$120 Million In Hourly Billing For A Single Trial: What Happened In Robertson v. Princeton?

The blog "How Appealing" has plenty of links on the $90 million settlement of the donor-intent suit brought against Princeton University by the heirs to the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. (and now A&P supermarket) fortune, alleging misuse of a 1961 donation of $35 million which had swelled in value to over half a billion dollar.

The case was scheduled to go to trial in New Jersey state court in January. Pretrial litigation costs were $40 million for each side. Princeton expected its own trial costs to reach $20 million; it's fair to assume that the Robertson's trial costs would have been the same if not greater.

$80 million to litigate and another $40 million to try a breach of fiduciary duty, accounting and breach of contract dispute between two parties. No appeals, certs, or retrials included.

How could that be? Let's look at how those numbers compare to other complicated cases like patent infringement, white collar criminal defense, and antitrust.

According to the American Intellectual Property Law Association, the average per-party cost to take through litigation and trial a large (over $25 million at stake) patent infringement / dispute is $5 million. (For all patent cases, the average is $1 million). Patent cases are document intensive, involve numerous expensive experts, and typically require dozens of depositions and motions. They're often more complicated than large commercial litigation or breach of fiduciary duty cases.

Yet, the Robertson case would have cost twelve times what the biggest patent cases typically do.

Remember the white collar criminal defense that got WilmerHale sued? That "feeding frenzy" of billing was over $12 million in hourly fees, less than one-third what either side here charged, and it involved more than double the documents of Robertson.

So what happened in Robertson?

Sure, the case wasn't a slip-and-fall:

The university says it produced more than half a million pages of documents in pretrial discovery. The trial witness list had 124 names, 80 witnesses had been deposed, 3,000 pages of briefs were required and 5,000 trial exhibits were identified.

But it wasn't that big. Here's how the District Court described the Visa / Mastercard merchant and debit card antitrust case, which settled just before trial a few years ago:

Class Counsel have litigated this case -- which did not culminate in settlement until the eve of trial -- for seven years. During that time, there were almost 400 depositions of witnesses, including 21 experts who issued 54 expert reports; four rounds of class certification briefing (through the Supreme Court); 16 summary judgment motions, 31 motions in limine, and three Daubert motions; and a pretrial order identifying 230,000 pages of trial exhibits, 730 trial witnesses, and more than 17,000 deposition designations

In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litig., 297 F. Supp. 2d 503 (E.D.N.Y., 2003). Now that's big.

Yet, that much work -- several orders of magnitude larger than Robertson -- resulted in a "lodestar" (hours times prevailing rates) fee calculation of $62,545,603 for plaintiffs' counsel, or one and a half times each side's bill in Robertson.

The Robertson case was filed July 17, 2002. In the 6 years, 4 months, and 24 days leading up to the settlement announcement, the parties averaged $34,202.65 in costs every single day, or about the same as if each side had one of the most expensive partners in the country (each at $1,000 an hour) and two of the most expensive associates in the country ($600 an hour per associate) working every single day, including weekends and holidays, from 8am to 6pm, taking no more than 2.2 hours in their work day to do anything else, including eating, twittering or answering angry phone calls from their abandoned spouses.

Using more reasonable numbers, like an average rate of $348 an hour, and seven hours of actual, billable hours per day, we still end up with the ridiculous conclusion that each side had seven lawyers working full time for them every day, including weekends and holidays.

Some of these numbers may be unfair. For instance, both sides hired major accounting firms to prepare extensive expert reports. So let' s very generously assume that these firms performed the same level of accounting work as required for companies with under $1 billion in annual revenue to ensure complete Sarbanes-Oxley compliance: $2.8 million (which I think is a high estimate) for each side.

Let's also assume "costs," like copying, postage, phone calls and research equal about 5% of overall billing, as is often the case in business representation. I think that's actually generous here -- $2 million per side will get you an awful lot of copies.

Adding in those expert fees and costs drops the attorneys' fees to $70.4 million, or a mere $30,098.33 every single day. Using our "reasonable" hourly rates and billable hours, that's a team of six lawyers working full time every day, including weekends and holidays. For each side.

That's outrageous: other than the fees, Robertson was closer in size to complicated personal injury litigation than a large, complex commercial dispute like a patent, antitrust, or securities case.

Multi-defendant, multi-claim personal injury cases -- e.g., a catastrophic injury or wrongful death at a construction site that raises both product liability and negligence issues -- frequently exceed 100,000 documents, 100 potential witnesses, 50 depositions, and 1,000 trial exhibits. I can't judge what the article meant by 3,000 pages of "briefs," but, based on the motions and orders available online, I assume that number includes pleadings, motions and exhibits, which is not at all impressive.

Tomorrow we'll look at how not to spend $120 million bringing a case to trial.

The Watchmen Movie: Copyright Infringement, Injunctions, Options, Laches, and a Circuit Split All in One

We're aiming for new heights of nerdom here at Litigation & Trial, combining comic books, movies, old law school contract cases, equitable principles, permanent injunctions, and recent circuit splits in one post. The Watchmen lawsuit -- which is less copyright infringement and more commercial litigation, since the dispute is largely over contract terms -- gives us license (har har) to do so.

Graphic novels (née "comic books") are serious money these days, at least when adapted for the big screen. In addition to the normal superhero adaptations, like Iron Man and The Incredible Hulk (which have generally done quite well), particular attention has been paid to noir comics like Sin City and 300. (The Nolans' Batman adaptations are a hybrid, drawing from noir variations on Batman, like The Dark Knight Returns.)

Watchmen, published in 1986-87, is perhaps the most heralded of the noir comics, a complex and character-driven drama set in a alternative-history 1980s United States in which superheroes (the bulk of which have no obvious superpower) have been suppressed as unaccountable vigilantes, while Nixon is on his fifth term as president.

Such a complicated tale obviously presents numerous visual, thematic and temporal problems for moviemakers, in addition to normal stress of taking a work revered by a subculture and making it widely appealing without offending the subculture or alienating the masses. Multiple attempts to make the movie since the story was published have fizzled out; even Terry Gilliam, who has no trouble bringing madness to the big screen, deemed it unfilmable.

But Zack Snyder, who directed the enormously successful 300 (which made $450 million on a $60 million budget), has apparently done it and done it well.

Since he's appearing on this blog, you can guess what happened next: the production company, Warner Brothers, was sued.

The movie buzz is that the case has substantial merit and could turn the movie into a loss for WB, and the original documents are available online for your perusal. In essence, Fox bought the complete rights to Watchmen, tried to begin production, gave up, quitclaimed the rights to the producer (with the terms of that quitclaim disputed), then entered into multiple disputed subsequent agreements. Here's the Court's outline (as formatted by Deadline Hollywood):

1986-90: Fox acquires motion picture rights in The Watchmen.

1990: Fox enters into a domestic distribution agreement with Largo Entertainment, a joint venture of JVC Entertainment Inc., Golar (Larry Gordon), and BOH, Inc. The “Largo Agreement” established Fox’s domestic distribution rights, through a license from Largo, in “subject pictures” as defined in the agreement.

June 1991: Fox enters into a “Quitclaim Agreement” with Largo International, through which Fox “quitclaims to Purchaser all of Fox’s right, title and interest in and to the Motion Picture project presently entitled Watchmen, which included specifically described literary materials. Notably, the agreement provides that, “if Purchaser elects to proceed to production, the Picture shall be produced by Purchaser and shall be distributed by Fox as a Subject Picture pursuant to the terms of the Largo Agreement ...” In consideration for the rights to Watchmen, Fox was to be reimbursed for its development costs ($435,600) plus interest plus a profit participation in the worldwide net proceeds of any Watchmen picture.

Nov. 1991: The Largo Agreement was amended; Watchmen was listed as a project quitclaimed to Largo.

Nov. 1993: Larry Gordon, through Golar, withdraws from the Largo Entertainment joint venture; Largo conveys any rights it has in Watchmen to Gordon/Golar. Based on the 1991 quitclaim, the Court may infer that Gordon now stood in the shoes of Largo with respect to Watchmen and held whatever rights it acquired through the 1991 Quitclaim, which left Fox with the distribution rights it retained through that agreement.

1994: Fox negotiated a “Settlement and Release” agreement with Gordon which contemplated that the Watchmen project would be put in “perpetual turnaround” to Lawrence Gordon Productions, Inc. The “turnaround notice” gave Lawrence Gordon Productions “the perpetual right . . . to acquire all of the right, title and interest of Fox [Watchmen] pursuant to the terms and conditions herein provided.” The turnaround notice then described the formula for determining the buy-out price in the event that Gordon elected to acquire Fox’s interest. Thus, the document suggests that Gordon acquired an option to acquire Fox’s interest in Watchmen for a price. In fact, the notice obligated Gordon to pay the buy-out price on the commencement of any production of a Watchmen film. The notice also provided that the agreement was personal to Gordon and that, “prior to payment of the Buy-Out Price,” he could not assign rights or authorize any person to take any action with respect to the project.

(emphasis mine) WB now argues the full rights were quitclaimed multiple times; Fox claims they granted an option the producer failed to exercise, so the rights are still their's. A court last week denied WB's motion to dismiss. Variety summarizes:

At the heart of Fox’s suit, filed in February, is the contention that it never ceded rights to the property. And according to the federal Judge Gary Allen Feess, Fox retained distribution rights to the graphic novel penned by Alan Moore and illustrated by Dave Gibbons through a 1991 claim. Furthermore, Feess appears to agree that under a 1994 turnaround deal with producer Larry Gordon, Gordon acquired an option to acquire Fox’s remaining interest in "Watchmen," which was never exercised, thereby leaving Fox with its rights under the 1994 agreement.

Frankly, I agree with the Court's ruling (denying the motion to dismiss) but not the reasoning, which I'll get to below. For now, it's a motion to dismiss: all disputed facts and ambiguities are resolved in the plaintiff's favor and all reasonable inferences are  made in the plaintiff's favor. The meaning could be as Fox alleges, but that'll require some testimony and extrinsic evidence.

But that's not what this post is about. This post is about the remedy requested in paragraph 30 of Fox's complaint:

Fox is entitled to preliminary and permanent injunctive relief enjoining and preventing Defendants, their agents' and employees, and all persons acting in concert or participation with Defendants, from having, copying, distributing, displaying or making any other unauthorized use of The Watchmen in a manner inconsistent with Fox's rights as detailed herein.

As a practical matter, I can assure all graphic novel fans that no one wants to stop or even delay this movie. Fox doesn't want to scrap the picture, they want as big a piece as they can get, and they want the injunction for leverage. We're watching a negotiation-by-litigation.

Yet, as a legal matter, if they prevail, they can halt distribution entirely.

But, you say, recalling first year contract law, wouldn't that be a tremendous waste of money, the type of economic destruction generally discouraged by a long line of post-formalist, legal realism cases, like Jacob & Youngs v Kent, 230 NY 239; 129 NE 889 (N.Y. 1921, Cardozo, J.)(denying specific performance where home contractor used wrong brand of plumbing pipes)? Yes, but that's the choice you made through your elected representatives and the copyright laws they have enacted.

So how can the law allow Fox to sit by while WB (and their producers, directors, actors, etc) pours their sweat, tears and money into a work, just to later bring a lawsuit requesting not a cut of the profits but total destruction of the work?

It may not sit by. The doctrine of laches was created to thwart people to squat on their rights, lie in wait, and choose not to sue until it will most damage and prejudice the other party.

The doctrine of laches is a judicial escape hatch enabling courts to dismiss or limit lawsuits that, though brought within the statute of limitations, would be inequitable to permit because of the conduct of the party bringing the lawsuit. It's closely related to the doctrine of unclean hands, a similar tool courts use to deny equitable remedies to those who have behaved badly in the context of the dispute.

Since the doctrine of laches has its roots back in the English common law, the elements in all 50 states are roughly the same, so we might as well look to Pennsylvania:

Laches bars relief when the plaintiff's lack of due diligence in failing to timely institute an action results in prejudice to another. Because it is an affirmative defense, the burden of proof is on the defendant or respondent to demonstrate unreasonable delay and prejudice. See Weinberg v. State Bd. of Exam'rs. of Pub. Accountants, 509 Pa. 143, 147, 501 A.2d 239, 242 (1985). Thus, "[t]he party asserting laches as a defense must present evidence demonstrating prejudice from a lapse of time . . . [such as] that a witness has died or become unavailable, that substantiating records were lost, or that the defendant has changed [her] position in anticipation the opposing party has waived his claims." Richard, 561 Pa. at 496, 751 A.2d at 651. Furthermore, "[t]he question of laches is factual and is determined by examining the circumstances of each case." Weinberg, 509 Pa. at 148, 501 A.2d at 242 (quoting Leedom v. Thomas, 473 Pa. 193, 200-01, 373 A.2d 1329, 1332 (1977)).

Commonwealth ex rel. Corbett v. Griffin, 946 A.2d 668, 676-677 (Pa. 2008). Like most equitable doctrines, it has essentially no elements: the court finds it or it does not.

Obviously, such equitable powers apply to common law claims. Can it apply to statutory claims like copyright infringement?

In most circuits, yes. The Eleventh Circuit just grappled with that in Peter Letterese & Assocs. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enterprises et al, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 14496; Copy. L. Rep. (CCH) P29,589 (July 8, 2008). They unearthed a fantastic Learned Hand quote:

It must be obvious to every one familiar with equitable principles that it is inequitable for the owner of a copyright, with full notice of an intended infringement, to stand inactive while the proposed infringer spends large sums of money in its exploitation, and to intervene only when his speculation has proved a success. Delay under such circumstances allows the owner to speculate without risk with the other's money; he cannot possibly lose, and he may win.

That describes Fox's conduct precisely: they couldn't make it, so they waited for someone else to get it together then filed suit after WB tests Synder and crew out on 300, figures out a plausible script, puts together a cast and crew, films it, and makes its way through a good deal of post-production. But that was before there was an explicit 3-year federal statute of limitations for copyright claims. What now? The Eleventh Circuit sums up other responses:

In answering the question of whether the defense of laches may be interposed in a copyright infringement suit, therefore, we cannot agree with the conclusion of the Fourth Circuit, which is an unqualified "no." See Lyons P'ship, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 798 (4th Cir. 2001). Prather recognized the applicability of general equitable doctrines, and like tolling, laches falls into that category. Cf. Teamsters & Employers Welfare Trust of Ill. v. Gorman Bros. Ready Mix, 283 F.3d 877, 882 (7th Cir. 2002) ("What is sauce for the goose (the plaintiff seeking to extend the statute of limitations) is sauce for the gander (the defendant seeking to contract it)."). However, we remain mindful of the Fourth Circuit's invocation of separation of powers principles which counsel against the use of "the judicially created doctrine of laches to bar a federal statutory claim that has been timely filed under an express statute of limitations." Lyons P'ship, 243 F.3d at 798. We therefore answer this question with a presumptive "no"; there is a strong presumption that a plaintiff's suit is timely if it is filed before the statute of limitations has run. Only in the most extraordinary circumstances will laches be recognized as a defense. Cf. Chirco v. Crosswinds Communities, Inc., 474 F.3d 227, 234 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting the limited applicability of laches to copyright cases in "what can best be described as unusual circumstances"); Jacobsen v. Deseret Book Co., 287 F.3d 936, 951 (10th Cir. 2002) ("Although it is possible, in rare cases, that a statute of limitations can be cut short by the doctrine of laches, we see no reason to supplant the statute of limitations in this case." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

But we're not yet done:

Even where such extraordinary circumstances exist, however, laches serves as a bar only to the recovery of retrospective damages, not to prospective relief. As the former Fifth Circuit explained in a patent infringement action:

Although laches and estoppel are related concepts, there is a clear distinction between the two. The defense of laches may be invoked where the plaintiff has unreasonably and inexcusably delayed in prosecuting its rights and where that delay has resulted in material prejudice to the defendant. The effect of laches is merely to withhold damages for infringement which occurred prior to the filing of the suit.

Estoppel, on the other hand, "arises only when one has so acted as to mislead another and the one thus misled has relied upon the action of the inducing party to his prejudice." Estoppel forecloses the patentee from enforcing his patent prospectively through an injunction or through damages for continuing infringement.

Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbH v. Eastman Kodak Co., 616 F.2d 1315, 1325 (5th Cir. 1980) (internal citations omitted).

Arguably, the big damages here have yet to occur, and will occur when the film is distributed for hundreds of millions of dollars. But I still don't understand why WB didn't raise laches as an affirmative defense in their Answer to Fox's Complaint. There's a legitimate argument that the real infringement damages occured during scripting, casting, filming, and post-production, where Fox was shut out of the creative process it presumably wanted to control.

Moreover, the quitclaim agreement itself (the source of most of Fox's claimed rights) includes a clause where, if the movie is ever made, Fox is entitled to the money it initially spent (at least half a million, circa 1990) plus interest. That's serious money by now, at least enough to warrant adding one line about laches to your Answer and briefing the issue.

THE POINT (other than to learn):

There's been a lot of hoopla about this sentence in the judge's order:

It is particularly noteworthy that nothing on the face of the complaint or the documents supplied to the Court establishes that Gordon, the claimed source of Warner Brothers' interest in 'Watchmen,' ever acquired any rights in 'Watchmen.'

That's a problem, but it's not the end of the road. Let's presume Fox still legally has the rights to Watchmen. Now what? Do they get an injunction?

As the Eleventh Circuit continued,

Rather, under "well-established principles of equity, a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test before a court may grant such relief," and a court's decision to grant or deny such relief is within the exercise of its discretion.  [eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391, 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1839 (2006)]

A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.

Id.

Even if laches doesn't directly apply, and even though "irreparable injury" is presumed in copyright cases, Fox may have waived its "irreparable injury" by allowing virtually all of Watchmen to be completed (excepting some post-production) before filing suit in February 2008. Fox did exactly what Learned Hand complained about: waiting for WB to finish what Fox could not, then suing when they got wind that it was good.

They're no longer in it for protection of their creative endeavor; they're in it just for the money. That won't do. WB's goal is to show that to the judge.

But I think Fox has a bigger problem: the 1994 agreement. Under that, the last of all agreements with Fox, Gordon (the producer) has a perpetual right to exercise his option to make the film. Fox's complaint mentions the 1994 agreement but does not claim breach of it, just breach of the 1991 quitclaim, which means Gordon (now WB) can still exercise the option, buying out the rights.

And that raises yet another problem for Fox when they then try to claim their due under the 1994 option: laches, which can completely bar a contract claim, not just pre-suit damages. When did Fox first know Gordon was trying to make the movie? Recall from the Court's outline, "The notice also provided that the agreement was personal to Gordon and that, “prior to payment of the Buy-Out Price,” he could not "assign rights or authorize any person to take any action with respect to the project."

Here's a 2001 article about an attempt, long after the relevant agreements with Fox. Did Fox move to protect its rights then? Did it tell Gordon not to "authorize any person to take any action with respect to the project?" Here's a rumor:

[P]rivately, Warner Bros execs are decrying to me what they say is Fox's "opportunistic claim," noting that "Fox sat on its so-called rights for years while other studios in town developed this property. In fact, Paramount greenlit the movie for production and Fox never said a word! Fox even had an opportunity to re-acquire the project at some point and it passed on it!"

Did Fox try to "speculate without risk with the other's money?"

I'd say "we shall see," but we probably won't. Once the injunction and the option are decided, the case will likely be sufficiently narrowed to be settled easily; the spread won't be worth the risk anymore.

 

UPDATE: On December 24, 2008, District Judge Gary A. Feess issued a brief ruling holding "Fox owns a copyright interest consisting of, at the very least, the right to distribute the Watchmen motion picture," with a promise to issue a more definite ruling soon. It's hard to say what the practical effect is of such a holding (it's obviously not good news for WB); I still believe an injunction is unlikely. I'll write more when the full order comes out.

Shareholder Activism and the "Eclipse of the Public Corporation"

Martin Lipton, who knows a thing or two about corporations, presents:

On June 25, I presented a paper entitled “Shareholder Activism and the “Eclipse of the Public Corporation”: Is the Current Wave of Activism Causing Another  Tectonic Shift in the American Corporate World?” at the 2008 Directors Forum of The University of Minnesota Law School. The paper discusses the pressures that have been pervasively eroding the centrality of the board of directors and transforming its role in the governance structure of public companies, with the end game being a new conception of the corporate organization. Against the backdrop of the subprime and leveraged loan financial crisis and other recent events, the paper addresses what I regard as the crux of the issue affecting public companies today: whether the institution of the corporate board can cope with these pressures and survive as the vital governing organ of public companies. Or, will a forced migration from director-centric governance to shareholder-centric governance, along with a concomitant transformation of the role of the board from guiding and advising management to ensuring compliance and performing due diligence, simply overwhelm American business corporations?

I say the latter, and that's why so many companies have gone private lately. The paper is available here. For reference, he notes what he thought a year and a half ago:

That is, while the public corporation would continue, it would be eclipsed by a new corporate form: the privately owned corporation that uses public and private debt, rather than public equity, as the major source of capital. Since the time I gave that speech, however, the subprime and leveraged loan financial crisis has significantly altered the corporate landscape.

The paper's worth a read, not least to see what one of the most-informed corporate thinkers has on his mind. Here's part of the conclusion:

At its core, the board-centric model of governance is premised on the notion that boards merit the vote of confidence of shareholders and the public markets, ...

That's the same thing I was thinking as I read the paper. Here's how he finishes that sentence:

and notwithstanding the strong current of distrust that runs through many corporate  governance reforms, history has proven this vote of confidence to be well deserved.

He has one piece of particularly strong evidence: in general, public corporations have done very well, returning 8-12% annually. But the idea has always been a little crazy.

Think of your typical pension fund investor and just how far removed they are from the actual use of their money in a basic corporation with minimal management structure. The investor gives their money to the pension fund (1) which purchases a moderate amount of control over the selection of a board of directors (2) that monitors and reviews the work of executives (3) who command their subordinates (4) to manage employees (5) actually working to make a return. Odds are, the investor could get closer to the employees on the ground by playing six degrees of separation.

That system was bound to come apart at some time. I think the information revolution of the past 20 years has finally made it happen by enabling detailed accounting and review of these massive organizations; trust is no long essential, it's merely good. Further, the Internet has increased the speed at which the market reacts, thus raising the stakes even further for investors, who now will only have a very small window in which to escape if internal misconduct becomes public. That's important because the desire to flee is strongly contradicted by the evidence that waiting out the market can trash traditional buy-and-hold strategies (e.g., missing the best ten months between small company stocks between 1925 and 1992 slashed gains from 12% to 6%).

In this day and age, investors can easily feel their money is trapped by a large public corporation.

So what's next? I think the information revolution will continue its course. Just as it is now possible to quickly do a wholesale accounting and review of a massive international corporation, it is also possible -- or at least soon will be possible -- for investors to keep close tabs on private corporations, even without the benefits of the openness and the economies of scale that come with public trading.

I thus foresee over the next few years growth in mid-size and large private corporations where the investors have extensive access to the records in real-time; perhaps not the same level as in a small private company, but far more than investors and public companies now have. We've already started to see that trend with the recent explosion of private equity groups like Blackstone.

What does it mean for lawyers? Well, it's hard to dispute that securities class actions have become tightly regulated. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1996 shrank the market for securities class actions, narrowing the field of plaintiff and defense lawyers while also tightening those claims to the ones with the strongest pre-litigation proof. There is thus simply less demand for securities class action work.

The private equity boom will go in the opposite direction. The marketplace for private companies with a large number of investors is unsettled and barely regulated, which makes for lawsuits. Most likely, the less-savvy companies will be thrown together with generic LLC agreements that fail to address a number of issues (always fertile ground for lawsuits) while the more-savvy ones will send everything to arbitration, where such disputes probably should be anyway. The truly savvy investors will submit to arbitration (to get faster results on valid claims), but will extract heavy concessions for it, like clauses permitting them extensive records review.

So who will fill that demand? Will securities class action attorneys start looking towards pushing fraud and similar claims through arbitration, or will commercial litigators move from ordinary inter-company breach of contract to intra-company shareholder and ownership disputes? Since few investors will be prepared to start shelling out serious funds it would require to prosecute these actions, I bet the former will probably have more of an impact than the latter, given how they are better suited structurally and temperamentally for plaintiff's work on a contingency basis.

 

$1.8 Billion AmEx Antitrust Settlement

Kudos to David Boies:

Fresh off his depiction in “Recount” — the HBO movie about the 2000 election fiasco — David Boies, along with partner Don Flexner, have, on behalf of American Express, negotiated one of the largest antitrust settlements ever for an individual company: $1.8 billion. The settlement with Mastercard comes on the heels of a similar $2.25 billion settlement, also handled by Boies, between AmEx and Visa.

The background: The Supreme Court ruled in 2004 that Visa and MasterCard violated antitrust laws by prohibiting their member banks from offering credit cards that could be used on rival payment networks. AmEx and Discover sued. Here are reports from the WSJ and NYT.

Really, though, kudos to Mr. Feinberg:

Kenneth R. Feinberg, who handled the earlier settlement with Visa and who also oversaw administration of the 9/11 compensation fund, acted as arbitrator in the case during secret negotiations that lasted eight weeks.

And while we're at it, don't forget to review the AAA rules for large, complex commercial disputes. There are two myths about commercial arbitration worth dispelling while on the subject.

First, you are generally not entitled to three arbitrators; you can ask for them, but the only time you'll get them is if you and the other party cannot agree on arbitrators and the case is worth more than $1 million.

Second, there is no rule prohibiting discovery in commercial arbitration, there just isn't any entitlement to it. I frequently recommend following the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with regard to written discovery, except for depositions, which are limited usually to just the principle witnesses.

Of course, the best part of arbitration from the plaintiff's perspective is the finality, where the pressure of an unappealable award strongly encourages settlement. When you litigate a case through the civil system, there is virtually no chance of settlement prior to scheduling of trial, and, indeed, a good number of cases have to get through verdict and at least some of the appeal before the offers become reasonable. That takes years.

As you can see from the AmEx arbitration, nearly $2 billion dollars changing hands took eight weeks.