reinsurance, limit exposures, prohibited classes, and so on. All of these decisions must now take place under potentially unusual conditions, in effect under the supervision of a government appointed caretaker/liquidator?

Therein lies the rub: general insurance is its only profitable sector, so it's the only source of new funds. Which raises a couple questions:

  1. Will AIG file for bankruptcy if the current credit facility is not enough to keep operational? Doing so will, as discussed above, likely result in a total collapse as counterparties abandon their obligations.
  2. Will the Federal Reserve attempt to use the insurance arm as a profit center to fund payments to the Federal Reserve or other creditors? Doing so imperils the reserve available for future claimants on the policies.
  3. Will the Federal Reserve sell off the insurance arm? Doing so imperils the Federal Reserve's loan as well as the demands of other creditors.

That leaves the Federal Reserve balancing its own interests against those of claimants, the very sort of problem avoided by the normal receiver / guaranty association split. Who do you think will win out?

"Patients Lose" When Physicians Have To Do Their Job

Sometimes I read Kevin, M.D. out of what I can only assume is a hidden desire to gnash my teeth thinking about medical malpractice:

Massachusetts is allowing a new form of malpractice lawsuit to go forward:

A woman wrecked her car, killing an innocent bystander. Now the bystander’s widow is suing the woman’s doctors, arguing that they should have warned her not to drive while taking the pain medicines they prescribed.
The problem is, a majority of medications can lead to lightheadedness and dizziness, which in theory, can impair the ability to drive. Blood pressure and diabetes drugs for instance. Should patients taking these medications be warned not to drive?

At the very least, I would be very wary of prescribing any form of narcotic medications if these types lawsuits were to succeed. Patients lose again.

I'll put aside the assertion that "a majority of medications" are at issue; I imagine he wrote that as a throw-away line.

On to the merits, it's interesting that Kevin does not attack the nominal "problem" with the ruling, in that it creates the right of third parties to sue physicians where the physician was negligent in their treatment of a patient and that negligence injured the third party. That's what all the doctors in Massachusetts were freaking out about. So we'll leave that to another day.

Instead, he apparently frets that physicians should not be held liable where they failed to warn patients about the risks of the medications they are prescribing.

Why not? Is it really so hard to hand a patient a brochure or to talk over the risks on the package with them? Is it really so terrible if the standard of care requires a physician listen to their patient and, upon hearing an elderly woman say she feels faint while driving, suggest she stop driving?

The practical answer most physicians would give is that of course they want to take the time to discuss every detail of the medication they are prescribing to their patients, but they simply can't. If they did that, they wouldn't make nearly enough money to support their practice.

That's not a complaint about medical malpractice, trial lawyers, or torts. It's a complaint about insurance reimbursements, which encourage doctors to treat patient visits like speed dating.

So stop blaming us.

* gnashes teeth *

Pennsylvania Medical Malpractice After An Car Accident: From Whom Do You Recover?

From the Middle District of Pennsylvania:

In Pennsylvania, an individual who sustains injury in a motor vehicle collision that is aggravated by subsequent medical negligence may recover damages for both injuries either from the driver exclusively or from the driver and the negligent medical practitioner in tandem. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 457 (s1965) [hereinafter "RESTATEMENT"]; Smialek v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 290 Pa. Super. 496, 434 A.2d 1253, 1258 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) (stating that "the original tortfeasor[ in an automobile collision] is . . . fully responsible . . . for the negligent manner in which a physician or surgeon treats the case"). The plaintiff may recover all damages solely from the negligent driver because subsequent faulty treatment is deemed to be a foreseeable consequence of the automobile accidence. See RESTATEMENT § 457 cmt. a ("[D]amages assessable against [a negligent driver] include not only the injury originally caused by the [driver's] negligence but also the harm resulting from the manner in which the medical, surgical, or hospital services are rendered"); Boggavarapu v. Ponist, 518 Pa. 162, 542 A.2d 516, 517 (Pa. 1988).

However, if the plaintiff sues both the driver and the physician, liability should be allocated according to each tortfeasor's separate negligence. 1 See Frazier v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 109 F.R.D. 293, 295-96 (W.D. Pa. 1985) (stating that negligent motorists and subsequently negligent physicians commit separately identifiable acts of negligent); Smith v. Pulcinella, 440 Pa. Super. 525, 656 A.2d 494, 497 (Pa. Super Ct. 1995); Harka v. Nabati, 337 Pa. Super. 617, 487 A.2d 432, 434 (Pa. Super Ct. 1985) (quoting Voyles v. Corwin, 295 Pa. Super. 126, 441 A.2d 381, 383 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982)) ("[T]o the extent that the acts of the original tortfeasor and those of the physician are capable of separation, the damages should be apportioned accordingly."). The court determines as a matter of law whether injuries are capable of apportionment; however, the jury determines the value of the claim against each defendant. Voyles, 441 A.2d at 383.

Trout v. Milton S. Hershey Med. Ctr., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65553 (emphasis added).

If the medical malpractice causes a catastrophic injury, there are very few situations in which you would want to proceed only against the car driver, not least because they likely have far less available insurance than the medical provider. Indeed, in this case the plaintiff's leg became necrotic and had to be amputated allegedly due to medical malpractice, an injury that, when combined with the accident itself, likely exceeds the insurance coverage of most drivers.



Then again, if neither the auto accident nor the medical malpractice was catastrophic, and the damages are within the coverage limits, the action can be substantially simplified by proceeding only against the car driver. You will still need expert medical testimony, but you might not get nearly the same fight as you would going against the medical provider directly. You might also have more settlement leverage against the car driver's insurance company because they run the risk of eating all of the damages at trial.


The Worst Insurance Companies in America

As deemed by the American Association for Justice (which, really, should have been renamed to The Justice League of America):

1.  Allstate

2.  Unum

3.  AIG

4.  State Farm

5.  Conseco

6.  Wellpoint

7.  Farmers

8.  United Health

9.  Torchmark

10.  Liberty Mutual

Lines up with this intriguing website, which also lists Allstate the worst and Chubb the best.

I'm inclined to agree. I've been very impressed by Chubb's claims handling. I once had to interpret their "Masterpiece" policy to see if it covered a particular act which a jury could easily find was intentional (and, if proven, would have been criminal). Amazingly, it did, and without any weasely insurance-coverage language designed to tie up such a question in the courts for years.

I switched my own homeowner's to it promptly.