Why Are Taxpayers Criminally Investigating Shepard Fairey For Lying In A Civil Lawsuit?

Shepard Fairey, creator of the iconic "Hope" poster during Obama's Presidential campaign, is not perfect.

After the Associated Press claimed that Fairey's use of one of their images for the poster required authorization, Fairey — represented by the Fair Use Project at Stanford University — pre-emptively sued to establish (by way of a declaratory judgment action) that his transformation of the original image constituted "fair use" and thus did not infringe on their copyright.

Frankly, I thought he had a good case, but the suit hasn't gone well: last October, Fairey was forced to admit he spoliated and fabricated evidence:

"Throughout the case, there has been a question as to which Mannie Garcia photo I used as a reference to design the HOPE image," Fairey said. "The AP claimed it was one photo, and I claimed it was another."

New filings to the court, he said, "state for the record that the AP is correct about which photo I used...and that I was mistaken. While I initially believed that the photo I referenced was a different one, I discovered early on in the case that I was wrong. In an attempt to conceal my mistake I submitted false images and deleted other images."

You may be shocked to learn that people sometimes lie in civil litigation.

It's true. Just this week, I received a big stack of documents that the defendant in one of my cases thought I'd never see. Sure enough, they prove the defendant repeatedly lied under oath.

But no one outside of the case itself will care. If I take it to the U.S. Attorney's office, they will tell me to take it up with the judge in my case.

Unless, apparently, the Associated Press is involved:

Fairey sued the AP last February, asking a judge to declare that Fairey's artwork does not infringe any copyrights held by the AP. A month later, the AP countersued, saying the uncredited, uncompensated use of one of the news cooperative's photos violated copyright laws and signaled a threat to journalism.

The U.S. Attorney's office had a grand jury begin an investigation after Fairey said he erred about which AP photo he used as the basis for "HOPE" and had submitted false images and deleted other images to conceal his mistake.

Last I knew, the U.S. Attorney's office in every district had an unwritten policy of ignoring perjury in civil cases. Though such restraint often pains me — as the plaintiff's lawyer, I'm often the one who was lied to — I understand it. They have better things to do (e.g., prosecuting human trafficking), and the civil justice system already has methods for dealing with evidence tampering.

Which makes the investigation, at taxpayer expense and at the cost of valuable prosecutorial time and resources, all the more disturbing. Is the Associated Press more deserving of justice than my clients and the thousands of other litigants who every day endure the indignity of watching their adversary lie under oath? Doesn't the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York have something better to do?

Judging Lawyers By Their Causes: Carter Phillips and Joe Arpaio

I was going to write about how the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) had hired Carter Phillips of Sidley Austin — perhaps the most experienced Supreme Court advocate in the country — to "study" the constitutionality of President Obama's proposed tax on the big banks, which is really just code for "SIFMA hired Phillips to create grounds for a 5-4 Supreme Court decision invalidating the tax."

Then something funny happened.

When I typed "Carter Phillips" into Google News to find an article about the SIFMA representation, I saw another story posted around the same time, "Joe Arpaio's Lawyer for Records Dispute Costing Taxpayers $990 -- Per Hour."

The $990 per hour lawyer for Sheriff Joe Arpaio is, indeed, Carter Phillips.

For those of you who don't know about Sheriff Joe Arpaio, here's an introduction:

A federal grand jury is investigating Joe Arpaio, the Arizona sheriff known for his aggressive stance on illegal immigration, for possible abuses of power in launching investigations of local officials who disagree with him, authorities said Friday.

Two Maricopa County officials have been subpoenaed to appear before the grand jury to testify about Arpaio's actions against county officials since they moved to cut his budget in late 2008.

Since then Arpaio and County Atty. Andrew Thomas, an ally, have filed criminal charges against two county supervisors, have said dozens of other county workers are under investigation and have filed a federal racketeering lawsuit accusing the entire county political structure of conspiring against them.

A walk through the "Joe Arpaio" tag at the Phoenix New Times will appall you for hours.

The United States Constitution rightly ensures criminal defendants the right to assistance of counsel. Common law in all fifty states rightly holds the attorney-client relationship to be as sacred and protected as any other. And we all have bills to pay, even Jay Leno, even top-drawer Supreme Court lawyers.

I'd understand if Phillips was part of Arpaio's criminal defense team. But he's not: Phillips represents Arpaio in a vindictive attempt to dig into Maricopa County judges' and administrators' emails following their investigation into his abuses. There's no right to that.

We can't judge a lawyer by their clients — consider public defenders, the unsung guardians of liberty — but a lawyer is only as good as the causes he or she represents.

No matter how effective Carter Phillips is as an advocate or counselor, he'll never be a great lawyer.

Not while doing Joe Arpaio's dirty work.

Jones v. Harris Brings Out Another Harvard Law Professor Who Knows More About Writing Columns Than Litigating Cases

[Updated to clarify a distinction between securities suits and investment company act suits.]

This week, the Supreme Court heard arguments in Jones v. Harris. Briefly, the Oakmark complex of mutual funds "hired" Harris Associates as investment advisers, paying Harris 1% (per year) of the first $2 billion of the fund’s assets, 0.9% of the next $1 billion, 0.8% of the next $2 billion, and 0.75% of anything over $5 billion. I write "hired" because the situation is murky: Harris is directly affiliated with Oakmark. Importantly, the fee charged by Harris to Oakmark is more than double the fee it charges unaffiliated mutual funds.

Plaintiffs are investors in Oakmark funds who sued Harris under a variety of claims, including a claim that Harris's fees were "excessive," in violation of Section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act.

Section 36(b), which was added in 1970, is almost poetic in its ambiguity:

For the purposes of this subsection, the investment adviser of a registered investment company shall be deemed to have a fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of compensation for services, or of payments of a material nature, paid by such registered investment company, or by the security holders thereof, to such investment adviser or any affiliated person of such investment adviser. An action may be brought under this subsection by the Commission, or by a security holder of such registered investment company on behalf of such company, against such investment adviser . . . . With respect to any such action the following provisions shall apply:

(1) It shall not be necessary to allege or prove that any defendant engaged in personal misconduct, and the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving a breach of fiduciary duty.

(2) In any such action approval by the board of directors of such investment company of such compensation or payments, or of contracts or other arrangements providing for such compensation or payments, and ratification or approval of such compensation or payments, or of contracts or other arrangements providing for such compensation or payments, by the shareholders of such investment company, shall be given such consideration by the court as is deemed appropriate under all the circumstances. . . .

In essence, the statute says only that the plaintiff can recover against the investment adviser by "proving a breach of fiduciary duty." Subsections (1) and (2) fill in a little detail — i.e., the investor need not prove "personal misconduct" and the court shall "consider" board of directors and/or shareholder ratification — but that's it.

Congress might as well have written, "investors can sue if investment advisers do something bad, but 'bad' doesn't necessarily mean really bad."

Twenty-seven years ago, faced with the same opaque language, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals came up with its own standard for "excessive fee" claims:

[T]he test is essentially whether the fee schedule represents a charge within the range of what would have been negotiated at arm’s-length in the light of all of the surrounding circumstances.

[and]

[t]o be guilty of a violation of §36(b) . . . the adviser-manager must charge a fee that is so disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable relationship to the services rendered and could not have been the product of arm’s-length bargaining.

Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc., 694 F.2d 923, 928 (2d Cir. 1982).

Last year, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals came up with a different standard for "excessive fee" claims:

Having had another chance to study this question, we now disapprove the Gartenberg approach. A fiduciary duty differs from rate regulation. A fiduciary must make full disclosure and play no tricks but is not subject to a cap on compensation. The trustees (and in the end investors, who vote with their feet and dollars), rather than a judge or jury, determine how much advisory services are worth. ...

Federal securities laws, of which the Investment Company Act is one component, work largely by requiring disclosure and then allowing price to be set by competition in which investors make their own choices. Plaintiffs do not contend that Harris Associates pulled the wool over the eyes of the disinterested trustees or otherwise hindered their ability to negotiate a favorable price for advisory services. The fees are not hidden from investors—and the Oakmark funds’ net return has attracted new investment rather than driving investors away.

In short, the Seventh Circuit held that, regardless of what the Investment Company Act says, investment advisers don't have a fiduciary duty to investment companies; instead, they're held to the same fraud and misrepresentation standards as total strangers.

The Seventh Circuit opinion was remarkable not only because it eviscerated the Investment Company Act — which clearly does not require personal misconduct like "pulling the wool over [investors'] eyes" — but also because it produced a sharp disagreement on the underlying economics between Judges Easterbrook and Posner, two of the most notable adherents to the conservative "law and economics" doctrine.

It goes almost without saying that there are reasonable arguments in favor of both the investors and the investment advisers. The statute is ambiguous; there's no clear answer for what the standard "should" be in these cases, but there's also little doubt that something has gone awry with investment adviser fees in the context of affiliated mutual funds.

I write "almost," however, because Professor John Coates of Harvard Law School wants nothing to do with reasonable arguments:

How can such cases make it to the highest court in the land? Plaintiffs’ lawyers are able to file these cases because of three features of the US legal system. First, investors are dispersed, and cannot easily work together to protect their own interests. Collective action costs are often identified as a reason that investors cannot protect themselves from predatory institutions – and sometimes that is true. But those same costs also make it impossible for investors to control the lawyers who nominally represent them. Investors cannot stop lawyers from using weak or even frivolous claims to extract rich legal fees. Nor need lawyers even listen to investors with the most at stake in a case. Unlike the advisers, the lawyers are not required to negotiate with independent trustees, or to submit their lawsuit for approval to the investors. Once lawyers have appointed themselves as investor guardians, they face little competition – again, unlike the advisers, who compete with other advisers to attract new investments.

In Professor Coates' world, a lawyer can, on her own, file a "weak or even frivolous" case and "extract rich legal fees" without any involvement of the actual investors.

What a great racket! Lawyers must be filing these cases all the time and collecting big fat checks for nothing.

Or maybe fewer than 200 securities class actions are filed every year, and maybe only half of them settle for any amount, with the other half of investors and their lawyers recovering nothing for their losses.

Since Coates has never represented any investors in a lawsuit, much less represented a class of investors on a contingent fee, I suppose he needs a few reminders on how the process works.

"Jones" in Jones v. Harris is an investor, not a lawyer. Only investors can bring lawsuits and they can only win if they prove every element of their case. Like I wrote above, most of these cases are sent to the rubbish heap without any payment.

If the investors are in the lucky half that survive years of litigating over dismissal (for reference, Jones v. Harris was filed five years ago and is still at the dismissal stage), the court will carefully analyze which investor should represent the class as the lead plaintiff, giving preference to the investors with the "most at stake in a case." Nonetheless, every investor with a stake in the case, even if not the lead plaintiff, can participate in, and object to any part of, the process, including any settlement and any award of attorneys' fees.

Unsurprisingly, three-quarters of successful investor lawsuits are lead by large institutional investors (p. 27) such as public and union pensions, the ones with "the most at stake in the case."

Coates thus has it backwards: it's not "impossible for investors to control the lawyers who nominally represent them," it's impossible for lawyers to bring and win a lawsuit without the participation and support of the investors, particularly the ones with "the most at stake."

Indeed, in most potential investor class action cases, it's impossible for the lawyers to collect any fee at all: you never know when a court will read an act that says "it shall not be necessary to allege or prove that any defendant engaged in personal misconduct" and nonetheless require the investor prove personal misconduct. Based on this week's oral argument, it looks like the Supreme Court will do just that, leaving the investors and their lawyers with nothing after five years of litigation.

So much for a "rich legal fee." And that's the greatest irony: in the nearly forty years since Section 36(b) was passed, not one single court (see pp. 3–4) has ever held an investment adviser's fee was "excessive."

The Ethics of Internal Corporate Investigations by In-House Counsel

At Legal Ethics Blog, Professor Andrew Perlman posts a hypothetical:

I was recently a panelist at the Association of Corporate Counsel's annual conference, and someone in the audience posed an interesting hypothetical.

Imagine that in-house counsel is conducting an internal investigation and speaks with an employee whose conduct may have been unlawful. 

Let me interrupt to point out that the above hypothetical is one of the classical examples used to teach professional responsibility to law students. Employees are frequently confused about the role of the company's lawyers in internal investigations, and frequently do not understand that the lawyer there represents solely the company and not the employees themselves. The context of these interviews — typically involving nothing more than the lawyer coming into the employee's workplace — heightens the likelihood of confusion.

As such, corporate lawyers are under a duty (under Model Rule 1.13(f)) to explain the distinction whenever they deal with directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other corporate constituents.

But Perlman's hypothetical is a bit different:

The employee does not have her own counsel, so the in-house lawyer makes clear to the employee that the lawyer represents the company and not the employee herself. So far, so good.

But now let's imagine that the employee is reluctant to speak with the lawyer. The lawyer then says to the employee, "You are subject to the company's employment policies, which require you to speak with me about this matter."

Several audience members were convinced that such a statement was both commonplace and ethically permissible. It was my position that such a statement, which appears to be giving legal advice to an unrepresented (and potentially adverse) party regarding her obligations under the employment policy, could be unethical under Rule 4.3. What do you think?

Here's the whole text of Rule 4.3:

In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested. When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer’s role in the matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding. The lawyer shall not give legal advice to an unrepresented person, other than the advice to secure counsel, if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the interests of such a person are or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the interests of the client.

It's an interesting question. As I responded in the comments [with minor edits here], I think it comes down to context. If the context has made it clear to the employee that the employee's interests are, or could be adverse, then there is not much problem in the lawyer advancing the views of the company, since the concern about "misunderstanding" expressed by the rule is inapplicable.

If, however, the impression created is one of a neutral investigator, then it seems to be legal advice given to an adverse unrepresented party.

The precise wording also creates a problem for the attorney, because they did not merely assert that the company could do if the employee did not cooperate (e.g., terminate and/or sue them), but instead outright told the employee what their legal obligations were under the employment agreement. That's the essence of legal advice.

Supreme Court To Review Enron "Honest Services" Mail Fraud Conviction

SCOTUSBlog reports:

The Supreme Court agreed on Tuesday to rule on claims that “searing media attacks” on longtime Enron executive Jeffrey K. Skilling tainted his criminal trial and conviction on various fraud charges.  The case of Skilling v. U.S. (08-1394) also raises an issue on the scope of the federal law punishing the failure to provide “honest services” as a corporate executive.

In his petition to the Supreme Court, Skilling argued,

In closing argument, the government declared that Skilling and Lay committed honest-services fraud because they violated a duty to Enron’s “employees”—a duty the government described as “a duty of good faith and honest services, a duty to be truthful, and a duty to do their job, ladies and gentlemen, to do their job and do it appropriately.”

Of critical importance here, the government argued that Skilling committed every alleged act of misconduct with the specific intent to advance Enron’s interests—by increasing reported earnings, maintaining an investment-grade credit rating, and improving the price of Enron’s stock. ... The government did not contend, and the record did not suggest in any way, that Skilling intended to put his own interests ahead of Enron’s. To the contrary, the government’s stated theory was that its evidence needed only to show—and did only show—“a material violation of a fiduciary duty that defendants owed to Enron and its shareholders.”

...

The Fifth Circuit erred in holding that a conviction under § 1346 is valid even where the defendant did not seek to elevate material private interests over his employer’s. Even that limitation may not suffice to save the statute from unconstitutional vagueness, but it at least establishes some reasonably clear and intelligible boundary to the statute. It also reflects the pre-McNally understanding of honest-services fraud Congress sought to adopt in § 1346.

As Justice Scalia recently observed, the statute on its face sweeps in a breathtaking range of conduct. Sorich, 129 S.Ct. at 1310. The phrase “honest services” itself provides no clear guidance as to “how far the intangible rights theory of criminal responsibility really extends.” Bloom, 149 F.3d at 656; see Sorich, 523 F.3d at 707 (§ 1346 is “amorphous and open-ended”); Urciuoli, 513 F.3d at 294 (“the concept of ‘honest services’ is vague and undefined”); Brown, 459 F.3d at 520 (§ 1346 is a “facially vague criminal statute”); Murphy, 323 F.3d at 116 (“the plain language of § 1346 provides little guidance as to the conduct it prohibits”); U.S. v. Handakas, 286 F.3d 92, 105 (2d Cir. 2002) (“the text of § 1346 simply provides no clue to the public or the courts as to what conduct is prohibited”), overruled in part by Rybicki, 354 F.3d at 144; U.S. v. Brumley, 116 F.3d 728, 736 (5th Cir. 1997) (Jolly & DeMoss, JJ., dissenting) (§ 1346 is “general, undefined, vague, and ambiguous”). ...

Several lower courts, however, have sought to resolve the problem of the statute’s facial ambiguity by reading into the text limitations on “honest services” fraud. The “private gain” requirement is among the clearest of those limitations, and it is drawn directly from the pre-McNally cases that created the concept of honest-services fraud. McNally itself stated the rule: “Under [the prior honestservices] cases, a public official owes a fiduciary duty to the public, and misuse of his office for private gain is a fraud.” Id. at 355 (emphasis added).

Applying a private-gain limitation to honest services fraud is the only way to even arguably “avoid the constitutional question” raised by the vagueness of the phrase “honest services.” Jones v. U.S., 529 U.S. 848, 858 (2000). Absent that limitation, the statute is nothing more than a common-law fiduciary-breach statute, impermissibly criminalizing whatever wrongful or unethical corporate acts a given prosecutor decides to attack. Brown, 459 F.3d at 521-22; Bloom, 149 F.3d at 654.

 Here's the whole statute at issue:

For the purposes of this chapter, the term “scheme or artifice to defraud” includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.

It defines part of the statute for "fraud by wire, radio, or television:"

Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. ...

He may be on to something.

Then again, is there really any "vagueness" to the notion that fraud is criminal? Does anyone really throw their hands up into the air and proclaim that they don't know if it's illegal to defraud investors for the benefit of a company that pays that person millions every year, a company of which they own millions of dollars worth of shares?

Issues and Briefs in the Major Business Cases in the Supreme Court's 2009-2010 Term

Business Week points us to the major cases.

As Litigation & Trial is a legal, rather than a business, blog, I'm going to take their list of cases but replace their description of each with the actual legal issue at stake, along with links to SCOTUSWiki, which hosts all of the relevant briefs for your reading pleasure:

Bilski v. Kappos: Whether a “process” must be tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or transform a particular article into a different state or thing (”machine-or-transformation” test), to be eligible for patenting under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and whether the “machine-or-transformation” test for patent eligibility, contradicts Congressional intent that patents protect “method[s] of doing business” in 35 U.S.C. § 273.

Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, et al.: Whether the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is consistent with separation-of-powers principles - as the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board is overseen by the Securities and Exchange Commission, which is in turn overseen by the President - or contrary to the Appointments Clause of the Constitution, as the PCAOB members are appointed by the SEC.

Black et al. v. United States: Whether the “honest services” clause of 18 U.S.C. § 1346 applies in cases where the jury did not find - nor did the district court instruct them that they had to find - that the defendants “reasonably contemplated identifiable economic harm,” and if the defendants’ reversal claim is preserved for review after they objected to the government’s request for a special verdict.

American Needle Inc. v. NFL, et al.: Whether NFLP, the NFL, and the teams functioned as a “single entity” when granting the company an exclusive headwear license and therefore could not violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, which requires proof of collective action involving “separate entities.”

United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa: Where a debtor declares to discharge a student loan debt in his Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan, has the debtor satisfied the due process requirements of Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co, and does the fact that the debtor failed to initiate an adversary proceeding render the enforceability of the discharge order under 11 U.S.C. 1327(a)inapplicable?

Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Company: Can a state legislature properly prohibit the federal courts from using the class action device for state law claims?

Hemi Group, LLC, et al v. City of New York: Whether city government meets the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act standing requirement that a plaintiff be directly injured in its “business or property” by alleging non commercial injury resulting from non payment of taxes by non litigant third parties.

Graham County Soil and Water Conservation Dist v. ex rel. Wilson: Whether federal courts have jurisdiction over False Claims Act suits based on revelations in administrative reports or audits issued by state or local governments, as opposed to the federal government.

Stay tuned for more discussion of each in upcoming posts.

Court Re-Rejects Bank of America & Merrill Lynch's SEC Settlement For Failure To Waive Attorney-Client Privilege

On Tuesday, The New York Times reported:

The finger-pointing in Merrill Lynch’s bonus troubles shifted to a new target on Monday in two court documents that essentially said: blame the lawyers.

Responding to questions posed by a federal judge, Bank of America and the Securities and Exchange Commission said the bank had relied on its outside lawyers to fill in the fine print in that firm’s controversial marriage with Bank of America.

That meant that lawyers at two firms — Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz as well as Shearman & Sterling — handled a decision to keep Merrill’s $3.6 billion in bonus payouts a secret from Bank of America’s shareholders, according to the filings.

It is unclear if the responses will satisfy the judge who requested them, Judge Jed S. Rakoff of the Southern District of New York. He has the power to decide whether to approve a $33 million settlement reached between Bank of America and the S.E.C. over the bank’s failure to disclose the bonuses to its shareholders.

I was going to write a post about how that bothered me, because, as the AmLaw Litigation Daily noted:

"The preparation of the joint proxy statement, including the decision not to attach the disclosure schedule setting forth the agreement on...bonuses or otherwise disclose its contents in the proxy statement, was made by the lawyers at Wachtell, Shearman, Bank of America and Merrill," the SEC brief says, adding that statements in the proxy materials deliberately misled investors into believing Merrill bonuses would not be paid.

Bank of America did not waive attorney-client privilege for the SEC investigation, so the SEC says its knowledge of what the Wachtell and Shearman lawyers said is limited. The government contends, moreover, that the executives' reliance on their lawyers shields them from fraud accusations because it would be hard to prove scienter.

Bank of America's lawyers at Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton--Lewis Liman and Shawn Chen--offered precious few of the specifics Judge Rakoff seemed to be asking for at the August 10 hearing. The names of Kenneth Lewis and John Thain, for instance, appear nowhere in BofA's submission. And as for the role of the outside lawyers, the brief merely says: "The parties were represented throughout the process by two law firms with preeminent experience in the field of mergers and acquisitions." Cleary offered no details on who or what those preeminent firms advised about disclosure materials.

Judge Rakoff, however, beat me to it:

Federal judge Jed S. Rakoff fired a new shot in his challenge to a $33 million settlement by Bank of America Corp. over investor disclosures, saying the government's justification for letting individual executives off the hook is "at war with common sense."

The Securities and Exchange Commission reached the settlement with the bank last month. The agency charged that a Bank of America proxy statement in November misled investors about bonuses for employees at Merrill Lynch, which was about to be acquired by the bank.

The SEC has said it couldn't investigate individual executives' culpability because they said they relied on lawyers' advice. Unless the executives waived their right to keep the advice private, the SEC said it would face "substantial obstacles" to building a case.

Judge Rakoff, who must approve any settlement, criticized that reasoning. If that were the regulator's policy, "it would seem that all a corporate officer who has produced a false proxy statement need offer by way of defense is that he or she relied on counsel." He said if the company insists on attorney-client privilege, there is no way to test the assertion and determine whether executives or their lawyers were culpable.

Exactly right. Courts often hold that clients cannot use attorney-client privilege as both a sword and a shield. That is, clients can either use lawyers' advice as a "sword" to defend themselves or they can use the privilege as a "shield" to keep communications private, in which case they're off limits entirely.

But they can't have it both ways. If they could, every defendant would just blame their lawyers and call it a day.

(If you're interested in more, AmLawDaily dug a bit deeper into the ethics issues raised by the litigation.)

Lawyers: Create A Paper Trail To Protect Yourself (A Philadelphia Inquirer Bankruptcy Story)

The Inquirer reports on a hearing I attended on Tuesday in The Inquirer's bankruptcy:

In a scathing rebuke, the judge overseeing the bankruptcy of Philadelphia Newspapers L.L.C. yesterday described the investigation of an unauthorized taping of a meeting between the company and its senior lenders as a "fine mess."

The investigation of the taping, done by one of the officers of the largest creditor, was directed by a committee of the unsecured lenders, or second-tier creditors. By failing to take sworn depositions and seek key e-mails, the committee left its interim report on the taping open to questions and criticism, Superior [ed - I don't know what they mean by "Superior," though he is the Chief] Bankruptcy Court Judge Stephen Raslavich said.

* * *

[The investigation] stems from a meeting between the company's senior lenders and its top managers at Philadelphia Newspapers' offices at 400 N. Broad St. on Nov. 17, 2008. Vincent DeVito, a managing director of CIT Group Inc., was found taping the meeting without the knowledge or permission of everyone in the room, a violation of Pennsylvania law.

Philadelphia Newspapers, in court filings, contends that its relationship with its senior lenders deteriorated dramatically after its officials made an issue of the taping. The company has asked the court for permission to hire the firm of Elliott, Greenleaf & Siedzikowski P.C. to investigate the incident to see if its interests had suffered.

That request was initially rebuffed by the court, which appointed the committee of unsecured creditors to conduct the investigation. The company asked the court to reconsider, given what it contended were inadequacies in the investigation directed by former Pennsylvania Superior Court Judge Robert A. Graci, who now works for the firm that represents the unsecured creditors' committee.

Yesterday, Raslavich made it clear that he shared those concerns, dressing down Graci for failing to take sworn depositions and issuing his interim report before seeing key e-mail files requested from DeVito.

An important piece of background that Graci himself brought up, albeit fairly late in his colloquy with Judge Raslavich: Graci's background is in criminal work, specifically in representing the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in appeals.

Civil litigators wouldn't dream of conducting an investigation through unsworn interviews, and most litigators start with requests for important documents, like emails, then follow up with depositions. Typically, only one deposition is permitted for each witness, so you need to make it count. From that perspective, Graci's investigation looks like a joke.

Yet, most criminal investigations are performed exactly the opposite way, through informal interviews followed by document requests and possibly more interviews. Typically, prosecutors don't even get to talk to the defendant at all, given the defendant's right to remain silent, much less depose them.

That's what Graci's used to. As he said at the hearing, he initially contemplated using depositions or sworn statements, then figured that would have added another layer to the proceedings (such as endless objections by the attorneys representing the witnesses) and would have delayed everything without providing any clear benefit. So he switched gears and conducted it like a criminal investigation.

That is to say, his technique was in no way evidence that the investigation was a sham, in bad faith, or the result of incompetence. Judge Raslavich told him as much.

But there's a problem: Graci wasn't there just to get to the bottom of what happened, but to ensure the appearance of propriety. As it stands now, Judge Raslavich has to grapple with the Inquirer's legitimate complaint that, whatever the merits of the investigation, there's no record for them and their lawyers to review, just the conclusions.

The odds of there being an inadequacy or impropriety in the investigation are slim, but they're not zero, which may render the whole thing a nullity.

A good lesson and question for all lawyers -- what does your paper trail look like?

Why False Claims Act Whistleblower Cases Need Awards Over $50 Million

Via @walterolson, CQ Politics reported yesterday:

The Senate rejected a bid Thursday to impose new limits on whistleblower awards as it moved toward passage of legislation to beef up the government’s ability to combat financial fraud.

By 31-61, the Senate rejected an amendment by Jon Kyl , R-Ariz., that sought to set a $50 million maximum on the amount that a whistleblower could receive through a False Claims Act lawsuit to recoup taxpayer funds lost to fraud. Currently, awards can reach 30 percent of the total recovered for the federal government, if a judge approves that much.

Kyl said whistleblowers who pinpoint fraud by government contractors and other recipients of taxpayer funds “deserve to be compensated when they save the government money.” But he said the current percentage formula can result in some successful litigants being “grossly overcompensated.”

Senate Judiciary Chairman Patrick J. Leahy , D-Vt., sponsor of the antifraud bill, and Sen. Charles E. Grassley , R-Iowa, author of the 1986 False Claims Act provisions that reward citizens for suing on behalf of taxpayers, opposed Kyl’s effort to cap the awards.

The law, Leahy said, “is very well balanced the way it is, with a judge having to make a final decision on the award. ...I don’t want to fix something that’s not broken.”

Grassley said whistleblower suits under the False Claims Act have recovered $22 billion for the government since 1986.

False Claims Act cases, sometimes known as qui tam (an abbreviation of qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur, meaning "[he] who sues in this matter for the king as [well as] for himself"), are unique and complicated beasts dating back to the 13th century in England. 1986 is when the most recent amendments to the Act were passed.

The cases are initially filed in under seal for review by the U.S. Attorney, who then decides if they want to pursue the action themselves. If they decline, then the whistleblower can proceed as a "relator" of the United States, fighting the action on the government's behalf. There's already a huge backlog of these cases waiting for Department of Justice review, unable to proceed.

I don't blame them for the delay. The cases combine the legal complexity of interpreting federal regulations and procurement contracts with the factual difficulty of proving mens rea in a white collar criminal case, making them difficult and time-consuming just to screen, much less pursue.

The reason whistleblowers and law firms take them -- with extraordinary risk to the whistleblower's career and livelihood, and substantial investments in time and money by the law firm, which usually represents the plaintiff on a contingent fee -- is because they can result in tremendous damages if proven at trial. Under 37 U.S.C. § 3729, anyone proven to have knowingly presented a false claim "is liable to the United States Government for a civil penalty of not less than $5,000 and not more than $10,000 [for each false claim], plus 3 times the amount of damages which the Government sustains because of the act of that person," as well as "costs of a civil action brought to recover any such penalty or damages."

The whistleblower -- assuming they can prove entitlement by, among other elements, being the "original source" of the information -- gets a portion of the recovery, which they then split with the lawyers who represented them on the contingent fee.

The question is: why would anyone want to cap these incentive awards at $50 million?

The vast majority of qui tam / False Claims Act cases don't get anywhere near that. Some recent large settlements have been for $325 million against Northrop Grumman, with the plaintiff / relator receiving $48.7 million, and for $128 million against Network Appliance, with the plaintiff / relator receiving $19.2 million. One of the very few cases in which the award broke $50 million was the $1.4 billion Eli Lilly Zyprexa case, in which the four different plaintiff / relators together received $78,870,877, about 5% of the overall recovery. It's unclear if even that would have hit Senator Kyl's proposed cap, since it was divided among the plaintiffs.

The answer becomes clearer when you talk about massive cases, particularly those in which the government declines to intervene.

Assuming a 40% contingent fee agreement, a $50 million cap results in a $20 million cap on the attorney's fees. Sounds like a lot until you consider that litigation and trial over the meaning of a few documents and involving only half a million pages of documents, 124 trial witnesses, and 80 depositions, can cost $60 million for each side. For the In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litigation, 297 F. Supp. 2d 503 (E.D.N.Y., 2003), had plaintiffs' lawyers been billing by the hour, they would have worked in just the litigation the equivalent of $62,545,603 -- trial would have been extra.

But the plaintiffs' firms weren't billing by the hour -- they took on the risk themselves, much as most False Claims Act firms do. Can you imagine what it would take to actually prove at trial, as the DoJ press release says, "Northrop provided and billed the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) for defective microelectronic parts, known as Heterojunction Bipolar Transistors (HBTs)?"

What about something bigger? What if there are serious problems with more than just the "Heterojunction Bipolar Transistors" in the $337 billion F-35 joint strike fighter? What if private military contractors in Iraq have been overbilling the more than $100 billion they've received? What about the next Zyprexa fraud?

Such cases would be enormously costly, time-consuming and difficult to pursue, undoubtedly many times larger than the $120-million-in-fees Princeton case and at least as large as the more-than-$120 million Visa antitrust case. Most importantly, such would be exceedingly risky, as the plaintiffs would have to prove "knowing" fraud among millions of documents, thousands of transactions, and hundreds of pages of complicated regulations.

What if the Department of Justice wasn't able to commit the resources to do that? The government can't always get David Boies and his team, eager to promote their new firm, for half price, like they did in the antitrust case against Microsoft.

Keep in mind, the core purpose of qui tam is not only to encourage whistleblowers, but to outsource the heavy lifting of carrying a lawsuit through to recovery. As noted by Justice Scalia, "The FCA can reasonably be regarded as effecting a partial assignment of the Government’s damages claim," critical because "the assignee of a claim has standing to assert the injury in fact suffered by the assignor. " Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex. rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765 (2000).

An upper limit on recovery of $20 million -- or even, say, $40 million, if we doubled the contingent fee to 80% -- isn't enough to justify pursuing a case of that magnitude, which leaves us, the taxpayer, holding the bag for someone else's fraud on the government.

Senator Kyl has never been a fan of open government. Is there a particular case brewing that he has in mind? 

Does The Fumo Juror's Twittering Warrant A Mistrial?

Twitter, twitter, everywhere. My delicious morning coffee was interrupted this morning by Anne Reed, who tweeted the following on Twitter:

Another tweeting juror, in Philly Fumo trial; How Appealing posts copy of "motion for immediate voir dire", http://tinyurl.com/c74h6s

Apparently the blogging gods want to be kind to your gentle host, ensuring him an endless fountain of inspiration. The Philadelphia Inquirer summarizes:

Defense lawyers for former State Sen. Vincent J. Fumo moved late yesterday for an immediate halt in jury deliberations and the removal of one juror, contending that the juror posted oblique remarks on Facebook.com and Twitter.com - including one declaring, "Stay tuned for a big announcement on Monday everyone!"

The petition, filed on the eve of the scheduled sixth day of deliberations in Fumo's federal corruption trial, stated that there was "substantial evidence" that the juror, who was not identified, had violated admonitions not to disclose the status of deliberations.

The lawyers asked U.S. District Judge Ronald L. Buckwalter to question the juror and other members of the panel.

"An immediate suspension of deliberations and a delicate but probing judicial inquiry is warranted," lawyers NiaLena Caravasos and Peter Goldberger stated in the petition. "Depending on the results of that inquiry, it seems that one or more jurors ought to be removed and possibly replaced . . . or that a mistrial will be required."

The motion cites one case, United States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 257, 301 (3d Cir. 2007). Here's the relevant passage:

"We review 'a trial court's response to allegations of juror misconduct for abuse of discretion.' United States v. Boone, 458 F.3d 321, 326 (3d Cir. 2006). Here, we conclude that the District Court acted within its discretion when it individually questioned the jurors.

We have recently had occasion to set forth the applicable legal standard governing the district courts' latitude to question jurors during deliberations about allegations of misconduct. In Boone, we recognized that '[i]t is beyond question that the secrecy of deliberations is critical to the success of the jury system.' Id. at 329. At the same time, we emphasized that '[i]t is also manifest, however, that a juror who refuses to deliberate or who commits jury nullification violates the sworn jury oath and prevents the jury from fulfilling its constitutional role.' Id. Attempting to reconcile these disparate values, we held that 'where substantial evidence of jury misconduct -- including credible allegations of jury nullification or of a refusal to deliberate -- arises during deliberations, a district court may, within its sound discretion, investigate the allegations through juror questioning or other appropriate means.' Id. We stressed that a district court, 'based on its unique perspective at the scene, is in a far superior position than this Court to appropriately consider allegations of juror misconduct, both during trial and during deliberations.' Id.

...

Accordingly, the legal standard is clear: a district court may investigate allegations of juror misconduct when presented with 'substantial evidence' of that misconduct.

In other words, while the District Court has ample discretion in deciding whether or not to question a juror, the Court can't just do so on a whim -- it needs "substantial evidence" of juror misconduct.

Here, however,the situation is a little different: while particular tweets (say, "he's guilty as sin, ain't nothin' gonna change my mind") might provide "substantial evidence" of "jury nullification" or "a refusal to deliberate," twittering alone isn't necessarily "substantial evidence" itself of any particular misconduct.

Sure, the jury is instructed to keep the content of deliberations secret, but it doesn't seem the juror revealed any content, other than the cryptic reference to a "big announcement" on Monday, which itself doesn't reveal any content other than the jury being close to a resolution.

Moreover, there's the bigger question of: so what? The Third Circuit still hasn't settled on a standard for removing a juror. Suffice to say it's not easy:

"While it is undisputed that in certain circumstances, district courts may discharge a juror for cause during deliberations, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(b), we have yet to enunciate the appropriate standard. 24 Any standard must accommodate two clashing interests. First, it is clear that 'a court may not dismiss a juror during deliberations if the request for discharge stems from doubts the juror harbors about the sufficiency of the government's evidence.' United States v. Brown, 262 U.S. App. D.C. 183, 823 F.2d 591, 596 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Any other rule would eviscerate the right to a unanimous verdict of guilt. See id. On the other hand, courts agree that a district court has the authority to dismiss a juror -- even during deliberations -- if 'that juror refuses to apply the law or to follow the court's instructions.' United States v. Abbell, 271 F.3d 1286, 1302 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). That is because 'a juror who refuses to deliberate or who commits jury nullification violates the sworn jury oath and prevents the jury from fulfilling its constitutional role.' Boone, 458 F.3d at 329. While the jurisprudence discussing the discharge of jurors during deliberations has largely focused on a refusal to deliberate or jury nullification, its reasoning applies with equal force to claims of juror bias." United States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 257, 303 (3d Cir. 2007).

Id. at 303.

Twittering a couple lines about the status of the trial doesn't come close to "refusing to apply the law." At the most, the juror arguably didn't "follow the court's instruction" with regard to secrecy, but it's hard to say such was deliberate when the juror plainly made an effort not to disclose any specific information.

It all comes back to a discussion I had with Anne Reed just last week (on Twitter, about another juror twittering case, of course):

annereed: Civil defendant wants new trial after finding juror's trial tweets; they look appropriate to me. http://ping.fm/OvHlM

phillyshortcite: @annereed re http://ping.fm/OvHlM Agreed; jurors entitled to tell others they're on a jury and to describe verdict afterwards.
 
annereed: @phillyshortcite Yes.Juror networking issues are easier than people think; q is whether it would be ok if juror said it face to face.
 
phillyshortcite: @annereed I'm surprised by depth of confusion over social media & law. "Are tweets admissible?" Yep, just like everything else.

There's nothing different here. Jurors for centuries have told their friends over the weekend "I think we've finally reached a verdict!"

We just have more "friends" these days, and, as Seth Godin would put it, everything goes on your permanent record.

So, juror, if the jury's suspended while the lawyers argue and you're reading this... stop reading this! Do what the court tells you to and stick to the evidence at trial!

But if you're done with deliberations and have entered a verdict, don't sweat it. You're not the first juror to breathe a sigh of relief after months of trial.

Fumo Trial Part 13: Closing Arguments, The Kitchen Sink Versus The Frying Pan

Closing arguments are the only time that trial lawyers get to be the pious, melodramatic, over the top shysters that television portrays them to be. It's where Clarrence Darrow stood against the death penalty for Leopold and Loeb, where Socrates admits the charges but not the crime.

It's the only point in the entire trial where all the facts make sense to the jury.

It's also where, for the first time, the law is revealed to the jurors and they are told what it is that they're supposed to do(warning: PDF), where it is explained, just once, that:

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all possible doubt or to a mathematical certainty. Possible doubts or doubts based on conjecture, speculation, or hunch are not reasonable doubts. A reasonable doubt is a fair doubt based on reason, logic, common sense, or experience. It is a doubt that an ordinary reasonable person has after carefully weighing all of the evidence, and is a doubt of the sort that would cause him or her to hesitate to act in matters of importance in his or her own life. It may arise from the evidence, or from the lack of evidence, or from the nature of the evidence.

I've often wondered if further explaining the burden of proof makes matters clearer or more confusing. The rules of evidence and the practical reality of storytelling require that each and every claim or defense be proven with at least some conjecture, speculation or hunches, exactly the sort of evidence deemed unreasonable.

My favorite instruction is this one, which has an analogue in civil trials of an instruction to the jury that the number of witnesses or length of testimony is not a relevant factor in assessing which side should prevail:

Although the government is required to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the government is not required to present all possible evidence related to the case or to produce all possible witnesses who might have some knowledge about the facts of the case. In addition, as I have explained, the defendant is not required to present any evidence or produce any witnesses.

In every trial I've seen, the lawyers promptly request the jury to disregard this instruction, after which they proceeded to "bang the empty chair," the trial lawyer's term for arguing the importance of one side's failure to call a particular witness or present particular evidence. That's already happened here, with Assistant U.S. Attorney Zauzmer calling out Dennis Cogan and Edwin Jacobs' failure to call Michael Rubin to the stand.

And it'll happen tomorrow when Cogan and Jacbos lay into Zauzmer for failing to call Litchko, whose destruction of emails and guilty plea formed the core of their obstruction of justice case.

The real question, to me, comes down to the choice between the kitchen sink or the frying pan. Do you throw all of the facts back at the jury again, including the kitchen sink? Or do you beat the jury over the head with the frying pan, making sure they really, really, really understand the most important parts of your argument?

It would be great if you could strike a balance between these two, but "striking a balance" in this context is about the same as telling someone to "keep their eye on the ball." It doesn't help and it's pointless anyway. Whatever you do, you are going to annoy some jurors with your repetition. You are still not going to reach some of them. And some of them will not interpret the facts and the issues the same way you do. Period.

As Zauzmer enters his third day of closing, it's clear he's gone with the kitchen sink, a logical choice given the way they prosecuted and presented their 141-count indictment and the simple fact that, by now, nothing remains in the jury's mind of most witnesses' testimony except some notes and a vague impression.

Cogan and Jacobs will likely take the opposite approach, poking a few holes in the prosecution's case (like with the chart of Citizens' Alliance Fumo tried to take apart on the standard) but generally sticking to their themes of intent and criminality.

Though I favor the frying pan approach -- IMHO, if the jury hasn't absorbed your alleged facts by now, they're not going to -- neither can be said to be better, it's just a question of which tool you use for the job.

There are, however, two main points to consider as the defense begins their closing and the jury deliberates.

First, what is the law? Zauzmer's closing was, in my opinion, thin on the jury instructions themselves. And that's understandible: confusion and complexity create doubt, which favors the defense, and there is little more confusing and complex than a federal charge of mail and wire fraud, the core of which is an element that mails or wire communications be used to commit the fraud so as to satisfy the constitutional requirement that the federal government is acting within its commerce clause powers in bringing the case. Such a requirement, glossed over by both jurors and lawyers in most cases, does nothing to simplify the case.

As such, expect Cogan and Jacobs to walk the jury through the finer details of the law, particularly the obstruction of justice charges and the vague "corruptly persuade" requirement of the witness tampering law.

Second, what was not said? "Show, don't tell." The same is just as true for closing arguments -- sometimes your best arguments should be left unspoken, so as to leave their inherent power in juror's minds as the jurors find the words to express the argument themselves in deliberations. This is a terribly risky strategy, one that requires considerable fortitude, as you don't want jurors to miss one of your arguments, but one that I think is underused by lawyers. Jurors don't really want to hear your arguments unless they're really novel -- don't be afraid to let them figure some things out on their own.

Cogan and Jacobs, bearing no burden of proof at all, have far more latitude to use this tactic, and so have used it far more than Zauzmer and Pease, just as I discussed way-back-when in my jury nullification post, the groundwork for which was laid heavily by Fumo's testimony, particularly the part about being a target of the Bush Administration.

Will those issues enter the deliberations?

Fumo Trial Post 12: A Criminal Trial Is Not A Popularity Contest

[Ed - I originally accidentally posted an uncorrected draft with some truly interesting (and incomprehensible) voice recognition errors, hopefully now corrected below.]

And so 62 days of ugly testimony comes to its ugly end. Fumo's defense was short -- largely his own testimony -- and the prosecution's rebuttal was his lawyers, called to rebut Fumo’s testimony that he had been advised he could continue and step up his deletion policies, a rebuttal the lawyers were all too willing to give.

As one observer told me, "I did not think it was possible, but they actually got me to feel sorry for Vince Fumo." Indeed, Fumo has left this saga a pathetic figure, a wealthy and influential man with few friends, no relationship with his own child, spying on those closest to him, surrounded 24 hours a day by people paid to be there, a Citizen Kane on trial for the excesses of his last few years in power.

Which is really a shame. Far be it from me to defend Fumo's conduct on a personal or ethical level, but we don't arrest and convict people for who they are, but rather for what they have done, and Fumo is not on trial for abusing his legislative position to extract multimillion-dollar private (and secret) settlements from major industries, nor is he on trial for lying to everyone in the Philadelphia-area about his connection to Citizens Alliance, nor is he on trial for the dysfunctional and sometimes abusive way he treated his staff, friends and family.

He is on trial for fraud against three particular entities and obstruction of justice. He is on trial for what appear to have been an open secret.

Let's start with part of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in model jury instructions for criminal fraud, the basis for what the jury was told this morning:

The first element that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that (name) knowingly devised (or wilfully participated in) a scheme to defraud (the victim) of money or property (or the intangible right of honest services) by materially false or fraudulent pretenses, representations or promises.

A ''scheme'' is merely a plan for accomplishing an object.

''Fraud'' is a general term which embraces all the various means by which one person can gain an advantage over another by false representations, suppression of the truth, or deliberate disregard for the truth.

Thus, a “scheme to defraud” is any plan, device, or course of action to deprive another of money or property (or the intangible right of honest services) by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations or promises reasonably calculated to deceive persons of average prudence.

The false or fraudulent representation (or failure to disclose) must relate to a material fact or matter. A material fact is one which would reasonably be expected to be of concern to a reasonable and prudent person in relying upon the representation or statement in making a decision (describe relevant decision; e.g., with respect to a proposed investment).

This means that if you find that a particular statement of fact was false, you must determine whether that statement was one that a reasonable person (or investor) might have considered important in making his or her decision. The same principle applies to fraudulent half truths or omissions of material facts.

In order to establish a scheme to defraud, the government must also prove that the alleged scheme contemplated depriving another of money or property (or of the intangible right of honest services).

Does that bear any relationship to what happened with the Pennsylvania Senate, Citizens Alliance and the Independence Seaport Museum?

What, really, should Fumo have told Citizens Alliance, and who would he have told? He was in constant contact with the director, who approved all of these expenses, and the board never even met until well after all of the allegedly criminal activity occurred. Same goes for the ISM – would they have done anything different if he had gone out of his way to tell each and every board member what he planned?

The Senate has a similar problem. It’s not as if Fumo wrote his own checks out of the Senate; did no one ask why he had three drivers? Have they ever asked?

Put simply, the "fraud" that occurred here doesn't bear much of a relationship to how we normally perceive fraud. Fudging the duties of politically-appointed government employees is a disreputable tradition with a long history stretching directly to the present, but only a single example of anyone in the past actually being prosecuted and convicted for it in Pennsylvania, the Habay case.

More tomorrow.

Fumo Trial Post 11: Fumo Takes The Stand - Can He Contain His Political Instincts?

As expected, Fumo's defense has gone on the "offensive," so to speak, and has done much more than merely poke holes in the prosecution's case, though they have done that, too.

They've put Vince himself up there to explain everything. And he's gone down the roads anticipated in that last post. He's proudly (some might say defiantly) admitted the secret settlements behind the PECO and Verizon suits, overworking his staffers and putting them on personal duties, and pulling the strings at Citizens' Alliance.

As predicted, he has directed his efforts at arguing what he did was not criminal, or, if it technically was, that he shouldn't be convicted anyway (an argument only made implicitly by references to the merits of political power and boogeymen like Enron, rather than explicitly, which would earn him and his lawyers a sharp reprimand).

Of course, his testimony isn't really the interesting part -- cross-examination by the US Attorneys, likely to begin tomorrow, is the interesting part.

So what's he need to do? Obviously prepare, prepare, prepare. Get his thoughts in order. A skilled trial lawyer can quickly start dragging an unprepared witness around by the nose.

But there's another, counter-intuitive piece of advice: Fumo needs to refrain from having an explanation for everything.

If there's one thing a jury hates, it's a liar. Some liars are dumb, have bad memories, or otherwise expose themselves to inconsistencies and attack. Those are the easy ones to expose.

The smart ones are harder to deal with -- they rarely offer you inherently contradictory testimony, you have to walk them into it. You have to give them enough rope to hang themselves with.

In general, a trial lawyer has a huge cognitive advantage over a witness. Whereas the witness knows what they're going to say in response to a particular question, the lawyer knows where the questions are going. Let's go back to my third Fumo post:

The two "rules" for cross examination are well-known and taught at every law school. Use leading questions only (i.e., questions with a yes or no answer), so that the witness will not have a chance to tell their story again. Do not ask any questions for which you do not already know the answer.

That is the safe option. Do that as a trial lawyer and you will not be sued for malpractice. No one will blame you when your client loses.

Do that in a difficult case -- Fumo has a very difficult case -- and you will lose.

Jurors want drama. They want a fight. Some lawyers and commentators blame television shows and movies for the jury's expectation that the criminal defense lawyer will assault the prosecution's main witnesses, but I believe the situation inherently demands drama. If the witness is calling your client a criminal, you have no choice but to call them a liar and to prove it.

How do you prove it?

Timing.

If you can understand the difference between Humpty Dumpty and Socrates, you can understand the difference between direct and cross-examination. Cross examination leads, direct examination builds.

Like Dennis Cogan and Edwin Jacobs, Robert Zauzmer and John Pease aren't amateurs, and they're not timid. They're not going to stick to scripted leading questions, not going to only ask Fumo questions to which they already know the answer.

The prosecutors are going to lead Fumo, to get him to talk. And talk, and talk, and talk.

Because they want to force Fumo to do one of three things:

  1. Appear to be uncooperative. (Liar!)
  2. Stumble into a contradiction and then be called out on it. (Liar!)
  3. Become a used-car salesman. (Liar!)

The third is the part that most well-educated witnesses -- whether they're doctors, businessmen, lawyers, or otherwise -- fail to guard against.

Sure, everyone gets cagey and defensive when under hostile questioning, particularly when their liberty is on the line. Jurors know that. And they know he's been preparing for this for years. But at some point, a jury will not accept testimony from a witness who appears to have an answer to everything. Not even a politician.

It's certainly Fumo's biggest weakness -- just consider the tape played from the Michael Smerconish show. He just couldn't help himself. I wouldn't be surprised if the prosecutors played that for him, not just to remind the jury, but to see if they can get Fumo to start explaining it away. His liberty may depend on holding back everything he's been for thirty years and coming clean with each and every answer, the first time around.

Can Fumo do it? 

Fumo Trial Post 10: What Does The Defense Have To Prove?

Legally, almost nothing. The burden lies with the plaintiff (or prosecutors) to prove the elements of their claims, and the defense can sit back and do nothing more than poke holes in those claims. (There’s an exception for “affirmative” defenses like Fumo’s proposed “advice of counsel” defense, discussed previously.)

Fumo’s lawyers have certainly done their share of poking holes in the prosecution’s case, with lengthy, often painful cross-examinations of the FBI agents and accountants who performed forensic examinations of the books for the State Senate, Citizens Alliance and the Independence Seaport Museum.

Although these cross-examinations are boring to most observers, even those who have followed the trial closely, their importance should not be understated. As I’ve written before, although I have seen plenty of cases in which I could not understand why the lawyer by being so excessively nitpicky – even when I was the one doing it! – I have never actually heard a juror complain about such a cross-examination, nor have I seen a jury fail to appreciate the deeper meaning of such a laborious exercise if it bears fruit.

And such nitpicking can bear fruit, as it did for Fumo: nitpicking showed the jury that the issues weren’t as simple as the prosecution contended. Since Fumo’s charged with white collar crimes, complexity plays to his advantage. Whether it be appropriate invoicing by a contractor in a white collar criminal case, or the use of a particular technique by a doctor in a medical malpractice case, or the choice between options by a manufacture in a product liability case, at some point an issue becomes so complicated that jurors will respect most any reasonable judgment made by the defendant.

But Vince Fumo can’t sit back and poke holes in the prosecution’s case.

There’s simply too much out there. Intentional or not, the prosecutors have stripped Fumo of the general sympathy and affinity most people inherently feel for one another by portraying Fumo as a thin-skinned creep whose own daughter won’t even speak to him and who spied on his ex-girlfriend’s email. The prosecutors have also shown beyond any reasonable doubt that Fumo received substantial political and personal work from his Senate-paid staff, that Citizens Alliance and Independent Seaport Museum conferred substantial pecuniary benefits on him (even if they didn’t give him any money directly) and, most importantly, that Fumo panicked when he learned of the FBI investigation, after which he took substantial steps to minimize evidence left behind.

 

Indeed, Fumo’s lawyers didn’t dispute most of that. They couldn’t.

 

They have something else in mind: they’re going to “prove” the case by framing the context and mindset of Fumo’s actions.

 

The first few witnesses have been directed towards that context. Surprisingly, perhaps the most revealing context came in response to questions by the prosecution posed to former Montgomery County District Attorney (and currently County Commissioner) Bruce Castor.

 

Under cross examination by U.S. Attorney John Pease, however, Bruce Castor admitted that he and Marrone discussed a number of political concerns during normal business hours in Castor’s office, which Castor admitted was probably inappropriate.

 

But Castor’s admission raises a simple question: why has Vince Fumo been indicted for using his staff for political purposes but not Bruce Castor?

 

Cogan tried to drive that point home with testimony by Paul S. Dlugolecki, one of Fumo’s top advisors, that other Senators frequently did the same around election time. Zauzmer called him out on it, demanding Dlugolecki “name one” who did, to which Dlugolecki demurred, but the point was made. Frankly, as open as the testimony has been, I doubt any juror expected Dlugolecki to spill the beans and I doubt they’ll hold it against him.

 

Over the next few days we’ll continue to see more of that context: the defense’s goal will be to create enough context to rebut the prosecution’s central assertions underlying the fraud charges, which is that Fumo had staffers and contractors on the senate payroll who did no work for the government and that Citizens Alliance and the Independent Seaport Museum were treated like shams to benefit Fumo. They don’t have to rebut everything, just paint enough context to slant everything else.

 

Fumo doesn’t have to do much for the fraud charges: once he shows largely legitimate explanations for what happened, and once he challenges the worst allegations – like those made by Marrone – he’ll likely earn back reasonable doubt. The jury knows the FBI dug deep for months, and they’ll expect a case that’s, if not airtight, is at least watertight. If Fumo can show that everyone saw him dipping his hand into the cookie jar, and that the FBI has mislabeled a significant number of cookies, he’ll likely create enough reasonable doubt to avoid most of the charges.

 

The obstruction of justice charges are harder to fight: as the context for them is an FBI investigation. As such, Fumo’s lawyers will need to show that Fumo’s mindset – his paranoia and rampant destruction of emails – long preceded the investigation, and that he had reason to believe he could continue such destruction even after he got wind of the investigation.

 

And that’s where the lawyers come back into play. It also presents a judgment call for Dennis Cogan and Edwin Jacobs on how they portray the mindset of the clients, who appear to have deliberately destroyed documents in the face of an FBI investigation: do they reject the prosecutor’s portrayal of the defendant’s paranoia and recast their clients as confused innocents, or do they run with the paranoia and claim the destruction was nothing unusual for them, and so didn’t reflect a guilty mindset?

 

The former is the safe choice, but their hands are tied by the facts.

  

Fumo Trial Post 9: It May Be Wrong, But It's Not A Crime -- What Have The Prosecutors Proven?

As the prosecution's case comes to a close, calling up supervising FBI Agents such as Vicki Humphreys to summarize and to distill the mountains of paper and weeks of testimony, it's time to take stock of what we've learned since October 2008.

We've learned, broken down into the four general categories of charges (fraud on the State Senate, fraud on Citizens' Alliance, fraud on the Independence Seaport Museum, and obstruction of justice):

Fumo lived well, financied partly by staffers and contractos paid by the Pennsylvania State Senate who performed substantial personal work for the Senator. Most everyone in the Senate apparently knew all of this, did not complain, and the Senate has not asked for Fumo for reimbursement.

Fumo received a little over $100,000 in power tools and consumer goods from Citizens Alliance, a nominally independent nonprofit set up to help out South Philadelphia neighborhoods. No one at Citizens Alliance objected to these payments, probably because the executive director, co-defendant Ruth Arnao, was the one who made the purchases, while the Board of Directors, whose job it was to oversee these things, never actually met until well after the FBI investigation started. Citizens Alliance has also not asked for any of this money back; it's also, despite being a "victim," now under investigation by the state.

Fumo took a number of voyages aboard yachts owned by the nonprofit Independence Seaport Museum without paying for them. The museum has not asked him to pay them back. It's unclear whether (and how) the museum's officers and directors were unaware that a state senator had repeatedly taken their historic yacht and its crew out for joyrides for free. The Museum was already investigated before, resulting in its director going to prison.

Fumo became extremely paranoid when he was under federal investigation and dramatically escalated efforts to destroy e-mails that he no longer needed around, including instructing his staff to delete (and thus have wiped by other programs) every e-mail to or from him. He did this in earnest up until he was actually served a subpoena, at which point he apparently continued some, but not all, of it, then stopped when his lawyers told him to. Despite these efforts, the US attorneys were able to uncover a wealth of information, including thousands of e-mails at the relevant times.
 

That is to say, we've learned about a bunch of "crimes" no one has complained about except the U.S. Attorneys, who did not subpoena Fumo's office until the second year of the investigation, long after the investigation was made public.

What are we doing here? Being greedy and paranoid is wrong, but isn't a crime. Nor is being thin-skinned, as ample evidence has shown Fumo was by his repeated efforts to retaliate against anyone who crossed his path. It's also not a crime to go on to Michael Smerconish's radio show and lie to the public about the benefits you receive from a nonprofit. It's similarly not a crime to have a horrible relationship with your daughter and her husband. It's probably illegal to hack into your ex-girlfriend's email, but Fumo wasn't charged with that. That's all just background.

It's also apparently not a crime to ask PECO and Verizon to secretly direct millions to particular nonprofits and law firms as part of a government settlement, and for them to cooperate, since the U.S. Attorney sure hasn't charged anyone with anything related to that.

What are we looking at here? A State Senator twisting the staffing rules into spaghetti in plain sight and having his luxuries paid for by two nonprofits that didn't care? That's outrageous, unseemly and greedy, but it's not criminal fraud.

Fumo's "wiping" of the computers certainly had the intent to obstruct a federal investigation, but so what? Every major corporation in America routinely scrubs their email system to obstruct later litigation, including prosecutions brought by the government. Does every CEO in America need to keep their email the moment they hear of a government investigation apparently related to their business?

We'll dive more into these issues as the defense progresses -- for now, think about the case you didn't see, the one where Fumo secretly pockets millions by abusing his government office, the "normal" corruption case.

That case was apparently so flimsy it wasn't even brought and the jury's supposed to convict on the leftovers?

Fumo Trial Post 8: Fumo is One of the First Prosecutions Under a New Obstruction of Justice Statute

Although the defense has yet to begin its case, we have seen enough hints over the past few months so that we can sum up Fumo’s defense in two words: “it’s complicated.”

The Pennsylvania State Senate rules regarding the payment of staffers and the time they may spend on a senator’s personal or political goals are complicated. The Internal Revenue Service guidelines for transactions between non-profits and their fundraisers are complicated. Fumo’s relationship with Citizens Alliance and the Independence Seaport Museum was very complicated.

It’s a common strategy for defense lawyers, particularly in white collar criminal cases. The defense doesn’t have to prove anything at all. Their ‘burden’ is to poke enough holes in the prosecution’s case to create “reasonable doubt.”

Such, however, has made for an extraordinarily boring trial, livened up only by descriptions of Fumo’s lifestyle and evidence of the extortion and/or corruption charges never actually brought against him.

That is to say, the most interesting parts of the case have also been the least important.

That has changed. The first three sets of charges – fraud on the Senate, Citizens Alliance, and ISM – were presented by the prosecutors through a laundry list of improperly invoice expenditures, as boring as crime gets. The final set of charges, obstruction of justice, began with a $50 million secret deal with Verizon and will conclude with a desperate attempt to thwart an FBI investigation.

And we’ll finally learn how Fumo, himself a lawyer, ended up indicted for obstruction of justice while represented by legendary former prosecutor Richard Sprague.

As referenced in my last post, on September 5, 2008, the Friday before trial began, Fumo’s current lawyers sent the prosecutors a letter describing their intention to present a so-called “advice of counsel” defense to the obstruction of justice charges. As they wrote,

Specifically, at all relevant times up to February 18, 2005, when the search warrant was served, Mr. Fumo relied upon advice given to him by his long-time attorney and confidant, Richard A. Sprague, that it was permissible under federal law not to retain any document that was not under subpoena.

That was, shall we say, a surprise to the prosecutors, who had previously fought long and hard to disqualify Sprague and his firm from representing Fumo because, among other issues, they had represented the victims in the case and because their role in the facts leading up to the indictment made them potential witnesses and blurred the line between being a witness and being an advocate.

Sprague and his firm beat back the prosecutors’ attempt, in part by assuring the court that they were unaware of the “wiping” of Fumo’s computers, the destruction of evidence at the heart of the obstruction of justice charges.

So how do Fumo’s current lawyers intend to reconcile their advice of counsel defense with Mr. Sprague’s prior representations that his firm was not involved in any of the wiping? We get a hint from the September 2008 letter sent by his attorneys. The letter doesn’t reference Sprague having specific knowledge of any particular deletion or wiping, but rather implies Sprague gave Fumo generalized advice, perhaps before the investigation, that he could destroy any documents not under subpoena.

The prosecutors have filed a motion, mid-trial, to preclude Fumo from raising the advice of counsel defense. In the motion, which you can read here, the prosecutors argue that advice of counsel is only applicable to “specific intent” crimes and not “general intent” crimes like obstruction of justice.

It’s not worth going into the details; if you are interested, you can see the response from Fumo’s lawyers here. I presume the judge will deny the government’s motion and permit Fumo to raise the defense – both Judges Yohn and Buckwalter have been very permissive in allowing evidence in this trial. Both have rejected essentially every attempt to limit the scope of this trial, such as by denying the prosecutors’ motion to disqualify Sprague and denying the defendant’s motion to bifurcate the charges into separate trials.

A laissez-faire approach to evidence is generally the best way for a trial judge to avoid reversal by an appellate court; when in doubt, let the jury sort it out.

I have heard numerous theories on how this situation came to pass, with Sprague being offered up to testify regarding something he apparently previously knew nothing about.

Some have hypothesized that Sprague’s vigorous resistance to disqualification was a “sham” from the beginning, as is his “feud” with Fumo (reportedly over fees), and that Sprague and Fumo have been planning the whole time for Sprague or one of his firm’s attorneys to take the stand in Fumo’s defense.

I have also heard it hypothesized that the opposition to the disqualification and the “feud” are both real, and that the “sham” will come when Fumo claims that Sprague actually did advise him on the deletions and wiping, despite Sprague’s prior representations to the court.

It’s probably a little more complicated than that. By pure coincidence, Senator Fumo became the target of a federal investigation a year after a major change in the law relating to obstruction of justice.

Prior to 2002, obstruction of justice was criminalized by three separate federal statutes, none of which clearly prohibited the destruction of documents in anticipation of a government investigation or subpoena.

18 U.S.C. § 1503 created criminal penalties for anyone who “corruptly ... influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice.” Court opinions had supplemented the statute with four essential elements that the government must prove:

(1)    a judicial proceeding which was pending when the documents were destroyed (the “pending proceeding” requirement),
(2)     the individual  had knowledge of that proceeding,
(3)    a sufficient “nexus” existed between the document destruction and the proceeding, and
(4)     the defendant acted corruptly and with an intent to obstruct or interfere with a judicial proceeding or administration of justice.

See “Anticipatory Obstruction of Justice: Pre-Emptive Document Destruction Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Anti-Shredding Statute,” 89 Cornell L. Rev. 1519, 1529-1530 (September, 2004).

These requirements are strictly applied. One of the more important Supreme Court cases interpreting § 1503 overturned a conviction of a Federal Judge for deliberating lying to FBI investigators about leaking information about a wiretap because the investigation did not have a sufficient “nexus” with an actual grand jury proceeding. United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593; 115 S. Ct. 2357; 132 L. Ed. 2d 520 (1995).

18 U.S.C. § 1505 is essentially the same as § 1503, except it applies to agency and congressional investigations. 18 U.S.C. § 1512, the third and final statute under the pre-2002 system, has a broad reach and references government investigations, but only actually criminalizes witness tampering.

That is to say, the pre-2002 obstruction of justice law was limited to situations “closely tied to a pending judicial proceeding” while the witness tampering law ironically only “made it a crime to persuade another person to destroy documents, but not a crime to actually destroy the same documents yourself.”

Don’t take my word for it – those quotes come from United States Senator Patrick Leahy, Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, who proposed the new and current obstruction of justice statute, the one under which Fumo has been indicted, in response to revelations of the accounting firm Arthur Andersen shredding hundreds of thousands of documents in anticipation of receiving a subpoena relating to its work for Enron. 148 Cong. Rec. S7, 419 (daily ed. July 26, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy). Fumo has been charged with witness tampering as well, by way of instructing other persons to destroy relevant evidence.

Sound complicated? It gets worse.

At trial, Fumo’s lawyers seem likely to argue that Sprague gave Fumo inaccurate advice
, an argument hinted at in their response to the prosecution’s motion to prelude Fumo from presenting an advise of counsel defense. (Fumo’s lawyers note, correctly, that advice of counsel usually arises in cases where the advise was inaccurate, as common sense suggests that, if the lawyer’s advice had been accurate, then the defendant would not have been indicted.)

Making matters worse, it’s possible that Fumo will testify he received this general advice relating to document destruction and subpoenas at some point before July 30, 2002, the day the new obstruction of justice statute -- which has a much broader reach, covering any destruction or other tampering done with intent to obstruct a federal investigation, no matter how far removed -- became law.

As everyone knows, ignorance of the law is no defense, but it does raise reasonable doubts about a defendant’s intent.

Fumo may then end up arguing that he had the old law in mind, the one that did not criminalize anticipatory destruction, when he ordered his staff to ramp up their document destruction once he generally learned of the investigation. And who is to say his belief was unreasonable – Congress, after all, apparently thought the same thing, which is why they changed it.

The trick for Fumo’s lawyers is to present this all to the jury in a manner that makes it complicated, but not too complicated. Complicated sounds like reasonable doubt; too complicated sounds like baloney.

Fumo Trial Part 7: Send Lawyers, Guns and Money (and Get Me Outta This!)

 

If you don’t recognize the reference in the title, here’s the Warren Zevon song.

This week saw a recounting of one of the most dramatic moments in Senator Fumo's saga, testimony which brought into focus the original impetus for the FBI and the U.S. Attorneys’ Office to consider public corruption charges against Fumo.

Daniel Whelan, the former president of Verizon of Pennsylvania, testified about a meeting he had with two lawyers, David Cohen and Arthur Makadon, both then of the law firm Ballard Spahr. The context is important: Verizon is one of the most powerful corporations in Pennsylvania, with an industry position often bordering on monopoly status. Ballard Spahr, in turn, has one of the largest and most influential government relations law practice in the state; David Cohen, for example, was Ed Rendell’s Chief of Staff when Rendell was the mayor of Philadelphia.

Whelan approached Cohen and Makadon for advice regarding a settlement offered by Senator Fumo arising from the Pennsylvania Utility Commission’s proposal to split Verizon into separate retail and wholesale businesses, a change which, Whelan testified, could have cost Verizon $2 billion. Fumo, Whelan said, had demanded nearly $50 million from Verizon in the form of donations to non-profits and guaranteed billables for large law firms (not including Ballard) in the area. As the demand had nothing to do with Verizon, phone service, or the taxpayers, and had everything to do with Fumo, Whelan was concerned that he or Verizon might later be accused of bribery.

Which is understandable. As I discussed in my last post on Fumo, 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(2) makes it a federal offense to "corruptly give ... anything of value to any person, with intent to influence ... an agent of ... a State..., in connection with any business ... of such government ... involving anything of value of $5,000 or more." On the other side of the transaction, 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(1)(B) makes it a crime for any government official who “corruptly solicits or demands for the benefit of any person … anything of value from any person, intending to be influenced or rewarded in connection with any business … of such … government… involving any thing of value of $5,000 or more.”

Whelan testified that Cohen and Makadon told him to “work it out with Fumo,” which Whelan did, with the requirement that none of the money be directly tied to Fumo, and as such no work was sent towards law firms which either compensated Fumo generally or would compensate him for that particular work.

Ironically, under current law it does not seem that such a limitation would have changed Whelan’s potential criminal liability. "A quid pro quo of money for a specific legislative act is sufficient to violate the statute, but it is not necessary." United States v. Gee, 432 F.3d 713, 714 (7th Cir. 2005). That is to say, a bribery charge does not depend upon specifically offering a certain amount for a particular act, but rather merely giving anything of value to any person with the intent to influence an agent of the state. It does not matter if the money goes into Fumo’s pocket: on Whelan’s side, paying anyone with the intent to influence Fumo in connection with his government business is, by definition, public corruption, just as, on Fumo’s side, soliciting anything of value from anyone for the benefit of anyone while “intending to be influenced” is, by definition, public corruption.

Which is why the lawyers were called in.

Truth is, we only barely know what happened here, with conflicting versions having already arisen. Cohen, for instance, told The Inquirer he recommended Verizon fight the PUC in Court, not that they work out a deal with Fumo. Regarding the legal work, Whelan said that he originally meant to send work to Cozen O’Connor, but stopped when he learned they were going to pay Fumo a referral fee. Today, however, The Legal Intelligencer quoted a representative from Cozen saying that the firm did some work for Verizon, but without compensating Fumo.

We also don't know what the agreement between Verizon and Fumo really was, since it was never put into writing. As The Inquirer reported, though, when some of the Verizon contributions did not appear on time, one of Fumo’s lawyers wrote Whelan: "I understand that Senator Fumo believes that there were certain undertakings of Verizon in connection with the settlement he reached with you that have still not been fulfilled," enclosing a draft letter to the PUC. That, Whelan testified, was a reference to the payments to organizations chosen by Fumo, including Citizens Alliance.

It’s a fascinating story with considerable innuendo which brings us back to the mystery at the heart of the Fumo indictment: if the underlying crime here was Fumo’s abuse of his office to benefit himself, his allies, and his organizations, including Citizens Alliance, why was he indicted for defrauding Citizens Alliance and not indicted for corruption?

There’s a simple answer that many have reached: he had enough lawyers, guns and money to effectively conceal the corrupt deal, then destroyed everything that was left when he learned of the investigation, hence the obstruction of justice charge.

But it's not that simple; indeed, on the facts we know, it should be even more simple than that. Whelan's testimony alone supports probable cause for a corruption charge, so where is it?

Moreover, the obstruction of justice charges arise from a time when Fumo presumably would have called upon his lawyers, guns and money for assistance and guidance.

In short, how did Fumo avoid indictment for demanding over $50 million to change his legislative position but not for stepping up his office's document-destruction procedures after he learned of the investigation? People get sloppy -- it's how most criminals are caught -- but it just doesn't make sense here, not with what we know about Fumo and his heavy reliance on lawyers.

We may soon learn. Here’s the letter one Fumo’s current lawyers -- none of whom were involved prior to the indictment -- sent the Friday before trial started:

 

In response, the government subpoenaed over 1,200 documents from Sprague, documents which, the prosecutors have contended, contain no record of any specific advice given to Fumo regarding the "wiping" of computers, the basis of the obstruction of justice charge. That contention is consistent with Sprague's own representations, back when he represented Fumo, that he was not aware of any of the "wiping."

I'll have more on Sprague's advice -- and whether Fumo will even be allowed to testify about it, given his prior pleadings claiming there was no such advice -- next week.

$120 Million In Hourly Billing For A Single Trial: What Happened In Robertson v. Princeton?

The blog "How Appealing" has plenty of links on the $90 million settlement of the donor-intent suit brought against Princeton University by the heirs to the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. (and now A&P supermarket) fortune, alleging misuse of a 1961 donation of $35 million which had swelled in value to over half a billion dollar.

The case was scheduled to go to trial in New Jersey state court in January. Pretrial litigation costs were $40 million for each side. Princeton expected its own trial costs to reach $20 million; it's fair to assume that the Robertson's trial costs would have been the same if not greater.

$80 million to litigate and another $40 million to try a breach of fiduciary duty, accounting and breach of contract dispute between two parties. No appeals, certs, or retrials included.

How could that be? Let's look at how those numbers compare to other complicated cases like patent infringement, white collar criminal defense, and antitrust.

According to the American Intellectual Property Law Association, the average per-party cost to take through litigation and trial a large (over $25 million at stake) patent infringement / dispute is $5 million. (For all patent cases, the average is $1 million). Patent cases are document intensive, involve numerous expensive experts, and typically require dozens of depositions and motions. They're often more complicated than large commercial litigation or breach of fiduciary duty cases.

Yet, the Robertson case would have cost twelve times what the biggest patent cases typically do.

Remember the white collar criminal defense that got WilmerHale sued? That "feeding frenzy" of billing was over $12 million in hourly fees, less than one-third what either side here charged, and it involved more than double the documents of Robertson.

So what happened in Robertson?

Sure, the case wasn't a slip-and-fall:

The university says it produced more than half a million pages of documents in pretrial discovery. The trial witness list had 124 names, 80 witnesses had been deposed, 3,000 pages of briefs were required and 5,000 trial exhibits were identified.

But it wasn't that big. Here's how the District Court described the Visa / Mastercard merchant and debit card antitrust case, which settled just before trial a few years ago:

Class Counsel have litigated this case -- which did not culminate in settlement until the eve of trial -- for seven years. During that time, there were almost 400 depositions of witnesses, including 21 experts who issued 54 expert reports; four rounds of class certification briefing (through the Supreme Court); 16 summary judgment motions, 31 motions in limine, and three Daubert motions; and a pretrial order identifying 230,000 pages of trial exhibits, 730 trial witnesses, and more than 17,000 deposition designations

In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litig., 297 F. Supp. 2d 503 (E.D.N.Y., 2003). Now that's big.

Yet, that much work -- several orders of magnitude larger than Robertson -- resulted in a "lodestar" (hours times prevailing rates) fee calculation of $62,545,603 for plaintiffs' counsel, or one and a half times each side's bill in Robertson.

The Robertson case was filed July 17, 2002. In the 6 years, 4 months, and 24 days leading up to the settlement announcement, the parties averaged $34,202.65 in costs every single day, or about the same as if each side had one of the most expensive partners in the country (each at $1,000 an hour) and two of the most expensive associates in the country ($600 an hour per associate) working every single day, including weekends and holidays, from 8am to 6pm, taking no more than 2.2 hours in their work day to do anything else, including eating, twittering or answering angry phone calls from their abandoned spouses.

Using more reasonable numbers, like an average rate of $348 an hour, and seven hours of actual, billable hours per day, we still end up with the ridiculous conclusion that each side had seven lawyers working full time for them every day, including weekends and holidays.

Some of these numbers may be unfair. For instance, both sides hired major accounting firms to prepare extensive expert reports. So let' s very generously assume that these firms performed the same level of accounting work as required for companies with under $1 billion in annual revenue to ensure complete Sarbanes-Oxley compliance: $2.8 million (which I think is a high estimate) for each side.

Let's also assume "costs," like copying, postage, phone calls and research equal about 5% of overall billing, as is often the case in business representation. I think that's actually generous here -- $2 million per side will get you an awful lot of copies.

Adding in those expert fees and costs drops the attorneys' fees to $70.4 million, or a mere $30,098.33 every single day. Using our "reasonable" hourly rates and billable hours, that's a team of six lawyers working full time every day, including weekends and holidays. For each side.

That's outrageous: other than the fees, Robertson was closer in size to complicated personal injury litigation than a large, complex commercial dispute like a patent, antitrust, or securities case.

Multi-defendant, multi-claim personal injury cases -- e.g., a catastrophic injury or wrongful death at a construction site that raises both product liability and negligence issues -- frequently exceed 100,000 documents, 100 potential witnesses, 50 depositions, and 1,000 trial exhibits. I can't judge what the article meant by 3,000 pages of "briefs," but, based on the motions and orders available online, I assume that number includes pleadings, motions and exhibits, which is not at all impressive.

Tomorrow we'll look at how not to spend $120 million bringing a case to trial.

Fumo Trial Part 5: Are We There Yet? The Perils of Really Long Trials

Last week, Fumo and Arnao joined the thin ranks of defendants not in jail who want their trial done faster, with a motion by Fumo's lawyers to split the Independence Seaport Museum charges, for which no evidence has yet been presented, into a separate trial.

Before the trial, Judge Yohn denied a similar request (though disfavored, it's a discretionary call to bifurcate a trial), which I think was the appropriate decision, given how the alleged obstructions of justice arose as a response to the totality of the circumstances, including investigations into, and press reports about, the ISM. I doubt they'll succeed now, but it's worth reviewing why they're trying.

Partly for psychological reasons, most civil and criminal defendants who don't have an immediate concern – like sitting in jail or suffering continued damage to their reputation – will use every available legal mechanism to slow down the rush to judgment. Why, then, is Fumo moving to speed up his trial? (Other than, obviously, to combat the sheer boredom of hearing weeks of testimony from every gardener and computer technician who ever worked for him.)

I see two primary issues. First, the defense wants to disarm the government's strategy of proving Fumo's intent through circumstantial evidence that his whole lifestyle was framed by the use of "OPM" for personal gain. One of the biggest weaknesses in the prosecution's case is the lack of smoking guns compared to most white collar criminal trials. Enron, for example, had Chewco, the obvious purpose of which was to hide liabilities, enabling Enron to inflate the profits it stated to investors. In the only other prosecution for a Pennsylvania legislator for misusing legislative staff, the Habay case, the facts were straightforward. Here's an example:

Rebecca Coleman testified that she was employed in the defendant's office from June 1999 through January 2000. Her first assignment was to plan a fundraiser for July 29, 1999. She spent approximately one half of her working hours on this campaign related activities. She did this work at the defendant's direction. In performing these duties, she used the office facilities provided to the defendant for his official duties. She also used the telephone, fax machine and computer located in the district office. She did the same for another fundraiser in November, 1999.

Commonwealth v. Habay, 2006 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 482 * 19. That's quite different from the case here, where there's no dispute that Fumo's staff usually worked well beyond the 37.5-hour workweek imposed by Senate staffing rules. Did Fumo's staff put in their 37.5-hours for the Senate every week and then, say, 13 more hours for Fumo? That wouldn't be illegal. More importantly, if the numbers became uneven at times – say, a staffer sometimes putting in only 30 hours for the Senate – can we really say that shows Fumo had the criminal intent to defraud the Senate?

The Citizens' Alliance and Independence Seaport Museum charges have similar problems, which I'll address more in-depth later. For now, consider that The Franklin Institute spends over a million dollars a year on fundraising, a perfectly respectable amount that nets it more than 20-times that in contributions. There would be nothing wrong per se with The Franklin Institute compensating a fundraiser with a wide array of telescopes and molecular models, so what's criminally wrong with Fumo's power tools?

Even the more egregious examples -- what business does a South Philly nonprofit have with dunes on the New Jersey shore? -- lose their sting in the absence of direct evidence of intent. Arnao didn't keep two sets of books or a separate account for "OPM." Fumo didn't tell the Senate staffers that they had to keep quiet about the trips to Martha's Vineyard. Thus, the prosecutors have little choice but to throw everything in the pile to arrange a bonfire by the end, a sense of inevitability that Fumo must have known the wrongfulness of what he was doing, that Fumo's "OPM" really was code for taking money belonging to others.

In that context, it's easy to see why the defense wants to keep any logs they can out of that bonfire, to prevent the prosecution from drawing what they contend is a comprehensive picture of fraud. Moreover, Fumo's life was downright embarrassing, particularly in these economic times. He made taxpayer-paid staffers work on his house while a community organization bought him half of Home Depot and a museum gave him free rides on their yacht? Citizens' Alliance paid for his trips to McDonald's? I've argued before on this blog that, in general, jurors take their duties very seriously and do not ordinarily resent (or take out their resentment on) defendants like oil companies or corporate executives, but it's always a concern nonetheless. The more of that they can keep out, the better.

Second, once a trial goes more than a week or two, the length of the trial itself becomes a variable. In the fourth week of the Fledderman trial this summer, at sidebar I started arguing an objection when the judge sharply cut me off, told me that I was misrepresenting what happened, and ruled against us. I was shocked (and offended by the accusation) so, at the next break, I went back to the transcript. Lo and behold, I saw what the judge probably had in mind. I even found it in my notes.

How did that happen?

Consider cognitive science.

For one thing, pursuing the notion of a memory as a thing has yielded a surprisingly small set of principles by which we can understand the causes of remembering and forgetting (Kihlstrom & Barnhardt, 1993):

    • Elaboration: Memory improves when an event is related to pre-existing knowledge.

    • Organization: Memory improves when events are related to each other.

    • Time-Dependency: Memory fades with time.

    • Interference: The cause of forgetting is competition among available memories, not the loss of memories from storage through decay or displacement.

      ...
    • Schematic Processing: Memory is better for events that match our expectations than for events that are irrelevant to them, but memory is best for events that violate our expectations.

Memory, Autobiography, History, by Prof. John F. Kihlstrom, UC-Berkeley.

For lawyers, trials begin with intense organization that easily enables elaboration and schematic processing. If they're not careful, everything that happens -- no matter how garbled, incoherent, or illogical -- will appear in their own minds (but not anyone else's) to "fit" their theory of the case.

For juries, trials begin with poor elaboration, minimal organization and no schematic processing: the trial starts with a jury chosen specifically because they're barely aware of the facts and have minimal expectations, then proceeds through awkward sequential question-and-answer sessions. Making matters worse, in a criminal trial the defendant typically goes last. To put that in context, imagine watching The Sopranos not as 86 chronological episodes, but as a collection of multi-hour interviews played back to back, with a third of the witnesses intentionally misleading the jury, a third telling the truth, and a third unintentionally misleading the jury, with Tony Soprano going last.

As such, at trial the jury has to create their own context (the opening statement occurs at the worst time, when the jury has no context whatsoever in which to elaborate, organize or process what they hear), weed through interfering details, and uphold their duty not to judge until they've heard all the facts. It's a tall order. In fact, it's impossible, resulting in more failures of attention, memory and understanding than anyone wants to admit. That's part of why we have so many jurors up there, in the hopes at least one juror has picked up and properly processed each fact presented. I doubt that ever actually happens; there's too much going on.

Rarely does anyone -- judge, jury or attorney -- remember testimony verbatim, they remember themes, perceptions, and a handful of details. In time, details fade, and certain themes and perceptions become more pronounced. In the Fledderman case, I remembered the testimony in the context of our theory of the case, which did not include the parts relevant to the judge, who likely had a broader context in mind when he listened to the testimony.

As the Fumo trial drags on, the passage of time has an increasing impact on the juror's view of the case. Part of Cogan and Jacobsí concern right now is that, after enough time, details and perceptions will fade, leaving jurors with the prosecutors' themes in their mind as if they were their own. Think of Ronald Reagan erroneously recalling the climax of Wing and a Prayer as an actual WWII war story.

Another concern is simply faulty memory. By the end, Zauzmer, Cogan and Jacobs' closings will all reference facts that at least some jurors don't remember or remember differently. Most of that is worked out in deliberations - where one juror has forgotten, others usually remember, and the consensus usually wins. But the longer the trial goes, the more important these variables become, despite having nothing to do with whether Fumo is guilty or not.

Does the length of the trial inherently bias the case against Fumo? That's hard to say – there are simply too many variables to say if trial length helps plaintiffs/prosecutors or defendants, and there are plenty of long cases won by plaintiffs and defendants. But it represents an uncontrollable variable, which both sides tend to avoid. Here, however, the prosecution believes it is worth that risk given their circumstantial case; the defense, unsurprisingly, believes exactly the opposite.

Fumo Trial Part 3: The Secret of Comedy and the Art of Cross Examination

 

Cross examination is expected to be the most dramatic part of any trial; it's where Perry Mason extracted confessions from the main witness, where Jack McCoy pummels the defendant's alibi, and, indeed, it's where most real life criminal trials are won or lost.

For a civil or criminal case to go to trial, there must be at least one witness who will stand up and say they saw or know that the defendant did something wrong. It's thus no accident that criminal defense attorneys are cross-examiners, as they rarely have the same opportunity as civil defense attorneys to raise doubt by arguing that, even if the facts as alleged are true, their client either did nothing wrong or was not the cause of the harm suffered by the plaintiff. Even in the Fumo trial, where his attorney has argued that the misuse of Senate resources was not a crime, Fumo cannot take the chance the jury will believe the facts alleged by those staffers.

For criminal defense lawyers, if they cannot cast doubt on the testimony by the prosecution's witnesses, then they will lose, pure and simple. They have no choice but to attack everyone who testifies against their client.

So it has been in the Fumo trial. As I wrote before, it is a bit of a mystery why the United States Attorneys began their case with the testimony of Christopher Marrone, given how, as Fumo's estranged son-in-law, he transparently hated Fumo and had strong reasons to exaggerate -- possibly even fabricate -- his testimony. As expected, Fumo and Arnao's lawyers, who spent several hours on Marrone's relationship with Fumo and his unseemly decision to retain hundreds of incriminating e-mails for the apparent purpose of later retaliating against Fumo. As prosecution witnesses go, he was an easy target.

Now the US Attorneys have turned to witnesses who remained loyal to Fumo until the criminal indictment, witnesses with far less obvious reasons to be untruthful. Witnesses like Howard Cain, a long-time political consultant to Fumo who has just testified to doing extensive political work on behalf of Fumo while on the Senate's payroll.

Cain, however, walks into the courtroom as tainted goods: Cain spent the better part of a decade failing to file taxes, has pled guilty to tax evasion, and cooperated with the government here in exchange for favorable consideration in his own sentencing. To Dennis Cogan and Ed Jacobs, Cain is a rat, a tax cheat trying to save his own skin by selling Fumo down the river. Their job is to make the jury see Cain the same way.

How do they do that?

The basic tool in the trial lawyer's cross-examination box is impeachment by prior inconsistent statement. In the Fumo trial, those prior inconsistent statements have come largely from FBI interviews with the witnesses before trial, which Fumo and Arnao's lawyers have reviewed carefully, organizing and memorizing every detail just in case the witness's testimony at trial differs from those statements and interview notes. The defense lawyers can use those prior inconsistent statements in three ways.

First, they could get lucky. Perry Mason could get a prosecution witness to implode on the stand, break down, and confess everything. Mere mortals like Dennis Cogan and Ed Jacobs cannot, not unless they're lucky. Rarely does the actual culprit take the stand in a criminal trial as a witness and then, against all reason and sense, confess on the spot.

Second, they could find a smoking gun. If a trial lawyer catches a major inconsistency -- like a witness testifying about an event they could not possibly have seen -- then the task becomes comparatively easy, and the trial lawyer can slowly hand the witness enough rope to hang themselves with, calling into question their entire testimony. You can often see these moments coming: look for a cross examining attorney to fixate on a handful of banal details, so much so that the court may intervene to instruct the attorney to move on, after which the attorney reveals that the banal details, which have now been burned into the jurors' brains, could not possibly be true.

Third, and most commonly, they can fight it out. The two "rules" for cross examination are well-known and taught at every law school. Use leading questions only (i.e., questions with a yes or no answer), so that the witness will not have a chance to tell their story again. Do not ask any questions for which you do not already know the answer.

That is the safe option. Do that as a trial lawyer and you will not be sued for malpractice. No one will blame you when your client loses.

Do that in a difficult case -- Fumo has a very difficult case -- and you will lose.

Jurors want drama. They want a fight. Some lawyers and commentators blame television shows and movies for the jury's expectation that the criminal defense lawyer will assault the prosecution's main witnesses, but I believe the situation inherently demands drama. If the witness is calling your client a criminal, you have no choice but to call them a liar and to prove it.

How do you prove it?

Timing.

If you can understand the difference between Humpty Dumpty and Socrates, you can understand the difference between direct and cross-examination. Cross examination leads, direct examination builds.*

We will come back to this subject in future posts. For now, let's focus on Cogan's initial cross-examination of Cain. Cogan did not rise, say good afternoon, and call Cain a rat. First came the challenge to Cain's credibility and truthfulness: the plea agreement and his tax evasion. Then came a prior inconsist statement: Cain's testimony about a Verizon meeting differed from what he told FBI investigations. Then came a challenge to the substance of Cain's allegations: Cogan walked Cain through multiple invoices Cain had submitted showing extensive work for the Senate, work that would have been entirely appropriate under the rules.

Only then, after Cain's credibility had been attacked, and after the jury had seen a clear inconsistency, and after the substance of his testimony had been called into question, came the accusation: "are you making all of this up?" At that, Cain became combative and evasive.

From there, it was all downhill, and he's been pummeled on the stand ever since. The question will be if Cogan and Jacobs can maintain this intensity as the US Attorneys move forward into witnesses with stronger allegations and fewer weaknesses.

* I paraphrased this great example and description from a story about Chicago legend Oliver Frank told by Thomas Anthony Durkin in the exceptional cross-examination book "Your Witness" by Steven Molo and James Figliulo.

 

Fumo Trial Part 2: Starting with a Bang Versus Building a House

 

While you were making up your mind or worrying about the election, the United States Attorneys in Senator Fumo's public corruption trial were building a house.

To many reporters, the first week of the Fumo trial appeared the most interesting, as the prosecution called Christopher Marrone, the former staffer and current estranged son-in-law of Fumo. Moreover, he was reportedly the most important source in the entire investigation, retaining years worth of e-mails, which he voluntarily provided to the FBI and the US Attorneys' office. As such, he has a salacious story that was not only the genesis of the whole trial but is also directly relevant to many of the charged crimes.

The US attorneys decision to call him first, however, raised two big questions:

Why pad your already months-long, 139-count case with testimony that, though embarrassing, may not have been criminal even if proven true?

and

Why begin your case with a clearly unobjective witness with an easily-proven bias against the defendant?

Fact is, of all the charges in Fumo's indictment, the charges supported by Marrone's testimony are the weakest, and Marrone himself may be the least credible witness (or at least the witness most open to attacks on credibility) to testify in the entire trial. So why start with him?

The answer comes down to a timeless debate in the annals of trial advocacy, going back to ancient Athens and before. Most every advocate believes you should end strong, whether you are trying a case, giving a speech, or hanging up the phone ("have a nice day!").

But how should you should start? Do you start with a bang, putting on some of your best evidence to make a good first impression and quickly align the jurors with your theory of the case? Or do move slowly, putting on weaker evidence to lay a foundation upon which you can enhance the impact of the stronger evidence?

The above are but two of the innumerable concerns that go into a trial lawyer's decision to set the order in which evidence will be presented, to decide the level of detail for a given part of the case and to assess whether certain claims or evidence should be presented to the jury at all. There is no right answer. On the one hand, many trial lawyers believe that juries in the era of television and movies have come to expect a lot of drama at trial and will be disappointed if you do not deliver it early on, while on the other hand you never want to reveal a smoking gun if the jury does not have enough context to understand its full meaning and importance.

Here, it is not in initially clear why the prosecutors would threaten the credibility of their entire case by spending a week on potentially legal conduct supported by a biased witness. Indeed, one experienced white collar criminal defense attorney who has been following the case told me that, in his opinion, the US attorneys should not have even raised most of the Senate staff misuse allegations at all. In his analysis, there were simply too many risks, such as opening Christopher Marrone to extensive attacks on his credibility (attacks which both defense lawyers were happy to launch), or ending up making the trial about whether it was criminal at all to use staffers this way given Fumo's 24-hour workaholic habits.

Wrong? Sure. Criminal? That requires a different mindset from merely "wrong." Worse, it can distract from other issues in the case. One wonders if the testimony of Frank Wallace, the Senate-paid investigator who allegedly spent most of his time doing personal and political dirty work for Fumo, had the same impact given how it immediately followed Marrone's cross-examination.

That said, the white collar criminal defense attorney continued, it appeared the US attorneys intended "to build a house brick, by brick, by brick, and when it's done there will be no mistaking what it looks like."

I agree. I believe the US Attorneys realized that, despite the weight of the evidence here on the whole, there were few smoking guns -- no explicit bribes, no fraud on innocent parties, and no clear embezzlement -- so they eschewed dramatic effect, instead attempting to prove that Fumo lived in a house of corruption. That is, the work on his house may not have been paid for by taxpayers, but the oversight was. He may have been working hard 24 hours a day to promote the Citizens Alliance for Better Neighborhoods, but he did so at an office they renovated at their expense. All of which, when put together, enhances the impact of the worst evidence by creating a contrast with the ordinary corruption the US Attorneys allege surrounded Fumo day and night.

Viewed that way, we can see that perhaps the prosecutors called Christopher Marrone not to prove his time was abused on personal errands, but to shed light on the ordinary corruption in the Fumo's day-to-daily activities, which they will later contrast to more explicit corruption.